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The final volume in this tripartite series on Brain Augmentation is entitled “From 
Clinical Applications to Ethical Issues and Futuristic Ideas”. Many of the articles 
within this volume deal with translational efforts taking the results of experiments on 
laboratory animals and applying them to humans. In many cases, these interventions 
are intended to help people with disabilities in such a way so as to either restore or 
extend brain function.
Traditionally, therapies in brain augmentation have included electrical and 
pharmacological techniques. In contrast, some of the techniques discussed in this 
volume add specificity by targeting select neural populations. This approach opens 
the door to where and how to promote the best interventions. Along the way, results 
have empowered the medical profession by expanding their understanding of brain 
function. Articles in this volume relate novel clinical solutions for a host of neurological 
and psychiatric conditions such as stroke, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease, 
epilepsy, dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, autism spectrum disorders (ASD), traumatic 
brain injury, and disorders of consciousness.
In disease, symptoms and signs denote a departure from normal function. Brain 
augmentation has now been used to target both the core symptoms that provide 
specificity in the diagnosis of a disease, as well as other constitutional symptoms 
that may greatly handicap the individual. The volume provides a report on the use of 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) in ASD with reported improvements 
of core deficits (i.e., executive functions). TMS in this regard departs from the present-
day trend towards symptomatic treatment that leaves unaltered the root cause of 
the condition. In diseases, such as schizophrenia, brain augmentation approaches 
hold promise to avoid lengthy pharmacological interventions that are usually riddled 
with side effects or those with limiting returns as in the case of Parkinson’s disease. 
Brain stimulation can also be used to treat auditory verbal hallucination, visuospatial 
(hemispatial) neglect, and pain in patients suffering from multiple sclerosis.
The brain acts as a telecommunication transceiver wherein different bandwidth 
of frequencies (brainwave oscillations) transmit information. Their baseline levels 
correlate with certain behavioral states. The proper integration of brain oscillations 
provides for the phenomenon of binding and central coherence. Brain augmentation 
may foster the normalization of brain oscillations in nervous system disorders. These 
techniques hold the promise of being applied remotely (under the supervision 
of medical personnel), thus overcoming the obstacle of travel in order to obtain 
healthcare.
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At present, traditional thinking would argue the possibility of synergism among 
different modalities of brain augmentation as a way of increasing their overall 
effectiveness and improving therapeutic selectivity. Thinking outside of the box would 
also provide for the implementation of brain-to-brain interfaces where techniques, 
proper to artificial intelligence, could allow us to surpass the limits of natural selection 
or enable communications between several individual brains sharing memories, or 
even a global brain capable of self-organization.
Not all brains are created equal. Brain stimulation studies suggest large individual 
variability in response that may affect overall recovery/treatment, or modify desired 
effects of a given intervention. The subject’s age, gender, hormonal levels may 
affect an individual’s cortical excitability. In addition, this volume discusses the 
role of social interactions in the operations of augmenting technologies. Finally, 
augmenting methods could be applied to modulate consciousness, even though 
its neural mechanisms are poorly understood.
Finally, this volume should be taken as a debate on social, moral and ethical issues on 
neurotechnologies. Brain enhancement may transform the individual into someone 
or something else. These techniques bypass the usual routes of accommodation to 
environmental exigencies that exalted our personal fortitude: learning, exercising, 
and diet. This will allow humans to preselect desired characteristics and realize 
consequent rewards without having to overcome adversity through more laborious 
means. The concern is that humans may be playing God, and the possibility of 
an expanding gap in social equity where brain enhancements may be selectively 
available to the wealthier individuals. These issues are discussed by a number of 
articles in this volume. Also discussed are the relationship between the diminishment 
and enhancement following the application of brain-augmenting technologies, the 
problem of “mind control” with BMI technologies, free will the duty to use cognitive 
enhancers in high-responsibility professions, determining the population of people 
in need of brain enhancement, informed public policy, cognitive biases, and the 
hype caused by the development of brain-augmenting approaches.
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Temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and mild cognitive impairment (MCI) are both subject to
intensive memory research. Memory problems are a core characteristic of both conditions
and we wonder if there are analogies which would enrich the two distinct research
communities. In this review we focus on memory decline in both conditions, that is, the
most feared psychosocial effect. While it is clear that memory decline in MCI is highly likely
and would lead to the more severe diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, it is a debate if TLE is
a dementing disease or not. As such, like for MCI, one can differentiate progressive from
stable TLE subtypes, mainly depending on the age of onset. Neuroimaging techniques
such as volumetric analysis of the hippocampus, entorhinal, and perirhinal cortex show
evidence of pathological changes in TLE and are predictive for memory decline in MCI.
Several studies emphasize that it is necessary to extend the region of interest—even
whole-brain characteristics can be predictive for conversion from MCI to Alzheimer’s
disease. Electroencephalography is increasingly subject to computational neuroscience,
revealing new approaches for analyzing frequency, spatial synchronization, and information
content of the signals. These methods together with event-related designs that assess
memory functions are highly promising for understanding the mechanisms of memory
decline in both TLE and MCI populations. Finally, there is evidence that the potential
of such markers for memory decline is far from being exhausted. Similar structural and
neurophysiological characteristics are linked to memory decline in TLE and MCI. We raise
the hope that interdisciplinary research and cross-talk between fields such as research
on epilepsy and dementia, will shed further light on the dementing characteristics of
the pathological basis of MCI and TLE and support the development of new memory
enhancing treatment strategies.
Keywords: epilepsy, mild cognitive impairment, subjective cognitive complaints, memory decline, neuroimaging,
neurophysiology
1. INTRODUCTION
Memory problems are a core symptom of amnestic mild cogni-
tive impairment (MCI) (Stewart, 2012a), but are also one of the
chief complaints of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE)
(Helmstädter, 2002; Butler and Zeman, 2008). Even worse, qual-
ity of life is negatively influenced by memory impairment (Fisher
et al., 2000). This superficial analogy is not only a possible link
between TLE and MCI but can serve as starting point from which
researchers in each field may add innovative aspects to their
respective research areas. Detection of early prognostic markers
of memory deficits in MCI and TLE would obviously pave the
way for new therapeutic programs, for memory augmentation,
and treatment of memory deficits, possibly reducing the overall
prevalence of memory disorders and improving quality of life in
these patients (DeKosky and Marek, 2003; Geda, 2012).
Current research endeavors are focused on early diagnosis of
MCI and TLE. In the case of MCI it is clear that neuropsycho-
logical tests alone are not sufficient, since they are not sensitive
enough for patients with subjective complaints and no significant
and clinically detectable deficits (Stewart, 2012b). Analogously,
electroencephalographic assessment and imaging may lead to
dubious findings, or no findings at all, in the epileptogenesis or
latency period of epilepsy (Engel et al., 2013). Because of the
various aetiologies and pathologic processes that may lead to
memory impairment, it is suggested that a combination of sev-
eral biomarkers is necessary to provide an early diagnosis with
reliable prognostic validity (DeKosky and Marek, 2003). In this
review, we want to highlight promising biomarkers from a pool
of structural and electroencephalographical measures for which
prognostic validity was evidenced for one of the two clinical
groups with similar cognitive impairments, TLE and MCI. While
prediction of memory decline and conversion to Alzheimer’s dis-
ease is an established field of research, prognosis of memory
decline in TLE mainly focuses on the prediction of post-surgical
memory impairment and only rarely on the prediction of change
over the course of the disorder; in this review, we focus on the
latter case. As such, we identify commonalities between the two
disorders, which could give rise to new approaches in research.
2. NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND PROGNOSIS
TLE is most often associated with impaired long-term memory
(Hermann et al., 1997). In addition to problematic long-term
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memory, MCI is especially annoying for patients because of
impairment of prospective memory (van den Berg et al., 2012).
Patients with epilepsy rank cognitive dysfunction highest among
the problems experienced (Fisher et al., 2000). However, in many
cases such impairments are not detected by standard neuropsy-
chological tests of memory functions, so that complaints about
memory decline commonly mismatch with test performance
(Butler and Zeman, 2008). Specifically, standard test intervals
ranging from some hours to days are too short to detect impaired
long-term memory. Indeed, it is the episodic memory which is
affected in TLE (Helmstädter, 2002). In addition, it seems difficult
to tell from neuropsychological tests alone if patients are already
impaired during encoding or if they just fail to retrieve learned
information. Similarly, it is necessary to distinguish free recall
of memories from recognition. Thus, research should take into
consideration the existence of inter-individual differences with
respect to the type of impairment, i.e., encoding or retrieval, recall
or recognition, within the specific pathologies.
Epileptic seizures might trigger neurodegenerative changes
leading eventually to memory impairments (Helmstädter, 2002;
Stefan and Pauli, 2008). However, the question whether TLE
is a dementing disease due to seizure activity is under debate
(Helmstaedter and Elger, 1999, 2009; Jokeit and Ebner, 1999,
2002; Dodrill, 2004; Elger et al., 2004; Mantoan et al., 2009;
Gonzalez et al., 2012). The typical course of epilepsy includes in
the early phase a long silent period after the brain insult before
recurrent seizures start, which then allows an accurate diagno-
sis (see Najm et al., 2001, for a review on epidemiology and
risk factors). The early evolution is often caused by a structural
lesion, that is, the epileptogenic lesion (Rosenow and Lüders,
2001). In fact, memory deficits correlate well with the age of the
early precipitating event. This might produce an artificial cor-
relation of memory impairment with the duration of epilepsy
(Kaaden and Helmstaedter, 2009). For example, no difference
between the extent of memory deficits at the time of the first
diagnosis and a 5-year follow up was found (Äikiä et al., 2001),
suggesting a non-progressive course of memory deficits in TLE.
In fact, Helmstaedter and co-workers found that memory decline
which is specific to TLE occurs in childhood and early adoles-
cence, while a further progress of loss of memory functions runs
in parallel with normal aging (Helmstaedter and Elger, 2009). On
the other hand, deficits are more severe in patients with chronic
TLE as compared with newly diagnosed patients (Äikiä et al.,
2001). Similarly, there is a correlation between time and sever-
ity of memory impairments for patients with long chronic course
(>27 years) but only for those with more than 10 secondarily
generalized seizures per year, and not for complex-partial seizures
(Stefan and Pauli, 2002). There are further studies suggesting that
patients with a longer duration of refractory TLE exhibit more
severe cognitive impairments (Hattiangady and Shetty, 2008;
Stefan and Pauli, 2008; Mantoan et al., 2009). However, a longitu-
dinal study over at least 10 years at the stage of severe, chronic and
intractable epilepsy showed that duration has less influence on
cognitive decline than what was found in cross-sectional studies
(Thompson and Duncan, 2005). Most importantly, in this study
it was demonstrated that in refractory epilepsy a high frequency
of tonic-clonic seizures was the strongest predictor for cognitive
decline. However, it is necessary to disentangle the influence of the
underlying causes, such as mitochondrial dysfunction or inflam-
matory causes from seizure activity (Helmstaedter, 2007). It is
obvious that progressive brain diseases, such as a malignant brain
tumor, lead to a progressive pathology of memory function and
it is therefore important to provide an accurate diagnosis which
allows identification of progressive comorbidity.
Epileptic seizures can occur also at the stage of MCI or early
Alzheimer’s disease (Vossel et al., 2013) and the initial diagnosis
of late-onset TLE, more specifically the epileptic amnesic syn-
drome, can be indicative for development of MCI and Alzheimer’s
disease (Cretin et al., 2012). Most interestingly, Vossel and co-
workers reported that cognitive decline is detectable in patients
with amnestic MCI or Alzheimer’s disease on average 6.8 (MCI)
or 5.5 (Alzheimer’s disease) years earlier in the case of comorbid
epilepsy (Vossel et al., 2013). It is important to note that epilep-
tic symptoms predated memory symptoms or at least showed up
contemporaneously.
Finally, memory deficits in TLE may be caused by clinical or
subclinical seizure activity, structural, or other underlying brain
pathology, adverse effects of anticonvulsant medication, and
psychological mechanisms (Butler and Zeman, 2008; Hermann
et al., 2010). Helmstaedter suggests that assessing two types
of patients could explain contributory mechanisms of memory
decline (Helmstädter, 2002). The first type includes newly diag-
nosed TLE patients at first presentation, i.e., after experiencing
first seizures. The second type includes TLE patients with chronic
course and drug resistant seizures. A follow-up measurement
of memory performance should help to answer the question
whether memory deficits are progressive or not. However, exam-
ining newly diagnosed TLE patients is a challenge. After the
first or second seizure, a patient is usually not subjected to
cost-intensive, extensive examinations, such as long-term video-
monitoring which is the gold standard to reliably establish a
diagnosis. Instead, in clinical practice an appropriate first line
medication is chosen in order to control seizures, even if the
type of epilepsy is not fully elucidated. Again, simple and reli-
able biomarkers to ascertain diagnosis at this early stage are highly
warranted. For example, in a large multicenter study, hippocam-
pal T2 hyperintensity and impaired hippocampal growth were
found to be an early biomarker for epilepsy after febrile status
epilepticus in children (Lewis et al., 2013).
A similar challenge is met by family doctors with respect to
MCI. The first examination in primary care needs to reliably dis-
tinguish between age-associated memory impairment (Hänninen
and Soininen, 1997), subjective memory complaints, and MCI
(Stewart, 2012a,b). Classification is performed according to the
global deterioration scale for aging and dementia (Reisberg et al.,
1982). This scale stages individuals into Level 1, being free of both
subjective and objective clinical deficits, Level 2, having subjec-
tive deficits only, Level 3, having subtle deficits in cognition and
some impairments in executive functioning, affecting complex
occupational and social activities, and finally Level 4, having clear
deficits in cognition and functioning with reduced performance
in instrumental activities of daily life (Gauthier et al., 2006). Thus,
patients which present memory complaints in primary care with-
out fulfilling the criteria for MCI are considered to suffer from
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so-called subjective memory complaints. These complaints are
not related to significant deficits on neuropsychological scales
but could still be an early form of a neurodegenerative disorder
since this diagnosis implies high risk to experience further decline
toward MCI (Reisberg et al., 2010). It contrast, it is possible that
a patient who is diagnosed as suffering from subjective cogni-
tive complaints has simply detected an age-associated memory
impairment, which can be a symptom of normal aging. As such,
subjective complaints do not necessarily correlate with progress
of decline (Förstl et al., 1995). However, the diagnosis of age-
associated memory impairment does not imply that the patient’s
memory performance is normal (Goldman and Morris, 2001).
A normal test-performance can still be seen after a significant
decline when the patient’s starting level of memory was high.
As such, neuropsychological tests cannot identify progressive
memory decline alone.
If a patient has ascertained the diagnosis of MCI, the diag-
nosis can be further refined into amnestic, multi-domain and
single, non-memory-domain subtypes (Winblad et al., 2004), as
well as into a stable and a progressive group. While 30–50% of
newly diagnosed MCI patients do not experience further decline
of cognitive functions over 3–5 years, or even return to normal,
the residual 50–70% show progress toward a more severe form
of impairment (Rossini et al., 2007). This broad range of pro-
gression rates results from a large number of studies, in which
inclusion and exclusion criteria varied to some degree. It is pos-
sible that correlating neuropsychological progression to specific
biomarkers could yield less variable estimations of conversion
rates. Therefore, the following sections of this review are dedi-
cated to promising biomarkers in the fields of neuroimaging and
neurophysiology. Finally, we close with an outlook on possible
strategies for augmentation of memory function with respect to
the discussed biomarkers.
3. NEUROIMAGING
Neuroimaging is of high value for diagnosis and prognosis of
neurodegenerative diseases (Borghesani et al., 2010) such as MCI
(Winblad et al., 2004). A characteristic symptom in MCI is
atrophy of the medial temporal lobe, including memory related
structures such as the hippocampus. Brain atrophy correlates with
the progression of cognitive decline at the stage of subjective cog-
nitive complaints (Förstl et al., 1995). More specifically, medial
temporal lobe atrophy is able to predict progression to dementia
in patients with MCI (Korf et al., 2004) with a reasonable predic-
tive value (positive and negative predictive values 0.44 and 0.91,
respectively Geroldi et al., 2006).
Decreased volumes of hippocampal formations are also a com-
mon finding in TLE patients. There is a relation between degree
of memory impairment and seizure frequency, but it is sug-
gested that structural pathologies in the temporal lobe rather than
seizures cause memory difficulties (Butler and Zeman, 2008).
However, these pathologies may be the consequence as well as the
cause of seizures (Mathern et al., 2002a) and there are contro-
versial findings in these respects. While neuronal cell loss in the
hippocampus is not related to duration of the epilepsy, decreased
neuronal density in the dentate gyrus evidenced by histology
correlates positively with memory impairment in patients with
TLE (Pauli et al., 2006). In addition, TLE is also associated with
reduced neurogenesis in this region, further contributing to the
decreased neuronal density (Mathern et al., 2002b). Neurogenesis
of functional granule cells in the dentate gyrus of the hip-
pocampus might facilitate hippocampal-dependent learning and
episodic memory (Hattiangady and Shetty, 2008; Kuruba et al.,
2009). On the other hand, some studies have indicated a cor-
relation between epilepsy duration and neuronal loss (Mathern
et al., 1995, 2002a). In other words, reduced neurogenesis and/or
neuronal loss in this region in the chronic stage of TLE may be
closely related to impairments in learning, memory, and other
cognitive functions. In fact, it seems that the origin of memory
problems in TLE is in childhood or adolescence (Helmstaedter
and Elger, 2009). Well in line with this, hippocampal sclero-
sis is associated with poorer performance independent of age.
However, temporal lobe atrophy is not present in all TLE patients.
(Bernasconi et al., 2000) averaged six slices containing the head,
body, and tail of the hippocampus. They found that the obtained
hippocampal T2 relaxation times better predicted the epileptic
focus than analyzing atrophy. Most interestingly, in addition to
hippocampal damage, entorhinal lesions seem to play a special
role in memory impairment in TLE. Especially lesions in layer III
which are frequently found in TLE (Schwarcz and Witter, 2002).
These findings and the importance of the rhinal cortex for mem-
ory consolidation (Axmacher et al., 2008) suggest that extracting
biomarkers of the rhinal cortex may shed further light on memory
problems in TLE. Thus, it is very likely that also other charac-
teristics and other regions need to be addressed in the debate of
whether memory decline in TLE is progressive or not.
Since hippocampal volumes discriminate patients with
Alzheimer’s disease and correlate with episodic memory perfor-
mance, the volume and shape of this structure has the potential
for a valid biomarker (Mueller et al., 2012). However, the hip-
pocampus is not the only relevant structure in memory deficits.
Research in MCI and Alzheimer’s disease suggests that it is possi-
bly not even the most relevant one. Volumetry of the hippocam-
pal formation with Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) revealed
a relative risk of 0.69 for transition from MCI to Alzheimer’s dis-
ease (Jack et al., 1999). A recent review suggests that perirhinal
lesions have a stronger impact on memory functions than hip-
pocampal lesions (Salig, 2009). Thus, atrophy of both structures,
hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, may be a better marker
for MCI, than either one of these alone (Winblad et al., 2004).
Similarly, for TLE patients, entorhinal and perirhinal cortices
are reduced in volume. Atrophy of the entorhinal cortex ipsi-
lateral to the seizure onset zone is only found in patients with
TLE, but not in other forms of epilepsy (Bernasconi et al.,
2003). In addition, there is evidence that a global cortical atro-
phy marker such as widening of cerebrospinal fluid spaces might
also be predictive for conversion from MCI to Alzheimer’s dis-
ease (Teipel et al., 2007). Well in line with this, in MCI and
Alzheimer’s disease brain atrophy is prominent in the medial
temporal lobe but also widespread over posterior cingulate and
neocortical temporoparietal regions (Fox et al., 2001). Similarly,
gray-matter decrease in the hippocampal area, inferior and mid-
dle temporal gyrus, posterior cingulate, and precuneus is greater
in patients who convert from MCI to Alzheimer’s disease than
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in non-converters (Chételat et al., 2005). Moreover, entorhinal
and perirhinal cortices reveal reduced numbers of cells before
the hippocampus is affected by degeneration (Dickerson and
Sperling, 2008). The special role of the enthorinal cortex is fur-
ther supported by a study which revealed that best classification
accuracy of MCI was based on enthorinal cortex volume and best
classification accuracy of Alzheimer’s disease was based on hip-
pocampal volume (Pennanen et al., 2004). Similarly, enthorinal
cortex thickness was found to predict further memory decline in
established Alzheimer’s disease (Velayudhan et al., 2013). Thus,
it would be worth analyzing more globally defined markers for
atrophy or different combinations of regions, depending on the
questions being asked.
However, by interpreting the role of hippocampal volumetry
for predicting memory decline we have to consider the large vari-
ation between protocols for the delineation of the hippocampus
in MR images. Up to date, there is no consistently applied stan-
dard which would allow comparing results of different studies
to each other. Major differences refer to inclusion and exclu-
sion of hippocampal white matter, definition of the anterior
hippocampal—amygdala border, definition of the posterior bor-
der, and the extent to which the hippocampal tail is included,
definition of the inferior medial border of the hippocampus, and
use of varying arbitrary lines (Konrad et al., 2008). Therefore, it
is difficult to estimate the real validity of volumetry in predicting
memory decline. Alternatively, hippocampal shape features may
be used instead of hippocampal volumetry. (Gerardin et al., 2009)
utilized these shape features to train a support vector machine in
order to perform multidimensional classification. The resulting
classification rates were 94% for patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease and 83% for MCI patients. Regarding the entorhinal cortex,
reliable findings support stability of cortical thickness, volume,
and surface area in normal aging (Lemaitre et al., 2012). The
average cortical thickness over a region is a feature which is
mostly independent from defined borders. Finally, to account for
global atrophy, measures of intensity and deformation were of
high predictive value for memory decline (Duchesne et al., 2010).
Similarly, whole brain atrophy measures are predictive for conver-
sion from MCI to Alzheimer’s disease (Jack et al., 2005; Spulber
et al., 2010).
Another promising MR technique is Diffusion Tensor Imaging
(DTI). The potential of DTI for diagnosing MCI and its ability
to predict further decline might have been underestimated so far,
possibly due to a higher variability of fractional anisotropy than
volumetric measures (Mueller et al., 2012). Indeed, DTI has been
shown to be superior to hippocampal volumetry in distinguishing
MCI from healthy controls (Muller et al., 2007). Hippocampal
diffusivity predicts conversion from amnestic MCI to Alzheimer’s
disease at least as well as hippocampal atrophy (Kantarci et al.,
2005; Fellgiebel et al., 2006).
4. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
Clinical EEG is the standard neurophysiological test in patients
with epilepsy, with a high positive and low negative predictive
value of epileptiform discharges, such as spikes and sharp waves
in routine recordings. While the literature on EEG-biomarker
for localization of the seizure-onset zone is overwhelming, the
information about memory-relevant biomarkers is scarce, and
there is even less literature about prediction of memory decline.
Analysis of peak-frequency showed that poorer memory per-
formance coincides with lower alpha peak (Ripper et al., 2001).
Similarly, in children with epilepsy the differential activation
of memory-resources has been documented with event-related
power changes in the theta and lower-alpha range (Krause et al.,
2008). Thus, assessing frequency properties of the EEG in TLE
patients may reveal memory-relevant features. As such, using the
rat pilocarpine model of TLE, it was found that spatial memory
declines soon after status epilepticus and that these deficits cor-
relate with a decrease of theta power but not with interictal-like
activity in the hippocampus (Chauviere et al., 2009). Similarly to
results from cross-sectional studies in humans (Helmstaedter and
Elger, 2009), the loss of spatial memory ability is stable and not
progressive in this model.
Intracranial EEG is only used in presurgical assessment to bet-
ter delineate the seizure onset zone (Foldvary-Schaefer, 2004)
and cannot be applied in the early stages of TLE. Indeed, neu-
rophysiological parameters have been underutilized to assess the
functional deficit zone, including memory deficits in patients
with TLE (Grunwald and Vannucci, 2004). Event related designs,
assessing brain signals in response to items that have to be mem-
orized and recalled, are well suited to identify abnormal patterns
in the surface and intracranial EEG of patients. We suggest that
it would be of interest if such designs could help identifying
abnormal changes over time in patients with TLE.
Despite the fact that the use of EEG for diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease or MCI is not a standard in clinical practice,
a large number of studies succeeded in identifying markers that
distinguish patients with Alzheimer’s disease from MCI. EEG-
biomarkers also successfully differentiated MCI from healthy sub-
jects (see Rossini et al., 2007, for a review). Dauwels et al. (2010)
summarize characteristics of the EEG in these clinical groups.
First, the EEG is dominated by slower frequencies (Bonanni
et al., 2008). Fast Fourier Transformations (FFTs) show a rela-
tive increase of activity below 8 Hz and decrease above this range.
This characteristic was the first measure used in quantitative EEG-
evaluation in MCI patients (Prichep et al., 1994) and therefore
probably the most well known in the field. However, this slow-
ing is possibly caused by perturbations in synchronization and
decreased neural complexity (Cantero et al., 2009), represent-
ing two characteristic features of EEG in MCI. Synchrony can be
expressed as Pearson’s correlation coefficient, coherence, Granger
causality, information-theoretic and state space based synchrony
measures, phase synchrony indices, stochastic event synchrony,
spatial distribution of phase synchrony, and small world net-
work characteristics, among others (see Dauwels et al., 2010, for a
review). Different measures of synchronization may be increased
or decreased in MCI depending on frequency range, type of anal-
ysis, and regions being assessed (Jelic et al., 2000; Stam et al.,
2003; Pijnenburg et al., 2004; Koenig et al., 2005; Babiloni et al.,
2006). In addition, analysis of complexity of EEG signals is a
valuable approach for resting EEG (Stam, 2005). Therefore, we
suggest to apply complexity analysis for prognostic assessments.
For example one could use approximate entropy, auto mutual
information, sample entropy, multiscale entropy, Lempel-Ziv
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complexity, Hjorth parameters, Petrosian fractal dimension, or
Higuchi fractal dimension (see also Bao et al., 2009; Dauwels
et al., 2010).
It is remarkable that assessing frequency characteristics of MCI
patients differentiates progressive from stable patients. It was
found that a reduction of alpha power over posterior leads is char-
acteristic for the progressive subgroup (Luckhaus et al., 2008).
Despite this success, it is acknowledged that markers of resting
EEG largely overlap between progressive MCI and stable MCI
(Giannakopoulos et al., 2009). For example, it was shown that
measures based on frequency analysis are valuable approaches for
diagnosis and they change over the course of progression, but
have no prognostic validity at baseline (Jelic et al., 2000). Thus,
such markers (i.e., theta and beta power) have to be recorded
longitudinally to detect changes which correlate with cognitive
decline. It is suggested to use event-related EEG dynamic analysis
to examine neocortical circuits and neuronal networks in order to
predict memory decline (Giannakopoulos et al., 2009). The major
advantage of doing memory research using event related designs
in the EEG is the high temporal resolution, showing immediately
pathologically delayed responses. In fact, it was found that delayed
components of the event-related potential differ between stable
and progressive MCI (Missonier et al., 2007). As such, it is highly
likely that the combination of frequency, complexity, and syn-
chrony characteristics in event-related EEG can shed further light
on the progressive nature of MCI and eventually also of memory
characteristics in TLE.
Since both TLE and MCI have impaired long-term memory,
it is reasonable compare the mechanisms of successful and non-
successful memory formation. A large number of studies have
aimed at identifying the markers in the event related potential.
The studies looked at efficient encoding which was recorded dur-
ing the patient’s learning of items. This was compared to the
patient’s recall performance in a later session (Fernández et al.,
2002; Voss and Paller, 2007). Another approach refers to the
dual route theory of recognition, that is, familiarity and recol-
lection components (see Rugg and Curran, 2007, for a review).
Familiarity is impaired in Alzheimer’s disease but to some extent
preserved in amnestic MCI while recollection is impaired in both
clinical groups (Ally et al., 2009). However, other research groups
report that familiarity is preserved in Alzheimer’s disease and
MCI for pictures (Westerberg et al., 2006), and that familiarity
is impaired to at least the same extent as recollection in amnes-
tic MCI, distinguishing MCI from normal aging population but
not from Alzheimer’s disease (Wolk et al., 2008). These findings
from functional research are well in line with decreased volume of
the perirhinal cortex and the hippocampus. While the perirhinal
cortex mediates familiarity, the hippocampus is considered a core
region for recollection (Turriziani et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2010).
Thus, when designing event-related EEG studies the dimensions
of familiarity and recollection, as well as encoding and retrieval,
have to be addressed.
5. AUGMENTATION OF MEMORY FUNCTION
There are several strategies to augment human memory, and
some of these are candidates for future treatment strategies in
the here discussed patient populations. Madan (2014) discusses
nootropic agents, brain stimulation, mnemonic strategies, and
external aids as possible approaches to support memory. These
strategies include common ones such as caffeine and notes, but
also implanted devices which stimulate deep brain structures
electrically. The hippocampus is an obvious target for memory
stimulation. For example, it was found that working memory in
rats could be transferred from one animal to the other by applying
hippocampal firing patterns via electrical stimulation (Deadwyler
et al., 2013). Deep brain stimulation in the entorhinal cortex of
epilepsy patients enhanced spatial memory (Suthana et al., 2012).
Similarly, in-phase stimulation during long-term encoding in the
rhinal cortex and the hippocampus of epileptic patients modu-
lated memory performance (Fell et al., 2013) and stimulation in
the fornix of Alzheimer’s patients activated entorhinal and hip-
pocampal regions, which lead to improved memory (Laxton et al.,
2010). Thus, it is not surprising that Alzheimer’s disease and tem-
poral lobe epilepsy were mentioned as possible target for deep
brain stimulation and memory enhancement (Suthana and Fried,
2014).
However, these stimulation techniques are still at an experi-
mental stage and can’t be used in every single patient. Specifically,
most stimulation studies were performed in epilepsy patients
with intracranial electrodes implanted for pre-surgical evalua-
tion. In contrast, cognitive intervention is an established strategy
for memory augmentation in MCI (Rapp et al., 2002; Simon et al.,
2012). The changes are not only measurable by the assessment
of memory function, but also with fMRI (Simon et al., 2012),
and can be enhanced by incorporating emotional content into
the training (Broster et al., 2012). While there have been several
endeavors to support the validity of cognitive training in MCI
or dementia, there is still room for research in temporal lobe
epilepsy.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Even if the debate of whether TLE is a dementing disease or
if there are just a few subtypes with progressive course is still
ongoing, there is a lot of literature about structural markers for
impaired memory whereas the literature about EEG-markers is
scarce. Valid biomarkers, which can reliably predict conversion
from MCI to Alzheimer’s disease, could shed new light on the
question of whether TLE is a disorder with progressive memory
decline. It is likely that memory decline occurs in TLE patients
with early onset but after a certain age does not result in a progres-
sive course. There may be elderly patients with MCI-like symp-
toms who instead suffer from late-onset epilepsy and could be
misdiagnosed. The biomarkers summarized in this review could
help determine the mechanisms of memory loss at early-onset of
TLE and, most importantly, identify patients with late-onset TLE.
Prediction of conversion from MCI to Alzheimer’s disease has
been paid much attention so far, but TLE research and specifically
intracranial recordings in presurgical evaluations may help to find
new biomarkers for both disorders. For example, the importance
of the rhinal cortex for memory consolidation has been shown
by use of intracranial EEG in TLE research and can be trans-
lated into prediction of memory loss in MCI by use of structural
imaging. As such, functional EEG is a promising approach which
should be paid more attention in the future, since it allows one
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to combine the strength of neuropsychological assessments and
the physiological assessment of brain function at a high temporal
resolution.
Finally, the mentioned structures could be target for stimu-
lating interventions such as deep brain stimulation in the rhinal,
entorhinal, and hippocampal regions. The basis for these stimu-
lation studies are the knowledge about the functional relevance
of the mentioned structures but also about the involved EEG-
oscillations. While deep brain stimulation is at an experimental
stage we should not forget about the good effects of cognitive
intervention, being established in MCI and having the potential
of enhancing memory function in TLE patients.
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Epilepsy is one of the most common neu-
rological disorders in humans afflicting
more than 1% of the population and
65 million people worldwide (England
et al., 2012). The most common form of
acquired epilepsy is temporal lobe epilepsy
(TLE), and over 30% of patients with TLE
have seizures that are refractory to com-
monly used anticonvulsant drugs (Bauer
and Burr, 2001). Mesial temporal lobe
sclerosis (MTS) is the most common
pathological abnormality in TLE (Bronen
et al., 1997). The histopathological hall-
marks of hippocampal sclerosis include
segmental loss of pyramidal neurons,
granule cell dispersion, and reactive glio-
sis (Sutula et al., 1989). Indeed, changes
in the integrity of hippocampus and sur-
rounding hippocampal white matter is
postulated to influence overall temporal
lobe network connectivity, hippocampus
efficiency, seizures (Cadotte et al., 2009),
and memory function (Eichenbaum et al.,
2007, 2012). Indeed, animal and human
studies show that abnormalities in the hip-
pocampus and its white matter inputs and
outputs are correlated with the severity
of memory dysfunction (Christidi et al.,
2011).
TEMPORAL LOBE CONNECTIVITY IN
TLE: FILLING GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE
Patterned inputs to the hippocampus from
mediobasal cortical regions and entrorhi-
nal cortex are hypothesized to support
critical memory functions of recollection
(controlled, deliberate recall) and famil-
iarity (automatic, item-based memory),
respectively (Eichenbaum and Lipton,
2008; Eichenbaum et al., 2012; Dixon
et al., 2014). An integrated theory of
parahippocampal (PHc), perirhinal (PRc),
entrorhinal (ERc), and hippocampal (HC)
functioning [the ‘Binding of Items and
Context [BIC] Model (Diana et al., 2007)],
suggests that these structures form an inte-
grated circuit that supports recollection
and familiarity. The PRc is proposed to
be important in encoding and retriev-
ing items (e.g., objects, words, and ideas),
whereas the PHc is responsible for rep-
resenting spatial, temporal, and semantic
context. The HC supports memory for
episodes by integrating these inputs and
binding the item-based contextual infor-
mation together as a unique event in
space and time. In this view, the forma-
tion of new memories depends upon the
integrated series of inputs from PRc and
PHc components of the parahippocampal
gyrus and their respective targets in the
ERc and hippocampus. Despite extensive
animal work, it is unknown in humans
whether selective damage to these areas
or their interconnections that produce
subtypes of memory impairment might
differentially respond to different types
of memory training. Although some data
exists on the efficacy of memory reha-
bilitation programs, little is known about
the neural basis of individualized rehabil-




Understanding individual differences in
morphological and connectional compo-
nents of medial temporal lobe injury in
TLE can lead to identification of sub-
types of memory impairment, and thus
help identify clinically important targets
for memory augmentation. Our hypothe-
sis is that the subtypes of memory impair-
ment that result will preferentially respond
to specific memory interventions, a notion
that is also being addressed in the apha-
sia treatment literature (Kim et al., 2011).
To this end, an emerging method for
treating neurologically-induced memory
impairment is non-invasive brain stimula-
tion (NIBS), including transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS) and transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Both
tDCS and TMS are safe for use in human
subjects (Nitsche et al., 2003b), and have
been used widely to test hypothesis about
causal links between specific brain struc-
tures supporting cognition and mem-
ory (Dayan et al., 2013; Hummel, 2014).
Indeed, several studies support the use
of NIBS techniques as tools for enhanc-
ing cognitive function in normal subjects
and as therapeutic agents for individu-
als with psychiatric and neurologic disor-
ders (Hummel and Cohen, 2006; Miniussi
et al., 2008). NIBS consist of applying a
weak (0.5–2.0 mA in tDCS) direct current
through the scalp and skull. Depending on
the polarity of the current during stim-
ulation, NIBS may increase or decrease
the rate of neuronal firing by modu-
lating the resting membrane potentials
(Creutzfeldt et al., 1962; Bindman et al.,
1964; Liebetanz et al., 2002; Nitsche et al.,
2003a; Zaghi et al., 2010). Although these
studies are preliminary, they do pro-
vide reassuring proof-of-principle that the
stimulated brain region is part of a criti-
cal circuit for performing the task under
investigation.
The application of brain stimulation
in combination with specific memory
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rehabilitation methods (Stringer and
Small, 2011) has been put forth as a strat-
egy to compensate for basic defects in
TLE-related memory processing (Miatton
et al., 2011; Sankar et al., 2012; Suthana
et al., 2012; Fell et al., 2013; Hariz et al.,
2013; Hartikainen et al., 2014; Suthana
and Fried, 2014). These studies demon-
strate that electrical neuromodulation of
specific deep structures within the medial
temporal lobe may have persistent benefits
in memory function.
NIBS has been shown to signifi-
cantly decrease seizures in individuals with
treatment-resistant epilepsy (Fregni et al.,
2006; Nitsche and Paulus, 2009; San-Juan
et al., 2011; Varga et al., 2011; Yook et al.,
2011; Auvichayapat et al., 2013; Parazzini
et al., 2014). Whether NIBS techniques
can also improve memory function in TLE
is an area of much interest. To this end,
recent reports suggest that NIBS may aug-
ment cognition in a wide array of neuro-
logic and psychiatric disorders, including
schizophrenia (Minzenberg and Carter,
2012), Alzheimer’s disease (Boggio et al.,
2006), depression (Brunoni et al., 2012),
and post-stroke recovery (Floel, 2014).
Although the underlying mechanism that
produces the cognitive deficits associated
with epilepsy may differ from those that
produce similar deficits in other disor-
ders, the mechanism that enables tDCS’
therapeutic effect appears to transcend
individual disease. These results strongly
suggest that tDCS may represent an excel-
lent potential new treatment modality for
epilepsy. Therefore, future studies on the
possible effects of tDCS in TLE are highly
warranted. There are however, a number
of significant issues that must be addressed
for tDCS to become practical as a treat-
ment for TLE.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
While NIBS has been shown to be rela-
tively safe, currently there is surprisingly
little known about the specific mecha-
nisms underlying the therapeutic effects
(Reato et al., 2013). Nevertheless, various
postulates have been put forward such as
N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor mediated
long and short-term potentiation modula-
tion (Liebetanz et al., 2002; Nitsche et al.,
2004; Thickbroom and Mastaglia, 2009).
Studies aimed at defining the dose for
NIBS techniques in space and in time, as
well as determining the safe stimulation
intensity parameters and electrode posi-
tions, are now critical to propel this field
forward. Finally, with regard to tDCS, it
was initially believed to primarily affect
cortical regions directly beneath the elec-
trode. However, there are now a number
of reports based on results from com-
puter modeling suggesting that the current
during tDCS may in fact reach deeper
areas, such as the hippocampus (Sadleir
et al., 2010; Parazzini et al., 2012). In
order to systemically reach the hippocam-
pus and surrounding structures at thera-
peutic levels, computer modeling will be
needed and will likely play an increasingly
important role in the design of electrode
montages that can consistently reach these
areas in the future. Fortunately, a num-
ber of groups now use computer modeling
to gain a better understanding of where
current is flowing during NIBS as well as
methods to guide or focus current (Datta
et al., 2009; Bai et al., 2013; Dmochowski
et al., 2013; Edwards et al., 2013). While
NIBS techniques offer the capability to
modulate large or diverse areas of the
brain, it is still an open question as to
what extent electrical neuromodulation in
one brain area may affect adjacent or more
distant areas and mechanism of action.
However, recent efforts are beginning to
explore these many complex issues directly
(Keeser et al., 2011; Polania et al., 2011;
Lamy et al., 2012; Polania et al., 2012;
Park et al., 2013; Hampstead et al., 2014;
Notturno et al., 2014).
Future advancements in current
methodologies for NIBS may provide
substantial improvements during focal
delivery of stimulation to the temporal
lobe for memory augmentation. Also,
improvements in multi-modal non-
invasive techniques such as fMRI or MEG,
may be able to detect neural signatures
reflective of NIBS related neurophysio-
logical changes within the hippocampus
and surrounding structures that result in
memory enhancement. Through the com-
bined use of NIBS and multiunit local field
potential recordings in combination with
non-invasive measurements such as EEG
and fMRI studies we may be able to opti-
mize detection and determine the precise
neuronal correlates of NIBS related behav-
ioral changes. Other training techniques
such as neurofeedback may also allow
patients the ability to modulate electrical
stimulation oscillatory activity in order to
achieve improvements in memory.
In summary, it will become increas-
ingly important for future studies to
build upon and elucidate the mecha-
nism of action used in NIBS enhancement
of memory. The location, parameters,
and phase of delivery of NIBS may
need to vary amongst individuals. Hence,
systematic comparisons and consistent
methodologies across studies will likely
contribute to a solid understanding of
NIBS and its effects on learning and mem-
ory. Resolution of these issues may be cru-
cial as to whether NIBS based therapeutics
will advance toward a useful treatment
for patients with TLE related memory
problems.
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Several brain disorders are characterized by abnormally strong neuronal synchrony.
Coordinated Reset (CR) stimulation was developed to selectively counteract abnormal
neuronal synchrony by desynchronization. For this, phase resetting stimuli are delivered
to different subpopulations in a timely coordinated way. In neural networks with spike
timing-dependent plasticity CR stimulation may eventually lead to an anti-kindling,
i.e., an unlearning of abnormal synaptic connectivity and abnormal synchrony. The
spatiotemporal sequence by which all stimulation sites are stimulated exactly once is
called the stimulation site sequence, or briefly sequence. So far, in simulations, pre-clinical
and clinical applications CR was applied either with fixed sequences or rapidly varying
sequences (RVS). In this computational study we show that appropriate repetition of
the sequence with occasional random switching to the next sequence may significantly
improve the anti-kindling effect of CR. To this end, a sequence is applied many times
before randomly switching to the next sequence. This new method is called SVS
CR stimulation, i.e., CR with slowly varying sequences. In a neuronal network with
strong short-range excitatory and weak long-range inhibitory dynamic couplings SVS
CR stimulation turns out to be superior to CR stimulation with fixed sequences or RVS.
Keywords: coordinated reset, slowly varying sequences, desynchronization, spike timing-dependent plasticity,
anti-kindling
Introduction
Abnormally strong neuronal synchronization characterizes several brain disorders, e.g., Parkin-
son’s disease (Lenz et al., 1994; Nini et al., 1995; Hammond et al., 2007), epilepsy
(Wong et al., 1986; Schomer and Lopes da Silva, 2010), and tinnitus (Ochi and Eggermont, 1997;
Llinas et al., 1999; Weisz et al., 2005; Eggermont and Tass, 2015). Coordinated reset (CR)
stimulation (Tass, 2003a,b) was developed in order to specifically counteract abnormal neu-
ronal synchrony by desynchronization (Tass, 1999). CR stimulation means to deliver phase
resetting stimuli at different times to different sub-populations involved in abnormal neu-
ronal synchronization (Tass, 2003a,b). Computational studies showed that in neuronal popu-
lations with spike timing-dependent plasticity (STDP) (Gerstner et al., 1996; Markram et al.,
1997; Bi and Poo, 1998; Feldman, 2000) CR stimulation has long-lasting, sustained effects (Tass
and Majtanik, 2006; Hauptmann and Tass, 2007; Popovych and Tass, 2012). This is because
20
Zeitler and Tass Boosting CR by SVS
CR stimulation employs the multistability of neuronal networks
with STDP (Tass and Majtanik, 2006; Hauptmann and Tass,
2007; Maistrenko et al., 2007; Popovych and Tass, 2012). CR-
stimulation causes a desynchronization and in turn, due to STDP
(Gerstner et al., 1996; Markram et al., 1997; Bi and Poo, 1998;
Feldman, 2000), leads to a decrease of the mean synaptic weight.
In this way, CR stimulation shifts the neuronal network from a
pathological attractor with up-regulated synchrony and connec-
tivity to a physiological attractor with down-regulated synchrony
and connectivity (Tass andMajtanik, 2006; Hauptmann and Tass,
2007; Popovych and Tass, 2012). In this way CR applied induces
an unlearning of the abnormal synaptic connectivity and abnor-
mal neuronal synchrony, so that an anti-kindling is achieved
(Tass and Majtanik, 2006).
Computational studies showed that anti-kindling can robustly
be achieved in networks of spiking or bursting model neurons
where the neurons interact via plastic excitatory and inhibitory
synapses (Popovych and Tass, 2012; Tass and Popovych, 2012).
These studies show also that anti-kindling occurs irrespective of
whether CR stimulation is delivered to the somata or to excitatory
or inhibitory synapses.
In accordance with these computational findings, long-lasting
CR-induced desynchronization was achieved in pre-clinical as
well as clinical studies with invasive and non-invasive stimulation
modalities. Electrical CR stimulation induced long-lasting desyn-
chronization in rat hippocampal slice rendered epileptic by mag-
nesium withdrawal (Tass et al., 2009). Therapeutic long-lasting
after-effects of electrical CR deep brain stimulationwere observed
in parkinsonian non-human primates (Tass et al., 2012b). Uni-
lateral CR stimulation applied to the subthalamic nucleus (STN)
of parkinsonian MPTP monkeys for only 2 h per day during 5
subsequent days caused significant sustained bilateral therapeu-
tic after-effects for at least 30 days, while no after-effects were
induced by standard permanent high-frequency deep brain stim-
ulation (Tass et al., 2012b). By the same token, lasting after-
effects of electrical CR stimulation of the STN were also verified
in parkinsonian patients (Adamchic et al., 2014a). So far, non-
invasive CR stimulation was realized with acoustic stimuli and
applied to the treatment of chronic subjective tinnitus (Tass and
Popovych, 2012; Tass et al., 2012a). In a proof of concept-study it
was shown that acoustic CR stimulation causes a statistically and
clinically significant and sustained reduction of tinnitus symp-
toms (Adamchic et al., 2012a,b; Tass et al., 2012a) along with a
concomitant reduction of abnormal neuronal synchrony (Tass
et al., 2012a; Adamchic et al., 2014b), abnormal effective connec-
tivity (Silchenko et al., 2013) and abnormal cross-frequency cou-
pling (Adamchic et al., 2014c) within a tinnitus-related network
of brain areas.
We here set out to further improve the efficacy of CR stimu-
lation by focusing on a key element of CR, the stimulation site
sequence, i.e., the temporal sequence of activating the different
stimulation sites exactly once, which in what follows will briefly
be called sequence.Keeping the sequence constant for all stimula-
tion cycles is optimal in neuronal networks without STDP, since
it enables optimal desynchronization at minimal intensities (Tass,
2003a,b). The situation gets more sophisticated in the presence of
STDP. In a network of phase oscillators with couplings subject to
STDP the sequence was randomly varied from cycle to cycle in
order to avoid reverberations which might possibly lead to the
formation of sequence-related neuronal subclusters and/or to a
delayed anti-kindling (Tass andMajtanik, 2006). However, in sev-
eral computational studies addressing different aspects of CR a
robust anti-kindling was achieved with CR stimulation with fixed
sequence (Hauptmann and Tass, 2007, 2009; Tass and Haupt-
mann, 2007, 2009) as well as with sequences randomly varying
form cycle to cycle (Tass and Majtanik, 2006; Tass and Haupt-
mann, 2006; Popovych and Tass, 2012; Tass and Popovych, 2012;
Ebert et al., 2014). We denote CR stimulation with sequences
randomly varied from cycle to cycle as RVS CR stimulation, i.e.,
CR with rapidly varying sequences, whereas CR stimulation with
fixed sequence is called FS CR stimulation, i.e., CR stimulation
with fixed sequence. Although some findings indicated that RVS
CR might lead to a quicker anti-kindling (Tass and Majtanik,
2006), so far no systematic comparison or deeper analysis was
performed. In pre-clinical and clinical studies mainly RVS CR
stimulation was applied (Tass et al., 2012a,b; Adamchic et al.,
2014c), while FS CR stimulation was used only in an in vitro
experiment (Tass et al., 2009). The available results do not allow to
judge whether RVS CR or FS CR stimulation or possibly another
variant of CR might be superior.
In this study we investigate the efficacy of a new CR stimula-
tion variant for which a sequence is repeated during n stimulation
cycles in a row before randomly switching to the next sequence.
This type of CR will be called SVS-n CR stimulation, where SVS
stands for slowly varying sequences.We show that repetition with
occasionally switching of the sequence may significantly improve
the performance of CR stimulation, leading to a more robust and
quicker anti-kindling. To this end, we use a neuronal network
model with STDP as described in Section Materials and Meth-
ods. The impact of the RVS and the SVS-n CR stimulation are
compared in Section Slowly Varying Sequences Boost CR Stim-
ulation Effect. Finally, in Section Optimal Number of Different
Sequences Used for SVS CR Stimulation we demonstrate that
optimal anti-kindling requires both variation and substantial rep-
etition of the sequence. In fact, a sequence has to be repeated suf-




The neural network used in this study consisted of N (N = 200)
spiking conductance-based Hodgkin-Huxley neurons (Hodgkin
and Huxley, 1952). The membrane potential V of each neuron i





= Ii − gNam
3
i hi (Vi − VNa) − gKn
4
i (Vi − VK)
− gl (Vi − Vl) + Si + Fi. (1)
C is the membrane capacitance, Ii the constant depolarizing cur-
rent injected into neuron i, Si is the current that represents synap-
tic input of the neurons within the network to neuron i and Fi is
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the current induced in neuron i by CR stimulation. Values used
in this study are: C = 1µF/cm2, maximum conductance per unit
area for the sodium, potassium and leak currents, gNa = 120
mS/cm2, gK = 36 mS/cm
2, gl = 0.3 mS/cm
2, with sodium
reversal potential VNa = 50mV, potassium reversal potential
VK = −77mV, leak reversal potential Vl = −54.4mV. For
the equations of the time-varying gate variables m, h, and n see
Hansel et al. (1993). The injected constant currents (Ii) are uni-
formly distributed random numbers (Ii ∈ [I0 − εI, I0 + εI], in
this study I0 = 11.0 µA/cm
2 and εI = 0.45 µA/cm
2) and
determine the intrinsic firing rate of the uncoupled neurons.
The coupling term Si from Equation (1) (Popovych and Tass,
2012) contains a weighted ensemble average of all post-synaptic
currents received by neuron i from the other neurons in the














N is the number of neurons within the ensemble,Vr,j is the rever-
sal potential of the synaptic coupling (20mV for excitatory and –
40mV for inhibitory coupling), and cij is the synaptic coupling
strength from neuron j to neuron i. There are no neuronal self-
connections within the network (cii = 0 mS/cm
2). Mij has the
form of a Mexican hat (Wilson and Cowan, 1973; Dominguez
et al., 2006; De la Rocha et al., 2008) and defines the strength




























∣ is the distance between neurons i and j,
d = d0/(N − 1) (4)
is the lattice distance between two neighboring neurons within
the ensemble, d0 is the length of the neuronal chain, σ1 = 3.5,
and σ2 = 2.0 as used in Popovych and Tass (2012). To mini-
mize boundary effects, the neurons form a ring, which implies























] − 2sj. (5)
Spike Timing-Dependent Plasticity
In general, synaptic coupling strengths change depending on the
precise timing of pre- and post-synaptic spikes (Markram et al.,
1997; Bi and Poo, 1998). In the present study all synaptic weights
cij were considered to be dynamic variables dependent on the
time difference (1tij) between the onset of the post- and pre-
synaptic spikes ti, respectively tj
(
1tij = ti − tj
)
. According to the
spike timing-dependent plasticity (STDP) rule (Bi and Poo, 1998)













γ2τ ,1tij < 0
(6)
See Popovych and Tass (2012), In ourmodel we update the synap-
tic weights cij in an event-based manner by adding δ · 1cij for
excitatory connections and −δ · 1cij for inhibitory connections
with learning rate δ > 0 every time a neuron spikes. To avoid
an unbounded strengthening or weakening, the synaptic weights
are restricted to the interval cij ∈ [0, 1] mS/cm
2 for excitatory
synapses and cij ∈ [0, cmax] mS/cm
2 for inhibitory synapses with
cmax = 1 unless stated otherwise. In this study the following
values are used for the STDP parameters: β1 = 1, β2 = 16,
γ1 = 0.12, γ2 = 0.15, τ = 14 ms, and δ = 0.002.
Due to STDP and the different intrinsic periods of the neu-
rons, the synaptic weights change constantly. In this study the
dynamics of the synaptic weights were investigated on a pop-
ulation level. The strength of the coupling within the neuronal
population at time t is given by the synaptic weight averaged over
the population:








cij (t) , (7)
with Mij as defined in Equation (3) and the sign-function sgn.
The amount of synchronization of the neuronal activity within
the ensemble is influenced by the synaptic weights and can be




















Where ϕj (t) = 2π(t − tj,m)/(tj,m+1 − tj,m) for tj,m ≤ t < tj,m+1
is a linear approximation of the phase of neuron j between its
mth and (m + 1)th spikes at spiking times tj,m and tj,m+1. The
order parameter Rmeasures the extent of phase synchronization
in the neuronal ensemble and takes values between 0 (complete
desynchronization) and 1 (perfect in-phase synchronization). For
our data analysis the order parameter was averaged over the last
1.6 s of the CR-off period and will be denoted as average order
parameter Rav.
Coordinated Reset Stimulation Algorithms
Coordinated Reset (CR) stimulation was delivered to the neu-
ronal ensemble of N spiking Hodgkin-Huxley neurons. This
was done sequentially via Ns equidistantly spaced stimulation
sites (Tass, 2003a): one stimulation site was active during Ts/Ns,
while the other stimulation sites were inactive during that period.
After that another stimulation site was active during the next
Ts/Ns period. All Ns stimulation sites were stimulated exactly
once within one stimulation ON-cycle. Therefore, the dura-
tion of each ON-cycle is Ts. This spatiotemporal activation
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of stimulation sites is represented by the indicator functions
ρk (t) (kǫ {1, . . . ,N}):
ρk (t) =
{
1, kthstimulation site is active at t
0, otherwise
(9)
The stimulation signals induced single brief excitatory post-
synaptic currents. The evoked time-dependent normalized con-
ductances of the post-synaptic membranes are represented by




e−(t−tk)/τ, tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1. (10)
Here τstim = Ts/(6Ns) denotes the time-to-peak of Gstim, and
tk is the onset of the k
th activation of the stimulation site. The
spatial spread of the induced excitatory post-synaptic currents in
the network is defined by a quadratic spatial decay profile (see
Popovych and Tass, 2012 for motivation) given as a function of
the difference in index of neuron i and the index xk of the neuron
at stimulation site k:






with d the lattice distance between two neighboring neurons as
defined in Equation (4) and σd = 0.08d0 the spatial decay rate of
the stimulation current.
The stimulation current from Equation (1) is given by:




D (i, xk) ρk (t)Gstim(t), (12)
where Vr = 20mV denotes the excitatory reverse potential, Vi
the membrane potential of neuron i, K the stimulation intensity,
and D, ρ, G are given by Equations (11), (10), and (9).
In this paper we study three different CR algorithms: RVS
CR stimulation (Tass and Hauptmann, 2006; Tass and Majtanik,
2006; Popovych and Tass, 2012; Tass and Popovych, 2012), FS CR
stimulation (Tass, 2003a,b; Hauptmann and Tass, 2007, 2009; Tass
and Hauptmann, 2007, 2009), and our novel SVS CR stimulation.
During one sequence each stimulation site is activated exactly
once. There are Ns ! (in our study 4!=24) different sequences
possible to stimulate Ns stimulation sites. In the RVS CR algo-
rithm for each ON-cycle a new sequence was drawn randomly
from the set of Ns ! possible sequences (see Figure 1A). For the
slowly varying sequences CR algorithm (SVS-n) the sequence
order is random and determined a priori in such a way that each
sequence used, is consecutively repeated n times before another
one is applied. For the SVS-4 CR stimulation signals as shown in
Figure 1B one sequence was applied during the first n consecu-
tive ON-cycles. After that the next sequence was applied during
the next n consecutive ON-cycles, and so on (see Figure 1B for
n = 4).
FIGURE 1 | Spatiotemporal stimulation signals of CR stimulation. (A)
An example sequence order for the rapidly varying sequences (RVS) CR. (B)
An example sequence order for the slowly varying sequence CR with every
sequence repeated 4 times (SVS-4) before the next sequence is used. A
change of color indicates a new sequence. Vertical dashed lines separate
stimulation ON- and OFF cycles: three ON-cycles are followed by two
OFF-cycles.
Simulation Details and Data Analysis
We ran simulations for different initial network conditions and
different sequence orders. For each initial network condition the
initial conditions of all N neurons were randomly drawn from
uniform distributions (ni,mi, hi, si ∈ [0, 1]; Vi ∈ [−65, 5]mV ;
Ii ∈ [I0 − σI, I0 + σI]). The initial synaptic weights cij between
the neurons were drawn from a normal distribution (cij∼ N(µ =
0.5µA/cm2, σ = 0.01µA/cm2)). After an initial equilibration
phase of 2 s, STDP was included for the rest of the simulation.
During the first 60 s with STDP the network was given the oppor-
tunity to rewire its connections without any influence from an
external stimulation. At the end of this STDP-only period the
network activity was highly synchronized and the CR simula-
tion was applied for 64 s from t = 0 s on. During this CR-on
period three stimulation ON-cycles alternated with two OFF-
cycles as in the example stimulation signal shown in Figure 1. No
stimulation was applied during the OFF-cycles. Each ON- and
OFF-cycle lasted Ts = 16 ms. After 64 s the CR stimulation was
stopped permanently and the 64 s lasting CR-off period started.
After going through this procedure for one particular stimula-
tion intensity, K, the procedure was repeated from t = 0 s on
for the other K-values (K ∈ {0.10, 0.20, 0.30 . . . , 0.60}). For
each CR stimulation this whole process was repeated for eleven
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different initial network conditions and sequence orders. Besides
the RVS CR stimulation also the SVS-100 CR stimulations were
applied for eleven different combinations of initial conditions
and sequence orders. Finally, the optimal number of different
sequences used in the SVS CR stimulation was explored.
The resulting values of Cav (Equation 7) at t = 128 s and Rav
(Equation 8) averaged over the last 1.6 s of the CR-off period)
were plotted in boxplots (Tukey, 1977). In order to compare
the results of different CR algorithms for a constant stimula-
tion strength, K, the obtained boxplots are plotted next to each
other, whereby the color represents which CR algorithm was
used. Statistical significances of differences between the results of
the different CR algorithms were determined by the one-sided
Mann-Whitney test.
Results
Slowly Varying Sequences Boost CR stimulation
Effect
To verify whether the SVS CR stimulation is more successful than
the RVS CR stimulation, the effect of both CR algorithms on the
average synaptic weight, Cav, as well as on the synchronization of
neuronal activity R has to be investigated. Each measure will be
explored first for the RVS and then for the SVS CR stimulation.
As visualized in Figure 2A the RVS CR stimulation causes a
weakening of the average synaptic weight Cav during the CR-on
period for all stimulation intensities K. At the end of the sub-
sequent CR-off period, the average synaptic weight is still much
weaker than before the CR stimulation was applied, except for the
weakest stimulation intensity. Figure 2B then shows how the SVS
CR stimulation, delivered to the same initial network, decreases
the average synaptic weights even more and causes in general
lower long-lasting Cav–values compared to the RVS CR stimula-
tion. Since we are interested in the long-lasting effects of the CR
stimulation period, we will concentrate on the values at the end
of the CR-off for the remainder of this work.
To investigate whether this observed improvement by the
SVS CR stimulation is just a coincidence, we have also changed
the sequence order or the initial network conditions. Figure 3A
shows that by applying another RVS order to the same initial net-
work or by applying the initial sequence order to a network with
different initial conditions, different long-lasting Cav-values were
obtained. Only for the weakest stimulation intensity, K = 0.10,
the RVS algorithm caused similar long-lasting Cav-values. For
other stimulation intensities, it suggests that the effect of the RVS
CR stimulation depends on the sequence order used and on the
initial network conditions. As follows from Figure 3B, the suc-
cess of the SVS-100 CR stimulation depends less strongly on the
exact sequence order and the initial network conditions and the
SVS-100 CR stimulation results in a smaller Cav-value than the
RVS CR stimulation, over a wide range of stimulation intensities
K continuing the superiority of this method.
Robustness against variations of the sequence order and
against initial network conditions is of crucial importance for
the CR therapy. Therefore, all stimulations were repeated 11
times for different combinations of initial network conditions
FIGURE 2 | Dynamics of the average synaptic weight, Cav , for different
stimulation intensities, K. (A) Results of the RVS CR stimulation. (B) Results
of the SVS-100 CR stimulation. The initial network is the same for all
simulations. The sequence order used for each CR method is constant for all
K-values. The CR-on period, represented by the red horizontal bar, starts at
t = 0 s and is switched off at t = 64 s (dashed vertical line). During the
subsequent 64 s CR-off period, no stimulation is delivered, and Cav evolves
spontaneously. cmax = 1 for all simulations.
and sequence orders. The boxplots in Figure 4A show that the
long-lasting effect of decreasing the average synaptic strength is
significantly better for the SVS-100 than for the RVS CR stimu-
lation over a wide range of stimulation intensities K (one-sided
Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.05). Besides generating a better Cav-
value, the SVS CR stimulation is also more robust against ini-
tial network conditions and sequence orders. The SVS-100 also
induces a significant smaller Rav than the RVS CR stimulation
(one-sided Mann-Whitney test p < 0.01), but for a smaller set
of K-values as shown in Figure 4B. Rav is the value of the order
parameter averaged over the last 1.6 s of the CR-off period.
To rule out false estimates of the time averaged order parame-
ter R, we used different window lengths. False estimates could, for
instance, be caused by low-frequency oscillations of R with peri-
ods exceeding the window length used for our averaging analysis.
In our analysis of the order parameter R, presented in this paper,
we averaged over the last 1.6 s of the 64 s during CR-off period.
Averaging R over a quarter (=16 s) of the total CR-off period gave
very similar results. Hence, we can consider our results to be suf-
ficiently robust with respect to variations of the length of the time
window used for our evaluation.
Simulations for SVS-25 CR stimulation during the 64 s lasting
CR-on period gave similar results for Cav and Rav as the SVS-100
CR (results not shown), illustrating that 25 consecutive repeti-
tions of each sequence are already enough to improve the CR
effect.
From the standpoint of clinical applications it is important
to understand the relationship between the acute effect achieved
during stimulation and the after-effect observed after cessation of
stimulation. To this end, we studied the relationship between the
values of Cav and Rav at the end of the CR-on period (t = 64
s) and their values at the end of the CR-off period (t = 128 s)
(Figure 5). The relation between Cav at t = 64 s and at t = 128 s
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FIGURE 3 | Effect of the sequence order and of the initial network
conditions on the average synaptic weight Cav at t = 128 s as a
function of stimulation intensity K. (A) Cav-values at t = 128 s
obtained by the RVS CR stimulation. (B) Cav-values at t = 128 s
obtained by the SVS-100 CR stimulation. The Cav (t = 128 s) values in
Figure 2 are the reference results and represented by the solid lines in
this Figure. The dashed-dotted lines show the result for a simulation
with the same initial network conditions as used to obtain the reference
results but for another randomly chosen sequence order. The dotted
lines represent the obtained Cav-values at t = 128 s for a simulation
with the same sequence order as used to obtain the reference results,
but for other initial network conditions.
FIGURE 4 | Comparison of the anti-kindling effects at t = 128 s for the
RVS and the SVS-100 CR stimulation. (A) Boxplots of the average synaptic
strength, Cav, at t = 128 s as a function of the stimulation intensity, K, for the
RVS and the SVS-100 CR stimulation. (B) Boxplots of the order parameter R
averaged over the last 1.6 s, Rav, as a function of K for the RVS and the
SVS-100 CR stimulation. The RVS CR results for the same K-values are
shown in red and slightly shifted to the left and the SVS-100 results are shown
in blue and slightly shifted to the right. The black lines within the boxes show
the medians for each condition, the boxes the middle 50% and the whiskers
below (above) the boxes the first (last, respectively) 25%. Outliers are defined
as 1.5 times the length of the box below or above the box and represented by
open circles. For each condition (K-value and type of CR) the simulations are
repeated eleven times for different initial conditions of the network in
combination with different sequence orders. One asterisk indicates a
significantly lower Cav - or Rav-value compared to the values obtained by the
RVS CR stimulation (one-sided Mann-Whitney test with p < 0.05).
is visualized in Figure 5A. In a first approximation, small values
Cav and Rav at t = 64 s are required but not necessarily sufficient
for small values of Cav and Rav at t = 128 s. Hence, with a
certain probability a pronounced acute stimulation effect is asso-
ciated with a good long-term outcome. In contrast, poor acute
stimulation effects are not related to pronounced after-effects.
Optimal Number of Different Sequences Used for
SVS CR Stimulation
In this section we analyze the impact of sequence changes on
the dynamics of the average synaptic connectivity as assessed by
Cav. To this end, first, we perform a CR stimulation with fixed
sequence (FS CR) and compare it to CR stimulation epochs where
the sequence is either changed once or at three equidistant times
without changing the total duration of the CR-on period. This
implies that the number of different sequences multiplied with
the number of consecutive repetitions, n, is constant. Finally,
the optimal number of different sequences used in the SVS CR
stimulation was explored.
We analyzed the effect of FS CR stimulation for eleven dif-
ferent initial network conditions in combination with a different
sequence for each network, respectively. Figure 6A clearly shows
that for the FS CR stimulation (SVS-2400) with K = 0.20, the
decrease of Cav strongly depends on which sequence is used.
Pronounced long-lasting effects are achieved by some sequences,
whereas no anti-kindling is observed for other sequences.
Increasing the stimulation intensity to K = 0.45 improves
the robustness of FS against the choice of the sequence used
and the initial network conditions (Figure 6B). For K = 0.45
the average synaptic weight stabilizes at a small to intermediate
value, depending on the sequence and the initial network condi-
tions. The stabilization of Cav is more rapidly achieved at higher
stimulation intensity K.
By using two different sequences instead of just one sequence,
the first sequencemay stabilizeCav at an intermediate value ofCav
and, hence, lead to a sub-optimal outcome. However, at t = 32
s the second sequence takes over, and may further reduce Cav as
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FIGURE 5 | Predictability of the anti-kindling effect by Cav at
t = 64 s. (A) Relation between Cav at the end of the CR-on period
(t = 64 s) and at the end of the CR-off period (t = 128 s). (B) Relation
between Cav at the end of the CR-on period (t = 64 s) and Rav at the
end of the CR-off period (t = 128 s). The Cav-values at t = 64 s are
calculated and plotted against Cav or Rav at t = 128 s for each
condition (initial network conditions, stimulation intensity, sequence order,
cmax = 1) as used for Figure 4. Red circles represent the results of the
RVS CR stimulation, blue circles of the SVS-100 CR stimulation. Note
that the red circles are plotted on top of the blue circles.
shown by its kinks at t = 32 s (Figure 6C for K = 0.20 and SVS-
1200), in particular, for the more effective stimulation intensity
K = 0.45 (Figure 6D).
By the same token, the long-lasting effects on the mean synap-
tic connectivity Cav and the robustness of the stimulation further
improve by using four different sequences (SVS-600, Figure 6E for
K = 0.20 and Figure 6F forK = 0.45). Again, especially at higher
stimulation intensity changes of the sequence may come with a
stepwise-like further reduction of Cav showing up as kinks in the
time course of Cav at times when sequences are changed (t = 16,
32, and 48 s).
Analogously, we further increase the number of different
sequences used during one CR epoch. Figure 7 shows the
stimulation outcome in terms of synaptic connectivity Cav
(Figures 7A,C) and order parameter Rav (Figures 7B,D) aver-
aged over the last 1.6 s of the CR-off period for different stimu-
lation intensities (K = 0.20 in Figures 7A,B and K = 0.45 in
Figures 7C,D). The statistics obtained from a set of eleven sim-
ulations performed for different initial network conditions and
sequence orders shows that the main part of the SVS-induced
improvement of the CR effect is already achieved with four differ-
ent sequences. Using more than four different sequences hardly
leads to a further reduction of Rav and Cav and their variability.
Discussion
Our results show that the SVS CR stimulation leads to signifi-
cantly weaker average synaptic weights than the RVS CR stim-
ulation over a wide range of stimulation. Within this range the
Inter-Quartile-Range (25th to 75th percentile) is smaller for the
SVS CR approach compared to the RVS CR. This implies that
the SVS CR approach is more robust against initial conditions of
the network and against the order of the sequences than the RVS
CR in this range. The differences between the results of the SVS
with 25 and 100 consecutive repetitions of each sequence are in
general not significant, although more repetitions tend to have a
larger impact on the average synaptic weight (results not shown).
A more significantly reduced average synaptic weight does not
necessarily translate into more significantly reduced overall syn-
chrony. In fact, for the SVS CR stimulation the network activity
was significantly more desynchronized than for the RVS CR stim-
ulation in a smaller range of stimulation intensities than for the
weakening of the network connectivity.
Optimal anti-kindling is obtained at intermediate stimula-
tion intensities (Figures 3, 4). This is in agreement with previous
computational studies (e.g., Lysyansky et al., 2011a; Popovych
and Tass, 2012; Ebert et al., 2014). On the one hand CR stim-
ulation has to be of sufficient intensity to achieve phase resets
of the different subpopulations, but on the other hand at high
intensities the subpopulations are no longer separately stimu-
lated. In the limiting case of very high intensities each stimu-
lus affects nearly the whole neuronal population and causes an
entrainment of the whole population which fosters synchroniza-
tion rather than desynchronization. Our results are stable with
respect to variations of model parameters, e.g., by doubling the
maximum allowed inhibitory synaptic weight (cmax = 2 for
inhibitory synapses, results not shown).
Our results show that optimal long-lasting desynchroniza-
tion requires the right combination of appropriate repetition
and occasional variation of sequences. In fact, SVS-CR stimu-
lation is better than FS CR stimulation over a wide range of
stimulation intensities. Furthermore, the optimal number of dif-
ferent sequences for the SVS CR stimulation is four or more.
This implies that repetition alone, like in the case of FS CR
simulation (Hauptmann and Tass, 2007, 2009; Tass and Haupt-
mann, 2007, 2009; Tass et al., 2009), is not the only ingredi-
ent for the improvement of CR stimulation. With insufficiently
many different sequences in the SVS CR approach, the network
can stabilize in a local minimum that is much larger than the
global minimum Cav-value for a given stimulation intensity. In
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FIGURE 6 | Effect of switching the sequence during CR
stimulation. In a series of simulations with different stimulation
intensities (K = 0.20 in left panels and K = 0.45 in right panels) the
sequence was either kept fixed [FS CR stimulation, (A,B)], randomly
varied just once [in the middle of the stimulation period, at t = 32 s,
(C,D)] or randomly varied at three equidistant times [at t = 16, 32,
48 s, (E,F)]. Simulations were performed for eleven different sequence
orders and initial network conditions. Each panel shows the dynamics
of Cav for each of the eleven simulations in a different color. FS CR
stimulation (A,B): Time course of Cav for eleven combinations of
different initial network conditions and different sequence for
SVS-2400, respectively, for K = 0.20 (A) and K = 0.45 (B). Change
of sequence in the middle of the stimulation epoch (C,D): Two
different sequences, each applied 1200 times in a row. Change of
sequence at t = 32 s, with K = 0.20 (C) and K = 0.45 (D).
Sequence is changed three times at equidistant times (t =, 16,32,
and 48 s) during the stimulation epoch (E,F): In each simulation four
different sequences are applied 600 times in a row, so that after
16 s the next sequence randomly chosen, with K = 0.20 (E) and
K = 0.45 (F). The red horizontal bars represent CR-on periods. The
vertical dashed-dotted lines indicate a change of sequence. cmax = 1
in all simulations.
case the sequence is replaced after many repetitions by another
sequence and again after a large number of repetitions by another
sequence, the network connectivity can stepwise decrease from
one local minimum to another, in this way, approaching the
global minimum for a given stimulation intensity. Using more
than four different sequences in the SVS CR stimulation does
not significantly improve the long-lasting anti-kindling effects
compared to those obtained with just four different sequences.
The different local minima correspond to different attractors of
the network (see Popovych et al., 2015). In fact, in our model net-
work a multitude of attractors with different amount of mean
synaptic weight and neuronal synchrony coexist, covering the
whole spectrum fromminimal mean connectivity and synchrony
up to strongly up-regulated mean connectivity and synchrony.
Hence, our results indicate that SVS CR stimulation prevents
the network from getting stuck in undesirable attractors (with
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FIGURE 7 | Comparison of the anti-kindling effects for some numbers
of different sequences applied during the SVS CR stimulation. (A)
Boxplots of Cav at t = 128 s for different numbers of sequence changes used
in the SVS CR stimulation with K = 0.20. (B) Boxplots of Rav at t = 128 s for
some numbers of different sequences used in the SVS CR stimulation with
K = 0.20. (C) As in (A) for K = 0.45. (D) As in (B) for K = 0.45. The black lines
within the boxes show the medians for each condition, the boxes the middle
50% and the whiskers below (above) the boxes the first (last, respectively)
25%. Outliers are defined as 1.5 times the length of the box below or above
the box and represented by open circles. For each condition (K-value and
number of sequences) the simulations are repeated eleven times for different
initial conditions of the network in combination with different sequence(s). The
number of consecutive sequence repetitions was adjusted with respect to the
number of different sequences so that the duration of the CR-on period is
always 64 s for each simulation. For example if two different sequences are
used, each of them is repeated 1200 times in a row, in case four different
sequences are used, each of them is repeated 600 times.
intermediate mean connectivity and synchrony) in the course of
the anti-kindling stimulation.
Another difference between the SVS-100 and the RVS CR
stimulation is that for the SVS CR stimulation by definition in
a suitably large time window each sequence is repeated exactly
100 times, but that for the RVS CR stimulation the number of
(timely separated) repetitions of each sequence can vary within
such a time window, since by definition the sequence of the RVS
CR changes from ON-cycle to ON-cycle, where each sequence
occurs with equal probability. For an infinitely long time win-
dow also for the RVS CR stimulation the different sequences will
occur with equal probability. However, on the time scale of one
completed series of sequences of the SVS-100 CR stimulation, i.e.,
for larger, but not infinitely large numbers of sequences, this may
be different. Taking a permutation of all 2400 applied sequences
(including the repeated sequences) of a SVS-100 CR stimula-
tion generates a CR stimulation signal in which the different
sequences occur randomly, but each still exactly 100 times. Simu-
lations with this permutated CR stimulation signal show that Cav
and Rav-values are similar to those obtained by the RVS CR stim-
ulation although the spread is in general larger for the permutated
than the random signal (results now shown). This suggests that a
constant frequency with which each sequence occurs in a wider
time window does not contribute to the success of the SVS CR
stimulation, but that it is mainly determined by the consecutive
repetitions of a sequence and the number of different sequences.
This is actually supported by the fact that already four different
sequences in the SVS CR stimulation are sufficient to induce a
full-blown anti-kindling (see above).
Applying our SVS CR approach to DBS may be particularly
rewarding, since with the same stimulation intensity as used for
RVS CR or fixed sequence CR, SVS CR might lead to a bet-
ter therapeutic outcome. Reducing the stimulation energy will
likely lead to a reduction of the rate of side effects. RVS CR DBS
was successfully applied at stimulation amplitudes (of the sin-
gle stimulation pulses) similar to those of standard permanent
high-frequency DBS (Adamchic et al., 2014a) as well as corre-
sponding to a third of the amplitude used for standard permanent
high-frequency DBS (Tass et al., 2012a). Accordingly, within that
range of stimulation amplitudes SVS CR-DBS might be supe-
rior to RVS CR-DBS. However, given the intensity dependence of
the anti-kindling effects (e.g., Figure 4), systematic dose finding
studies for both types of CR-DBS are required to best exploit their
actual clinical potential. By the same token, systematic dose find-
ing studies should be conducted for acoustic CR stimulation for
the treatment of tinnitus (Tass et al., 2012b) for SVS CR. As yet,
acoustic RVS CR stimulation was delivered at only one stimula-
tion intensity (i.e., loudness level), namely for just super thresh-
old loudness. In the context of dose finding studies the results
from Figure 5might be important, since they show that—at least
in the model under study—acute effects (achieved during stimu-
lation) are necessary but not sufficient for pronounced long-term
desynchronization effects observed after cessation of stimulation.
In a previous computational study it was shown that FS CR
stimulation may augment brain function by counteracting cere-
bral hypo-activity without promoting pathological neuronal syn-
chrony (Lysyansky et al., 2011b). Accordingly, a forthcoming
study might focus on the comparison of the potential of SVS CR
for activating brain areas and protecting the brain from abnormal
synchrony and kindling as opposed to both FS CR and RVS CR.
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Assistive technology allows for intensive practice and kinematic measurements
during rehabilitation exercises. More recent approaches attach a gravity-compensating
multi-joint exoskeleton to the upper extremity to facilitate task-oriented training in
three-dimensional space with virtual reality feedback. The movement quality, however, is
mostly captured through end-point measures that lack information on proximal inter-joint
coordination. This limits the differentiation between compensation strategies and genuine
restoration both during the exercise and in the course of rehabilitation. We extended
in this proof-of-concept study a commercially available seven degree-of-freedom arm
exoskeleton by using the real-time sensor data to display a three-dimensional multi-joint
visualization of the user’s arm. Ten healthy subjects and three severely affected chronic
stroke patients performed reach-to-grasp exercises resembling activities of daily living
assisted by the attached exoskeleton and received closed-loop online feedback of
the three-dimensional movement in virtual reality. Patients in this pilot study differed
significantly with regard to motor performance (accuracy, temporal efficiency, range
of motion) and movement quality (proximal inter-joint coordination) from the healthy
control group. In the course of 20 training and feedback sessions over 4 weeks,
these pathological measures improved significantly toward the reference parameters of
healthy participants. It was moreover feasible to capture the evolution of movement
pattern kinematics of the shoulder and elbow and to quantify the individual degree
of natural movement restoration for each patient. The virtual reality visualization and
closed-loop feedback of joint-specific movement kinematics makes it possible to detect
compensation strategies and may provide a tool to achieve the rehabilitation goals in
accordance with the individual capacity for genuine functional restoration; a proposal that
warrants further investigation in controlled studies with a larger cohort of stroke patients.
Keywords: robot-assisted rehabilitation, stroke rehabilitation, hemiparesis, motor recovery, upper-limb outcome
assessment
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INTRODUCTION
Assistive rehabilitation technology allows an increase and
standardization in the amount of upper limb movement
therapy after stroke, potentially resulting in improved arm/hand
function and muscle strength, albeit respective trials have,
as yet, provided only low-quality evidence (Kwakkel et al.,
2008; Mehrholz et al., 2015). In clinical settings, therapists
often provide the patient with feedback on the movement
quality to encourage relearning of premorbid movement patterns
(Cirstea and Levin, 2007). Particularly in patients with severe
impairment, deficits in the range and coordination of elbow and
shoulder movements might interfere with reaching performance
(Cirstea and Levin, 2000; Cirstea et al., 2003). Moreover,
motor compensation could limit gains in motor function by
learned non-use and lead to pain and joint contractures in the
long run (Cirstea and Levin, 2007). However, although robot-
assisted therapy focuses on task performance, it usually does
not differentiate between compensation strategies and genuine
motor restoration despite being capable of objective movement
evaluation (Kwakkel et al., 2008). Although kinematic parameters
would be particularly suitable for assessing movement quality
during rehabilitation exercises, current robotic devices tend to
capture end-point measures that lack information on proximal
interjoint coordination (Nordin et al., 2014) which would be
necessary to differentiate recovery from compensation. In this
context, a gravity-compensating multi-joint exoskeleton could
not only support reach-to grasp movements in severely affected
stroke patients but also provide closed-loop virtual reality
feedback ofmovement quality during task-oriented training. This
pilot study intended to explore the methodological feasibility
and clinical validity of virtual reality visualization and closed-
loop feedback of joint-specific movement kinematics to capture
the evolution of upper extremity movement patterns in severely
affected stroke patients. We furthermore wanted to quantify
the individual degree of natural movement restoration or
compensation for each patient. When a proof-of-concept is
demonstrated here, such an approach would provide a tool to
follow rehabilitation goals in accordance with the individual
capacity for genuine functional restoration, a strategy that could
then be verified by further investigations in controlled studies.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We recruited ten right-handed healthy subjects (6 males, mean
age: 29 ± 4 [24 39] years) and three right-handed stroke patients
(all male, mean age: 62 ± 6 [56 68] years). The patients were
in the chronic phase after stroke (57 ± 22 [34 78] months)
and presented with a severe and persistent hemiparesis of the
left side. To ensure that our results were comparable to earlier
studies, coordination, speed and reflexes were not taken into
account. This resulted in amodified upper extremity Fugl-Meyer-
Assessment scores (UE-FMA) of 12, 12, and 25, respectively.
This study was in accordance with the guidelines of the ethic
committee of the local medical faculty. Participants performed
either a single session (healthy control group) or 20 sessions
in the course of 4 weeks (patients) of reach-to-grasp training
with a multi-joint exoskeleton attached to the left arm. The
orthosis was calibrated according to the individual anatomy (e.g.,
shoulder position, forearm/upper arm length) of each patient.
This setup and calibration of the system before every session
took about 5min per patient. Each session lasted approximately
30min and consisted of 150 trials. The general experimental
setup has already been described in detail elsewhere (Grimm and
Gharabaghi, 2016; Grimm et al., under review) and is cited here
when applied in the same way.
Exoskeleton and Virtual Reality
We used a commercially available (Armeo Spring, Hocoma,
Volketswil, Switzerland) rehabilitation exoskeleton for shoulder,
elbow and wrist joints with seven axes (i.e., degrees of freedom)
providing antigravity support for the paretic arm and registration
of movement kinematics and grip force. This device allowed
individual adjustments e.g., of gravity compensation, thereby
supporting patients with severe impairment in performing
task-oriented practice within a motivating virtual environment.
Kinematic sensor data was provided by 7 built-in angle sensors
(sensor resolution <0.2◦) for shoulder flexion/abduction (1
sensor), shoulder rotation (2 sensors), elbow flexion/extension
(1 sensor for horizontal registration, 1 sensor for vertical
registration), forearm pronation/supination (1 sensor) and
wrist flexion/extension (1 sensor). The shoulder rotation was
calculated as the sum of the two sensors. The upper arm
movement was calculated as the angle between forearm and
upper-arm in three-dimensional space. The sensors were placed
directly in the movement axis of the exoskeleton within the
joints, allowing an accurate registration of the actual joint
position of the upper arm, forearm and hand (Figure 1).
Kinematic data of hand closure/opening could not be captured
directly with this set up. We therefore estimated the hand
function indirectly by registering the grip force. Grip force has
previously been shown to correlate with motor function in
chronic stroke patients (Boissy et al., 1999) and was captured
with an in build mid-palmar grip pressure sensor in the present
study.
FIGURE 1 | Exoskelleton setup and location of angle sensors within the
device (yellow dots).
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Thereby, a complete real-time registration of the subject’s
kinematic reach-to-grasp movement could be performed with
the orthosis. We extended these features in-house by using the
real-time sensor data of the exoskeleton to display a three-
dimensional multi-joint visualization of the user’s arm in virtual
reality (Figure 2A). The exercises where displayed to the subjects
on a monitor in front of the setup. For this purpose, we
captured the angles of all arm joints and the grip force from
a shared memory block using a file mapping communication
protocol. The virtual arm engine was programmed in aMicrosoft
XNATM framework. The arm model utilized by the engine
was constructed as a meshed bone-skin combination with 54
bones (3Ds Max 2010TM, Autodesk). The measured joint angles
and grip forces of the device were used to modify the bone-
vectors of the meshed model according to the movements
of the user thereby providing online closed-loop feedback.
The kinematic data and the 3D virtual representation were
updated in 20ms intervals. The joint angles of the exoskeleton
were directly represented in virtual reality, whereas the grip
forces were augmented to feedback natural hand function.
Prior to each session, participants were instructed to perform
a natural reach-to-grasp movement during the task by using
distal (elbow) rather than proximal (shoulder) movements. The
participants were moreover encouraged to track and adjust their
movements accordingly with the information provided by the
virtual environment. Furthermore, they were informed that their
movement quality would be captured and evaluated afterwards.
This preparation was intended to prime the participants to
exploit the information provided by the virtual feedback. The
three-dimensional visualization of the arm was then applied
during each task as an implicit online feedback of movement
quality, since explicit information can disrupt motor learning
in stroke patients (Boyd and Winstein, 2004; Cirstea and Levin,
2007). Various virtual training paradigms were designed to allow
for different rehabilitation exercises resembling activities of daily
living.
Task Design
In this study, participants performed a reach-to-grasp movement
toward a ball which changed its position in virtual space after
each trial, necessitating three-dimensional transfer movements.
The ball had to be grasped, carried to a distant basket and then
released again (Figure 2B). The virtual hand could interact with
the ball as soon as it entered a defined range around the latter. The
ball changed its color according to the hand position (white: out
of range, green: possible to grasp, yellow: possible to transfer, red:
possible to release). The grasping and releasing of the virtual ball
was performed by applying force to the grip sensor and opening
the hand, respectively, while the threshold was adjusted to the
individual strength of the user. No other support was provided
during the exercises. The level of orthotic assistance remained
constant in the course of the 20 sessions.
Outcome Measures
The kinematic assessment included both motor performance and
movement quality (Nordin et al., 2014). The motor performance
was estimated with regard to accuracy, temporal efficiency and
range of motion. Movement accuracy, more specifically the
decrease of inaccuracy, was captured by calculating changes of
movement direction along an optimal path toward the targets,
by estimating the distance function between the hand-position
and the final endpoint, and by calculating the second derivative
of the function to acquire the number of turning points for each
task (Cirstea et al., 2006). Temporal efficiency was captured as the
mean velocity of the hand between the targets while calculating
their distance for X-, Y- and Z-directions in virtual units (vu).
The range of motion of each joint was measured according
to the orthosis and displayed in degrees along with the mean
change in grip pressure. Movement quality of proximal inter-
joint coordination was defined as the amount of compensatory
shoulder inward rotation during the task and quantified by
a shoulder/elbow index, i.e., the degree of inward rotation of
the shoulder in relation to the degree of elbow movement.
More specifically, a larger proportion of shoulder movement
would indicate compensation, while a larger proportion of elbow
movement for the same task would indicate a rather natural
movement.
Statistics
Statistical analysis was performed on a Matlab 2010b Engine.
Data was tested for linear distribution using the Lilliefors-test (2-
sided goodness-of-fit test). The non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis
was used for group comparisons. To estimate the evolution
of parameters during training, a robust multilinear regression
model was fitted. Although the Lilliefors-test revealed normality
of the data, a robust multilinear regression analysis was applied in
order to minimize the impact of outliers. The fitting function was
FIGURE 2 | (A) Bone architecture of the three-dimensional multi-joint
visualization of the user’s arm in virtual reality. (B) Virtual training environment
for reach-to-grasp movements toward a ball which changes its position in
space after each trial. The ball has to be grasped, carried to a distant basket
and then released again.
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TABLE 1 | Overview of kinematic data for subjects and patients, respectively.
Parameter Subjects Patients p-value
Inaccuracy, number of turning points 4.20± 0.42 [4.00 5.00] 8.75± 2.51 [6.00 13.00] <0.001
Average velocity (distance/time) (vu/s) 13.86± 2.17 [11.31 17.53] 3.89± 1.85 [0.90 8.04] <0.001
Grip pressure 0.45± 0.19 [0.14 0.69] 0.684± 0.27371 [0.22 1.04] <0.001
Shoulder movement, angle in degrees (◦) 32.90± 8.03 [21.81 44.42] 22.00± 12.48 [11.93 35.97] <0.001
Elbow movement, angle in degrees (◦) 36.83± 7.65 [19.65 44.79] 19.18± 5.03 [6.94 28.87] <0.001
Shoulder/elbow index 0.78± 0.05 [0.71 0.88] 1.36± 0.30 [1.0 1.58] <0.001
TABLE 2 | Individual slopes of robust multilinear regression models of kinematic changes in the three stroke patients (n.s.: not significant).
Parameter Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3
Inaccuracy, turning points −0.24, p = 0.26 (n.s.) −0.14, p = 0.02 −0,06, p < 0.001
Average velocity (distance/time) (vu/s) + 0.14e-3, p < 0.001 + 0.13e-3, p < 0.001 + 0.17e-3, p < 0.001
Grip pressure +1.1e-3, p = 0.08 (n.s.) +4.4e-3, p < 0.001 +8.4e-3, p < 0.001
Shoulder movement, angle in degrees (◦) +0.14, p = 0.45 (n.s.) +0.4, p = 0.01 +1.2, p < 0.001
Elbow movement, angle in degrees (◦) +0.49, p = 0.01 +0.36, p = 0.01 +0.36, p < 0.001
Shoulder/elbow index −27e-3, p = 0.007 −15e-3, p = 0.05 −6e-3, p = 0.46 (n.s.)
based on an iteratively reweighted least squares algorithm. The
weights of each iteration were calculated by applying a bisquared
function to the residuals of the previous iteration. For every
fitting function the slope b of coefficient estimates was presented.
The significance level was set to p = 0.05 for all tests.
RESULTS
Patients differed significantly with regard to motor performance
(accuracy, temporal efficiency, range of motion) and
movement quality (proximal inter-joint coordination) from
the healthy control group (Table 1). Most notably, they applied
compensatory strategies by using more shoulder than elbow
movements.
However, the patients showed motor learning in the course of
the training program with significant changes in most kinematic
measures toward the reference parameters of healthy participants
(Table 2) paralleled by improved FMA-UA scores (+1, +2, +5
points, respectively) in the end of the training.
Most importantly, the evolution of movement pattern
kinematics of the shoulder and elbow enabled us to quantify
the individual degree of natural movement restoration for
each patient: Patient 1 had the lowest scores in all kinematic
parameters and also showed the poorest motor performance
(Figure 3). However, he presented with the steepest evolution of
movement quality and was the only patient to reach the reference
parameter of healthy participants (Figure 4). By contrast, patient
3 showed the highest kinematic parameters, i.e., the best
motor performance (Figure 3), but also revealed the strongest
compensatory movements with the shoulder (Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
Rehabilitation devices with a gravity-compensating arm
exoskeleton provide assistance for intensive exercises in severely
affected stroke patients and may thereby improve motor
performance in the course of a training intervention (Housman
et al., 2009). However, functional gains in hemiparetic patients
are often achieved by non-physiologic movements with a
disturbed shoulder-arm inter-joint coordination (Levin, 1996;
Levin et al., 2002). Although these compensatory strategies might
be efficient in short-term task accomplishment, they may lead
to long-term complications such as pain and joint-contracture
(Cirstea and Levin, 2007). Movement pattern kinematics may
provide accurate, valid, reproducible and predictive measures
of the impairment severity in chronic stroke (Subramanian
et al., 2010) and of atypical movement patterns that aim to
compensate the diminished range of motion of the affected limb
(Cirstea and Levin, 2000). In this context, providing detailed
information about how the movement is carried out, i.e., the
movement quality regarding inter-joint coordination, is more
liable to recover premorbid movement patters and to avoid
compensatory movements than to provide information about
movement outcome, i.e., end-point based accuracy information,
only (Cirstea et al., 2006; Cirstea and Levin, 2007). When this
feedback is administered during virtual reality training, even less
compensation was achieved in the moderate-to-severe group
(Subramanian et al., 2013). However, in these previous studies,
information on movement quality was provided explicitly to
the patients via auditory feedback. Moreover, all patients who
received this feedback on their movement pattern kinematics
were mildly or moderately-to-severely affected and were able to
perform reach-to-grasp movements without assistance.
In the present feasibility study, we extended this line of
research by incorporating information on movement quality
as implicit closed-loop feedback in the virtual environment
of an exoskeleton-based rehabilitation device suitable for
severely affected stroke patients who require gravity-support
to perform activities of daily living such as reach-to-grasp
exercises. Notably, antigravity-support did not interfere with the
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FIGURE 3 | Motor performance data for subjects (boxplots) and individual patients over the time course of training.
kinematic evaluation of proximal inter-joint coordination. By
contrast, this approach allowed disentangling in patients with
severe impairments whether improved motor performance was
achieved by compensation or by functional restoration. Notably,
improvement in kinematic measures may be misleading since
driven by compensatory strategies. The observations of this
study highlighted that these measures were not sufficient to
fully assess the evolution during motor rehabilitation thereby
supporting the analysis of multi-joint information along the
movement trajectory. Moreover, the continuous visual feedback
of the whole arm kinematics allowed the patients to adjust
their movement quality online during each task; an approach
closely resembling natural motor learning. Although pathological
measures improved significantly toward the reference parameters
of healthy participants, this study did not provide evidence for the
specificity of these effects to the implemented setup, i.e., feedback
modality. Future studies need therefore to address this question
by directly comparing multi-joint with end-effector feedback
in controlled trials with long-term follow up evaluation, before
conclusions about the therapeutic superiority of the presented
approach can be drawn. In any case, however, the diagnostic
advantage of detecting compensatory strategies (i.e., use of
proximal instead of distal joints in a reach-to-grasp task) with the
help of the multi-joint orthosis remains evident.
Future studies may explore the additional effects of brain
stimulation on movement quality for assisted reach-to-grasp
exercises: a recent study which applied bilateral transcranial
direct current stimulation has demonstrated improved motor
performance beyond the natural learning curve while using the
very same multi-joint arm exoskeleton studied in the present
work (Naros et al., 2016a). Moreover, brain state-dependent
transcranial magnetic stimulation has been demonstrated to
induce robust increases of corticospinal excitability (Kraus
et al., 2016b) and may thereby amplify use-dependent plasticity
when applied in conjunction with orthotic rehabilitation devices
(Gharabaghi, 2015). Future approaches may also address patients
with even more limited residual motor function as well (which
might not benefit from the presented approach) by providing
closed-loop feedback with a robotic multi-joint exoskeleton
during brain-states in which both the participant’s effort to move
and the responsiveness of the brain for peripheral input are
reflected (Brauchle et al., 2015). In such a restorative framework,
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FIGURE 4 | Movement quality data for subjects (boxplots) and individual patients over the time course of training.
closed-loop interfaces follow an operant conditioning rationale,
providing contingent feedback to facilitate self-regulation of
specific brain activity which is considered to be beneficial for
recovery andmight ultimately lead to functional gains (Bauer and
Gharabaghi, 2015a). Accordingly, these brain-robot interfaces
were found to constitute a back-door to the motor system
(Bauer et al., 2015; Gharabaghi et al., 2014a), since this type of
feedback training may result in connectivity changes of cortico-
spinal (Kraus et al., 2016a) and cortico-cortical motor networks
(Vukelić et al., 2014; Vukelić and Gharabaghi, 2015a,b) and
thereby lead to behavioral gains after the intervention (Naros
et al., 2016b). Recently, pilot data has suggested that such
restorative brain-robot interfaces may even lead to task-specific
motor improvement in chronic stroke (Naros and Gharabaghi,
2015).
Problematic for restorative approaches is, however, that the
considerable challenge of these devices (Bauer and Gharabaghi,
2015b; Fels et al., 2015) might condition the patients to
explore alternative, i.e., therapeutically non-desired, strategies
(Gharabaghi et al., 2014b). Particularly in patients with severe
impairments, motor compensation could limit genuine motor
restoration. In this context, detection and closed-loop feedback
of movement quality during rehabilitation exercises would allow
differentiating recovery from compensation and thus encourage
the relearning of premorbid movement patterns. For those
patients, however, who benefit less from the implicit closed-loop
information provided in the presented set-up (e.g., patient 3)
more explicit feedback or even segmental movement restriction
by the orthosis might be necessary to reinforce the targeted
movement pattern.
In conclusion, virtual reality visualization and feedback of
joint-specific movement kinematics facilitates to monitor the
evolution of upper extremity movement kinematics and to
quantify the individual degree of natural movement restoration
in the course of rehabilitation training of severelymotor impaired
patients; controlled studies with a larger cohort of stroke patients
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 280
36
Grimm et al. Closed-Loop Feedback of Movement Quality
need to investigate whether this approach also allows to achieve
the rehabilitation goals in accordance with the individual capacity
for functional recovery.
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Cognitive impairment is a common non-motor feature of Parkinson’s disease (PD).
Understanding the neural mechanisms of this deficit is crucial for the development of
efficient methods for treatment monitoring and augmentation of cognitive functions in PD
patients. The current study aimed to investigate resting state fMRI correlates of cognitive
impairment in PD from a large-scale network perspective, and to assess the impact of
dopamine deficiency on these networks. Thirty PD patients with resting state fMRI were
included from the Parkinson’s Progression Marker Initiative (PPMI) database. Eighteen
patients from this sample were also scanned with 123I-FP-CIT SPECT. A standardized
neuropsychological battery was administered, evaluating verbal memory, visuospatial, and
executive cognitive domains. Image preprocessing was performed using an SPM8-based
workflow, obtaining time-series from 90 regions-of-interest (ROIs) defined from the AAL
brain atlas. The Brain Connectivity Toolbox (BCT) was used to extract nodal strength from
all ROIs, and modularity of the cognitive circuitry determined using the meta-analytical
software Neurosynth. Brain-behavior covariance patterns between cognitive functions
and nodal strength were estimated using Partial Least Squares. Extracted latent variable
(LV) scores were matched with the performances in the three cognitive domains
(memory, visuospatial, and executive) and striatal dopamine transporter binding ratios
(SBR) using linear modeling. Finally, influence of nigrostriatal dopaminergic deficiency
on the modularity of the “cognitive network” was analyzed. For the range of deficits
studied, better executive performance was associated with increased dorsal fronto-parietal
cortical processing and inhibited subcortical and primary sensory involvement. This profile
was also characterized by a relative preservation of nigrostriatal dopaminergic function.
The profile associated with better memory performance correlated with increased
prefronto-limbic processing, and was not associated with presynaptic striatal dopamine
uptake. SBR ratios were negatively correlated with modularity of the “cognitive network,”
suggesting integrative effects of the preserved nigrostriatal dopamine system on this
circuitry.
Keywords: parkinson’s disease, cognition, dopamine, resting state fMRI, SPECT, graph theory, nodal strength,
modularity
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive impairment is a very important and common non-
motor feature of Parkinson’s disease (PD) with a major impact on
patients’ and caregivers’ quality of life, as well as healthcare costs
(Muslimovic et al., 2005; Vossius et al., 2011; Svenningsson et al.,
2012). Approximately one-fifth of newly diagnosed PD patients
fulfill clinical criteria for mild cognitive impairment (PD-MCI)
(Aarsland et al., 2009) and about one-sixth develop dementia after
5 years (Williams-Gray et al., 2009).
Although the exact role and mechanisms of the dopaminer-
gic system in cognition are still a matter of debate, there is no
doubt that its preservation is crucial for cognitive functioning of
PD patients. Thus, there is strong evidence suggesting that the
impairment of at least 3 major dopaminergic pathways (nigrostri-
atal, mesocortical, mesolimbic) originating in the brainstem play
a very important role in cognitive dysfunction associated with PD
(Narayanan et al., 2013).
Previous neuroimaging studies assessing brain net-
works in vivo have shown impairment of the dopaminergic
pathways and related neural circuits in PD. Numerous
studies on cognitive dysfunction associated with PD have
revealed structural and functional abnormalities within the
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cortico-strio-thalamo-cortical circuits, known to be largely
modulated by the dopaminergic system (Hirano et al., 2012;
Christopher and Strafella, 2013).
Decreased 6-[18F]-fluorodopa (18F-DOPA) uptake in the ante-
rior cingulate cortex, ventral striatum and right caudate nucleus
has been found in PD patients with dementia (PDD) com-
pared to PD (Ito et al., 2002). Studies employing Single Photon
Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) with the dopamine
transporter-binding ligands (DaTSCAN) also suggest more severe
striatal presynaptic dopaminergic deficiency in PDD compared
to PD patients, especially in the caudate nuclei (O’Brien et al.,
2004). In addition, there is also evidence suggesting an association
between striatal 18F-DOPA uptake and executive performance in
PD patients (Bruck et al., 2001; Cheesman et al., 2005; Cropley
et al., 2008).
Several 18F-fludeoxyglucose Positron Emission Tomography
(FDG-PET) studies analyzing brain networks in PD have iden-
tified partially overlapping patterns of brain metabolic changes
associated with cognitive impairment in multiple domains, sug-
gesting that the PD-related profile of cognitive impairment is
associated with reduced glucose metabolism mainly in prefrontal,
parietal, hippocampal, and striatal regions (Mentis et al., 2002;
Huang et al., 2007a,b; Eidelberg, 2009). H152 O-PET studies have
shown an impaired basal ganglia and dorsolateral prefrontal
response during executive task performance in PD (Owen et al.,
1998; Dagher et al., 2001; Cools et al., 2002).
Functional MRI studies have also revealed abnormalities
within the frontal-subcortical circuits in patients with PD. For
instance, an abnormal fronto-striatal response during executive
task performance has been found in cognitively impaired PD
patients compared to non-impaired ones (Lewis et al., 2003).
Another fMRI study assessing working memory and motor func-
tions in ON and OFF dopaminergic medication states in PD
patients (Mattay et al., 2002) found increased prefrontal and pari-
etal activations during the working memory task performance in
the OFF state, which were positively correlated with errors during
the task. Studies focusing on set-shifting paradigms have found
a PD-associated pattern of prefrontal and parietal response char-
acterized by either reduced or increased activation depending on
whether the caudate nucleus was involved in the task (Monchi
et al., 2004, 2007).
Notably, a pharmacological fMRI study in healthy subjects
revealed a significant effect of L-dopa administration on stri-
atal functional connectivity (Kelly et al., 2009). In addition
to its effects on motor networks, L-dopa increased functional
connectivity between the ventral striatum and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, and disrupted connectivity of the striatum
with components of the default mode network (Kelly et al.,
2009). Impaired deactivation of the default mode network
during executive task performance has been reported in sev-
eral fMRI studies of PD (Tinaz et al., 2008; Van Eimeren
et al., 2009). Resting state fMRI studies have reported abnor-
mal cortico-striatal connectivity in PD (Wu et al., 2009; Helmich
et al., 2010; Kwak et al., 2010), while L-DOPA administra-
tion has been shown to enhance functional connectivity in
the frontal areas of the sensorimotor network (Esposito et al.,
2013).
The brain is a complex biological system that demonstrates
emergent network properties on different scales, even at a cellular
and single-structure level (Welsh et al., 2010). At the cellular
scale, neocortical neurons are organized into sets of structurally
and physiologically merged modules (Mountcastle, 1997), which
in turn, are grouped into functionally segregated hypercolumns,
wired with inter-modular connections. At the larger scale, system-
wide coordination of the brain networks give rise to the coherent
dynamic states that support cognitive functions and behavior
(Sporns, 2013). Large-scale network architecture of the human
brain appears to combine two principles of structural and func-
tional organization. On the one hand, densely connected net-
work modules or communities promote specialized processing
and functional segregation. On the other hand, these special-
ized communities are interconnected via long-distance pathways
that ensure efficient functional integration across multiple func-
tional domains. Maintaining the balance between segregation and
integration is thought to be essential for establishing complex
network dynamics that support cognition (Sporns, 2010).
Recent advances in neuroscience and mathematical modeling
have made it possible to apply classical concepts of graph theory
to the analysis of brain network structure and dynamics (Rubinov
and Sporns, 2010; Sporns, 2010). Graph-theoretical studies of
structural and functional networks of the brain have revealed
“small-world” properties (Achard and Bullmore, 2007), i.e., the
coexistence of dense local connectivity with relatively sparse long-
range connections. Such small-world networks combine high
clustering with a relatively short path length between any pair of
the elements (e.g., brain regions). The “small-world” model may
be of functional importance as it balances functional segregation
(high modularity or clustering) and functional integration (short
path length) and thus offers a network architecture that may be
well-suited for neuronal information processing (Sporns and Zwi,
2004).
To date, there are very few studies of PD employing graph the-
oretical framework for fMRI data analysis. Skidmore et al. found
reduced whole-brain global efficiency in PD (Skidmore et al.,
2011). Compared to healthy controls, 14 PD patients included
in the study demonstrated reduced local efficiency (nodal level)
in the precentral regions, primary and secondary visual cortex.
Another recent study found global reduction of network-level
processing efficacy in PD. Analysis of network modules indi-
cated decreased interaction of the visual network with other
brain modules, but abnormally increased connectivity within
the sensorimotor network. The authors interpreted the latter as
a compensatory mechanism aimed at overcoming the striato-
cortical functional deficit within the motor loops, which may
also be associated with loss of mutual inhibition between brain
networks (Gottlich et al., 2013).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous stud-
ies assessing brain correlates of PD-related cognitive impairment
employing both dopamine transporter imaging and fMRI with
graph theory metrics.
In the present study, we assessed global and local network-
level correlates of cognitive dysfunction and related dopaminergic
impairment in PD using the graph theory metrics of nodal
strength and modularity.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 45
40
Lebedev et al. Dopamine and cognition in PD
We hypothesized that the PD-related profile of cognitive
impairment would be associated mainly with abnormalities
within the fronto-subcortical (impaired cortico-striatal connec-
tivity) and fronto-parietal circuits, which are closely related to
nigrostriatal deficiency.
METHODS
The main workflow steps are illustrated in Figure S1.
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA
We included all 30 subjects (31 minus one subject excluded dur-
ing quality control due to “cuts” of dorsal cortical areas) with
rs-fMRI enrolled in the Parkinson’s Progression Marker Initiative
(PPMI) (in total 452 PD patients), a multicenter study launched
in 2010 designed to identify progression biomarkers in newly
diagnosed PD patients (www.ppmi-info.org/data).
Inclusion criteria required that subjects must have at least two
of the following symptoms: resting tremor, bradykinesia, rigidity
or either asymmetric resting tremor or asymmetric bradykine-
sia. In addition, the subjects had to be drug naïve, Hoehn and
Yahr stage I or II at baseline, and a screening 123I-FP-CIT SPECT
scan, sensitive to the loss of striatal dopamine transporter (DaT)
binding.
Exclusion criteria were atypical PD syndromes due to drugs or
metabolic disorders, encephalitis, or other degenerative diseases.
In addition, it was required that the subject was not taking lev-
odopa, DA agonists, MAO-B inhibitors, amantadine, or other PD
medication; or had taken levodopa or dopamine agonists prior to
baseline for more than a total of 60 days.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
In addition to a cognitive screening test, the Montreal Cognitive
Assessment (MoCA), all subjects underwent a neuropsychological
test battery developed to assess major cognitive domains affected
by PD.
Visuospatial function was evaluated using the 15-item ver-
sion of the Benton’s Judgment of Line Orientation Test, which
examines the ability of a subject to estimate angular relationships
between line segments by visually matching angled line pairs to
11 numbered radii forming a semi-circle (Benton et al., 1978).
Verbal memory was assessed using the Hopkins Verbal
Learning Test-Revised (HVLT-R) (Shapiro et al., 1999), which
consists of presenting a list of 12 words over three learning
trials. With each repetition, subjects are expected to learn addi-
tional words on the list and increase their performance with
each trial. Total immediate recall or encoding (sum of trial 1–3)
and delayed recall (after 20–25 min) scores were included in this
study.
Executive functions were evaluated using three semantic flu-
ency tests (names of animals, fruits, and vegetables, in 1 min
each), the MoCA subtests of phonemic fluency (words that start
from the letter “F,” in 1 min) and alternating trail making (draw-
ing a line, going from a number to a letter, in ascending order;
score 0–1).
Attention was assessed by the Letter-Number Sequencing Test
(LNST), in which a combination of numbers and letters is read
to the subject who is then asked to recall the numbers, first
in ascending order and then the letters in alphabetical order.
The Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT) was also used to
assess attention, in which specific numbers had to be paired with
geometric figures based on a reference key within 90 s.
COGNITIVE DOMAINS
Three cognitive domains were calculated based on the standard-
ized tests for memory, visuospatial, and attention/executive func-
tioning. Raw values were converted to z-scores using the mean
and standard deviation of the healthy control group. Domain
composite scores were calculated by averaging z-scores of the
standardized tests in each cognitive domain.
In the memory domain, three learning trials and the
delayed recall of HVLT-R were included. The visuospatial
domain included the Benton judgment of line orientation. The
attention/executive domain included the LNST, SDMT, seman-
tic fluency, and the phonemic fluency test. No corrections
were performed to adjust the tests scores for age or gender
given that the subsequent analyses included these variables as
nuisances.
Since the calculated composite scores for cognitive domains
were scaled and reflected positive cognitive performance (the
higher the score, the better functioning in a corresponding
domain), we defined the “motor” domain by inverting and scaling
UPDRS-III raw scores in order to achieve the same variable scale
and direction (higher scores correspond to better motor function)
when assessing and plotting the results.
AUTOMATED META-ANALYSIS IN NEUROSYNTH
In order to support our hypotheses and to objectively iden-
tify regions that are relevant for cognitive functions, an auto-
mated search using the meta-analytical software Neurosynth
(http://neurosynth.org) was undertaken. This approach utilizes
text-mining and machine-learning techniques to perform prob-
abilistic mapping between neural and cognitive states (Yarkoni
et al., 2011). In the present study, the Python-based ver-
sion (https://github.com/neurosynth/neurosynth) was used. The
database was accessed on 24.10.13, searching for the key-words
“executive” (237 studies), “visuospatial” (n = 116) and “mem-
ory” (n = 1470).
After the search overlapping patterns were found between cog-
nitive domains. They were in line with the regions that have
revealed an association with cognitive impairment in PD high-
lighted in the introduction. Thus, the profile of visuospatial
functions included prefrontal, parietal, and occipital regions. The
“executive” pattern contained prefrontal [with more extended
involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)], cin-
gulate, superior parietal, temporo-occipital, basal ganglia, and
cerebellar regions. Finally, the “memory” profile, in addition
to prefrontal and parietal regions, also included hippocampus,
temporal areas, and basal ganglia.
Due to the observed overlap, the resulting statistical maps were
merged and overlaid with the Automated Anatomical Labeling
(AAL) atlas in order to have an unbiased definition of ROIs
associated with cognitive functions for further network analysis.
The main steps of the meta-analysis and the resulting maps are
illustrated in Figure S2.
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MRI
Image acquisition
A standardized MRI protocol included acquisition of whole-brain
structural and functional scans on 3 Tesla Siemens Trio Tim MR
system. More details can be found in the MRI technical operations
manual at http://www.ppmi-info.org/.
3D T1 structural images were acquired in a sagittal orientation
using a MPRAGE GRAPPA protocol with Repetition Time (TR) =
2300 ms, Echo Time (TE) = 2.98 ms, Field of View (FoV) =
256 mm, Flip Angle (FA) = 9◦ and 1 mm3 isotropic voxel.
For each subject, 212 BOLD echo-planar rs-fMRI images (40
slices each, ascending direction) were acquired during a 8 min,
29 s scanning session (acquisition parameters: TR = 2400 ms,
TE = 25 ms, FoV = 222 mm, FA = 80◦ and 3.3 mm3 isotropic
voxels). Subjects were instructed to rest quietly, keeping their eyes
open and not to fall asleep.
123I-FP-CIT SPECT
In the fMRI + DaTSCAN subgroup (n = 18), only those PD
patients who had both fMRI and DaTSCAN acquired within less
than a week interval were included.
Image acquisition was performed 4 ± 0.5 h after injection of
123I-FP-CIT, a time-point at which striatal specific binding ratios
are stable (Booij et al., 1999) with a target dose of 185 MBq. The
radiopharmaceutical was provided as a unit dose and filled to a
standard volume, which was re-assayed.
Raw projection data were acquired into a 128 × 128 matrix
with steps of 3 or 4 degrees for the total projections. Image pre-
processing (reconstruction, attenuation correction, spatial nor-
malization) was performed using the Hermes software (Medical
Solutions, Stockholm, Sweden) at a central SPECT Core lab in
New Haven (Connecticut, United States). Specific binding ratios
were calculated for the left and right caudate nuclei according to
specific binding ratio = (L/R Caudate)/(Occipital area) − 1 and
then averaged for further analysis.
IMAGE PREPROCESSING
As a first step, a population template was generated from the
bias-corrected T1 structural images using the Diffeomorphic
Anatomical Registration Through Exponentiated Lie Algebra
(DARTEL) algorithm (Ashburner, 2007) in order to improve
normalization quality.
For the fMRI data, two initial echo-planar volumes were
automatically removed by the scanner software to minimize
T1 effects on the T2∗ echo-planar images, and the remain-
ing 210 volumes underwent preprocessing in the SPM8-based
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) pipeline implemented in the
Data Processing Assistant for Resting-State fMRI: Advanced
Edition (DPARSFA, version 2.3) (Chao-Gan and Yu-Feng, 2010),
installed within the MATLAB environment (Matlab 8.0 and
Statistics Toolbox, 2012).
Next, functional images underwent the following preprocess-
ing steps: spatial realignment and slice-timing correction, co-
registration with the high-resolution structural scans. Finally, the
co-registered BOLD volumes were normalized into standardized
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space using the DARTEL
template and resampled to 3 mm3 isotropic voxels. Spurious
variance was reduced by a voxel-specific head motion correction
(Satterthwaite et al., 2013) and by regressing-out time-series from
the white matter and cerebrospinal fluid. Next, the images were
band-pass filtered to eliminate biologically non-relevant signals
(Biswal et al., 1995; Lowe et al., 1998) (it was not necessary to use
large smoothing kernels due to a ROI-based framework imple-
mented in the study), and the resulting low-frequency fluctua-
tions were extracted from 90 regions-of-interest (ROIs) defined
in the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and were used in
the subsequent network analysis (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010).
DATA ANALYSIS
Network analysis
The data analysis workflow was developed in order to assess
both regional and global network-level correlates of presynap-
tic DAT uptake and cognitive functions. To do this, two metrics
were selected: nodal strength (local measure) and modularity of a
network (global measure).
Generalization of nodal strength and modularity for positive and
negative connections
In binarized networks, the number of edges emanating from
a particular node is known as its degree. For non-binarized
networks, this metric has generalization called nodal strength
(weighted degree), defined as the sum of neighboring link weights
(Rubinov and Sporns, 2010).
Although the source of negative correlations in rs-fMRI is still
a matter of debate (Fox et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2009), there
is strong evidence supporting a biological origin (Chang and
Glover, 2009). In light of this, generalizations of several weighted
graph theory metrics have been developed taking into account
negative correlations (Rubinov and Sporns, 2011).
Thus, nodal strength can be calculated for positive






[Equation (1), adopted from Rubinov and Sporns, 2011] Where:
N—set of all nodes in the network;
(i, j)—link between nodes i and j (i, j ∈ N), associated with
connection weights wij (0 < |w| < 1)
Nodal strength can therefore be computed for both positive
and negative weights (±). In our analysis, the total strength of
both positive and negative weights was used.
A widely used metric for network modularity is formally
defined as the fraction of the edges that are within a given
set of communities minus the expected fraction of edges if
the network was randomly wired (Newman, 2006). The met-
ric therefore serves as a global large-scale network measure that
allows quantification of the community structure of the brain.
Higher modularity values for a particular network are generally
associated with denser within-modular connections, but sparser
connections between nodes that are in different modules.
Generalization of the modularity to both positive and nega-
tive correlations is more complex than nodal strength due to the
differences in significance of positive and negative weights when
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determining modularity-partitions. Therefore, a non-symmetric
generalization of network modularity has been proposed as:
Q∗ = Q+ + v
−
v+ + v− Q
− (2a)
























—difference between present within-module con-
nection weights w and chance-expected within-module connec-
tion weights e;
δMiMj = 1, when i and j are in the same module and δMiMj = 0
otherwise.
v± = ∑i ∈ N s±i —total weight (the sum of all positive or nega-
tive weights)
The Brain Connectivity Toolbox (BCT,
http://www.brain-connectivity-toolbox.net) (Rubinov and
Sporns, 2010) was used to compute the described measures.
Of note, connectivity matrices were neither thresholded nor
binarized. Instead we employed a strategy that aimed to analyze
weighted graphs by taking into account both positive and
negative weights.
Next, the analysis proceeded in two directions with the aim
of assessing local and global network-level correlates of cognitive
functioning in PD and the impact of nigrostriatal dopaminergic
deficiency on these networks.
All statistical analyses were performed using the R program-
ming language, version 3.0.1 (R Core Team, 2013).
Dimensionality reduction: covariance patterns between nodal
strength and cognitive functions
Partial Least Squares Regression (PLSR) was performed to reduce
the dimensionality of the data, estimating latent components
associated with composite scores for each domain (executive,
memory, visuospatial).
PLSR is an effective data-driven method that allows high-
dimensional associations between explanatory and response vari-
ables to be reduced into a small set of latent variables (LVs) (Wold
et al., 1984). After decomposition, each of the LVs represents a
distinct pattern of brain–behavior associations.
The following elements of these components were of particu-
lar interest in our study: (1) eigenvector (loadings) showing the
degree to which a given LV contributes to the variance within the
X-matrix (in our case, brain network measures), and (2) a set of
scores representing a transform of a particular data-point into a
latent component’s space (the degree to which a given component
is “represented” in a particular subject).
The models were assessed with leave-one-out cross-validation.
As a result, 3 LVs minimizing total Root Mean Squared Error
Prediction (RMSEP) for all 3 domains were selected. For details,
see Figure S3. Individual LV scores were subsequently correlated
with 3 cognitive domains using motor function, age, and sex as
nuisance covariates.
GLM formula:
LVN−score ∼ (executive domain) + (memory domain)
+ (visuospatial domain) + (motor domain)
+ (age) + (sex). (3)
Finally, the scores were correlated with mean caudate DaT bind-
ing ratios in order to investigate which of them were influenced by
nigrostriatal dopamine deficiency. The analysis was focused only
on the caudate nuclei (without putamen), as this striatal structure
is well-documented to be involved in cognition.
Due to the concerns regarding potential influence of motion
artifacts, in addition to a voxel-specific correction strategy
(Satterthwaite et al., 2013), analysis of motion with respect to the
variables of interest (cognitive, motor domains, and age) was also
performed. For this purpose, first principal component extracted
from the absolute mean displacement values (x, y, and z axes) as
well as relative displacements were used.
None of our variables of interest (executive, memory, and
visuospatial domains) demonstrated significant association. The
only significant associations were found for the motor domain
(pmean displacement = 0.036; prelative displacement = 0.035) and age
(pmean displacement = 0.026), as expected. These variables were
included in the modes as nuisance covariates.
Impact of nigrostriatal deficiency on the modularity of cognitive
brain circuitry
For the second part, adjacency matrices were constructed using
60 AAL ROIs identified during the meta-analysis step (see Meta-
Analysis section and Figure S2). Next, modularity was estimated
based on both negative and positive weights [as described in
Equations 2a and 2b].
Finally, an association between network modularity and mean
DaT uptake in the caudate nuclei was analyzed using linear
modeling.
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHICS AND CLINICAL DATA
Demographics and clinical characteristics are shown in Table 1.
The data were representative of the entire DaTSCAN cohort of
PD patients (results not shown). Of note, visuospatial functions
were relatively less affected than executive and memory domains.
GRAPH THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Brain-behavior covariance patterns
The analysis was performed with PLS LV-scores determined after
the dimensionality reduction step (see corresponding Methods
section).
Nodal strength
The first PLS LV captured global effects. Its higher scores were
associated with higher strength of all 90 nodes with largest effects
on motor, prefrontal cortices, and striatum. On a behavioral level,
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Table 1 | Demographics and clinical data.
Complete sample (n = 30) Subsample* (n = 18)
Mean [±SD] Median (range) Mean [±SD] Median (range)
Age 61.67 [±9.46] 62 (40–75) 60.11 [±9.04] 61 (44–75)
MoCA 26.67 [±3] 27 (15–30) 26.72 [±3.5] 27 (15–30)
ExecDom −0.254 [±0.73] −0.125 (−1.37–1.26) −0.297 [±0.67] −0.125 (−1.35–0.99)
MemDom −0.51 [±1.2] −0.41 (−2.81–1.47) −0.73 [±1.26] −0.51 (−2.81–1.25)
VspDom 0.06 [±0.78] −0.06 (−1.57–0.95) 0.08 [±0.84] 0.44 (−1.57–0.95)
UPDRS III 20.2 [±10.6] 17 (7–47) 19.83 [±10.9] 17 (7–47)
Male/Female ratio was 2:1.
*Subsample of subjects who had both fMRI and DaTSCAN acquired within less than a week interval.
MoCA, the Montreal Cognitive Assessment; ExecDom, “Executive” domain; MemDom, “Memory” domain; VspDom, “Visuospatial” domain; UPDRS III, part III of
the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale.
Table 2 | Associations between component scores and behavioral data: nodal strength.
Executive Memory Visuospatial Motor
T DOF p T DOF p T DOF p T DOF p
LV I 0.782 29 0.442 1.35 29 0.19 −0.89 29 0.383 3 29 0.006
LV II −0.656 29 0.518 −2.45 29 0.022 −1.74 29 0.094 1.327 29 0.127
LV III 3.21 29 0.004 −1.74 29 0.096 1.65 29 0.113 −2.02 29 0.055
The table shows associations between latent variable (LV) scores extracted from the nodal strength data and performance in 3 cognitive (executive, memory,
visuospatial) and motor domains. Positive significant associations are depicted in red and negative ones in blue.
In total, 3 models were fitted with component scores as dependent variables, cognitive domains as independent variables (other covariates: motor domain score
[also shown here as an important confounder], age and sex).
T, t-statistics; DOF, degrees of freedom.
this component was positively associated with motor function
(see Table 2, Figure 1).
The second LV was associated with higher degree of pos-
terior (supramarginal, superior parietal, posterior cingulate,
occipital regions) and striatal nodes, and lower prefronto-
limbic (orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate, parahippocampal,
temporopolar regions) nodal strength (except for operculo-
triangular, middle frontal areas, and left hippocampus,
which demonstrated positive associations). Behaviorally,
this component displayed a negative association with mem-
ory function, that is to say that better memory performance
was associated with reversed component pattern, favoring
the involvement of prefronto-limbic nodes (see Table 2,
Figure 1).
The third LV, in turn, favored cortical-subcortical segrega-
tion with positive associations found in dorsal cortical nodes
(dorsolateral prefrontal, frontal and parietal areas) and neg-
ative in subcortical structures (hippocampi, striatum, globus
pallidus), primary visual, middle temporal, and paralimbic
(ventral prefrontal) areas. Higher scores of this component
were associated with better executive performance (see Table 2,
Figure 1).
Latent variable scores and caudate DaT uptake
Analysis of the effects of nigrostriatal dopaminergic deficiency on
the LVs estimated from the nodal strength revealed significant
positive associations of mean caudate SBR ratios with I and III
LV-scores (See Table 3, Figure 2).
This means that higher caudate DaT binding is associated with
global increase of nodal strength and segregation toward more
active dorsal cortical processing when the subject is at rest.
Modularity of the cognitive circuitry and caudate DaT binding
The analysis revealed negative effects of the preserved dopaminer-
gic function on modularity of the cognitive circuit (T = −3.6, 17
DOF, p = 0.002), suggesting greater integration among regions
within this network (see Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to assess
large-scale network correlates of PD-related cognitive impair-
ment and presynaptic dopaminergic deficiency, combining rs-
fMRI and DaTSCAN. Higher executive functional scores were
associated with higher nodal strength of dorsal cortical nodes
(predominantly in dorsolateral prefrontal, premotor, and supe-
rior parietal regions) and lower involvement of subcortical, occip-
ital, temporal, and ventral cortical nodes, suggesting that relative
preservation of executive functions in PD is linked to the domi-
nance of dorsal cortical processing with inhibition of subcortical,
paralimbic, and primary sensory circuitry when the subject is at
resting state with eyes open. This pattern was positively influenced
by higher nigrostriatal dopaminergic function.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 45
44
Lebedev et al. Dopamine and cognition in PD
FIGURE 1 | Associations between component scores and behavioral
data: nodal strength. (A) Between-component correlation plot. Positive
association (r = 0.5) was found between latent variables (LVs) I and III.
(B) Associations between LV scores extracted from the nodal strength data
and performance in 3 cognitive (executive, memory, visuospatial) and motor
domains. On the right-hand side of the graph, corresponding loading maps
are depicted in brain space, reflecting the relevance of the nodes (spheres)
for a particular LV, the magnitude of which is represented by nodal size.
Positive loading values are depicted as red spheres, whereas negative ones
are shown in blue. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
Our results are consistent with an abnormally increased
fronto-striatal connectivity found in a single-blind placebo-
controlled rs-fMRI study of PD patients (Kwak et al., 2010), in
which this hyperconnectivity was down-regulated by L-DOPA
administration. Further analysis in this study revealed PD-related
increase of power in the low-frequency band (0.02–0.05 Hz) in the
striatum, which was also reduced after L-DOPA administration.
Of note, this reduction correlated with L-DOPA-associated cog-
nitive improvement. Apart from this, an increase in spontaneous
oscillatory activity in the 10–35 Hz range (beta frequency band),
occurring within the basal ganglia-thalamocortical networks
and suppressed by dopaminergic treatment, is a well-replicated
pathophysiological finding in PD (Brown et al., 2001; Levy et al.,
2002; Gatev et al., 2006; Hammond et al., 2007), which provides
additional support of our results converging from other imaging
modalities.
The pattern associated with higher scores in the memory
domain favoring prefronto-limbic processing did not reveal
associations with presynaptic striatal dopamine uptake in the
present study. The latter suggests that other mechanisms may be
involved in the development of memory impairment associated
with PD. The most likely ones are mesocortical dopaminergic
deficiency (Narayanan et al., 2013) and impaired cortical cholin-
ergic function (Bohnen et al., 2003), which in turn may at least be
partly associated with concomitant cortical atrophy (Weintraub
et al., 2012).
Of note, our study did not find any correlates of visuospatial
impairment. However, this finding may be influenced by small
sample size and due to the fact that visuospatial function was only
mildly affected in the present cohort.
According to Mink’s hypothesis (Mink, 1996), the basal ganglia
play a crucial role in sustaining the balance between facilitation
and suppression of movements. If we consider executive functions
as the “movement of thoughts” a similar analogy can be drawn
within this context. Indeed, cognitive frontal-subcortical loops
is a widely accepted notion, where the DLPFC circuit has been
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documented to mediate set-shifting, complex problem-solving,
retrieval abilities, organizational strategies, concept-formation,
working memory (Zgaljardic et al., 2006), and other executive
functions that are known to be affected in PD. Preserved nigros-
triatal dopamine function therefore not only allows effective exe-
cution and termination of motor activity, but may also implement
Table 3 | Latent variable scores and mean caudate DaT binding.
CN DaT binding
T DOF p
LV I 2.87 17 0.011
LV II −0.096 17 0.925
LV III 2.281 17 0.037
The table shows associations of the PLS latent variables (LVs) extracted dur-
ing the dimensionality reduction step with nigrostriatal dopaminergic function
measured by 123I-FP-CIT SPECT (mean caudate SBR ratios). Positive signifi-
cant associations (depicted in red) were found for LVs I (“global/motor”) and
III (“executive”).
CN, Caudate Nucleus; DaT, Dopamine Transporter; T, t-statistics; DOF, degrees
of freedom.
smooth switching between cognitive patterns, controlling mutual
inhibition and/or facilitation of fronto-subcortical circuits. This is
also supported by computational models of the basal ganglia that
highlight their routing role in various cognitive functions, such as
for example action-selection (Stocco et al., 2010).
In general, higher DaT binding values were associated with
global integrative effects on the brain (global increase of nodal
strength). This was also confirmed for the cognitive circuitry
(defined during meta-analysis), where higher DaT SBR ratios
(relative preservation of dopaminergic function) were associated
with lower network-level modularity, suggesting that dopamine
favors integration of the cognitive network when the subject
is at rest. These results are in line with previous fMRI stud-
ies that indicated globally impaired network-level processing
in PD (Skidmore et al., 2011; Gottlich et al., 2013). Negative
effects of the preserved dopaminergic function on the modular-
ity of cognitive circuitry are also in line with previous literature.
Thus, a recent randomized double-blind rs-fMRI study of healthy
subjects with bromocriptine administration (dopamine agonist)
revealed drug-induced decreases in modularity, estimated for the
whole brain (White et al., 2013). Our results also suggest that
preserved nigrostriatal dopaminergic system allows supporting
integrity of the cognitive network when a subject is at rest. In
FIGURE 2 | Associations between component scores and mean
caudate DaT binding. Associations of latent variable (LV) scores
extracted from the nodal strength data with nigrostriatal dopaminergic
function measured by 123I-FP-CIT SPECT (mean caudate SBR ratios).
Positive associations (∗p < 0.05) were found for the Ist (“global/motor”)
and IIIrd (“executive”) LVs. Corresponding loading maps are depicted in
brain space, reflecting the relevance of the nodes (spheres) for a
particular LV, the magnitude of which is represented by nodal size.
Positive loading values are depicted as red spheres, whereas negative
ones are shown in blue.
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FIGURE 3 | Caudate DaT uptake and modularity of the cognitive
circuitry at rest. The figure shows significant (p < 0.01) negative
association between modularity of the cognitive circuitry (identified with
automated meta-analysis) and nigrostriatal dopaminergic function
measured by 123I-FP-CIT SPECT (mean caudate SBR ratios).
the light of this, it would be interesting to assess the dynamics
of cognitive circuitry during performance of particular executive
tasks or multi-tasking, where dopamine may have different or
even opposite effects on network modularity. This is supported
by previous functional imaging studies of executive functions
in PD, revealing that hypodopaminergic states are associated
with increased prefrontal cortical responses during performance
of corresponding tasks (Mattay et al., 2002), whereas L-dopa
administration, in contrast, decreases it (Cools et al., 2002). In
this context, it is also worth mentioning an event-related fMRI
study that found PD-related brain abnormalities during per-
formance of the set-shifting task specifically developed to elicit
caudate responses (Monchi et al., 2007). Compared to the con-
trol group, patients demonstrated increased cortical activation
in the condition not specifically requiring the caudate nucleus,
whereas decreased cortical activation was observed in the task
that involved the caudate nucleus. These studies, however, are not
focused on any specific dopaminergic system, looking at general
dopamine-related effects instead, and therefore do not necessar-
ily confirm the role of exactly nigrostriatal dopaminergic system
in these phenomena.
Finally, a recently published graph theoretical MEG study with
longitudinal design found that progression of PD is associated
with growing impairment of local integration (measured by clus-
tering coefficient) in multiple frequency bands and loss of global
brain network efficiency (based on path length) in the alpha2
frequency band. This deterioration was, in turn, correlated with
cognitive and motor impairment observed during disease pro-
gression (Olde Dubbelink et al., 2014). These findings provide
additional support for our results, also suggesting global positive
effects of dopaminergic preservation on efficient functioning of
the brain networks.
The main limitation of the present study is a relatively small
sample size. In addition, the cross-sectional design complicates
causal interpretation of the results. Apart from this, the resting
state setting itself hampers direct interpretation of the findings
with regard to the role of brain networks in cognitive task per-
formance. Active cognitive processing is likely associated with
patterns of brain dynamics that are different compared to the
ones occurring when the subject is at rest. These patterns in turn
may have different associations with altered dopaminergic func-
tion in PD. Therefore, this presents a need for further studies of
brain dynamics underlying cognitive processing in PD and related
dopaminergic deficits.
The main strengths are a multimodal approach and graph the-
oretical setting that have not yet been implemented together for
clarifying brain mechanisms of PD-related cognitive impairment.
Further strengths are a relatively broad cognitive evaluation com-
bining multiple tests to assess three major functional domains
and the drug-naïve status of the participants. Of note, although
the present study specifically investigated the nigrostriatal sys-
tem, the deficiency measured by 123I-FP-CIT SPECT might also
reflect indirect effects of neurodegeneration of dopaminergic
neurons within other pathways, since the severity of dopaminer-
gic deficits may correlate across different systems. Therefore, the
results should be interpreted with caution.
To summarize, our study found that PD-related executive
impairment is associated with altered balance between corti-
cal and subcortical processing at rest, when contribution of the
dorsal cortex is getting abnormally suppressed, and subcortical
processing is disinhibited. This pattern (unlike brain profiles of
visuospatial and memory impairment) is linked to nigrostriatal
deficiency, which also has disruptive effects on cognitive circuitry
at the network scale.
The results provide evidence for the contribution of the
nigrostrital dopaminergic system in human cognition, and the
described concept can potentially be utilized in future interven-
tional studies to monitor the effects of treatments, including the
approaches that augment cognitive functions.
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Figure S1 | Study Workflow. The study workflow consisted of IV main
steps: (I) Selection of 30 PD subjects with fMRI data from the complete
PPMI cohort and an fMRI + DaTSCAN subsample of 18 subjects; (II)
Preparation of the data for further analysis that, in turn, included (IIa)
calculation of composite scores for 3 cognitive domains, (IIb) automated
meta-analysis to define “cognitive network,” (IIc) image preprocessing
and network measure extraction; (III) Dimensionality reduction with PLS
followed by parametric tests evaluating associations between latent
variable (LV) scores and cognitive functions; (IV) Final analysis assessing
influence of caudate dopamine transporter (DaT) uptake on LV scores and
modularity of the “cognitive network.
Figure S2 | Automated meta-analysis workflow. An automated search
using the meta-analytical software Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org) was
undertaken in order to identify regions that are relevant for cognitive
functions. The key-words “executive” (237 studies), “visuospatial”
(n = 116) and “memory” (n = 1470). The profile of visuospatial functions
included prefrontal, parietal, and occipital regions. The “executive” pattern
contained prefrontal (with more extended involvement of DLPFC),
cingulate, superior parietal, temporo-occipital, basal ganglia, and cerebellar
regions. Finally, the “memory” profile, in addition to prefrontal and
parietal regions, also included hippocampus, temporal areas, and basal
ganglia. Due to the observed overlap, the resulting statistical maps were
merged and overlaid with the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas
defining cognitive circuitry, the modularity of which was then correlated
with nigrostriatal function measured by 123I-FP-CIT Single-Photon
Emission Computed Tomography.
Figure S3 | Latent variable selection. The figure shows Root Mean
Squared Error Prediction (RMSEP) as a function of a number of PLS latent
variables (LVs). The maximum number of LVs was selected that minimized
total training (red dashed line) and leave-one-out cross-validation (green
solid line) errors for all the domains (n = 3).
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Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative movement disorder that is characterized
clinically by slowness of movement, rigidity, tremor, postural instability, and often cognitive
impairments. Recent studies have demonstrated altered cortico-basal ganglia rhythms in
PD, which raises the possibility of a role for non-invasive stimulation therapies such as noisy
galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS). We applied noisy GVS to 12 mild-moderately affected
PD subjects (Hoehn and Yahr 1.5–2.5) off medication while they performed a sinusoidal
visuomotor joystick tracking task, which alternated between 2 task conditions depending
on whether the displayed cursor position underestimated the actual error by 30% (‘Better’)
or overestimated by 200% (‘Worse’). Either sham or subthreshold, noisy GVS (0.1–
10 Hz, 1/f-type power spectrum) was applied in pseudorandom order. We used exploratory
(linear discriminant analysis with bootstrapping) and confirmatory (robust multivariate linear
regression) methods to determine if the presence of GVS significantly affected our ability to
predict cursor position based on target variables. Variables related to displayed error were
robustly seen to discriminate GVS in all subjects particularly in the Worse condition. If we
considered higher frequency components of the cursor trajectory as “noise,” the signal-to-
noise ratio of cursor trajectory was significantly increased during the GVS stimulation. The
results suggest that noisy GVS influenced motor performance of the PD subjects, and
we speculate that they were elicited through a combination of mechanisms: enhanced
cingulate activity resulting in modulation of frontal midline theta rhythms, improved signal
processing in neuromotor system via stochastic facilitation and/or enhanced “vigor” known
to be deficient in PD subjects. Further work is required to determine if GVS has a selective
effect on corrective submovements that could not be detected by the current analyses.
Keywords: Parkinson’s disease, vestibular system, GVS, manual tracking, discriminant analysis
INTRODUCTION
Motor symptoms in Parkinson’s disease (PD) characteristically
manifest themselves as tremor, rigidity, akinesia/bradykinesia
and postural instability. While levodopa is the gold standard
treatment for PD, chronic use eventually leads to the long-term
development of side effects, such as motor fluctuations, dyskine-
sias, and psychiatric disorders (Pontone et al., 2006; Weintraub
et al., 2006). Surgical treatments, including deep brain stim-
ulation targeted to subcortical nuclei, have provided effective
therapeutic benefits, but are complex and invasive (Okun, 2012).
With recent technological advances, numerous novel stimula-
tory techniques for PD treatment are presently being explored
(Fuentes et al., 2009; Thevathasan et al., 2010; Samoudi et al.,
2012; Faught and Tatum, 2013). Non-invasive brain stimula-
tion techniques are currently a growing avenue of interest for
PD and other neurological disorders due to their safety, tolera-
bility and minimally invasive nature (Fregni and Pascual-Leone,
2007). Additionally, these methods, such as transcranial current
brain stimulation (tCS), arguably influence solely the targeted site
of stimulation, but also exert effects on associated brain con-
nectivity patterns (Luft et al., 2014). Since PD is characterized
by abnormally exaggerated beta synchronization throughout a
basal ganglia (BG)-cortical network (Eusebio et al., 2009), non-
invasive stimulatory approaches could potentially be used to
modulate aberrant network dynamics (Fregni and Pascual-Leone,
2007).
A few studies have suggested that non-invasive stimulation
of vestibular nerves via noisy galvanic vestibular stimulation
(GVS) may improve motor deficits in PD (Yamamoto et al.,
2005; Pan et al., 2008; Pal et al., 2009; Samoudi et al., 2012).
Noisy GVS delivers currents with randomly varying amplitudes
in time to vestibular afferents and subsequently influences resting
state cortical electroencephalography (EEG) activity, suggesting
that cortical-subcortical connections are also modulated by GVS
(Kim et al., 2013). Akin to how tCS strengthens connectivity
patterns in premotor, motor, and sensorimotor areas while sub-
jects are engaged in a finger tapping task (Polanía et al., 2011),
noisy GVS hypothetically is also able to influence functional BG-
cortical motor networks depending on the brain state during
stimulation. It is not fully established, however, whether noisy
GVS improves motor performance. Yamamoto et al. (2005) mea-
sured trunk dynamics as well as reaction time in a Go/NoGo
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paradigm whereas Pan et al. (2008) measured wrist activity in
akinetic PD patients. Effects of noisy GVS on postural and bal-
ance responses have also been measured in both humans and
rat models (Pal et al., 2009; Samoudi et al., 2012), although
none of these studies have directly investigated the effects of
GVS on bradykinesia with respect to motor coordination and
sensorimotor processing.
One potential way to rigorously assess the motoric effect of
GVS is to utilize a visuomotor task, which is useful for under-
standing mechanisms that contribute to motor coordination with
accuracy and stability (Ryu and Buchanan, 2012). Corrective
movements and behavior are required in response to vary-
ing visual error feedback, which are important for maintaining
effective perception-action or sensorimotor processing (Ryu and
Buchanan, 2012). With respect to clinical significance, the abil-
ity to continually adapt one’s behavior to changing environmental
or sensory stimuli is particularly relevant in PD as these patients
demonstrate impaired switching between motor paradigms (Engel
and Fries, 2010).
In the present study, we implemented a visuomotor tracking
task and investigated the effect of noisy GVS on motor per-
formance. Our visuomotor task required subjects to respond
to visual error feedback that was, unbeknownst to the sub-
jects, either minimized to 30% of the actual error, or amplified
by 200% to create the appearance of ‘Better’ or ‘Worse’ motor
performance, respectively. We used linear discriminant analy-
sis (LDA; Duda et al., 2012) to identify parameters significantly
influenced by GVS and to investigate if the effects of GVS are
dependent on the task conditions. We then analyzed our data
using a robust multivariate linear regression method (Filzmoser
and Todorov, 2011) to test if tracking movement was affected by
GVS. We show that subthreshold GVS resulted in robust changes




Twelve PD subjects (10 males, 2 females; mean age 61.4 ± 6.5 years;
11 right-handed, 1 left-handed) participated in the study. None of
the participants had any reported vestibular or auditory disor-
ders. All PD subjects were recruited from the Pacific Parkinson’s
Research Centre (Vancouver, BC, Canada). PD subjects had mild
to moderate disease severity (Hoehn and Yahr stages 1.5–2.5)
with UPDRS (Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale) Part III
motor scores at a mean of 22.3 ± 7.8 (Table 1). All PD sub-
jects were tested in the off-medicated state after a 12-h overnight
withdrawal from L-dopa medication. Other medications that
some subjects were on included: amantadine, ramipril, and
atorvastatin.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The study was approved by the University of British Columbia
Clinical Research Ethics Board. All subjects gave written, informed
consent prior to participation. Research was conducted according
to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
VISUOMOTOR TRACKING TASK
Subjects were comfortably seated 80 cm in front of a screen and
performed a manual tracking task. On the screen, a target (blue)
and cursor (yellow) connected by a black horizontal rod were
displayed (Figure 1). The target box oscillated vertically up and
down with the summation of two frequencies (0.06 and 0.1 Hz).
Subjects controlled the cursor using a joystick with the objective of
matching the horizontal position of the cursor to the target – i.e.,
to keep the horizontal black rod straight. The tracking error (,
difference between the actual positions of the target and cursor)
was scaled by a factor (α) to determine the displayed position
of the cursor:  × α = displayed visual error feedback. In the
‘Better’ (B) task condition, α was set to 0.3, and in the ‘Worse’ (W)
Table 1 | PD subjects’ characteristics for behavior task.
Patient
number







1 58 M 4 18 2 R
2 64 F 4 12 1.5 R
3 67 M 4 16 2 R
4 56 M 2.5 21 2 L
5 53 M 3 32 2.5 R
6 49 M 7.5 35 2 R
7 65 F 5 32 2 R
8 68 M 1.5 22 2 R
9 66 M 1 24 2 R
10 70 M 1 21 2 R
11 59 M 1.5 10 2 R
12 62 M 3.5 24 2 R
UPDRS, unified Parkinson’s disease rating scale.
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FIGURE 1 | Behavior task. (A) Subjects faced a screen with a target (blue)
that moved vertically up and down, and controlled a cursor (yellow) using a
joystick. The error difference () between the actual positions of the target
and cursor was amplified by a scaling factor (α):  × α = displayed visual
error feedback. In the ‘Better’ (B) condition, α was set to 0.3, and in the
‘Worse’ (W) condition, α was set to 2, such that it appeared that subjects
performed better or worse respectively based on their visual error
feedback. (B) Trials (90 s) alternated between B and W conditions (each
condition 30 s). Each trial was followed by a break of 30 s until a
culmination of eight trials total were completed for the experiment.
task condition, α was set to 2, such that it artificially appeared to
subjects that they performed better or worse, respectively, based
on their scaled error feedback.
During the experiment, subjects performed a total of eight tri-
als. Each trial (90 s) was comprised of three alternating blocks
(30 s each) of B and W conditions – with Trial 1 ordered as
B-W-B and Trial 2 ordered as W-B-W (Figure 1). During each trial,
either a subthreshold verum current (90% of cutaneous sensory
threshold) or sham current stimulation was delivered. Four trials
contained verum GVS delivery whereas the other four trials con-
tained sham stimulation. Subjects were unaware of either verum or
sham stimulation since the order in which stimuli were delivered
was pseudorandom, and the verum stimulation was imperceptible
to the subject. Each trial was followed by a break (30 s) to preclude
a hysteretic effect carrying over to the next trial. Before starting the
experiment, subjects were allowed to practice tracking the target
and using the joystick as needed in at least one practice trial. Prac-
tice trials were differently structured from the eight experiment
trials described above. Due to technical details of the data capture
system, the cursor position was irregularly sampled at ∼55 Hz. We
then resampled the data at exactly 50 Hz using linear interpolation
before further analyses.
STIMULUS
Galvanic vestibular stimulation was delivered to subjects through
carbon rubber electrodes (17 cm2) in a bilateral, bipolar fashion.
For bilateral stimulation, an electrode was placed over the mastoid
process behind each ear, and coated with Tac gel (Pharmaceutical
Innovations, NJ, USA) to optimize conductivity and adhesive-
ness. The average impedance of the subjects was measured around
1 k. Digital signals were generated on a computer using MATLAB
and converted to analog signals via a NI USB-6221 BNC digital
acquisition module (National Instruments, TX, USA). The analog
command voltage signals were subsequently passed to a constant
current stimulator (Model DS5, Digitimer, Hertfordshire, UK),
which was connected to the stimulating electrodes.
Bipolar stimulation signals were zero-mean, linearly detrended,
noisy currents with a 1/f-type power spectrum (pink noise) as
previously applied to PD and healthy subjects (Soma et al., 2003;
Yamamoto et al., 2005; Pan et al., 2008). The stimulation signal was
generated between 0.1 and 10 Hz with a Gaussian probability den-
sity, with the command signal delivered to the constant-current
amplifier at 60 Hz (Figure 2). The stimulus was applied at an
FIGURE 2 | Characteristics of the stimulus. (A) Typical recording from a
subject receiving a noisy stimulus applied for 90 s duration. The stimulus
presented is at the highest current intensity (current level 6), which is set to
90% of the subject’s individual sensory threshold (RMS current value of
266 μA). (B) Probability density function of the stimulus current follows a
Gaussian distribution.
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imperceptible level to avoid effects by general arousal and/or
voluntary selective attention, with the current level individu-
ally determined according to each subject’s cutaneous sensory
threshold.
Since perception of GVS is inherently subjective, we utilized
systematic procedures that have been previously used in deter-
mining subliminal current levels for both GVS and transcranial
stimuli (Hummel et al., 2005; Utz et al., 2011; Wilkinson et al.,
2012). Starting from a basal current level of 20 μA, noisy test stim-
uli were delivered for 20 s periods with gradual stepwise increases
(20 μA) in current intensity until subjects perceived a mild, local
tingling in the area of the stimulating electrodes. As performed
previously, a threshold value was defined once subjects reported a
tingling sensation (Utz et al., 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2012), which
lasted for the duration of the test stimulus. The current level was
then decreased each time by one level until sensation was no longer
reported during delivery of test stimulus pulses, and increased by
one step in current intensity to confirm threshold. Each delivery
of a test stimulus was followed by a period of no stimulation for
at least 30 s to preclude a hysteretic effect carrying over to the
next test stimulus. Subjects were blind to the onset and duration
of test stimuli, as well as the threshold-testing scheme. After com-
pleting the threshold test and throughout the experiment, stimuli
were delivered at subthreshold intensity (190–900 μA), which is
achieved at 90% of the determined cutaneous sensory threshold
value.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
We employed both exploratory and hypothesis-driven analysis
methods to analyze the behavioral data. We initially analyzed the
data on a subject-by-subject basis as we were unclear whether
or not there would be substantial intersubject variability to GVS
response. LDA was first used to see if tracking behavior could be
reliably discriminated depending upon whether GVS was applied
or not. We derived a GVS linear discrimination function, g(X),
to create maximum separation between means of the projected
classes with minimum variance within each projected class:
g(X) = w1X1 + w2X2 + · · · + w21X21 + ω0 = wtXt + ω0 (1)
where X = [X1 X2 . . . X21] is a input data matrix in which each
column represents an independent variable, w = [w1, w2, . . . ,
w21] ∈ R21 the weight vector containing linear coefficients of the
variables in the data matrix X, and ω0 the bias-weight. LDA was
applied to the “Better” and “Worse” conditions separately.
For this exploratory part of the analysis, we included linear
(first-order) and non-linear (second- and third-order) combina-
tions of variables in the GVS discriminant function (Table 2).
During the experiment, we varied the phase of the initial tar-
get trajectory not only between subjects but also between the
trials to prevent the subjects from easily predicting upcom-
ing target movement. Therefore, variables from X1 to X9 were
included as nuisance variables in the LDA to account for the target
differences.
To test for significance of the LDA results, we employed boot-
strapping techniques. We permuted the GVS labels (on/off) and
then re-computed the LDA function with the permuted data.
Table 2 | Variables in linear discriminant analysis (LDA) model.
Notation Variables
X1, X2, X3 T (t),T (t)2, T (t)3
X4, X5, X6 VT (t), VT (t)2, VT (t)3
X7, X8, X9 AT (t), AT (t)2, AT (t)3
X10, X11, X12 D(t) − T (t), {D(t) − T (t)}2 , {D(t) − T (t)}3
X13, X14, X15 VD(t) − VT (t), {VD(t) − VT (t)}2, {VD(t) − VT (t)}3
X16, X17, X18 D(t + t) − D(t), {D(t + t) − D(t)}2,
{D(t + t) − D(t)}3
X19, X20, X21 VD (t + t) − VD(t), {VD(t + t) − VD (t)}2,
{VD(t + t) − VD(t)}3
T , target position; VT , target velocity; AT , target acceleration; D, displayed cursor
position; VD, displayed cursor velocity; t , time index, and t , reaction delay of
0.5 s (Jordan et al., 1992).
This was repeated 1000 times. Any weight value from the orig-
inal LDA function g(X) whose absolute value was greater than all
the weights computed from the permuted data was considered to
be significantly influenced by GVS.
In addition, a multivariate linear regression model was used
to test the hypothesis that GVS had a significant effect on cursor
position during tracking. As the traditional least squares regression
may be sensitive to noisy and gross errors (Akkaya and Tiku, 2008),
we chose a robust regression method to analyze our data (“robust-
fit” function in MATLAB). This method is known to be robust to
outliers utilizing an iteratively reweighted scheme to deweight the
influences of outliers. With cursor position as a response variable
(Yi ), the following regression model was proposed:
Yi = Aiβ + εi (2)
where for each data point i we have the vector of independent
variables Ai = [Ai1, · · · , Ai5], the vector of regression coefficients
solved by a bisquare weighting function β, and the residual εi
(assumed to be independent and identically distributed Gaussian).
The selected independent variables are summarized in Table 3
(note that A1, A2 and A3 are same as the variables X1, X4 and X10
in eq.1, respectively). The categorical variable of GVS was denoted
with either 0 (GVSoff) or 1 (GVSon). We tested for significance





Target position (A1) 1.00 0.0000
Target velocity (A2) −7.79e-02 0.0000
Displayed cursor position – target position (A3) 5.01e-01 0.0000
Cursor velocity – target velocity (A4) −1.60e-02 0.0002
GVS (A5) 3.99e-05 0.0410
R2 = 0.8811.
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of the coefficients under the null hypothesis that the coefficient
estimates were equal to zero.
For a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) analysis, we utilized “snr”
function in MATLAB to calculate SNR of cursor trajectories. This
examines the fundamental frequencies of the tracking trajectory
plus the next six harmonics, and assumes that any power in the
spectrum than these peaks are “noise.”
RESULTS
RESULTS OF LDA IN WORSE CONDITION
Coefficients of GVS discriminant function (eq.1) were calculated
for each subject and are plotted as black lines in Figure 3. For
clarity, nuisance variables related to absolute target position (i.e.,
X1–X9) are not shown. The 1000 sets of linear coefficients gen-
erated from the bootstrapping are depicted as blue lines. In most
subjects, the coefficients w10, w11, and w12 of g(X; representing
linear and higher powers of the perceived error between the tar-
get and the displayed cursor position) were robustly modulated
by GVS. In addition, displayed cursor velocity (w16 or w17) and
acceleration (w19, w20, or w21) were also found to be significantly
affected by GVS across subjects.
RESULTS OF LDA IN BETTER CONDITION
Figure 4 shows the LDA results in the better condition. As before,
coefficients w10, w11, and w12 were significant among all the sub-
jects. In addition, 10 out of 12 subjects showed significant w18
weightings. Other coefficients were not robustly seen in all sub-
jects. For example, unlike the LDA results of the Worse condition,
displayed cursor acceleration (w19, w20, or w21) was no longer
significantly influenced by GVS in the Better condition.
RESULTS OF ROBUST REGRESSION MODEL
Table 3 is the coefficient estimates of the variables of the multivari-
ate regression model (eq.2) and their p-values. The computed R2 of
the regression model was 0.8811. GVS was significantly associated
with cursor position across all subjects (p < 0.05).
EFFECT OF GVS ON CURSOR OVERSHOOTING
In order to get an intuitive interpretation of GVS effects, we calcu-
lated the GVS discriminant function values (eq.1) for each subject.
We used data from trials 1 and 7 for the calculation as these two
trials had identical phases of the trajectories, with a difference in
whether or not GVS was delivered (GVSon for trial 1). Then, g
was computed by subtracting the function values of trial 7 from
trial 1. By plotting g, we could not only locate GVS effects on the
cursor trajectory but also directly make visual comparison of the
cursor movement in the identified location. Figure 5 shows target
trajectory, cursor trajectory and g for each subject.
The effect of GVS was greatest near sinusoidal peaks. This trend
was found in most of the subjects regardless of how well the sub-
jects tracked the target. For instance, subject 5 tracked the target
relatively better compared to the other subjects, and g was signif-
icant around at 5, 20, 65, and 80 s. Subjects 11 and 12 performed
the tracking task poorly, but the GVS effects still appeared near
sinusoidal peaks.
One of the noticeable features on the peaks is a degree of
overshooting of cursor trajectories. To assess a possible relation-
ship to GVS stimulation, we compared the difference between
the cursor position and the target on the peaks. Figure 6 shows
a representative example of cursor overshooting near sinusoidal
peaks in target. The peaks in cursor appeared with some lagged
FIGURE 3 | Coefficients of the variables of the linear discriminant
function in the Worse condition. The x -axis represents variables from X10 to
X21 inTable 2 while the y -axis represents weight (w ) value. The computed
coefficients are depicted as black for the GVS discriminant function and blue
for bootstrapping. Red asterisks denote coefficients that are outside the 95%
confidence interval of bootstrapping.
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FIGURE 4 | Coefficients of the variables of the linear discriminant
function in the Better condition. The x -axis represents variables from X10 to
X21 inTable 2 while the y -axis represents weight (w ) value. The computed
coefficients are depicted as black for the GVS discriminant function and blue
for bootstrapping. Red asterisks denote coefficients that are outside the 95%
confidence interval of bootstrapping.
FIGURE 5 |Trajectories of target (blue) and cursor (GVSon: red, GVSoff: black) and g (black bar in the bottom). g was computed by subtracting the
linear discriminant function values of trial 7 (GVSoff) from trial 1 (GVSon).The trials alternated between W-B-W conditions (each condition 30 s).
time (t). The amplitude of the target peaks was subtracted
from the cursor peaks, and the difference (d) was defined as
cursor overshooting. Cursor peak was defined when the cur-
sor position was at its max/min point. Cursor overshooting
was calculated for all trials and subjects, then averaged depend-
ing on the task conditions and presence of GVS stimulation as
shown in Table 4. The p-value was calculated from ANOVA of
the means between GVSon and GVSoff (i.e., a single, two-level
factor).
In Worse condition, the subjects tended to overshoot signifi-
cantly less on the lower peaks while stimulated by GVS. On the
upper peaks, the mean overshooting of GVSon was also smaller
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FIGURE 6 | Representative example of cursor overshooting on upper
and lower peaks from Subject 1 Cursor overshooting (d) was
calculated as cursor position – target position. t represents time
difference between peaks in cursor and target trajectories.
Table 4 | Means of cursor overshooting on sinusoidal peaks and
ANOVA results.
Lower peak Upper peak
GVSon GVSoff p-value GVSon GVSoff p-value
Worse −0.0517 −0.0714 0.0036 0.0695 0.0784 0.22
Better −0.0946 −0.0451 0.0038 0.0890 0.0690 0.14
than GVSoff, but the difference was not significant. In Better
condition, however, there was an increasing tendency for cursor
overshooting with stimulation.
EFFECT OF GVS ON SNR OF CURSOR TRAJECTORY
Movement variability is another important feature to characterize
the tracking performance. Particularly, in goal-directed behavior,
the variability originates from collateral movement to the main
goal of a task. In this sense, the cursor trajectories in our track-
ing test can be seen to a combination of two components. One
is the primary movement whose form is similar to the target tra-
jectory, and the other is submovement that may appear as noise
superimposed on the primary movement. In order to investigate
if GVS had affected movement variability of the subjects, we cal-
culated SNR of cursor trajectories and compared differences in
between GVSon and GVSoff conditions. As shown in Figure 7,
the mean SNR of 12 PD subjects was 27.6 when GVS was applied,
which was significantly greater than 21.3 in GVSoff condition
(p < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that noisy GVS robustly influences motor
tracking performance in PD patients off dopaminergic medica-
tion. Motor improvements are consistent with results previously
reported in hemiparkinsonian rats (Samoudi et al., 2012) whereby
FIGURE 7 | Comparison of SNR of cursor trajectories between GVSon
and GVSoff conditions.
GVS with a 1/f power density improved rod performance. Previ-
ously, we demonstrated that noisy GVS has the ability to modulate
synchronization of broadband EEG oscillations in healthy sub-
jects (Kim et al., 2013). Our recordings of EEG rhythms were
observed at resting-state, suggesting that noisy GVS was able to
modulate cortical activity and presumably connected subcortical-
cortical projections. In this study, we observed a functional effect
of GVS on sensorimotor processing and motor performance in
a visuomotor task, suggesting that noisy vestibular stimulation
modulates motor networks in PD subjects.
Our results seem to indicate that noisy GVS affects the sensi-
tivity of motor responses (in this case, joystick-controlled cursor
position) to visualized error (displayed cursor position – target
position). We do not believe that our observed results are the
consequence of an attentional or general arousal effect, such as
through activation of the reticular activating system. The imper-
ceptible nature of our stimulus, which subjects were not aware
of throughout the experiment trials, precludes this issue which
is present with other forms of minimally invasive stimulation
methods (Fuentes et al., 2009).
Depending on the stimulus parameters (i.e., current intensity,
frequency, signal shape), GVS is known to induce a broad range
of effects, including eye movements, postural control and move-
ments (Fitzpatrick and Day, 2004). Therefore, one interpretation
of our results may include the confounding effects of nystagmus
and/or ocular torsion through activation of the vestibulo-ocular
reflex (VOR; Zink et al., 1998). Since subjects rely on visual error
feedback, ocular torsion would potentially hamper the perceived
error feedback through a subjective tilt in the visual perceptual
field (Zink et al., 1998). However, we note that our stimulus
levels were weak, subthreshold currents with the highest cur-
rent delivered at around 140 ± 113 μA, whereas the preferred
GVS current intensities for inducing ocular torsion and subse-
quent perceptual tilts through GVS are much higher at around
1–3 mA (Zink et al., 1998). Therefore, we presume that our
subthreshold stimulus was not strong enough to notably induce
confounding visual effects and corollary perceptual changes in our
experiment.
Noisy GVS is known to modulate EEG spectral power. Wilkin-
son et al. (2012) have demonstrated that noisy GVS is able to
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modulate the EEG spectral power during a face processing task.
Our previous study has demonstrated that noisy GVS is able
to modulate the EEG synchrony patterns in healthy subjects
(Kim et al., 2013). Altogether, these findings combined with our
present results suggest that noisy GVS is able to modulate oscil-
latory activity in resting and task-related networks, which involve
sensorimotor processing in our particular study.
The motoric effects of GVS may be related to modulation
of oscillations related to integration of information and error-
processing. Since perceived error (i.e., the error between the target
and the displayed cursor position) was robustly detected by the
LDA analysis, fronto–midline (FM) theta may be a candidate
oscillation to be modulated by GVS in PD subjects. FM-theta
shows an increased amplitude during tasks requiring concen-
tration (Mitchell et al., 2008), which is related to error-related
negativity (ERN), an event-related potential seen after errors are
made. FM-theta may represent a universal mechanism for action
monitoring with the midcingulate cortex acting as hub for the
integration of information (Cavanagh et al., 2012). Thus, our
results suggest that GVS may regulate FM-theta activity in PD
subjects.
The increased SNR shown in Figure 7 suggests that application
of noisy GVS may have increased synchronization in neuromo-
tor system via stochastic facilitation. Stochastic facilitation is a
term to describe phenomena where stochastic biological noise
elicits functional benefits in a non-linear system such as the
nervous system (McDonnell and Ward, 2011). Several studies
have reported that a presence of additive noise allows a weak
input signal to be better detected, resulting in an increase in
SNR in EEG (Galambos and Makeig, 1992; Srebro and Mal-
ladi, 1999; Elias et al., 2003; Kitajo et al., 2007; Keita et al., 2008;
Ward et al., 2010; Doren et al., 2014) and sensorimotor perfor-
mance (Ignacio et al., 2012). These findings suggest that noisy
GVS input may also be able to modulate detection and trans-
mission of the sensorimotor system via stochastic facilitation,
resulting in an increase in synchronization of the neuromotor
system. However, a further investigation is required to elucidate
whether the synchronization is limited to cortical areas or if it
could give rise to corticomuscular synchronization (Ignacio et al.,
2012).
We further speculate that our results may be at least partly
explained by modulation of cortico-BG rhythms involved in sen-
sorimotor processing. Growing observations suggest a concept
that the BG regulates action motivation or response ‘vigor’ (Niv
et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2009) as well as the speed and size
of movement (Spraker et al., 2007; Thobois et al., 2007). Deficient
scaling of the initial burst of earliest agonist muscle activity (EMG)
to meet the demands of a motor task is frequently observed in clin-
ical disorders of the BG, such as PD. The link between motivation
and movement gain may be universally weakened in Parkinso-
nian subjects (Ballanger et al., 2006; Thobois et al., 2007). We
thus speculate that GVS may also correct deficient vigor caused
by BG dysfunction through modulation of pathological brain
rhythms.
We note that we used a single noisy stimulus for all sub-
jects. However, the results shown in Figure 3 also emphasize the
importance of looking at patient-specific stimuli. For instance,
the coefficients regarding the difference between cursor and target
velocities (w13, w14, and w15) were found to be significant in some
subjects, but were indistinguishable from bootstrapping for the
rest subjects.
Finally, we note that GVS had fewer effects in the Better condi-
tion compared to the Worse condition. Presumably, subjects would
have made fewer corrective movements in the former condition.
This raises the possibility that GVS may also depend upon the
number and form of corrective submovements. As submovements
were not captured by the global LDA and multivariate regression
methods used here, this warrants further investigation.
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Huntington’s disease (HD) is an incurable neurodegenerative disease characterized
by the triad of chorea, cognitive dysfunction and psychiatric disturbances. Since the
discovery of the HD gene, the pathogenesis has been outlined, but to date a cure has not
been found. Disease modifying therapies are needed desperately to improve function,
alleviate suffering, and provide hope for symptomatic patients. Deep brain stimulation
(DBS), a proven therapy for managing the symptoms of some neurodegenerative
movement disorders, including Parkinson’s disease, has been reported as a palliative
treatment in select cases of HD with debilitating chorea with variable success. New
insights into the mechanism of action of DBS suggest it may have the potential to
circumvent other manifestations of HD including cognitive deterioration. Furthermore,
because DBS is already widely used, reversible, and has a risk profile that is relatively
low, new studies can be initiated. In this article we contend that new clinical trials be
considered to test the effects of DBS for HD.
Keywords: deep brain stimulation, Huntington’s disease, globus pallidus, striatum, cognition, chorea
Preserving Cortico-Striatal Function: Deep Brain Stimulation in
Huntington’s Disease
Few conditions in medicine present patients and their families the challenges of Huntington’s
disease (HD). Because it is a heritable disease, the majority of individuals at risk are exposed to a
turbulent environment with a parent diagnosed with HD and faced with the reality of suffering a
similar fate. At-risk patients have the option to learn if they have the disease and thenmust confront
the sad truth that the disease will end in neurologic disability and premature death. For those who
elect not to be tested, the specter of developing symptomatic HD still looms large. This in part
contributes to the increased risk of suicide during early stages and engenders fear and desperation
that perpetuates itself with time as families search for answers (Meiser and Dunn, 2000). This
psychological burden, coupled with the absence of any promising interventions, contributes to
low predictive testing rates and the potential to adopt overly optimistic beliefs about one’s future,
which at times may have undesirable consequences from a medical or economic standpoint (Oster
et al., 2013).
It is estimated that 30,000 individuals in the United States alone have manifest symptoms
of HD, with twice as many additional individuals yet to manifest symptoms. Extensive efforts
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on the part of researchers, emboldened by these unfortunate
facts, identified the genetic basis of HD in the early 1990’s. Since
then, the effort to find a cure has accelerated, although to date
only one therapeutic agent has been approved for clinical use.
Physicians are therefore left to consider off-label uses of existing
therapies. Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been used in HD
as a treatment for disabling chorea but targeted stimulation
may be a potential consideration to palliate symptoms
of HD.
Several longitudinal studies have contributed to the current
understanding of the natural history of HD (Paulsen et al.,
2008; Ross and Tabrizi, 2011; Ross et al., 2014). The mean
age of onset is 40 with an additional 20 years of life expected
after the disease manifests (Tabrizi et al., 2011). Onset is
defined with the emergence of motor symptoms. Chorea---
abrupt, random, involuntarymovements---is the hallmark of HD.
These movements often intensify before being replaced with
voluntary motor deficits. The cognitive features of HD consist
of executive dysfunction, visuospatial dysfunction, cognitive
slowing, and loss of mental flexibility. Evidence suggests that
cognitive dysfunction may parallel (or precede) the emergence
of motor deficits (Paulsen and Long, 2014). The psychiatric
manifestations vary widely, ranging from mood disturbances to
obsessional anxiety and, rarely, psychosis. Furthermore, limbic
dysfunction, in the setting of cognitive inflexibility and poor
insight, contributes to a ‘dysexecutive syndrome’, characterized
by perseveration, apathy, impulsivity and aggression. Non-
pharmacologic interventions may be helpful in early stages
but tend to become less effective as the disease progresses.
Tetrabenazine is the only FDA-approved agent for the treatment
of the chorea. Psychiatric symptoms are managed similarly to the
general population. Cognitive symptoms are typically resistant
to intervention. Biomarkers that correlate to disease stages have
not yet been defined, although promising considerations in
premanifest individuals have been identified (Paulsen et al.,
2014).
Pathogenic Mechanisms of HD
HD exhibits autosomal dominant inheritance and is equally
prevalent in men and woman. In those who inherit the mutation,
a cytosine-adenosine-guanine (CAG) repeat expansion is added
to the IT15 huntington (HTT) gene on the short arm of
chromosome 4 (Raymond et al., 2011). Affected individuals with
the mutated form have between 36 and 121 CAG repeats in
the coding region that translate into a polyglutamine expansion.
The age of onset of motor symptoms inversely correlates with
the number of repeated sequences (Ross et al., 2014). In healthy
persons, HTT encodes a protein (huntingtin) responsible for
synaptic vesicular transit and other cellular functions that when
absent leads to in utero death (Cepeda et al., 2007). For example,
wild type huntingtin contributes to the cortical production of
brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) before the latter’s
downstream support of striatal neurons (Zuccato et al., 2010).
In those with the mutation, glutamine residues accumulate
and the mutant HTT protein disrupts cellular signals and
homeostasis decades before symptoms emerge. The mutation
is detectable in nervous tissue diffusely; however, the disease is
uniquely characterized by its expression in the medium spiny
neurons (MSNs) found in the caudate, putamen and cortical
pyramidal cells. The eventual death of these MSNs is the
pathological hallmark of the structural damage demonstrated in
HD (Georgiou-Karistianis et al., 2013). The precise cascade of
events that leads to neurodegeneration is still largely unknown
(Raymond et al., 2011).
MSNs account for 90% of all neurons in the striatum and
are its only output source (Murer et al., 2002). There are two
subtypes of MSNs that are differentiated by the peptides co-
expressed; the receptor subtypes and the target to which they
project. These GABAergic MSNs exert their effect via a direct or
indirect pathway. MSNs in the indirect pathway (striaopallidal,
D2 receptors) project to the external segment of the globus
pallidus (GPe) and subthalamic nucleus (Cepeda et al., 2007).
These indirect pathway neurons are the first cell population to
succumb in HD and are implicated in the hyperkinesia that
heralds the onset of the disease. MSNs in the direct pathway
(striatonigral, D1 receptors) project to the internal segment of
the globus pallidus (GPi) and the substantia nigra pars reticulatea
(SNr; Cepeda et al., 2007). Degeneration of direct pathwayMSNs,
and the resulting loss of substance P, may contribute to late stage
motor features characterized by impaired voluntary movement
(Raymond et al., 2011). This transition from hyperkinesia to
akinesia during the natural history of the disease may confound
the results of interventions aimed at arresting or controlling
chorea.
Impaired dopamine homeostasis is another consequence of
the mutation that contributes to the impaired information
processing from cortical inputs to the striatum (André
et al., 2010). Dopaminergic neurons projecting from the
substantia nigra pars compacta, and to a lesser degree the
ventral tegmental area (VTA), to the dorsal striatum regulate
glutamate sensitivity as well (dorsal circuit). Indirect pathway
MSNs express D2 receptors whereas D1 receptors are more
abundant in direct pathway MSNs. Degeneration of these
nigrostriatal dopaminergic neurons are observed in HD and
may contribute to late onset akinesia (André et al., 2010;
Raymond et al., 2011). Conversely, presynaptic hyperactivation
of the nigrostiatal pathway may elicit the characteristic chorea
of early stage disease (André et al., 2010). Agents affecting
dopamine (DA) transmission are used to modulate HD
symptoms with some effect. DA may facilitate the ‘‘upstate’’
or depolarized state that enables encoding of specific motor
tasks routed by the corticostriatal pathway (Murer et al.,
2002).
The primary inputs to theMSNs are glutamatergic projections
from the neocortex. Cortical neuron death is also observed
in HD, especially in layers III, V and VI. The cell death is
profound enough to be observed on gross pathological specimens
and predates the onset of motor symptoms. One hypothesis
is that excitotoxicity at the cortico-striatal synapses underpins
HD (Cepeda et al., 2007). This is supported by evidence that
increased release of glutamate from cortical projections, together
with reduced uptake from the synaptic cleft by glial cells and
enhanced striatal sensitivity to glutamate contributes to an
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amplified affect (Wójtowicz et al., 2013). In mouse models of
HD, down-regulation of GLT1 has been demonstrated (Liévens
et al., 2001). GLT1, a sodium-dependent glutamate transporter,
ordinarily serves to remove extracellular glutamate and limit
excitotoxicity. This down-regulation, together with NMDA-R
hypersensitivity, increases intracellular calcium and induces an
apoptotic cascade in HD.
Aspiny cholinergic, fast spiking, interneurons that co-express
parvoalbumin are the main inhibitory neurons within the
striatum (Russo et al., 2013). Theses interneurons are typically
preserved until the late stages of the disease and are at least
partly responsible for information processing and integration
in the normal striatum (Raymond et al., 2011). Although,
the death of the interneurons lags behind the MSNs, the
dystonia that is especially pronounced in early onset and
juvenile HD may be related to interneuron death (Reiner et al.,
2013).
Abnormal Electrophysiology in HD
Under normal conditions, the ventral, dorsolateral (motor)
and dorsomedial (associative) striatum are both activated
simultaneously during specific task learning (Williams and
Eskandar, 2006; Gale et al., 2014; Thorn and Graybiel, 2014).
As a behavior becomes habitual, the association between striatal
components decouples and the ventral (Gale et al., 2014) and
motor striatum emerges while the activity of the associative
striatum, now redundant, recedes (Williams and Eskandar,
2006; Thorn and Graybiel, 2014). In the ventral striatum, the
learning related facilitation of activity is thought to represent
the increased expectation of reward for the execution of specific
stimulus-motor behaviors (Gale et al., 2014). Thus, under normal
conditions, it is thought that the ventral striatum provides the
motivation to engage in reward obtaining behaviors. In HD, the
depressive and limbic symptoms may be related to motivational
changes brought on by dysfunction of striatal MSNs and/or
dopamine de-innervation (via dopamine cell loss of the SNpc
and VTA). In the dorsal striatum, once a task is learned, the
specific motor sequences or chunks are organized within the
basal ganglia as a concatenation of neuronal activity played out in
the direct and indirect pathway. Co-activation of these pathways
facilitates the desired movement by suppressing unwanted
movements (indirect) and expressing the specific motor chunk
(direct pathway) (Jin et al., 2014). Near limitless combinations
of nested oscillating frequencies are able to associate with
these specified action sequences. Normally, when an action
is queued, an assembly of neurons transitions to the upstate,
enabling the asynchronous, specified action to emerge (Stern
et al., 1998). However, in HD, the bidirectional cortico-striatal
network is no longer able to precisely orchestrate action as
nested frequencies uncouple (Miller et al., 2011). Together with
the thalamocortical network, which helps set the membrane
potential of the MSNs, the system becomes deregulated. As
redundancies in the system also dissociate, the behavior chunk
fails.
This high degree of coordination needed to facilitate a desired
movement is evident when studied on a smaller scale. In mouse
models of HD, widespread electrophysiologic dysfunction at the
neuronal level is observed. The MSNs demonstrate a depolarized
resting membrane potential. This induces hyper-excitability of
the depolarization dependent NMDA receptor in response to
glutamate. The overactive cells create an energy sink that may
lead to cellular death (Rebec et al., 2006). Similar findings are
noted in cortical pyramidal cells. As the disease progresses, the
overactive cortico-striatal pathway eventually becomes less active
and cortical synaptic inputs are lost (Cepeda et al., 2003).
Normalizing large-scale nested oscillations or stabilizing
more localized dysfunctional units in HD is challenging. To
achieve this, establishing how fundamental frequencies within
the striatum evolve throughout the course of HD will be
paramount. Recordings from the dorsal striatum in one study
of freely moving normal rats demonstrated LFPs in the 1--30 Hz
range with a relatively isolated peak at 50--55Hz (Masimore et al.,
2004). Still, LFPs in HD patients have not been well characterized
(Estrada-Sánchez and Rebec, 2013). Once known, an attempt
to tune the local frequency with electrical stimulation (ES) to
regulate function may be possible.
In HD, re-entrainment of the striatum through ES of both
the direct and indirect pathway, may repair learning deficits or
reduce the rate of loss of existing habitual circuits. ES may also
be able to partially restore the energy imbalance by reducing
the hyper-excitable state, consequently preserving cortical inputs.
Interestingly, in some animal models of HD, the cortex assumes
a hyper-excitable state only after the disease has progressed. This
finding contrasts with the observations in MSNs but may mark
an identifiable time point for intervention (Cummings et al.,
2009).
Deep Brain Stimulation for HD
There are several reports describing the use of DBS in HD when
debilitating chorea predominates in the presence of atrophy and
structural changes. We must be cautious in the interpretation of
these studies based on the heterogeneity (Table 1). The target
most often selected was GPi and DBS was primarily offered to
control medically refractory chorea in most cases; although the
progression to hypokinesia later in the disease can sometimes
complicate interventions (Reiner, 2004). Although cognition was
either not addressed or mentioned only in brief, these studies
serve as a starting point for the next generation of DBS therapies
for HD.
In one of the earliest published reports, bilateral GPi
leads were implanted in a patient with pharmacologically-
refractory HD chorea (Moro et al., 2004). 40 Hz stimulation
improved the chorea and dystonia in this patient. The
effect was enhanced at higher frequencies (130 Hz) but this
exacerbated the bradykinesia, corroborating findings in other
studies. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) studies in this
patient also demonstrated increased cerebral blood flow in
the supplementary motor area, anterior cingulate cortex and
sensorimotor cortex with ‘‘ON’’ stimulation only. It is unclear
what, if any, cognitive gains may have been facilitated by DBS.
In the wake of the success treating this initial patient, others
followed, publishing their findings after bilateral GPi DBS for HD
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TABLE 1 | Summary of published deep brain stimulation reports for HD.
Target(s) N Ages(s) at surgery Approximate disease duration CAG repeat
(years) prior to DBS (years) length(s)
Moro et al. (2004) GPi 1 43 8 -
Hebb et al. (2006) GPi 1 41 13 47
Biolsi et al. (2008) GPi 1 60 10 44
Fasano et al. (2008) GPi 1 72 17 -
Ligot et al. (2011) GPe 5 41--60 2--5 41--53
Kang et al. (2011) GPi 2 57 10 42
50 5 41
Groiss et al. (2011) GPi 1 65 - -
Spielberger et al. (2012) GPi 1 30 9 58
Cislaghi et al. (2013)* GPi 1 27 12 74
Huys et al. (2013) GPi 1 40 3 -
Velez-Lago et al. (2013) GPi 2 34 7 60
25 6 68
Gonzalez et al. (2014) GPi 7 30--78 3--8 40--50
Gruber et al. (2014) STN and GPi 1 41 9 49
Beste et al. (2014) GPe 2 57 - 42
32 53
*Westphal variant; (-) indicates data was not found or reported.
with mixed, but generally favorable, results (Hebb et al., 2006;
Spielberger et al., 2012).
Biolsi et al. described a patient with bilateral GPi DBS
implantation for chorea, which also had moderate subcortical
cognitive dysfunction at the time of surgery (Biolsi et al.,
2008). Four years later, the cognitive dysfunction remained
stable and the patient was still able to perform complicated
motor tasks. DBS in this case reduced the chorea and may
have been neuroprotective, although his disease progression
had been noted to be slow even prior to DBS. In another
case, bilateral GPi DBS was performed which demonstrated
global progressive cognitive decline on serial testing. He, like
others, developed bradykinesia after DBS that prevented stable
ambulation (Fasano et al., 2008). In two other patients who
underwent bilateral GPi, chorea was improved at 2 years
but cognitive decline continued, suggesting DBS was unable
to halt progression of cognitive dysfunction (Kang et al.,
2011).
Another report of two patients who underwent DBS of the
GPi as a palliative treatment for disabling motor symptoms
was recently published (Velez-Lago et al., 2013). In one patient,
for whom chorea was the predominate symptom, DBS reduced
a chorea subscore on the Unified HD Rating Scale. In the
second patient, DBS was offered as a treatment of generalized,
non-fixed dystonia. This failed to improve her dystonia, and
the devices were eventually turned off. Although GPi DBS is
a well-established treatment for primary generalized dystonia,
the dystonic symptoms in HD are unique and appear to
reflect the loss of direct pathway striatal neurons in advanced
disease.
In the largest published series to date, seven patients
with refractory chorea were treated with bilateral GPi DBS
between 2008 and 2010 (Gonzalez et al., 2014). Similar to
the other studies, chorea improved on average 60% at 1
year but a favorable improvement on the total motor score
was not observed (Gonzalez et al., 2014). Importantly, DBS
did not alleviate dystonia; while deactivation of stimulation
reactivated chorea, indicating that, as for other movement
disorders, the effects on motor symptoms depend on continuous
stimulation.
Gruber et al. implanted a patient using simultaneous STN
and GPi DBS in an attempt to recalibrate the direct and
indirect pathways. This strategy minimized the bradykinesia
observed following GPi stimulation alone (Gonzalez et al., 2014).
Not surprisingly, when STN was used alone, chorea was not
sustainably improved (Gruber et al., 2014).
Because of its role in error processing control, the GPe is
another potential target for DBS in patients with HD exhibiting
cognitive dysfunction. Error processing control, a measure of
negative feedback that updates a behavioral action in real
time, is believed to underlie early executive dysfunction in HD
(Smith et al., 2000). Temel et al. tested DBS of the globus
pallidus externus in a transgenic rat model of HD to evaluate
the effect on motor and cognitive function (Temel et al.,
2006). Cognitive function was measured by performance on
a choice reaction time test. Transgenic rats will prematurely
release a lever associated with a food reward compared to
controls. This indicates that transgenic rats are unable to
suppress the unwanted response. In both wild type rats and
transgenic rats, DBS improved performance on the choice
reaction time test relative to preoperative testing. Although the
number of animals tested was small, this study suggests DBS
restores unwanted response inhibition in the indirect pathway-
--a necessary precursor for executing learned behavior in the co-
activation model.
In part, based on these results, Ligot et al. proposed that
inhibitory stimulation of GPe would suppress thalamocortical
hyperactivity-induced hyperkinesia as well as influence
cognitive and behavioral symptoms (Ligot et al., 2011). To
study this effect, the investigators used PET imaging to
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FIGURE 1 | Therapeutic targets for deep brain stimulation in HD.
The scale of the response could be modulated by using different
stimulation paradigms in addition to the location of the lead(s). For
example, increasing dopaminergic activity through SNc stimulation may
improve non-specific striatal processing that governs learning. Similarly,
thalamic stimulation at low frequencies may modulate multiple nested
frequencies simultaneously to re-establish a normal frequency spectrum.
High frequency, triggered focal, pulsed stimulation of the striatum paired to
a specific task could augment learning of specific skills by boosting event
sequencing.
compare 15 control subjects with 5 HD patients implanted
with stimulation electrodes in GPe. In the resting state,
cortico-subcortical regional cerebral blood flow is reduced in
HD with the stimulator off. In keeping with the basal ganglia
thalamocortical circuit model, GPe stimulation modulated
connectivity and further reduced regional cerebral blood
flow in the basal ganglia, cortical structures and the default
mode network (Ligot et al., 2011). These findings lead to
the conclusion that stimulation of GPe may benefit patients
with HD. In a recently completed prospective pilot study,
intended to test both GPe and GPi stimulation using a
crossover design, DBS of GPe in two patients with HD
seemed to restore error processing control, although this
effect was washed out when the system was turned off
(Beste et al., 2014). Based on these studies and current
models of learning, it is our impression, that GPe DBS
warrants continued study as a potentially therapeutic target
in HD.
Deep Brain Stimulation for HD: Future
Directions
The effects of HD lead to cortical disassociation where new
behaviors and motor tasks are no longer acquired and existing
concatenations that subserve simple and complex skills are
decoupled. While the current results of DBS in HD patients may
seem disappointing at first, a great deal has been learned. Earlier
human studies are primarily aimed at evaluating safety of a novel
therapy. The current stage of knowledge seems to support that
GPi and GPe DBS may or may not improve motor symptoms
but, in general, effects of stimulation were not deleterious.
With safety largely established, new studies can be initiated
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including controlled trials. New therapies could be aimed at
realigning cortical and subcortical structures or reinforce existing
pathways, particularly when neural compensation is most
responsive (Papoutsi et al., 2014). Cognitive biomarkers that can
be detected during the prodromal stages and followed during
disease progression, such as working memory, psychomotor
speed, reaction to negative emotions, and executive functioning,
may be most promising (Dumas et al., 2013).
It is our opinion that DBS may hold promise in preserving
brain function in patients with HD to maintain independence
and reduce suffering. However, because the phenotypic
expression of HD is heterogeneous, DBS may only benefit a
select group of patients. Determining this subset is paramount
to the success of any intervention. Fortunately, recent large-
scale longitudinal studies (such as PREDICT-HD) that have
identified specific functional imaging signals indicating early
neuronal dysfunction in HD have exposed this window of
opportunity. Targeted ES, early in the course of disease may be
able to overcome limitations via several mechanisms including:
(1) regulation of dopamine homeostasis, (2) focal inhibition or
(3) activation of local brain regions, (4) task specific, triggered
closed-loop stimulation or (5) diffuse modulation of multiple
pathways with low frequency stimulation (Figure 1). Deciding
when to initiate a diseasemodifying therapy inHD is challenging.
Intervention in the prodromal stage exposes an individual to risk
when they may be able to live and work independently for many
more years. Similarly, initiating therapy after significant cell
death, a precursor to end-stage disease, may be futile. The ethical
considerations in delivering neuromodulation should therefore
be taken very seriously before such an intervention is delivered
to a desperate population (Ford and Kubu, 2006).
The question remains open on whether DBS may have any
effect in slowing disease progression in HD. To date DBS
has not demonstrated neuroprotection for motor decline in
other degenerative conditions (Lilleeng et al., 2014). We believe
HD may be unique to PD in the ability to identify gene
positive individuals prodromally and closely predict the age of
motor symptom onset, early in the course of cortico-striatal
dysfunction. Furthermore, even if unable to change the trajectory
of a terminal disease such as HD, the ability to successfully
improve functional capacity and, in turn, optimism (especially
early in the disease process), would have a substantial impact on
quality of life at an individual level, and the potential for positive
economic consequences at a societal level.
Author Contributions
Conception (SN, AM, MP); Drafting and/or revision (SN, AM,
JG, DL, MP); Final approval (SN, AM, JG, DL, MP); Agreement
to accountability (SN, AM, JG, DL, MP).
References
André, V. M., Cepeda, C., and Levine, M. S. (2010). Dopamine and glutamate in
Huntington’s disease: a balancing act. CNS Neurosci. Ther. 16, 163--178. doi: 10.
1111/j.1755-5949.2010.00134.x
Beste, C., Mückschel, M., Elben, S., Hartmann, C. J., McIntyre, C. C., Saft, C., et al.
(2014). Behavioral and neurophysiological evidence for the enhancement of
cognitive control under dorsal pallidal deep brain stimulation in Huntington’s
disease. Brain Struct. Funct.. doi: 10.1007/s00429-014-0805-x. [Epub ahead of
print].
Biolsi, B., Cif, L., El Fertit, H., Robles, S. G., and Coubes, P. (2008).
Long-term follow-up of huntington disease treated by bilateral deep brain
stimulation of the internal globus pallidus. J. Neurosurg. 109, 130--132. doi: 10.
3171/jns/2008/109/7/0130
Cepeda, C., Hurst, R. S., Calvert, C. R., Hernández-Echeagaray, E., Nguyen,
O. K., Jocoy, E., et al. (2003). Transient and progressive electrophysiological
alterations in the corticostriatal pathway in a mouse model of Huntington’s
disease. J. Neurosci. 23, 961--969.
Cepeda, C.,Wu, N., André, V.M., Cummings, D.M., and Levine,M. S. (2007). The
corticostriatal pathway in Huntington’s disease. Prog. Neurobiol. 81, 253--271.
doi: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2006.11.001
Cislaghi, G., Capiluppi, E., Saleh, C., Romano, L., Servello, D., Mariani, C., et al.
(2013). Bilateral globus pallidus stimulation in westphal variant of huntington
disease. Neuromodulation doi: 10.1111/ner.12098. [Epub ahead of print].
Cummings, D. M., Andre, V. M., Uzgil, B. O., Gee, S. M., Fisher, Y. E., Cepeda,
C., et al. (2009). Alterations in cortical excitation and inhibition in genetic
mouse models of Huntington’s disease. J. Neurosci. 29, 10371--10386. doi: 10.
1523/JNEUROSCI.1592-09.2009
Dumas, E. M., van den Bogaard, S., Middelkoop, H., and Roos, R. (2013). A review
of cognition in Huntington’s disease. Front. Biosci. (Schol. Ed). 5, 1--18. doi: 10.
2741/S355
Estrada-Sánchez, A. M., and Rebec, G. V. (2013). Role of cerebral cortex in the
neuropathology of Huntington’s disease. Front. Neural Circuits 7:19. doi: 10.
3389/fncir.2013.00019
Fasano, A., Mazzone, P., Piano, C., Quaranta, D., Soleti, F., and Bentivoglio,
A. R. (2008). GPi-DBS in Huntington’s disease: results on motor function and
cognition in a 72-year-old case.Mov. Disord. 23, 1289--1292. doi: 10.1002/mds.
22116
Ford, P. J., and Kubu, C. S. (2006). Stimulating debate: ethics in a multidisciplinary
functional neurosurgery committee. J. Med. Ethics 32, 106--109. doi: 10.
1136/jme.200x.013151
Gale, J. T., Shields, D. C., Ishizawa, Y., and Eskandar, E. N. (2014). Reward
prediction and reinforcement by the nucleus accumbens during learning. Front.
Behav. Neurosci. 8:114. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00114
Georgiou-Karistianis, N., Scahill, R., Tabrizi, S. J., Squitieri, F., and Aylward, E.
(2013). Structural MRI in Huntington’s disease and recommendations for its
potential use in clinical trials. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 37, 480--490. doi: 10.
1016/j.neubiorev.2013.01.022
Gonzalez, V., Cif, L., Biolsi, B., Garcia-Ptacek, S., Seychelles, A., Sanrey, E., et al.
(2014). Deep brain stimulation for Huntington’s disease: long-term results of a
prospective open-label study. J. Neurosurg. 121, 114--122. doi: 10.3171/2014.2.
JNS131722
Groiss, S. J., Elben, S., Reck, C., Voges, J., Wojtecki, L., and Schnitzler,
A. (2011). Local field potential oscillations of the globus pallidus in
Huntington’s disease. Mov. Disord. 26, 2577--2578. doi: 10.1002/mds.
23914
Gruber, D., Kuhn, A., Schoenecker, T., Kopp, U., Kivi, A., Huebl, J.,
et al. (2014). Quadruple deep brain stimulation in Huntington’s disease,
targeting pallidum and subthalamic nucleus: case report and review of
the literature. J. Neural Transm. 121, 1303--1312. doi: 10.1007/s00702-014-
1201-7
Hebb,M. O., Garcia, R., Gaudet, P., andMendez, I. M. (2006). Bilateral stimulation
of the globus pallidus internus to treat choreathetosis in Huntington’s disease:
technical case report. Neurosurgery 58:E383. doi: 10.1227/01.neu.0000195068.
19801.18
Huys, D., Bartsch, C., Poppe, P., Lenartz, D., Huff, W., Prütting, J., et al.
(2013). Management and outcome of pallidal deep brain stimulation in severe
Huntington’s disease. Fortschr. Neurol. Psychiatr. 81, 202--205. doi: 10.1055/s-
0033-1335097
Jin, X., Tecuapetla, F., and Costa, R. M. (2014). Basal ganglia subcircuits
distinctively encode the parsing and concatenation of action sequences. Nat.
Neurosci. 17, 423--430. doi: 10.1038/nn.3632
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 32
65
Nagel et al. Deep brain stimulation in HD
Kang, G. A., Heath, S., Rothlind, J., and Starr, P. A. (2011). Long-term
follow-up of pallidal deep brain stimulation in two cases of Huntington’s
disease. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 82, 272--277. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.2009.
202903
Liévens, J., Woodman, B., Mahal, A., Spasic-Boscovic, O., Samuel, D., Kerkerian-
Le Goff, L., et al. (2001). Impaired glutamate uptake in the R6 Huntington’s
disease transgenic mice. Neurobiol. Dis. 8, 807--821. doi: 10.1006/nbdi.2001.
0430
Ligot, N., Krystkowiak, P., Simonin, C., Goldman, S., Peigneux, P., VanNaemen, J.,
et al. (2011). External globus pallidus stimulation modulates brain connectivity
in Huntington’s disease. J. Cereb. Blood Flow Metab. 31, 41--46. doi: 10.
1038/jcbfm.2010.186
Lilleeng, B., Brønnick, K., Toft, M., Dietrichs, E., and Larsen, J. P. (2014).
Progression and survival in Parkinson’s disease with subthalamic
nucleus stimulation. Acta Neurol. Scand. 130, 292--298. doi: 10.1111/ane.
12224
Masimore, B., Kakalios, J., and Redish, A. (2004). Measuring fundamental
frequencies in local field potentials. J. Neurosci. Methods 138, 97--105. doi: 10.
1016/j.jneumeth.2004.03.014
Meiser, B., and Dunn, S. (2000). Psychological impact of genetic testing for
Huntington’s disease: an update of the literature. J. Neurol. Neurosurg.
Psychiatry 69, 574--578. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.69.5.574
Miller, B. R., Walker, A. G., Barton, S. J., and Rebec, G. V. (2011). Dysregulated
neuronal activity patterns implicate corticostriatal circuit dysfunction in
multiple rodent models of Huntington’s disease. Front. Syst. Neurosci. 5:26.
doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2011.00026
Moro, E., Lang, A. E., Strafella, A. P., Poon, Y. W., Arango, P. M., Dagher, A.,
et al. (2004). Bilateral globus pallidus stimulation for Huntington’s disease.
Ann. Neurol. 56, 290--294. doi: 10.1002/ana.20183
Murer, M. G., Tseng, K. Y., Kasanetz, F., Belluscio, M., and Riquelme, L. A. (2002).
Brain oscillations, medium spiny neurons and dopamine. Cell. Mol. Neurobiol.
22, 611--632. doi: 10.1023/A:1021840504342
Oster, E., Shoulson, I., and Dorsey, R. E. (2013). Optimal expectations and
limited medical testing: evidence from huntington disease. Am. Econ. Rev. 103,
804--830. doi: 10.1257/aer.103.2.804
Papoutsi, M., Labuschagne, I., Tabrizi, S. J., and Stout, J. C. (2014).
The cognitive burden in Huntington’s disease: pathology, phenotype and
mechanisms of compensation. Mov. Disord. 29, 673--683. doi: 10.1002/mds.
25864
Paulsen, J. S., Langbehn, D. R., Stout, J. C., Aylward, E., Ross, C. A., Nance,
M., et al. (2008). Detection of Huntington’s disease decades before diagnosis:
the predict-HD study. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 79, 874--880. doi: 10.
1136/jnnp.2007.128728
Paulsen, J. S., and Long, J. D. (2014). Onset of Huntington’s disease: can
it be purely cognitive? Mov. Disord. 29, 1342--1350. doi: 10.1002/mds.
25997
Paulsen, J. S., Long, J. D., Johnson, H. J., Aylward, E. H., Ross, C. A., Williams,
J. K., et al. (2014). Clinical and biomarker changes in premanifest huntington
disease show trial feasibility: a decade of the PREDICT-HD study. Front. Aging
Neurosci. 6:78. doi: 10.3389/fnagi.2014.00078
Raymond, L. A., André, V. M., Cepeda, C., Gladding, C. M., Milnerwood, A. J.,
and Levine, M. S. (2011). Pathophysiology of Huntington’s disease: time-
dependent alterations in synaptic and receptor function. Neuroscience 198,
252--273. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroscience.2011.08.052
Rebec, G., Conroy, S., and Barton, S. (2006). Hyperactive striatal neurons in
symptomatic Huntington R6/2 mice: variations with behavioral state and
repeated ascorbate treatment. Neuroscience 137, 327--336. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroscience.2005.08.062
Reiner, A. (2004). Can lesions of GPe correct HD deficits? Exp. Neurol. 186, 1--5.
doi: 10.1016/j.expneurol.2003.11.002
Reiner, A., Shelby, E., Wang, H., Demarch, Z., Deng, Y., Guley, N. H., et al.
(2013). Striatal parvalbuminergic neurons are lost in Huntington’s disease:
implications for dystonia.Mov. Disord. 28, 1691--1699. doi: 10.1002/mds.25624
Ross, C. A., Aylward, E. H., Wild, E. J., Langbehn, D. R., Long, J. D., Warner, J. H.,
et al. (2014). Huntington disease: natural history, biomarkers and prospects for
therapeutics. Nat. Rev. Neurol. 10, 204--216. doi: 10.1038/nrneurol.2014.24
Ross, C. A., and Tabrizi, S. J. (2011). Huntington’s disease: from molecular
pathogenesis to clinical treatment. Lancet Neurol. 10, 83--98. doi: 10.
1016/S1474-4422(10)70245-3
Russo, G., Nieus, T. R., Maggi, S., and Taverna, S. (2013). Dynamics of action
potential firing in electrically connected striatal fast-spiking interneurons.
Front. Cell. Neurosci. 7:209. doi: 10.3389/fncel.2013.00209
Smith, M. A., Brandt, J., and Shadmehr, R. (2000). Motor disorder in Huntington’s
disease begins as a dysfunction in error feedback control. Nature 403, 544--549.
doi: 10.1038/35000576
Spielberger, S., Hotter, A., Wolf, E., Eisner, W., Müller, J., Poewe, W., et al. (2012).
Deep brain stimulation in Huntington’s disease: a 4-year follow-up case report.
Mov. Disord. 27, 806--807. doi: 10.1002/mds.24959
Stern, E. A., Jaeger, D., and Wilson, C. J. (1998). Membrane potential synchrony
of simultaneously recorded striatal spiny neurons in vivo.Nature 394, 475--478.
doi: 10.1038/28848
Tabrizi, S. J., Scahill, R. I., Durr, A., Roos, R. A., Leavitt, B. R., Jones, R., et al. (2011).
Biological and clinical changes in premanifest and early stage Huntington’s
disease in the TRACK-HD study: the 12-month longitudinal analysis. Lancet
Neurol. 10, 31--42. doi: 10.1016/s1474-4422(10)70276-3
Temel, Y., Cao, C., Vlamings, R., Blokland, A., Ozen, H., Steinbusch, H. W.,
et al. (2006). Motor and cognitive improvement by deep brain stimulation in
a transgenic rat model of Huntington’s disease. Neurosci. Lett. 406, 138--141.
doi: 10.1016/j.neulet.2006.07.036
Thorn, C. A., and Graybiel, A. M. (2014). Differential entrainment and learning-
related dynamics of spike and local field potential activity in the sensorimotor
and associative striatum. J. Neurosci. 34, 2845--2859. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.
1782-13.2014
Velez-Lago, F. M., Thompson, A., Oyama, G., Hardwick, A., Sporrer, J. M.,
Zeilman, P., et al. (2013). Differential and better response to deep brain
stimulation of chorea compared to dystonia in Huntington’s disease. Stereotact.
Funct. Neurosurg. 91, 129--133. doi: 10.1159/000341070
Williams, Z. M., and Eskandar, E. N. (2006). Selective enhancement of associative
learning bymicrostimulation of the anterior caudate.Nat. Neurosci. 9, 562--568.
doi: 10.1038/nn1662
Wójtowicz, A. M., Dvorzhak, A., Semtner, M., and Grantyn, R. (2013). Reduced
tonic inhibition in striatal output neurons from huntington mice due to loss of
astrocytic GABA release through GAT-3. Front. Neural Circuits 7:188. doi: 10.
3389/fncir.2013.00188
Zuccato, C., Valenza, M., and Cattaneo, E. (2010). Molecular mechanisms
and potential therapeutical targets in Huntington’s disease. Physiol. Rev. 90,
905--981. doi: 10.1152/physrev.00041.2009
Conflict of Interest Statement: Andre Machado, MD declares the following:
Distribution rights from Intellectual Property for the following entities: Enspire,
ATI and Cardionomics.
Chief Scientific Officer, Enspire.
Consultant: Functional Neuromodulation and Spinal Modulation.
Copyright © 2015 Nagel, Machado, Gale, Lobel and Pandya. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution and reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 32
66
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 01 July 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2015.00099
123I-FP-CIT SPECT imaging in early
diagnosis of dementia in patients
with and without a vascular
component
Marina Garriga 1,2, Marta Milà 1, Manzoor Mir 3, Raid Al-Baradie 3, Sonia Huertas 1,
Cesar Castejon 1, Laura Casas 1, Dolors Badenes 1, Nuria Giménez 4, M. Angels Font 4,
Jose M. Gonzalez 5, Maria Ysamat 5, Miguel Aguilar 1, Mark Slevin 6 and Jerzy Krupinski 1,6*
1 Neurology Unit, Hospital Universitari Mútua Terrassa, Terrassa, Spain, 2 Psychiatric Unit, Hospital Universitari Mútua
Terrassa, Terrassa, Spain, 3 College of Applied Medical Sciences, Majmaah University Almajmaah, Al Majmaah, Saudi Arabia,
4 Research Unit, Research Foundation Mútua Terrassa, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, 5 Cetir-Grup Medic, CTD,







Universidad del Valle, Colombia
Mengchao Cui,
Beijing Normal University, China
*Correspondence:
Jerzy Krupinski,
Neurology Unit, Hospital Universitari
Mútua Terrassa, Plaça Dr. Robert,
5 08221 Terrassa, Catalonia, Spain
jkrupinski@mutuaterrassa.es
Received: 28 January 2015
Accepted: 15 June 2015
Published: 01 July 2015
Citation:
Garriga M, Milà M, Mir M, Al-Baradie
R, Huertas S, Castejon C, Casas L,
Badenes D, Giménez N, Font MA,
Gonzalez JM, Ysamat M, Aguilar M,
Slevin M and Krupinski J (2015)
123 I-FP-CIT SPECT imaging in early
diagnosis of dementia in patients with
and without a vascular component.
Front. Syst. Neurosci. 9:99.
doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2015.00099
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and vascular dementia (VaD) are the most common cause of
dementia. Cerebral ischemia is a major risk factor for development of dementia. 123I-FP-
CIT SPECT (DaTScan) is a complementary tool in the differential diagnoses of patients
with incomplete or uncertain Parkinsonism. Additional application of DaTScan enables
the categorization of Parkinsonian disease with dementia (PDD), and its differentiation
from pure AD, and may further contribute to change the therapeutic decision. The
aim of this study was to analyze the vascular contribution towards dementia and mild
cognitive impairment (MCI). We evaluated the utility of DaTScan for the early diagnosis of
dementia in patients with and without a clinical vascular component, and the association
between neuropsychological function, vascular component and dopaminergic function
on DaTScan. One-hundred and five patients with MCI or the initial phases of dementia
were studied prospectively. We developed an initial assessment using neurologic
examination, blood tests, cognitive function tests, structural neuroimaging and DaTScan.
The vascular component was later quantified in two ways: clinically, according to the
Framingham Risk Score (FRS) and by structural neuroimaging using Wahlund Scale Total
Score (WSTS). Early diagnosis of dementia was associated with an abnormal DaTScan.
A significant association was found between a high WSTS and an abnormal DaTScan
(p < 0.01). Mixed AD was the group with the highest vascular component, followed by
the VaD group, while MCI and pure AD showed similar WSTS. No significant associations
were found between neuropsychological impairment and DaTScan independently of
associated vascular component. DaTScan seems to be a good tool to discriminate,
in a first clinical assessment, patients with MCI from those with established dementia.
There was bigger general vascular affectation observable in MRI or CT in patients with
abnormal dopaminergic uptake seen on DaTScan.
Keywords: dementia, mild cognitive impairment, Framingham risk score, 123I-FP-CIT SPECT
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Introduction
Dementia is a chronic brain syndrome which affects 35.6 million
people worldwide and this number is expected to triple by 2050
(115.4 million). Thus, it has an enormous impact on health care
provision currently costing the world more than US$ 604 billion
per year (Wimo et al., 2013).
The most frequent cause of dementia in the elderly is
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), followed by vascular dementia (VaD),
Parkinson disease with dementia (PDD) and Lewy Body
dementia (LBD). Together these account for over 90% of cases
of dementia in the elderly (Albanese et al., 2007).
Although they have distinct features, the different types of
dementia overlap clinically and pathologically, especially in the
early stages and particularly in regards to the contribution
of brain ischemia (Iadecola and Gorelick, 2003). Increasing
evidence demonstrates that ischemia is not only an additive cause
of brain damage in all types of dementia but also contributes
specifically to the underlying disease processes (Niwa et al.,
2002; Iadecola and Gorelick, 2003) Many cardiovascular risk
factors (CVRF), such as hypertension, diabetes, dyslipidemia,
and smoking increase the risk of AD, suggesting a vascular
contribution to the etiology of AD. Ischemia upregulates
and deregulates the entire amyloidogenic cascade. Within the
framework of the neurovascular unit, vascular dysfunction may
reduce the clearance of β-amyloid (Aβ) via the blood brain
barrier or indirectly increase Aβ deposition. Amyloid deposition
is considered the pivotal event in the AD pathological cascade,
but whether the accumulation is accelerated by CVRF remains
unclear (Breteler, 2000; Purnell et al., 2009; Figure 1). The
evidence is stronger for VaD and AD, but there is a lack of
research into the potential contribution of ischemia to LBD
or PDD.
Other studies showed that most CVRF also increase the risk
for AD (Tatemichi et al., 1994; Tanimukai et al., 1998; Kalaria,
2012). In large epidemiological studies, the prevalence of AD
is reported to increase with the severity of atherosclerosis, the
presence of atrial fibrillation, hypertension, diabetes mellitus,
hyperinsulinemia and insulin resistance, and a previous stroke
(Skoog et al., 1996; Leibson et al., 1997; Ott et al., 1997).
Antihypertensive treatments can prevent stroke and also the risk
of dementia (Sörös et al., 2013). Further, abnormalities in the
cerebral white matter thought to be ischemic in nature are more
common in AD than controls, and its severity correlates with
mild cognitive impairment (MCI) progression to AD (Scheltens
et al., 1992; Eckerström et al., 2011).
The occurrence of both AD pathology and vascular brain
injury is very common, especially amongst the oldest of old
and can be classified as mixed AD. Although epidemiologic
studies report that vascular risk factors for arteriosclerosis
increase the risk of incident AD, both autopsy, MRI and amyloid
positron emission tomography (PET) studies indicate that AD
and vascular lesions contribute additively, but independently,
to the risk of dementia. The literature confirms the malignancy
of AD and highlights the adverse effects of microinfarcts on
cognitive function. For the clinical diagnosis of mixed AD,
the presence of AD can be recognized by neuropsychological
profile, structural imaging, cerebrospinal fluid biomarkers,
and glucose PET and amyloid PET imaging. The diagnosis
of mixed AD, however, still hinges predominantly on the
structural MRI findings (Chui and Ramirez-Gomez, 2015).
Studies on neuroimaging have reported that over 70% of
patients consulting for neurodegenerative disease have abnormal
MRI findings suggestive of a vascular component (Mills et al.,
2007). White matter hyperintensities (WMHs) on brain MRI
reflect cardiovascular risk profiles, and greater WMH volume is
associated with cerebral hypometabolism and cognitive decline,
particularly in tests of executive function (DeCarli et al.,
1995; Jeerakathil et al., 2004; Carmichael et al., 2010). These
structural and cognitive changes were associated with CVRF.
The Framingham Stroke Risk Profile score, a composite risk
score of CVRF that measures 10-year probability of stroke,
was negatively associated with total cerebral brain volume and
positively related to prevalent WMHs. The association between
multiple CVRF was examined by a number of studies using
the Framingham Stroke Risk Profile. High Framingham scores
correlate with poor cognitive performance (Wolf et al., 1991;
Elias et al., 2004; Jeerakathil et al., 2004). These results confirm
that ischemia is a major risk factor for dementia. In fact,
10% of stroke patients develop dementia shortly after their
first stroke and more than a third develop dementia after
recurrent strokes. Subjects not developing dementia as a direct
consequence of a stroke have a 10-fold increase in the risk
of dementia over the next 5 years (Pendlebury and Rothwell,
2009).
Neuroimaging techniques play a major role as diagnostic
instruments (Visser et al., 2012). In particular, emission
tomography (single photon emission computed tomography,
SPECT and PET) provides a unique tool to investigate functional
and neurochemical changes, both in those with established
dementia and at risk of subsequent cognitive decline (de Souza
et al., 2012; Herholz, 2012).
AD is characterized by bilateral temporoparietal
hypoperfusion on SPECT and hypometabolism on PET,
which may precede the onset of clinical dementia. Similar
changes can be demonstrated in those with MCI and in those
genetically at risk of developing AD (Brun and Englund, 1986;
Vanitallie, 2013). In turn, VaD is related to multiple, asymmetric,
perfusion deficits secondary to brain multi infarction (Chen
et al., 2013).
In contrast, in LBD medial parietal and occipital perfusion
deficits are seen together with mainly pre-synaptic dopaminergic
changes, most commonly a reduction in the striatal pre-
synaptic dopamine transporter (DAT) which can be visualized
using appropriate tracers [e.g., 123I-N-3-fluoropropyl-2beta-
carbomethoxy-3beta-4-iodophenyl tropane (123I-FP-CIT
SPECT); McKeith et al., 2005; Cummings et al., 2011].
Thus, advanced functional imaging has a promising potential
in supporting dementia diagnosis. Indeed, imaging of the DAT
defines integrity of the dopaminergic system, and hence its
degeneration in vivo (Varrone and Halldin, 2010). Its main
clinical application is in patients with mild, incomplete, or
uncertain Parkinsonism (Weng et al., 2004; Tolosa et al., 2007;
Eshuis et al., 2006). That is, striatal uptake correlating with
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FIGURE 1 | In VaD, cerebrovascular risk factors induce neurovascular
dysfunction leading to brain dysfunction and damage. In Alzheimer’s
disease (AD), cleavage of amyloid precursor protein by by β- and γ-secretases
leads to Aβ accumulation, which also causes brain dysfunction and damage.
Although individually these pathways are capable of inducing cognitive
impairment, their interaction enhances their pathogenic effects. Thus, Aβ
induces vascular dysregulation and aggravates vascular insufficiency, thereby
enhancing the brain dysfunction and damage associated with vascular risk
factors. In addition, the hypoxia-ischemia resulting from the vascular
insufficiency increases Aβ cleavage from APP and reduces Aβ clearance
through the cerebral vasculature, promoting Aβ accumulation and the attendant
deleterious effects on the brain (Iadecola, 2010).
disease severity, in particular bradykinesia and rigidity. Also, it is
a useful tool in the monitoring of progression in clinical trials of
potential neuroprotective drugs and in differentiating juvenile-
onset Parkinson’s disease (abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT) from
dopa-responsive dystonia (normal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT; Marshall
and Grosset, 2003).
Dopamine loss is seen even in the earliest clinical
presentations of true Parkinsonism; a normal scan suggests
an alternative diagnosis such as essential tremor, drug-induced
Parkinsonism, or psychogenic Parkinsonism (Cummings et al.,
2011). Congruence between working clinical diagnosis and DAT
imaging increases over time in favor of baseline 123I-FP-CIT
SPECT imaging results. Additional applications, especially
accurate when combining with other neuroimaging tools such
as FDG-PET, characterize dementia with Parkinsonian features
(Cummings et al., 2011; Garibotto et al., 2013). Furthermore, it
is possible to differentiate AD from LBD [normal tracer uptake
in AD and abnormal in dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) with
sensitivity and specificity of 78−88% and 94−100%, respectively;
McKeith et al., 2005].
Regarding the vascular component involved in dementia, the
role of nuclear medicine imaging in the diagnosis of vascular
Parkinsonism (VP) or VaD has been addressed by only a few
studies up to now and with non-definitive results. Some of these
suggest normal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT (Gerschlager et al., 2002;
Lorberboym et al., 2004; García Vicente et al., 2005) in VP while
others suggest reduced 123I-FP-CIT binding as well as a lower
mean asymmetry index than Parkinson’s disease (Zijlmans et al.,
2007). In general more studies reported higher percentage of
normal FP-CIT SPECT in VP patients (Bouwmans et al., 2013).
The aim of this study was to analyze the vascular contribution
towards dementia and MCI. We evaluated the utility of FP-
CIT SPECT for the early diagnosis of dementia in patients with
and without a clinical vascular component, and the association
between neuropsychological function, vascular component and
dopaminergic function on FP-CIT SPECT.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
The study population included 105 patients. They were recruited
prospectively from the outpatient Dementia and Stroke Unit.
We included patients with clinical diagnosis of MCI (n = 50),
probable dementia (AD and VaD, n = 37), and Parkinson disease
with dementia (PDD and DLB, n = 18; Table 1).
TABLE 1 | Distribution of different diagnoses in our study group.
N Age Sex M:F
Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) 50 72 ± 8 26:24
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 31 76 ± 7 12:19
Parkinson disease with dementia (PDD) 12 77 ± 6 10:2
Vascular dementia (VaD) 6 73 ± 9 3:3
Lewy body dementia (LBD) 6 73 ± 11 3:3
Data are presented as mean (±SD) or number.
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Dementia was diagnosed according to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-
IV), and AD based on the criteria of the National Institute
of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke and
the Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association for
definite, probable, or possible. Independently, two trained
neurologists made the diagnosis and the final diagnosis was
established by consensus. Patients with hemispheric vascular
accident or severe isolated aphasia were not included. Also,
patients with prior cranial trauma, severe heart, kidney or
liver disease, cancer or infection signs were excluded from our
study.
Baseline Assessment
Demographic and Clinical Variables and
Cardiovascular Risk Profile
Demographic data included age and gender. We also
recorded medical history including data such as CVRF and
psychiatric disorders. CVRF were extracted from the medical
history: hypertension, dyslipidemia, Diabetes Mellitus, smoke
habit, family history of dementia or cardiovascular disease,
presence of peripheral vascular disease (PVD), coronary artery
disease (CAD) or prior stroke. Cardiovascular risk score was
calculated using the recently developed Framingham General
Cardiovascular Disease Risk from the Framingham Heart
Study (Wolf et al., 1991; D’Agostino et al., 2008). Framingham
Risk Score (FRS) was estimated in all patients according to
age, gender, total cholesterol levels, HDL levels, systolic blood
pressure, hypertension treatment, smoking habit, diabetic
status, and vascular disease (CAD, PVD, stroke). Those patients
presenting moderate or high FRS were categorized as having a
clinical vascular component, while all the rest were considered as
not having it.
Data were provided by the patient and/or caregiver or
extracted from medical reports if available.
Physical Examination
Neurological clinical examination was performed. Assessments
were undertaken according to the local practice. The Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE) was administered as a
cognitive screening test. The effect of cognitive impairment on
global functioning was measured with the Clinical Dementia
Rating Scale (CDR) and the Global Deterioration Scale
(GDS). Instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) and
ADL functions were measured with the Blessed Dementia
Rating Scale (BDRS), the Bayer ADL or self-rating Bayer ADL
scale.
Motor sub-scale of the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating
(UPDRS- III) was used as a measure to help in the description
of the extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS). Neuropsychiatric
symptoms were measured with the Neuropsychiatric Inventory
(NPI) and depression rates on the elderly were measured with
the Yesavage scale.
Neuropsychological Battery
A standardized protocol was administered by a trained
neuropsychologist. We selected a short version of the Barcelona
test. The domains tested were orientation, attention, immediate
and differed memory, language, praxis, gnosis, executive
functions and working memory. Neuropsychologists were
also asked to give a GDS of the cognitive impairment
evaluated.
Complementary Physical Examinations
General blood tests were realized including lipid profile.
According to our laboratory criteria, lipid abnormal profile was
defined as cholesterol levels higher than 200 mg/dl, high density
lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL) lower than 56 mg/dL if men and
lower than 65 mg/dL if women, low density lipoprotein (LDL)
cholesterol higher than 100 mg/dl and triglycerides higher than
190 mg/dL.
Neuroimaging Study
In addition to the clinical vascular component defined
using FRS, the vascular contribution in each group of
patients was also quantified from WMHs on anatomic
neuroimaging.
MRI and CT imaging
MRI was used preferentially, if not available CT was used.
MRI was performed on a Symphony MR A-35 1.5 T scanner
and processed using MR 2004 A Syngo software. CT imaging
was performed on Siemens Sensation Somaton E scanner and
processed using the software CT 2007 –S 16 C. Axial CT
or T2 weighted MRI images were used for the quantification
of the vascular component using a validated score according
to Wahlund scale (from 0 to 3; Wahlund et al., 2001). The
Wahlund scale was used in the analyses of WMHs in five
cerebral areas in both hemispheres: frontal, parieto-occipital,
temporal lobes, infratentorial area and basal ganglia. WMHs
on MRI were defined as ill-defined hyperintensities >5 mm
on T2 images, and on CT as ill-defined and moderately
hypodense areas of >5 mm. Lacunes were described as well-
defined areas of >2 mm with attenuation (on CT) or signal
characteristics (on MRI) the same as cerebrospinal fluid. If
lesions with these characteristics were <2 mm, they were
considered perivascular spaces. Changes in the basal ganglia were
rated in the same way and considered WMHs even if located
in the gray matter nuclei, which contains a small amount of
white matter. The Total Score of the Wahlund Scale (WSTS) was
finally quantified as the mean value of the five cerebral areas
analyzed.
Molecular imaging of dopaminergic activity by 123I-FP-
CIT SPECT
SPECT images were acquired on a 2 headed gamma camera
hybrid SPECT-TC Infinia HW4 General Electronic with a high
resolution collimator. Images were acquired 3 h after a single
intravenous injection of 5 mCi (111–185 MBq) of the radiotracer
123I Ioflupane. Subjects underwent standard thyroid blocking
with potassium iodide oral administration (120 mg) 1–4 h
before and 12–24 h after the radiotracer injection. Images were
assessed using a dichotomous division of normal (0) vs. lower
uptake (1).
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Statistical Analyses
Demographic parameters were expressed as absolute values
and percentages for the qualitative variables and by mean and
standard deviation for the quantitative variables.
In bivariate analysis, qualitative variables were compared
using the χ2 test or Fisher exact probability Test, when
appropriated. To complete the comparison between qualitative
and quantitative variables Student’s t-test was carried out.
For the mean comparisons ANOVA test was used. Finally,
Pearson correlation coefficients were used to examine the
relationship between quantitative variables. A two-sided P
value of <0.05 was used to assess statistical significance.
For significant variables, 95% confidence intervals (CI) were
established.
Statistical analyses were performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences SPSS 17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago,
IL, USA).
Ethical Considerations
This study was done in accordance with the Review Board and
Ethics Committee of our center. Written informed consent was
always obtained from patients.
Results
Subject Demographics
Subject’s demographic characteristics, CVRF, results
of neurological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging
examination frequencies of MCI group compared to the
dementia group are shown in Table 2. In Table 3 the same
features are described as N(%) for each dementia type and
also MCI.
Vascular History and Risk Factors
Within clinically diagnosed AD, 7 out of 31 patients had vascular
lesions on imaging and were classified as mixed AD. However,
none of the CVRF studied was associated with dementia. Similar
frequencies of hypertension were seen in MCI and dementia
(62 vs. 66%, respectively). The same smoking habit frequency
was found in MCI compared to dementia (21%). Zero percent
smokers were found in the VaD group and the highest frequency
existed in DLB (40% smokers).
HDL levels were normal for all the different subtypes of
dementia except DLB and PDD, which presented with lower
levels (36 ± 22 mg/dL and 47 ± 13 mg/dL, respectively).
Elevated LDL levels were found in AD (136± 48 mg/dL). Overall
dementia presented with general abnormal triglycerides levels
(171± 59 mg/dL).
Regarding the clinical component according to FRS, no
significant association was found with dementia compared to
MCI (frequencies of 64% and 63%, respectively). When studying
the different types of cognitive impairment separately, PDD
showed the highest frequency (92%) followed by VaD (67%),
MCI (63%), DLB (60%) and AD (53.6%).
Related to the presence of PVD this showed the highest
frequency within the VaD group (20%) and no significant
differences were observed between MCI (5%) and overall
TABLE 2 | Subject’s demographic characteristics, distributions of CVRF,
results of neurological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging
examination in MCI group compared to the dementia group.
N (%) MCI Dementia
Sex M:F 26 (52):24 (48) 29 (53):26 (47)
Age 72 ± 8 75 ± 8
Vascular component 14 (29) 14 (26)
EPS 0 (0) 17 (31)
Hypertension 29 (62) 31 (66)
Dyslipidemia 16 (34) 17 (36)
Diabetes mellitus 12 (26) 15 (32)
Smoking or ex-smoking 10 (21) 10 (21)
PVD 2 (5) 3 (7)
CAD 4 (10) 6 (14)
Prior stroke 15 (37) 11 (26)
Total cholesterol 194 ± 40 190 ± 47
HDL cholesterol 50 ± 18 51 ± 21
LDL cholesterol 108 ± 63 103 ± 55
Triglycerides] 137 ± 100 171 ± 59
HACHINSKI 4 ± 3 4 ± 3
GDS fast 3 ± 1 4 ± 1
MMSE] 25 ± 4 21 ± 5
UPDRS-III motorsub-scale] 9 ± 9 37 ± 15*
WSTS] 0.5 ± 0.4 0.7 ± 0.6
123 I-FP-CIT SPECT decrease uptake] 7 (21) 14 (45)
Numbers and % are presented for each group. ]p < 0.05; ∗This refers only to PDD
group.
dementia (7%). The dementia group presented with higher
frequency (14 vs. 10% in MCI) of CAD, and similar frequencies
were seen in AD, VaD, PDD (13, 20 and 22% respectively).
MCI patients had more prior strokes than dementia patients (37
vs. 26%). When ischemic lesions were examined according to
Hachinski ischemic scale, VaD had the highest score (6 ± 5 total
score).
Parkinsonism Features
The presence of extrapyramidal signs (EPS) was measured with
UPDRS III (motor subscale) test. In our sample, 17 patients
presented with EPS, corresponding to all patients with PDD and
DLB. UPDRS III scores were higher in PDD than in MCI (mean
values of 37 vs. 9 in a 0–108 scale).
Cognitive Test Function and Neuropsychological
Battery
Our population of probable dementia patients did not show
significant differences regarding MMSE scores among dementia
subtypes (mean MMSE score for probable dementia and MCI
was 21 and 25, respectively).
A significant association was found between dementia and the
global neuropsychological function, measured as a summary of
the different affected areas (p = 0.025).
When we analyzed each neuropsychological area separately,
patients with overall dementia (regardless of dementia subtype)
had a higher frequency of affectation of the orientation domain
compared to those with MCI (35% in MCI and 58% in dementia,
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TABLE 3 | Subject’s demographic characteristics, CVRF, results of neurological, neuropsychological and neuroimaging examination in different dementia
subtypes and in MCI patients.
N (%) AD VaD PDD LBD MCI
Vascular component 7 (23) 5 (83) 2 (17) 0 14 (28)
EPS 0 0 12 (100) 6 (100) 0 (0)
Hypertension 18 (67) 4 (80) 8 (80) 1 (17) 29 (62)
Dyslipidaemia 9 (33) 2 (40) 4 (40) 2 (33) 16 (34)
Diabetes mellitus 6 (22) 2 (40) 4 (40) 3 (50) 12 (26)
Smoking or ex-smoker 6 (22) 0 2 (20) 2 (33) 10 (21)
PVD 1 (4) 1 (20) 1 (11) 0 2 (5)
CAD 3 (13) 1 (20) 2 (22) 0 4 (10)
Prior stroke 5 (21) 3 (60) 2 (22) 1 (17) 15 (37)
Total cholesterol 205 ± 49 165 ± 39 172 ± 34 186 ± 62 194 ± 4
HDL cholesterol 56 ± 17 66 ± 30 36 ± 22 47 ± 14 50 ± 18
LDL cholesterol 136 ± 48 83 ± 22 82 ± 56 74 108 ± 63
Triglycerides 144 ± 65 84 ± 31 97 ± 46 117 ± 68 137 ± 100
HACHINSKI 4 ± 3 6 ± 5 5 ± 3 2 ± 2 4 ± 4
GDS fast 4 ± 1 NA 4 ± 1 NA 3 ± 1
MMSE 22 ± 5 22 ± 6 19 ± 3 19 ± 6 25 ± 4
UPDRS-III motor sub-scale NA NA 38 ± 17 33 ± 4 9 ± 9
WSTS 0.6 ± 0.5 0.7 ± 0.6 0.8 ± 0.5 0.3 ± 0.4 0.5 ± 0.4
123 I-FP-CIT SPECT lower uptake 3 (23) 0 (0) 7 (78) 4 (80) 7 (21)
Numbers and percentage are presented.
p < 0.05). Speech was also more affected in dementia (16% in
MCI and 39% in dementia, p < 0.05) and gnosis alterations was
not found in MCI (0%) while 13% of patients with dementia
presented with gnosis alterations (p < 0.05). No significant
differences were found in relation to the other tested functions
(memory, working memory, attention, praxis).
Association Between Vascular Component and
WSTS
We used the WSTS to quantify the vascular lesions observed
either in MRI or CT and then studied their association with the
qualitatively established clinical vascular component.
An association was found between the presenting clinical
vascular component according to FRS and WSTS calculated
using MRI and CT images. Patients presenting with a clinical
vascular component showed a higher mean WSTS (mean WSTS
0.7 vs. 0.4, p < 0.05 respectively).
We also found significant association regarding frontal,
basal ganglia, infratentorial and Wahlund Scores with vascular
component according to FRS (p < 0.05).
Association Between WSTS and Clinical Diagnoses:
Mixed AD has Higher WSTS than Other Dementia
Types or MCI
One of our aims was to study the contribution of the clinical
vascular component towards brain damage and dementia.
Hence, after seeing association between clinical vascular
component according to FRS and WSTS, we wanted to look
at the association between having a high WSTS and the
clinical diagnoses of either dementia or MCI. Although not
being statistically significant, the highest mean WSTS was
found in the PDD group of patients. Moreover, when AD
patients with clinical vascular component (mixed AD, 7/31
patients) were separated from the pure AD they appeared
to have the highest WSTS. In contrary, pure AD showed
a lower WSTS, even lower than that observed in MCI
(Figure 2).
Association between area-specific WSTS and clinical
diagnosis was only found in infratentorial WSTS, which is linked
to PDD (p < 0.05).
FIGURE 2 | Mean values of wahlund scale total score (WSTS)
measured on MRI/CT for each patient group. AD patients with clinical
vascular component (mixed AD) have the highest score, followed by VaD and
PDD. DLB showed the lowest score, while mild cognitive impairment (MCI)
and pure AD presented with comparable values.
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FIGURE 3 | Dopaminergic uptake distribution observed on 123I-FP-CIT
SPECT for MCI and dementia group.
Association Between Clinical Diagnoses and Uptake
in 123I-FP-CIT SPECT
123I-FP-CIT SPECT was available in 33 MCI and 31 dementia
patients (13/31 AD, 4/6 VaD, 9/12 PDD, 5/6 LBD, respectively),
a total of 61% of studied population. A significantly higher
frequency of decreased uptake in 123I-FP-CIT SPECT was found
in patients with dementia compared to MCI (21% patients
with decreased uptake in MCI vs. 45% patients in dementia
group, p < 0.05; Figure 3; Table 2). As expected, patients with
Parkinsonism (DLB and PDD) showed the highest frequency of
decreased dopaminergic uptake (80% in DLB and 78% in PDD;
Table 3).
Association Between WSTS and Dopaminergic
Uptake in 123I-FP-CIT SPECT
A significant association was found between dopaminergic
uptake seen on 123I-FP-CIT SPECT and the vascular component
quantified using WSTS (p < 0.01; Figure 4). Thus, patients
presenting higher WSTS more frequently showed an abnormal
123I-FP-CIT SPECT image (p < 0.01; Figure 5).
Nevertheless, no significant association was found between an
abnormal 123I-FP CIT SPECT image and the vascular component
according to FRS.
No Association Between Dopaminergic Uptake
123I-FP-CIT SPECT nor WSTS and
Neuropsychological Function
In relation to the association between dopaminergic uptake
observed in 123I-FP-CIT SPECT and the neuropsychological
function examined by an ordinary test battery. No
significant results have been obtained when studying each
neusopsychological function separately, and neither with the
overall performance on neuropsycological tests. No relationship
was found between neuropsychological function and the clinical
vascular component measured using WSTS.
Discussion
In this study we aimed to analyze the contribution of vascular
component (assessed clinically and on neuroimaging) to clinical
diagnoses of the common types of dementia and MCI. We
tested the potential application of 123I-CIT-SPECT imaging
FIGURE 4 | Association between WSTS and abnormal dopaminergic
uptake in 123I-FP-CIT SPECT (p < 0.01).
FIGURE 5 | MRI and 123I-FP-CIT SPECT Images from a representative
patient to show relation existing between abnormal MRI and uptake
on 123I-FP-CIT SPECT. (A) MRI T2-potentiated showing diffuse cerebral
atrophy with increased size and depth of cerebral grooves and ventricular
supratentorial enlargement. Multiple lacunar chronic infarctions, some of those
were hemeorrhagic in the lenticular and head of caudate nuclei. Chronic
periventricular ischemia leucoencephalopaty and focal hyperintensities in
parietal frontal and temporal bilateral white matter WSTS = 1.6.
(B) 123 I-FP-CIT SPECT from the same subject showing detectable decreased
uptake in right putamen.
in dementia, particularly when the vascular component is
present. We looked at the association between having vascular
component and presenting an abnormal 123I-CIT-SPECT.
Finally, we studied the association between neuropsychological
function and vascular component or abnormal 123I-CIT-SPECT.
A better understanding of the association between these variables
could help providing new tools for a more accurate and early
diagnoses of common types of dementia.
Our results showed an association between clinical vascular
component according to FRS and quantification of the vascular
component using WSTS on MRI and CT images. These results
are in line with what would be expected and confirm the
reliability of the quantification of WMHs lesions using Wahlund
scale in our population (Wahlund et al., 2001). Further, it
confirms that it was a well selected population. The association
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between WMHs for each brain area separately was significantly
different in frontal, basal ganglia and infratentorial areas.
However, no association was found within the temporal area,
which actually would be the most likely, considering that
most frequent types of AD-like dementia are characterized by
temporo-parietal alterations (Fischer et al., 1990; Jabłoński et al.,
2011; Marchesi, 2011).
It was observed in previous studies that vascular lesions
contribute to cognitive decline. It was suggested that
cerebrovascular lesions induce amyloid deposition perhaps
accelerating the process of dementia (Garcia-Alloza et al., 2011;
Pluta et al., 2013). Although, we did not find a significant
association between the different clinical diagnoses of cognitive
impairment and WSTS, we have observed a notable frequency
of the vascular component on neuroimaging within the AD
group. The later group probably was formed by mixed AD
population. These findings confirmed the fact that vascular
accident history contributes to the etiology and/or progression
of dementia. Patients with mixed AD and PDD had a high
WSTS, even higher than in patients with VaD. Although
not being statistically significant, these results are in line
with the association between AD or PDD and WMHs. No
conclusions can be drawn related to overall dementia and MCI
WSTS.
In relation to the particular areas affected by ischemic lesions
and each diagnoses, we only found a significant association
relating to the infratentorial region in PDD. This could be
explained by the fact that in our PDD group there was a high
frequency of VP, as this group presented with a high mean
of WSTS (0.8 ± 0.5) with 92% frequency of clinical vascular
component according to FRS. Further, the non-association
of VaD and any specific brain region could be due to a
diffuse pattern of this type of dementia, unusual low FRS
of this group and/or the few number of patients in this
group.
Furthermore, we evaluated the potential utility of 123I-FP-CIT
SPECT as a diagnostic tool to discriminate dementia from MCI,
and differentiate among different dementia types, emphasizing
on dementia with a vascular component. Our study showed
that 123I-FP-CIT SPECT is a useful tool to discriminate MCI
from overall dementia subtypes. This is a promising observation,
since it is a major clinical priority to be able to more accurately
confirm dementia diagnoses and predict MCI progression.
However, in our study we could not demonstrate the utility of
123I-FP-CIT SPECT to discriminate among different dementia
types.
As expected, most of patients with PDD and all but
one of those with LBD showed an abnormal 123I-FP-CIT
SPECT. Nevertheless, three patients with PD did not show an
abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT, suggestive of possible iatrogenic
Parkinsonism. We hypothesized that patients with VaD could
show an abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT if ischemic lesions
affected directly or indirectly the dopaminergic control of
cortical-striatal circuits. This was not seen in our study
probably because of the small number of patients with
VaD (n = 6), none of which showed abnormal 123I-FP-CIT
SPECT.
Once we had demonstrated the utility of 123I-FP-CIT
SPECT to differentiate dementia vs. MCI, we then studied the
association between abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT and presence
of the vascular component clinically assessed with the FRS
and quantified on neuroimaging using WSTS. An association
between the vascular component according to FRS and abnormal
123I-FP-CIT SPECT was not found, but the association between
dopaminergic function and WSTS was statistically significant.
Thus, our results showed that 123I-FP-CIT SPECT discriminates
between vascular risk factors load and vascular component
quantified using WSTS and that neuroimaging of vascular lesions
is indeed important. Wahlund scale criteria thus being more
accurate in analysing the grade of vascular component observable
than classical FRS. It is interesting that WSTS, as a global brain
WMHs score, rather than basal ganglia sub-score, is associated
with an abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT imaging. This suggests
that this technique can reflect vascular alterations other than
those affecting basal ganglia. The association observed between
abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT and the vascular component
quantified by WSTS could be justified because dementia patients
have a significantly higher frequency of abnormal 123I-FP-
CIT SPECT, in particular, the PDD group seems to be the
responsible for this finding. PDD and LBD had the highest
frequency of abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT and PDD showed
the second highest WSTS after mixed AD. Moreover, AD
showed a high vascular contribution (high mean WSTS) and
the frequency of abnormal 123I-FP-CIT SPECT was higher
(23%) than expected according to previous reports that confirm
the utility of 123I-FP-CIT SPECT in the differentiation of
PDD/LBD from AD (O’Brien et al., 2009; Cummings et al.,
2011). Some studies reported that approximately 5–10% of
123I-FP-CIT SPECT in patients with clinical dementia showed
intermediate scans. Thus, abnormal images within AD group
may represent mixed LBD/AD disease (Kemp and Holmes,
2007).
In conclusion, our study supports the utility of 123I-FP-
CIT SPECT to detect abnormal dopaminergic function in those
patients that showed a high WSTS corresponding to a high grade
of generalized ischemic brain lesions. This decrease uptake could
be due to the loss of dopaminergic innervation in the striatum
as a consequence of ischemia or the alteration of dopaminergic
system because of abnormal cell functionality, characteristic of
oxidative stress that could precede cell death in dementia or MCI
(Kim et al., 2012).
There is growing evidence demonstrating that the vascular
component has an active role in dementia mechanisms and its
progress and is probably involved in most dementia subtypes
which share similar physiopathological features (Iadecola and
Gorelick, 2003). Therefore, it is not surprising that an abnormal
123I-FP-CIT SPECT is associated with cerebrovascular lesions
related to dementia, but cannot differentiate among dementia
subtypes that have an important vascular component, such as
mixed AD, VaD or VP.
It is known that 123I-FP-CIT SPECT is useful to discriminate
AD from PDD/LBD, and hence to distinguish patients in
whom dopaminergic therapy may be beneficial (Varrone and
Halldin, 2010; Cummings et al., 2011). Therefore, an abnormal
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scan suggests underlying neurodegeneration, supportive of a
diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease, or atypical parkinsonism, LBD
and even VP if the nigrostriatal system is affected. Conversely, a
normal dopaminergic imaging supports an alternative diagnosis
such as AD, essential tremor or iatrogenic parkinsonism. In our
study, we demonstrated that 123I-FP-CIT SPECT could be also
useful to confirm diagnosis of dementia among those patients
with MCI.
Recent studies have demonstrated a 6–8% decline of DAT per
decade (Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005), suggesting DAT binding
is a powerful mediator of age-related cognitive changes. These
findings should be taken under consideration when designing
and interpreting in vivo imaging studies.
Finally, this study did not find a significant association
between neuropsychological function and abnormal 123I-FP-
CIT SPECT nor high WSTS. This suggests that neither
measurement of vascular component score nor the functionality
of dopaminergic system can detect degree of cognitive decline in
our sample.
Limitations
It is important to note that patients with VaD in our sample
had lower FRS scores than expected; the distribution of CVRF
was low and they did not appear to have the highest WSTS-
being lower than those observed in AD, where cholesterol levels
seemed to be a risk factor to develop AD. This fact could be
due to the small number of patients in our sample, especially in
the VaD group. Another limitation of our study was the use of
clinical diagnosis as the gold standard, which may not always be
accurate.
Further studies are needed to better elucidate the potential
role of dopaminergic transporter imaging on detecting vascular
brain damage and its association with clinical dementia.
Conclusion
In agreement with previous reports 123I-FP-CIT SPECT imaging
is abnormal in patients with extrapyramidal signs (PDD and
DLB). Interestingly, around 20% of patients with pure AD or
MCI had abnormal SPECT. The new finding is that on initial
visit 123I-FP-CIT SPECT can differentiate severity in terms of
classification between MCI and dementia, thus helping establish
more accurately initial diagnosis and maybe providing a useful
tool to discriminate MCI from overall dementia at clinical
practice. Furthermore, in our sample, the vascular contribution is
shown to be relevant and present among AD and PDD patients,
in line with previously reported data and in addition, there is
a good correlation between uptake on 123I-FP-CIT SPECT and
ischemic score on MRI or CT.
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As the title of the special issue indicates,
controversy surrounds augmentation of
brain cognition in humans. Lacking effica-
cious drugs for Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
and with many AD patients recruited for
clinical trials that unfortunately do not
provide the expected results, one wonders
whether to test cognition enhancement
strategies in individuals without symp-
toms of cognition decline. This opin-
ion article presents the view that safe
drugs and or dietary supplements should
be tested worldwide in aged individu-
als under the control of a non-for-profit
organization.
Unfortunately, the effort to translate
the results in rodents into patients with
dementia, mainly of the Alzheimer’s type
has not provided the expected results.
The reasons for the loss-in-translation are
varied (see Franco and Cedazo-Minguez,
2014). Moreover, failures on achieving effi-
cacious anti-AD medications and the high
cost of performing clinical trials make
pharmaceutical companies to abandon
the dementia field (see http://www.abc.
net.au/pm/content/2012/s3611062.htm).
Clinical trials face the difficulty of patient
recruitment and the need—due to ethical
reasons- to maintain the already approved
anti-AD medication. It is difficult to attain
the primary outcomes in AD patients
under a multi-drug treatment regime.
An alternative approach consists of test-
ing cognition enhancement in individuals
not taking anti-AD medication, even in
those without any clinical symptom of
dementia.
A controversy concerning supplements
of vitamin D in individuals with little or
no clinically-relevant symptoms attracted
enough interest to allocate one discussion
session in the 15th European Congress
of Endocrinology held in Copenhagen in
2013. A similar controversy on testos-
terone supplementation exists among
endocrinologists and nutritionists. Solid
reasons emerge for and against the con-
venience of those supplementations; yet
these compounds are easily available. On
analyzing the benefit-risk balance, the
main concern is the side effects that may
appear after chronic treatment with vita-
min D or testosterone. A similar concern
arises on thinking about the possibility
to prescribe cognition enhancers under
a chronically regime. Research in animal
models clearly indicates that cognition
enhancement is possible. Should drugs
with cognition-enhancing potential in
mice models of dementia be tested in
healthy humans? I consider, for instance,
that safe drugs deserve a chance to be
tested in aged non-demented humans.
Relevant for the present discussion is
that drugs may be prescribed to indi-
viduals without any clinical symptom.
Statins, which are inhibitors of 3-hydroxy-
3-methylglutaryl coenzyme A reductase,
are instrumental for the prevention of
cardiovascular dysfunction in hyperc-
holesterolemic patients. Statins are taken
in familial hypercholesterolemia at rela-
tively high doses, chronically and from
very early in life. Statins are safe as deduced
from the records of millions of patients
taken the medication since 1985, when
the first statin was available for human
use. Statin development was on the verge
to be abandoned due to potential side
effects of blood lipid-lowering drugs.
An important pharmaceutical company
took the decision of discontinuing statin
development. Relevant here is that the
“FDA—food and drug administration—
became actively involved in maintaining
interest in the development of the statins.”
Also relevant is that “there was no proof
at that time—early eighties—that drugs
or diet used to lower cholesterol would
be the clinical equivalent of patients with
spontaneously occurring low cholesterol,”
meaning that statins were being devel-
oped without the certainty that lowering
cholesterol by statins could be effica-
cious in combating atherosclerosis. The




tory/ucm082054.htm. In summary, safe
and efficacious statins are prescribed even
in the absence of clinical symptoms.
Interestingly, some compounds
approved for non-CNS indications have
shown cognition enhancing properties in
animal models of AD. As scientist in a
laboratory on translational AD research I
had experience on two drugs with good
safety records: 4-phenylbutyrate (PBA)
and tadalafil. The first is used in children
with thalassemia, sickle-cell disease or
congenital defects in enzymes of the urea
cycle (Dover et al., 1994; Collins et al.,
1995; Maestri et al., 1996). The second is
one of the phosphodiesterase V inhibitors
prescribed in erectile dysfunction (Boolell
et al., 1996a,b) and pulmonary hyperten-
sion (Prasad et al., 2000; Weimann et al.,
2000; Ghofrani et al., 2004; Kukreja et al.,
2004; Affuso et al., 2006). Two are the
mechanisms underlying the cognition-
enhancing effects of PBA in mouse models
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of AD (reviewed in Cuadrado-Tejedor
et al., 2011a, 2013). On the one hand, PBA
is a chemical chaperone that may help in
preventing the formation of protein aggre-
gates. On the other hand, PBA is a histone
deacetylase inhibitor that enhances the
transcription of genes involved in memory
processes. Inhibition of phosphodiesterase
V is effective in AD models by increas-
ing the concentration of cGMP that in
turn enhances the neural mechanisms
of defense against tau hyperphospho-
rylation and Aß aggregation (Rutten
et al., 2007; Puzzo et al., 2009; Cuadrado-
Tejedor et al., 2011b, 2013; Zhang et al.,
2013; García-Barroso et al., 2013, 2014).
Importantly, whereas acute treatment
did not affect cognitive performance in
healthy individuals (Reneerkens et al.,
2013), a double-blind placebo-controlled
study in patients with erectile dysfunc-
tion showed cognitive enhancement of
a chronically administered phosphodi-
esterase inhibitor (Shim et al., 2014). Even
in a chronic regime phosphodiesterase V
inhibitors are safe (Montorsi et al., 2004;
Giuliano et al., 2010; www.fda.gov/drugs/
drugsafety/ucm390876.htm). To bridge
the gap of successful “anti-AD” therapies
in mice that do not reach humans (see
Franco and Cedazo-Minguez, 2014), safe
drugs could, in my opinion, be the first to
test.
I consider that a non-for-profit organi-
zation such as the US FDA may take the
lead to select 3–4 safe drugs, a couple of
dietary supplements and a placebo, and
design a longitudinal study that should
start in late middle-aged healthy individ-
uals with a lifelong follow-up. Such a
study will take long to give results, but
they would be quite robust and of bet-
ter quality as time passes. In summary my
opinion is that cognitive enhancers in the
form of safe drugs and safe dietary sup-
plements (vitamin C for instance1) should
be tested already in individuals without
clinical symptoms of dementia. Less infor-
mative but easier to implement would
be to follow the age-dependent cognitive
decay in patients taking already chronic
medication for non-CNS indications that
has shown (in mice) cognitive enhancing
1 A recent report shows positive results of vitamin C in
both wild type and the APP/PSEN1 animal model of
AD (Kennard and Harrison, 2014).
potential. Such studies would benefit of
the most recent criteria of dementia/AD
diagnosis, of novel behavioral tests and
of novel biomarkers of preclinical phases
of AD (Jack et al., 2011; Sperling et al.,
2011). Likely, the results would indi-
cate the potential of the assayed drugs
for improving cognition and/or delaying
onset of dementia, and the convenience or,
otherwise, the inconvenience of starting
medication in apparently healthy individ-
uals. Even individuals not entering into
dementia might benefit from reducing the
cognitive decline due to aging.
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Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is an age-
related neurodegenerative disorder char-
acterized by global cognitive decline,
with predominant impairments arising
in attention and memory (Perry and
Hodges, 1999). It is the sixth largest
cause of death, and currently there is
no way to prevent, cure, or even slow
the progression (Klafki et al., 2006;
Alzheimer’s Association, 2014). Although
there is a widespread decline in vari-
ous neurotransmitter-containing cell bod-
ies and axonal terminals in AD, the most
consistent losses are seen in the basal
forebrain (BF) cholinergic neurons and
its projections (Mesulam, 2004; Schliebs
and Arendt, 2011). Because of the docu-
mented role of the BF cholinergic system
in learning and memory, the “choliner-
gic hypothesis” of AD was established
(Bartus et al., 1982) and has been the
primary directive for drug development
and treatment in AD for almost three
decades. While cholinomimetic drugs such
as acetylcholinesterase (AChE) inhibitors,
which elevate extracellular levels of the
neurotransmitter acetylcholine (ACh), are
the viable treatment option for AD and
provide moderate alleviation to cogni-
tive impairment, the magnitude of cog-
nitive improvements with these drugs
has remained limited (McGleenon et al.,
1999; Raina et al., 2008). Additionally,
these drugs are not successful in halt-
ing the progression of AD. Furthermore,
the evidence that non-specific block-
ade of either muscarinic or nicotinic
ACh receptors (mAChRs and nAChRs)
alone produce dementia-like symptoms
has remained inconsistent (Little et al.,
1998; Erskine et al., 2004; Roegge and
Levin, 2006). These issues have raised
questions concerning the validity of the
cholinergic hypothesis and whether the
development of procholinergic therapies
as cognition enhancers should be con-
sidered for AD. Here we argue that
psychopharmacological approaches tar-
geting the cholinergic system are based on
previous conceptualizations of ACh regu-
lating arousal states. We urge that emerg-
ing views from recent studies that refine
our understanding of the cholinergic
mediation of specific cognitive processes,
and how cholinergic mechanisms inter-
act with other pathological markers during
the progression of AD, should be consid-
ered while designing procholinergic thera-
pies. This discussion will also focus on the
development of new drug candidates such
as cholinergic receptor subtype-specific
agonists, choline transporter (CHT) mod-
ulators and neurotrophin-based therapeu-
tics to normalize cholinergic function in
AD. Additionally, the need to combine
multiple therapeutic approaches to slow
AD progression and maximize cognitive
benefits will be emphasized.
BF cholinergic neurons located in
the medial septum, vertical and hor-
izontal band of Broca, and nucleus
basalis/substantia innominata complex
innervate the cortical mantle, as well as
the hippocampus. Traditionally, the BF
cholinergic system was described as a dif-
fusely organized neuromodulator system
that influences information processing
throughout the cortex and hippocampus
in the awake brain and during REM sleep
(Woolf, 1991). There are a plethora of neu-
rophysiological studies that demonstrated
that pairing BF stimulation with the stim-
ulation of thalamic afferents enhanced
the processing of sensory inputs, while
the loss of cortical cholinergic inputs or
administration of m/nAChR antagonists
abolished this effect (Sarter et al., 2005).
Additionally, a considerable amount of
evidence generated from psychopharma-
cological and lesion studies indicated that
the BF cholinergic system supports atten-
tional functions, working memory, and
memory consolidation (Furey et al., 2000;
Power et al., 2003; Sarter et al., 2003).
Furthermore, microdialysis studies illus-
trated performance-associated changes in
ACh release in the cortex and hippocam-
pus of rodents performing attention or
memory tasks (Himmelheber et al., 2000;
McIntyre et al., 2002). Together, these data
suggested that the BF cholinergic system
contributes to attention, learning, and
mnemonic processes by generally induc-
ing a state of arousal and elevating sensory
processing by increasing the signal to noise
ratio. Therefore, sustaining extracellular
ACh release by terminating its highly effi-
cient degradation process via AChE was
considered a valid approach to restore
cognitive function in AD.
AChE inhibitors have been in clinical
practice to treat the cognitive symptoma-
tology of mild to moderate AD for almost
two decades. Tacrine was the first approved
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AChE inhibitor for AD. However, due to
a faster half-life and potential to pro-
duce adverse effects, specifically liver tox-
icity, it was replaced by newer AChE
inhibitors such as donepezil, galantamine
and rivastigmine (Knapp et al., 1994;
Ma et al., 2003; Di Santo et al., 2013).
Although AChE inhibitors have been
shown to improve cognitive, specifically
attentional, functions in AD subjects
(Foldi et al., 2005), these improvements
are ultimately inadequate and new pro-
cholinergic approaches are needed (Raina
et al., 2008; Pepeu and Giovannini, 2009).
One possible explanation for limited ther-
apeutic efficacy of AChE inhibitors might
be that besides stimulating the postsy-
naptic cholinergic receptors, higher levels
of baseline ACh levels at the choliner-
gic synapses may also stimulate presy-
naptic autoreceptors, such as muscarinic
M2 receptors, which may shut down the
recruitment of cholinergic inputs during
information processing (Decossas et al.,
2005). Furthermore, the behavioral con-
sequences of sustained postsynaptic m/n
AChR activation remain unknown. The
uncoupling of presynaptic from postsy-
naptic cholinergic signaling is hypothe-
sized to have profound effects on the
neuromodulation of local and efferent
circuitry limiting cognitive enhancement
(Hasselmo and Sarter, 2011).
Advancements in understanding the
multi-temporal modes of cholinergic
transmission offer insight into develop-
ing drug treatments centered on cognition
enhancement. The recent evolution of a
biosensor-based electrochemical approach
for monitoring cholinergic transmission in
real time generated evidence that precisely
orchestrated and temporally restricted
changes in ACh release mediated specific
cognitive operations. In task-performing
animals, phasic (rapid; on a sub-second to
second time scale) increases in choliner-
gic transmission in the prefrontal cortex
mediated the detection of attention-
demanding cues by switching perceptual
processing of the cue to cue-evoked acti-
vation of response rules (Parikh et al.,
2007; Howe et al., 2013). Such transient
increases in behavior-evoked ACh release
were not observed in the motor cortex,
which was used as a neocortical control
region. Moreover, performance-related
tonic (slower; on the time scale of minutes)
increases in ACh release, which occurred
cortex-wide, fostered and maintained gen-
eral readiness for input processing, and
facilitated signal-driven processes required
for learning and maintaining attention.
The pattern of tonic changes in cholinergic
transmission resembled performance-
related cortical ACh release measured
using microdialysis (Parikh and Sarter,
2008). These temporally-dissociated char-
acteristics of ACh release patterns are also
supported by the electrophysiological evi-
dence demonstrating burst firing and
tonic discharges of BF cholinergic neu-
rons (Unal et al., 2012). Collectively, these
studies led to a major revision of our view
on ACh that was previously considered as
a slowly releasing modulator of arousal
augmenting the gain function of neurons,
to now, as a neurotransmitter that encodes
distinct cognitive operations. This view
emphasizes a need to focus on designing
cholinergic therapies targeting the phasic
component of cholinergic transmission
that is critical for signal detection.
Harnessing this updated view of cholin-
ergic transmission, specific ligands that
activate α4β2 nAChRs may exert procog-
nitive effects by amplifying cholinergic
transients in AD subjects. Cortical cholin-
ergic transients are generated based on
local glutamatergic-cholinergic interac-
tions (Sarter et al., 2009). Stimulus-driven
recruitment of thalamocortical inputs
increases glutamate release, which acti-
vates ionotropic glutamate receptors on
cholinergic terminals and evokes phasic
ACh release. These cholinergic transients
foster detection of signals in attentional
contexts, presumably by producing persis-
tent spiking activity on cortical pyramidal
neurons through postsynaptic mAChRs
(Haj-Dahmane and Andrade, 1998).
Activation of the high-affinity α4β2
nAChRs residing on thalamocortical
afferents also produces phasic increases
in cholinergic activity via similar gluta-
matergic mechanisms (Parikh et al., 2008,
2010). A similar conceptual framework is
applied to septo-hippocampal cholinergic
circuits for encoding of episodic memories
(Hasselmo and Sarter, 2011). Thus, α4β2
nAChRs represent a valid biological target
to develop procognitive drugs that act by
facilitating phasic cholinergic signaling.
Another strategy would be to target
cellular mechanisms that are involved in
ACh production in cholinergic synapses
and are critical to maintaining cholinergic
transmission under conditions of higher
cognitive load. The capacity to import
choline into the presynaptic terminals via
the high-affinity CHTs dictates the rate
of ACh synthesis and release (Ferguson
and Blakely, 2004; Sarter and Parikh,
2005). The mobilization of the intracellu-
lar pools of CHTs to the surface membrane
(CHT trafficking) increases during atten-
tional performance to maintain choliner-
gic transmission (Apparsundaram et al.,
2005). Therefore, aberrations in CHT traf-
ficking may influence phasic ACh release
and attentional functions. In a recent
study, we found that the capacity to gen-
erate cholinergic transients following sus-
tained BF stimulation declined in CHT
heterozygous mice (Parikh et al., 2013b).
Moreover, these mutants displayed atten-
tional impairments and disrupted traffick-
ing of subcellular CHTs. These interesting
results point toward an important role of
CHT function in sustaining phasic cholin-
ergic signaling to maintain cognitive func-
tions. Given the evidence that high-affinity
choline uptake declines in AD (Rodriguez-
Puertas et al., 1994), future research on
developing drugs that activate CHT func-
tion or increase the subcellular trafficking
of CHTs holds promise to be a potential
treatment for restoring cognitive deficits
in AD.
An additional approach to develop-
ing procognitive therapies is targeting
the interaction between BF choliner-
gic neurons, via n/m AChRs, and AD
biomarkers. Among the neuropathological
features of AD, the deposition of fibrillo-
genic β amyloid (Aβ) plaques and accu-
mulation of intracellular neurofibrillary
tangles containing hyperphosphorylated
microtubule-associated protein tau are the
two major hallmarks. Studies involving
transgenic mice harboring mutations in
AD-associated genes including amyloid
precursor protein (APP), presenilin-1 and
tau, have provided insights into possi-
ble reciprocal interactions between cholin-
ergic markers and amyloidosis/tauopathy
(Christensen et al., 2010; Perez et al.,
2011). While it remains debated whether
the cholinergic pathology is the primary
cause or a consequence of AD, efforts
to understand the relationship between
cholinergic signaling and pathological
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substrates of AD are critical to under-
standing the etiology of AD. The interac-
tions between Aβ and α7 nAChRs have
remained complex. For example, the loss
of α7 nAChRs produced cognitive decline
and accumulation of soluble oligomeric
forms of Aβ in 5-month old transgenic
mice harboring the mutation for APP
gene (Hernandez et al., 2010). Conversely,
the activation of α7 nAChR with Aβ was
shown to produce tau phosphorylation
(Hu et al., 2008), and the deletion of this
receptor gene improved memory impair-
ments, reduced gliosis and preserved long-
term potentiation in aged mice modeling
the key pathological features of AD
(Dziewczapolski et al., 2009). These data
present a scenario where α7 nAChR ago-
nists represent a potential strategy for con-
trolling cognitive deficits in early AD that
mostly result from synaptotoxic effects of
Aβ oligomers, while blocking α7 nAChR
function could alleviate cognitive symp-
toms during advanced stages of AD mostly
associated with Aβ plaque and neurofibril-
lary tangles.
There is some evidence that mAChRs
regulate APP processing. Specifically, the
loss of M1 mAChRs has been shown
to activate amyloidogenic processing of
APP and greater accumulation of amy-
loid plaques in APP transgenic mice (Davis
et al., 2010). Since M1 mAChRs are pre-
dominantly expressed in the cortex and
hippocampus and play a major role in
attention and memory (Soma et al., 2014),
targeting these receptors as a therapeutic
candidate for AD holds promise in com-
pensating for cholinergic hypofunction
while controlling Aβ. Currently efforts to
develop positive allosteric modulators for
M1 mAChRs as potential treatment for AD
are ongoing.
Besides the role of Aβ and tau, oxidative
stress and inflammation have also been
considered to account for neurotoxicity
in AD. It is important to note that some
of the modest cognitive benefits of AChE
inhibitors (above) have been actually
ascribed to their anti-inflammatory prop-
erties, which involve inhibition of cytokine
production and antioxidant effects (Chao,
2003; Tabet, 2006). Although a direct link
between central cholinergic mechanisms
and inflammatory processes is still lacking,
more research in this area may provide
new avenues to design procholinergic
therapies for mitigating inflammation
in AD.
The most significant obstacle in bol-
stering cholinergic and cognitive function
in AD is the progressive loss of cholin-
ergic innervation and neurons (Schliebs
and Arendt, 2011). This has spurred drug
discovery efforts to focus on develop-
ing neuroprotective therapies to preserve
cholinergic function in AD. Nerve growth
factor (NGF) is the primary neurotrophic
factor supporting the growth, mainte-
nance, and survival of BF cholinergic
neurons by binding to the high-affinity
tropomyosin-related kinase A (trkA)
receptor (Fagan et al., 1997). Moreover,
activation of p75 NGF receptors is known
to exert detrimental effects on neurons
by triggering apoptotic pathways (Chao,
2003). Postmortem studies have sup-
ported the notion that the loss of trkA
receptors, and presumably the imbal-
ance between trkA and p75 signaling,
contributes to cholinergic dysfunction in
AD (Mufson et al., 2008). We previously
demonstrated that selective reduction of
trkA receptors on BF cholinergic neurons
produces persistent attentional impair-
ments and decline in phasic cholinergic
signaling in aged but not young rats
(Parikh et al., 2013a). Moreover cholin-
ergic dysfunction in trkA-suppressed
aged rats occurred due to age-related
accumulation of proNGF and overacti-
vation of proNGF-p75 signaling (Yegla
and Parikh, 2014). We also found that Aβ
oligomers produced robust impairments
in presynaptic cholinergic signaling and
attentional capacities in aged rats (Parikh
et al., 2014). Because Aβ oligomers are
known to interact with the extracellu-
lar domain of p75 and produce neuritic
degeneration in neuronal culture prepared
from BF cholinergic neurons (Knowles
et al., 2009), oligomeric Aβ-induced dys-
function of cholinergic synapses may be
linked to p75 activation. Collectively, these
findings support the view that interac-
tions between aging/pathological aging
and neurotrophic signaling escalate the
vulnerability of the BF cholinergic system
and neurotrophin-based therapies may
have potential to rescue the loss of this
neurotransmitter system in AD. Therefore,
neuroprotective strategies that provide
trophic support to cholinergic neurons or
that restore trkA/p75 balance may offer
advantage over the current drugs to halt
cognitive deterioration in AD.
Recent research confirms that the era
of developing a “magic bullet” to fos-
ter cognition enhancement in AD is over.
Therefore, we need to consider devising
strategies that focus on a more integrated
or holistic therapeutic approach to pre-
serve cholinergic function and halt cog-
nitive deterioration in AD. In an ideal
scenario, a combination of drugs that aug-
ment phasic cholinergic signaling, block
the interactions between the pathological
markers of AD and the cholinergic pro-
teome, and activate neurotrophic signaling
will maximize cognitive benefits.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Our research was supported by NIH
grants AG0292592 and MH086530, and
American Federation for Aging research.
REFERENCES
Alzheimer’s Association. (2014). 2014 Alzheimer’s
disease facts and figures. Alzheimer’s Dement 10,
e47–e92. doi: 10.1016/j.jalz.2014.02.001
Apparsundaram, S., Martinez, V., Parikh, V., Kozak,
R., and Sarter, M. (2005). Increased capacity and
density of choline transporters situated in synaptic
membranes of the right medial prefrontal cortex
of attentional task-performing rats. J. Neurosci.
25, 3851–3856. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0205-
05.2005
Bartus, R. T., Dean, R. L. III, Beer, B., and Lippa, A.
S. (1982). The cholinergic hypothesis of geriatric
memory dysfunction. Science 217, 408–414. doi:
10.1126/science.7046051
Chao, M. V. (2003). Neurotrophins and their recep-
tors: a convergence point for many signalling
pathways. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 299–309. doi:
10.1038/nrn1078
Christensen, D. Z., Bayer, T. A., and Wirths,
O. (2010). Intracellular ass triggers neu-
ron loss in the cholinergic system of the
APP/PS1KI mouse model of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. Neurobiol. Aging 31, 1153–1163. doi:
10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2008.07.022
Davis, A. A., Fritz, J. J., Wess, J., Lah, J. J., and
Levey, A. I. (2010). Deletion of M1 muscarinic
acetylcholine receptors increases amyloid pathol-
ogy in vitro and in vivo. J. Neurosci. 30, 4190–4196.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6393-09.2010
Decossas, M., Doudnikoff, E., Bloch, B., and Bernard,
V. (2005). Aging and subcellular localization of
m2 muscarinic autoreceptor in basalocortical neu-
rons in vivo. Neurobiol. Aging 26, 1061–1072. doi:
10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2004.09.007
Di Santo, S. G., Prinelli, F., Adorni, F., Caltagirone,
C., and Musicco, M. (2013). A meta-analysis
of the efficacy of donepezil, rivastigmine,
galantamine, and memantine in relation to
severity of Alzheimer’s disease. J. Alzheimers Dis.
35, 349–361. doi: 10.3233/JAD-122140
Dziewczapolski, G., Glogowski, C. M., Masliah, E.,
and Heinemann, S. F. (2009). Deletion of the alpha
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 254
83
Yegla and Parikh Procholinergic therapies and cognition enhancement
7 nicotinic acetylcholine receptor gene improves
cognitive deficits and synaptic pathology in a
mouse model of Alzheimer’s disease. J. Neurosci.
29, 8805–8815. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6159-
08.2009
Erskine, F. F., Ellis, J. R., Ellis, K. A., Stuber, E.,
Hogan, K., Miller, V., et al. (2004). Evidence for
synergistic modulation of early information pro-
cessing by nicotinic and muscarinic receptors in
humans. Hum. Psychopharmacol. 19, 503–509. doi:
10.1002/hup.613
Fagan, A. M., Garber, M., Barbacid, M., Silos-
Santiago, I., and Holtzman, D. M. (1997). A role
for TrkA during maturation of striatal and basal
forebrain cholinergic neurons in vivo. J. Neurosci.
17, 7644–7654.
Ferguson, S. M., and Blakely, R. D. (2004). The choline
transporter resurfaces: new roles for synaptic
vesicles? Mol. Interv. 4, 22–37. doi: 10.1124/
mi.4.1.22
Foldi, N. S., White, R. E., and Schaefer, L. A. (2005).
Detecting effects of donepezil on visual selec-
tive attention using signal detection parameters in
Alzheimer’s disease. Int. J. Geriatr. Psychiatry 20,
485–488. doi: 10.1002/gps.1319
Furey, M. L., Pietrini, P., and Haxby, J. V. (2000).
Cholinergic enhancement and increased selectivity
of perceptual processing during working mem-
ory. Science 290, 2315–2319. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.290.5500.2315
Haj-Dahmane, S., and Andrade, R. (1998). Ionic
mechanism of the slow afterdepolarization
induced by muscarinic receptor activation in rat
prefrontal cortex. J. Neurophysiol. 80, 1197–1210.
Hasselmo, M. E., and Sarter, M. (2011). Modes and
models of forebrain cholinergic neuromodulation
of cognition. Neuropsychopharmacology 36, 52–73.
doi: 10.1038/npp.2010.104
Hernandez, C. M., Kayed, R., Zheng, H., Sweatt, J.
D., and Dineley, K. T. (2010). Loss of alpha7 nico-
tinic receptors enhances beta-amyloid oligomer
accumulation, exacerbating early-stage cognitive
decline and septohippocampal pathology in a
mouse model of Alzheimer’s disease. J. Neurosci.
30, 2442–2453. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5038-
09.2010
Himmelheber, A. M., Sarter, M., and Bruno, J. P.
(2000). Increases in cortical acetylcholine release
during sustained attention performance in rats.
Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 9, 313–325. doi:
10.1016/S0926-6410(00)00012-4
Howe, W. M., Berry, A. S., Francois, J., Gilmour,
G., Carp, J. M., Tricklebank, M., et al. (2013).
Prefrontal cholinergic mechanisms instigating
shifts from monitoring for cues to cue-guided per-
formance: converging electrochemical and fMRI
evidence from rats and humans. J. Neurosci.
33, 8742–8752. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5809-
12.2013
Hu, M., Waring, J. F., Gopalakrishnan,
M., and Li, J. (2008). Role of GSK-
3beta activation and alpha7 nAChRs in
Abeta(1-42)-induced tau phosphorylation in
PC12 cells. J. Neurochem. 106, 1371–1377. doi:
10.1111/j.1471-4159.2008.05483.x
Klafki, H. W., Staufenbiel, M., Kornhuber, J., and
Wiltfang, J. (2006). Therapeutic approaches to
Alzheimer’s disease. Brain 129(Pt 11), 2840–2855.
doi: 10.1093/brain/awl280
Knapp, M. J., Knopman, D. S., Solomon, P. R.,
Pendlebury, W. W., Davis, C. S., and Gracon, S. I.
(1994). A 30-week randomized controlled trial of
high-dose tacrine in patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. The tacrine study group. JAMA 271, 985–991.
doi: 10.1001/jama.1994.03510370037029
Knowles, J. K., Rajadas, J., Nguyen, T. V., Yang, T.,
LeMieux, M. C., Vander Griend, L., et al. (2009).
The p75 neurotrophin receptor promotes amyloid-
beta(1-42)-induced neuritic dystrophy in vitro
and in vivo. J. Neurosci. 29, 10627–10637. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0620-09.2009
Little, J. T., Johnson, D. N., Minichiello, M.,
Weingartner, H., and Sunderland, T. (1998).
Combined nicotinic and muscarinic block-
ade in elderly normal volunteers: cognitive,
behavioral, and physiologic responses.
Neuropsychopharmacology 19, 60–69. doi:
10.1016/S0893-133X(98)00002-5
Ma, X. C., Xin, J., Wang, H. X., Zhang, T., and Tu, Z.
H. (2003). Acute effects of huperzine A and tacrine
on rat liver. Acta Pharmacol. Sin. 24, 247–250.
Available online at: http://www.chinaphar.com/
1671-4083/24/247.pdf
McGleenon, B. M., Dynan, K. B., and Passmore,
A. P. (1999). Acetylcholinesterase inhibitors in
Alzheimer’s disease. Br. J. Clin. Pharmacol. 48,
471–480. doi: 10.1046/j.1365-2125.1999.00026.x
McIntyre, C. K., Pal, S. N., Marriott, L. K., and
Gold, P. E. (2002). Competition between memory
systems: acetylcholine release in the hippocam-
pus correlates negatively with good performance
on an amygdala-dependent task. J. Neurosci.
22, 1171–1176. Available online at: http://www.
jneurosci.org/content/22/3/1171.long
Mesulam, M. M. (2004). The cholinergic innervation
of the human cerebral cortex. Prog. Brain Res. 145,
67–78. doi: 10.1016/S0079-6123(03)45004-8
Mufson, E. J., Counts, S. E., Perez, S. E., and Ginsberg,
S. D. (2008). Cholinergic system during the pro-
gression of Alzheimer’s disease: therapeutic impli-
cations. Expert. Rev. Neurother. 8, 1703–1718. doi:
10.1586/14737175.8.11.1703
Parikh, V., Bernard, C. S., Naughton, S. X., and
Yegla, B. (2014). Interactions between Abeta
oligomers and presynaptic cholinergic sig-
naling: age-dependent effects on attentional
capacities. Behav. Brain Res. 274, 30–42. doi:
10.1016/j.bbr.2014.07.046
Parikh, V., Howe, W. M., Welchko, R. M., Naughton,
S. X., D’Amore, D. E., Han, D. H., et al. (2013a).
Diminished trkA receptor signaling reveals
cholinergic-attentional vulnerability of aging. Eur.
J. Neurosci. 37, 278–293. doi: 10.1111/ejn.12090
Parikh, V., Ji, J., Decker, M. W., and Sarter,
M. (2010). Prefrontal beta2 subunit-containing
and alpha7 nicotinic acetylcholine receptors dif-
ferentially control glutamatergic and choliner-
gic signaling. J. Neurosci. 30, 3518–3530. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5712-09.2010
Parikh, V., Kozak, R., Martinez, V., and Sarter,
M. (2007). Prefrontal acetylcholine release
controls cue detection on multiple timescales.
Neuron 56, 141–154. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2007.
08.025
Parikh, V., Man, K., Decker, M. W., and Sarter, M.
(2008). Glutamatergic contributions to nicotinic
acetylcholine receptor agonist-evoked cholinergic
transients in the prefrontal cortex. J. Neurosci.
28, 3769–3780. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5251-
07.2008
Parikh, V., and Sarter, M. (2008). Cholinergic medi-
ation of attention: contributions of phasic and
tonic increases in prefrontal cholinergic activ-
ity. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1129, 225–235. doi:
10.1196/annals.1417.021
Parikh, V., St Peters, M., Blakely, R. D., and Sarter,
M. (2013b). The presynaptic choline transporter
imposes limits on sustained cortical acetylcholine
release and attention. J. Neurosci. 33, 2326–2337.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4993-12.2013
Pepeu, G., and Giovannini, M. G. (2009).
Cholinesterase inhibitors and beyond.
Curr. Alzheimer Res. 6, 86–96. doi:
10.2174/156720509787602861
Perez, S. E., He, B., Muhammad, N., Oh, K. J.,
Fahnestock, M., Ikonomovic, M. D., et al. (2011).
Cholinotrophic basal forebrain system alterations
in 3xTg-AD transgenic mice. Neurobiol. Dis. 41,
338–352. doi: 10.1016/j.nbd.2010.10.002
Perry, R. J., and Hodges, J. R. (1999). Attention
and executive deficits in Alzheimer’s disease. A
critical review. Brain 122(Pt 3), 383–404. doi:
10.1093/brain/122.3.383
Power, A. E., Vazdarjanova, A., and McGaugh, J.
L. (2003). Muscarinic cholinergic influences
in memory consolidation. Neurobiol. Learn.
Mem. 80, 178–193. doi: 10.1016/S1074-7427(03)
00086-8
Raina, P., Santaguida, P., Ismaila, A., Patterson, C.,
Cowan, D., Levine, M., et al. (2008). Effectiveness
of cholinesterase inhibitors and memantine for
treating dementia: evidence review for a clinical
practice guideline. Ann. Intern. Med. 148, 379–397.
doi: 10.7326/0003-4819-148-5-200803040-00009
Rodriguez-Puertas, R., Pazos, A., Zarranz, J.
J., and Pascual, J. (1994). Selective cortical
decrease of high-affinity choline uptake carrier
in Alzheimer’s disease: an autoradiographic
study using 3H-hemicholinium-3. J. Neural.
Transm. Park. Dis. Dement. Sect. 8, 161–169. doi:
10.1007/BF02260937
Roegge, C. S., and Levin, E. D. (2006). “Nicotinic
receptor antagonists in rats,” in Animal Models
of Cognitive Impairment, eds E. D. Levin and
J. J. Buccafusco (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press),
21–36.
Sarter, M., Bruno, J. P., and Givens, B. (2003).
Attentional functions of cortical cholinergic
inputs: what does it mean for learning and mem-
ory? Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 80, 245–256. doi:
10.1016/S1074-7427(03)00070-4
Sarter, M., Hasselmo, M. E., Bruno, J. P., and
Givens, B. (2005). Unraveling the attentional
functions of cortical cholinergic inputs: interac-
tions between signal-driven and cognitive mod-
ulation of signal detection. Brain Res. Brain Res.
Rev. 48, 98–111. doi: 10.1016/j.brainresrev.2004.
08.006
Sarter, M., and Parikh, V. (2005). Choline trans-
porters, cholinergic transmission and cognition.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6, 48–56. doi: 10.1038/
nrn1588
Sarter, M., Parikh, V., and Howe, W. M. (2009).
nAChR agonist-induced cognition enhancement:
integration of cognitive and neuronal mecha-
nisms. Biochem. Pharmacol. 78, 658–667. doi:
10.1016/j.bcp.2009.04.019
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 254
84
Yegla and Parikh Procholinergic therapies and cognition enhancement
Schliebs, R., and Arendt, T. (2011). The choliner-
gic system in aging and neuronal degeneration.
Behav. Brain Res. 221, 555–563. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.
2010.11.058
Soma, S., Suematsu, N., and Shimegi, S. (2014).
Blockade of muscarinic receptors impairs
the retrieval of well-trained memory. Front.
Aging Neurosci. 6:63. doi: 10.3389/fnagi.
2014.00063
Tabet, N. (2006). Acetylcholinesterase
inhibitors for Alzheimer’s disease: anti-
inflammatories in acetylcholine clothing!
Age Ageing 35, 336–338. doi: 10.1093/ageing/
afl027
Unal, C. T., Golowasch, J. P., and Zaborszky, L.
(2012). Adult mouse basal forebrain harbors two
distinct cholinergic populations defined by their
electrophysiology. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 6:21. doi:
10.3389/fnbeh.2012.00021
Woolf, N. J. (1991). Cholinergic systems in mam-
malian brain and spinal cord. Prog. Neurobiol.
37, 475–524. doi: 10.1016/0301-0082(91)
90006-M
Yegla, B., and Parikh, V. (2014). Effects of sustained
proNGF blockade on attentional capacities
in aged rats with compromised choliner-
gic system. Neuroscience 261, 118–132. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroscience.2013.12.042
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of
interest.
Received: 01 November 2014; accepted: 29 December
2014; published online: 28 January 2015.
Citation: Yegla B and Parikh V (2015) Rejuvenating
procholinergic treatments for cognition enhancement in
AD: current challenges and future prospects. Front. Syst.
Neurosci. 8:254. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00254
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Systems Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2015 Yegla and Parikh. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 254
85
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 21 June 2016
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2016.00276






University of Trento, Italy
Roberto Canitano,






This article was submitted to
Neural Technology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Neuroscience
Received: 18 March 2016
Accepted: 02 June 2016
Published: 21 June 2016
Citation:
Billeci L, Tonacci A, Tartarisco G,
Narzisi A, Di Palma S, Corda D,
Baldus G, Cruciani F, Anzalone SM,
Calderoni S, Pioggia G, Muratori F
and Michelangelo Study Group (2016)
An Integrated Approach for the
Monitoring of Brain and Autonomic
Response of Children with Autism




An Integrated Approach for the
Monitoring of Brain and Autonomic
Response of Children with Autism
Spectrum Disorders during
Treatment by Wearable Technologies
Lucia Billeci 1, 2*, Alessandro Tonacci 1, Gennaro Tartarisco 3, Antonio Narzisi 4,
Simone Di Palma 5, Daniele Corda 6, Giovanni Baldus 6, Federico Cruciani 7,
Salvatore M. Anzalone 8, Sara Calderoni 4, Giovanni Pioggia 3, Filippo Muratori 2, 4 and
Michelangelo Study Group
1 Institute of Clinical Physiology, National Research Council of Italy, Pisa, Italy, 2Department of Clinical and Experimental
Medicine, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, 3 Institute of Applied Sciences and Intelligent Systems “Eduardo Caianiello”, National
Research Council of Italy, Messina, Italy, 4Department of Developmental Neuroscience, IRCSS Stella Maris Foundation, Pisa,
Italy, 5Department of Information Engineering, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, 6HelpyLife Technology, Oristano, Italy, 7 I+ srl,
Florence, Italy, 8 Institute of Intelligent Systems and Robotics, University Pierre and Marie Curie, Paris, France
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are associated with physiological abnormalities, which
are likely to contribute to the core symptoms of the condition. Wearable technologies
can provide data in a semi-naturalistic setting, overcoming the limitations given by the
constrained situations in which physiological signals are usually acquired. In this study
an integrated system based on wearable technologies for the acquisition and analysis
of neurophysiological and autonomic parameters during treatment is proposed and
an application on five children with ASD is presented. Signals were acquired during a
therapeutic session based on an imitation protocol in ASD children. Data were analyzed
with the aim of extracting quantitative EEG (QEEG) features from EEG signals as well
as heart rate and heart rate variability (HRV) from ECG. The system allowed evidencing
changes in neurophysiological and autonomic response from the state of disengagement
to the state of engagement of the children, evidencing a cognitive involvement in the
children in the tasks proposed. The high grade of acceptability of the monitoring platform
is promising for further development and implementation of the tool. In particular if the
results of this feasibility study would be confirmed in a larger sample of subjects, the
system proposed could be adopted in more naturalistic paradigms that allow real world
stimuli to be incorporated into EEG/psychophysiological studies for the monitoring of
the effect of the treatment and for the implementation of more individualized therapeutic
programs.
Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), quantitative EEG (QEEG), electrocardiogram (ECG), wearable
sensors, monitoring, naturalistic, personalization, imitation
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INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in neuroimaging and other less-invasive
neurophysiological monitoring systems allow researchers to
explore the relationship between neurophysiological signals,
neurodevelopmental disorders and behavioral changes. In
particular, atypical patterns of brain activity and connectivity
have been documented in children with Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASD) and are the basis of impaired and atypical
behaviors (Belmonte et al., 2004; Geschwind and Levitt, 2007;
Coben et al., 2008; Cantor and Chabot, 2009).
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a non-invasive technique
able to identify dysfunction in various brain regions in autistic
individuals. EEG measurements can be investigated in the
frequency domain, and it has been convincingly demonstrated
that assessing specific frequencies can yield insights into the
functional correlations between brain regions. The EEG patterns
analysis in the frequency domain is known as Quantitative
EEG (QEEG). Commonly QEEG has been used to capture
electrical patterns at the scalp surface, which primarily reflect
cortical electrical activity or “brainwaves” (Tong and Thakor,
2009). Recently, several studies have used QEEG as a tool for
neurophysiological assessment of children with ASD during
resting state condition or specific tasks (for a review see Billeci
et al., 2013). Interestingly, QEEG measurements can provide
a mean to establish treatment efficacy (Dawson et al., 2012).
According to the above-mentioned evidence, QEEG provides
sufficient sensitivity and specificity to be worthy of consideration
for use in the diagnosis, treatment and outcome evaluation of
neurodevelopmental disorders.
ASD are also characterized by altered autonomic function,
which plays an important role in the regulation of behaviors
during social interaction. Physiological parameters and vital signs
including heart rate, systolic and diastolic pressure, pulse rate,
skin conductance, body temperature, and fingertip temperature
can be used as cues of autonomic functions. In particular, heart
rate variability (HRV) is a well-recognized method to assess the
cardiac autonomic balance of the autonomic nervous system
(Goldberger, 1999; Friedman, 2007). Although a few parameters,
such as the HRV, are influenced by physical activity, nevertheless
they have been increasingly used to measure the activity of
the autonomic nervous system and to study neurophysiological
responses in naturalistic settings (Goodwin et al., 2006). Other
studies have shown an extremely high autonomic arousal in
individuals with ASD even though they appeared to be outwardly
calm (Hirstein et al., 2001; Hoch et al., 2010; Ming et al., 2011).
One of the limitations of the physiological parameters’
assessment protocol is the artificial setting in which signals are
usually acquired, which may or may not be closely related with
naturally occurring stimuli. Therefore, these protocols induce
both systematic and non-systematic biases to the experimental
outcome eluding the actual nature of the data. Furthermore, they
do not allow an ecological assessment and monitoring during
treatment or even at home.
The recording of physiological signals [such as
electroecephalogram (EEG) or electrocardioram (ECG)]
during treatment in a semi-naturalistic setting may reveal
important cues about the engagement, the arousal and emotional
state and can support clinicians during therapeutic sessions
in the implementation of the most appropriate personalized
treatment plan.
The study of engagement is particularly relevant in ASD
as deficits in this field (that is when the child is not able
to share his/her attention to the other) emerge very early, in
the second half of the first year of life, leading to reduced
engagement with social stimuli, and subsequently reduced
opportunities for social learning (Dawson et al., 1998; Mundy
and Neal, 2000; Chevallier et al., 2012). These early deficits
may thus have cascading effects on social communication
development in successive years. In order to contrast these
cascading effects evidence-based models (i.e., Early Start Denver
Model) suggest building therapeutic tasks around specific
engagement skills (i.e., imitation or joint attention) as core
of the intervention (Billeci et al., 2016; Bono et al., 2016).
During these tasks in which there is a social interaction with
a therapist, it is possible to explore the response to social
engagement and emotion regulation in response to social
disengagement (that is when the child is not involved in social
attention). In particular in the last years some studies have been
performed, which provide evidences that physiological signals
could constitute an important marker of social functioning
and well-being that differentiate between engagement and
disengagement during social interactions or treatment sessions
(Patriquin et al., 2013; Di Palma et al., 2016; Shahrestani et al.,
2016).
It is important to underline that monitoring physiological
parameters during therapeutic sessions or during daily basis
routines is definitely more challenging than monitoring the
same parameters under controlled conditions. It is mandatory
for example that the equipment should not interfere with the
activities performed by the children during the treatment session.
Wearable systems and wireless technologies can overcome this
problem allowing monitoring subjects in an unobtrusive way
(Varshney, 2005, 2006; Yilmaz et al., 2010).
The present study aims at describing and discussing the
implementation of a wearable technology system that can be
used during naturalistic interactions between a child and a
clinician during a treatment session for the monitoring of
brain and autonomic response. A preliminary application in
a sample of children with ASD is presented. This work has
been carried out within the framework of MICHELANGELO, a
project funded by the European Commission (FP7- ICT-288241)
(http://www.michelangelo-project.eu/).
The combined analysis of QEEG and ECG signals in
semi-naturalistic settings enables simultaneous examination of
neurophysiological and physiological correlates while the child
is engaged in socio-emotive interactions. This system is able to
provide (i) ecologically synchronized quantitative measurements
of brain signals, and (ii) autonomic responses not measurable
with traditional research methods within a natural environment.
For this purpose, wearable technologies for EEG and ECG
have been used, which are suitable for young children with
ASD. The system proposed will allow a reliable indication of
brain activity and autonomic status in a naturalistic setting
contributing toward the implementation of more individualized
and effective treatment for children with ASD.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Paradigm
The system was tested with five children with ASD (all males,
age range = 6–8 years, mean age = 7.2 ± 0.83 years) (Table 1).
The study was approved by the IRCSS Stella Maris Foundation’s
Ethical Committee and all the parents signed a written consent
form to participate.
The ASD diagnosis was formulated according to the DSM-
5 criteria (APA, 2013) and confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule-2 (ADOS-2, Lord et al., 2012) and the
Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R, Lord et al., 1994).
The ADOS-2 diagnostic algorithm also provides an algorithm
for computing the comparison score (CS), a measure of the
severity of autism-related symptoms. The CS ranges from 1 to
10, where 1 indicates minimal-to-no evidence of autism-related
symptoms and 10 indicates a high level of impairment.
The adaptive behavior was assessed according to the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scale-II (VABS-II, Sparrow et al., 2005). A
multidisciplinary team—including a senior child psychiatrist,
and two clinical child psychologists experienced in ASD—
conducted the diagnostic assessment during a 5-day extensive
evaluation. The Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children-IV
(WISC-IV) were used to assess the Full Scale Intelligence
Quotient (FSIQ).
The children involved in the experiment were monitored
during one therapy session in clinic with the integrated
system. The semi-naturalistic experimental paradigm was based
on imitation (IM) in the context of a play-based setting
(Figure 1). Each session took about 15 min. During all the
session the children remained seated on a chair playing at a
table with the therapist in order to limit artifacts in the data
acquired.
The IM phase is realized according to three different tasks
in which the therapist asks to the child to imitate what she is
doing. In task 1, the therapist uses blocks, play-doh, or sheets
and markets in order to elicit functional imitation in the child;
in task 2 the therapist suggests the child gestural and symbolic
imitation; in task 3 the therapist elicits facial expressions in
the child. Each task was repeated sever times in order to have
several segments of the signals, which could be mediated to have
more consistent results. During the experimental sessions data
brain, autonomic and video data were recorded and analyzed




The overall architecture of the integrated system is shown in
Figure 2. It mainly consists of threemodules: the biosignal sensor
unit, the video mobile unit, and a Central Unit (CU).
The main function of the biosignal sensor unit is the wearable
and wireless acquisition of EEG and ECG signals while allowing
the child to interact with the therapist. The unit is composed by
the Enobio wireless device (STARLAB, Barcelona, Spain) for EEG
recording (Cester et al., 2008) and by a wireless ECG chest belt
(Solar et al., 2012).
The integrated system is also provided of data analysis
toolboxes for the processing of the recorded video, EEG and
ECG signals. The collected data can be loaded and queried
for data visualization, segmentation, and feature extraction.
The toolboxes are developed as a research tool in order to
investigate physiological and behavioral parameters correlated
with behaviors of the child during treatment sessions. The
main components of the system are described in the following
paragraphs (for details about EEG and ECG feature extraction
see Supplementary Materials).
Biosignal Sensor Unit
Enobio offers a high degree of unobtrusiveness (easy to use,
wearable, only 65 grams weight). Each active digital electrode
with a transduction interface and electrode is able to acquire,
digitize, and transmit the signal on site in order to reduce the
environmental noise while recording data away from the lab or
controlled environments.
The system continuously records EEG signals over 19
channels positioned according to the 10/10 standard scheme
and two references (placed on the mastoid), at 500 Hz with
a 16-bit accuracy. Enobio is equipped both with gel and dry
electrodes. While gel electrodes provide a better contact with the
skin and lower impedance, their positioning can be very long
and uncomfortable for the child. In this setting dry electrodes are
chosen as they offer a shorter and easier set-up time comparable
with gel electrodes, which is particularly important with children
with ASD. Several articles indeed show that dry electrodes can
yield performance comparable to gel electrodes (Zander et al.,
2011; Guger et al., 2012). Data from Enobio are recorded by a
dedicated software (NIC, Neuroelectrics).
The chest belt for ECG acquisition is a wearable device
designed by our group based on the Shimmer R© (Burns et al.,
2010) wireless base module, which is CE certified and validated
prior to the present study in a group of healthy subjects (Solar
et al., 2012).
The system is powered by a 3.6 V rechargeable battery, which
allows up to 7 h of continuous monitoring per charge. The system
sample frequency can be set from a minimum of 100 Hz up to a
maximum of 500 Hz. The hardware module was tailored to be




chest straps in order to gain in ergonomics, to be lightweight and
allow long-term monitoring. These straps are fully washable and
integrate dry electrodes applied directly to the patient’s skin for
single-lead acquisitions.
Video Mobile Unit
The video mobile unit is made up by two environmental cameras
with a frame rate of 25 fps and a resolution of 640 × 480 for
video recording. The cameras are wired and synchronized with
the system to contextualize the neurophysiological parameters
with the behavior of the child. With the aim of building an
exploitable research tool to investigate EEG signal, inexpensive
webcam were used as video capture devices (Microsoft LifeCam
HD-5000).
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TABLE 1 | Participants characteristics.
Subjects Age Diagnosis ADOS-2 Module ADOS (CS) WISC-IV-FSIQ VABS-II Composite
in years
Child 1 7 Autism Spectrum 2 6 117 75
Child 2 8 Autism Spectrum 3 6 98 76
Child 3 6 Autism Spectrum 3 7 97 85
Child 4 7 Autism Spectrum 3 5 84 76
Child 5 6 Autism Spectrum 3 6 123 85
CS, Comparison Score; WISC-FSIQ, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; VABS, Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale.
Central Unit
The CU (OS: Win8, RAM: 4 GB, CPU: Intel Core i5-3450—
3.1 GHz—4 core) is positioned in the monitoring room and
enables researchers to monitor the child during therapy and the
neurophysiological signals. The monitoring room is located next
to the therapy’s room allowing the Bluetooth data transmission
from the biosignal sensor unit and the video mobile data
recording. Raw data are real-time displayed within four windows
(ECG, EEG, Videos) as shown in Figure 3.
The CU manages the connection between the monitoring
interface and the set of biosignal sensors and video mobile
units, in particular the CU is responsible for notifying the “Start
Session” message to all the recording units (RUs) involved and
initializing each new session. All the communication between
the CU and the RUs is transmitted in a validated XML
format v1.0. The application manages security and privacy,
real-time streaming and data synchronization. In particular the
synchronization among the different devices is guaranteed by the
fact their applications run in the same system and are launched
simultaneously by an application running on the CU.
After data collection, the data analysis toolboxes running in
the CU are able to analyze and process the collected data off-line
by combining different data as a whole data source.
Video Analysis Toolbox
The video analysis toolbox allows the labeling of the children’s
behaviors in the recorded session and is based on the Dante
annotation tool (Cruciani et al., 2011) customized for the labeling
of behaviors of children with ASD.
Some of the behavioral features extracted are considered as
instantaneous features (i.e., gesture), while others represent a
state of the subject that persists in time (i.e., engagement).
The video analysis tool provides a Graphical User Interface
(GUI) (Figure 4) to re-play the video of a recorded session, while
examining annotated data and the integration of EEG/ECG data.
A manual annotation grid, referring to the child and the
therapist, allows behavioral analysis of the therapeutic session, as
defined in the coding scheme.
The grid distinguishes between “States” and “Behaviors.”
States identify behavioral states of a subject that persist for
a given duration in time, for example Engagement and Dis-
Engagement. States are always considered as mutually exclusive.
In contrast, Behaviors are always considered as instantaneous
events, meaning that the corresponding event will have the same
timestamp for Start Time and End Time.
The Video Analysis interface produces an “Event File,” an.
xls file containing the information about the annotated events
(type of state/behavior, Start Time, End Time). Through the
annotation of these events, each therapy session can be analyzed
to provide contextual information on significant behaviors of the
child, useful for exploratory analysis of EEG/ECG signal.
EEG Analysis Toolbox
EEG signals are first-pre-processed using EEGLAB Toolbox
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004) to remove noise and artifacts. The
recorded EEG signals are high passed at 0.5 Hz to get rid of noise
from breathing and low passed at a cut-off frequency of 70 Hz to
get rid of the high frequency noise. A Notch filter (45–55 Hz) is
also applied to remove power line interference.
Ocular and muscular artifacts are first removed by visual
inspection. In particular blink artifacts are identified as segments
of data having deflection >150 µV, while ocular flutters, or
muscle movement artifacts as segments having deflections of 50
µV relative to baseline. Segments containing these artifacts are
excluded from the following analyses. In addition bad channels
are removed using the “channel statistics” tool of EEGLAB. On
the basis of these statistics “bad” channels were considered as the
ones that had distributions of potential values that were further
away from a Gaussian distribution than other scalp channels, and
they were remove from further analysis.
After artifacts removal baseline signal is removed form data
acquired during the task.
After-pre-processing, EEG data are imported in a home-made
Matlab analysis toolbox for QEEG analysis.
First, the Power Spectral Density (PSD) is evaluated by
transforming the signal from the time domain to the frequency
domain using the Welch method (Welch, 1967). Then the
absolute and the relative power of each band (delta: 1–4 Hz,
theta: 4–7 Hz, alpha: 8–13 Hz, beta: 14–29 Hz, and gamma:
30–70 Hz) are computed for each electrode. Relative powers
are usually more reliable than absolute powers because they
show less variability among different subjects and they are less
affected by artifacts (Duffy, 1986). Inter-hemispheric asymmetry
is computed by the Brain Symmetry Index (BSI) (van Putten
et al., 2004). The BSI is calculated within each EEG band
considering the total power in each region (frontal, temporal,
central, parietal, and occipital) of the left and right hemisphere
(sum of the electrodes).
The connectivity between brain regions is estimated with
the calculation of coherence, which gives an estimation of the
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm.
linear correlation between two signals collected at two different
scalp points as a function of frequency (Otnes and Enochson,
1972). Coherence is calculated for each pair of electrodes in each
frequency band.
ECG Analysis Toolbox
ECG signals are pre-processed through a stepwise filtering
process aimed at removing typical ECG artifacts and
interferences. In particular, the baseline wander due to body
movements and respiration artifacts are removed using a cubic
spline 3rd order interpolation between the fiducial isoelectric
points of the ECG (Jane et al., 1992). The power line interference
and muscular noise are removed using an IIR (infinite impulse
response) notch filter at 50Hz and an IIR low pass filter at 40Hz.
In the final step of the pre-processing phase the Pan-Tompkins
method is applied to detect the QRS complexes (Pan and
Tompkins, 1985). The tachogram and the HRV are extracted
according to the International Guidelines of HRV (Task Force of
the European Society of Cardiology the North American Society
of Pacing Electrophysiology, 1996). The tachogram is a vector
whose elements represent the beat-to-beat interval between two
adjacent R peaks in the ECG allowing the definition of useful
features for a further quantitative analysis. At this step the
tachogram signal might not be suitable yet for a proper features
extraction due to the presence of possible residual movement
artifacts and outliers, which can be easily detected by visual
inspection. Artifact are visually identified and removed. In order
to prevent the signal from excessive shortening, the user should
operate a careful artifacts selection choosing the interval to
remove as tight as possible. Outliers are replaced by division or
summation. Division is applied when the outlier is determined
by a failure to detect an R-peak while summation while it is
caused by faulty detections of two or more peaks within a period
representing the R-R interval.
After pre-processing significant features, which could give an
indication of the engagement of the child during the therapy are
extracted from the ECG signal. In particular the Heart Rate (HR),
the Root Mean Square of the Successive Differences (RMSSD),
and the Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA) are selected. The
HR measures the number of poundings of the heart occurring
in a specific lapse of time and it is typically expressed as beats
per minute (bpm). The RMSSD, indicator of vagal activity, was
chosen as a time domain measure of the HRV. The RSA refers
to the periodic fluctuations in HR that are linked to breathing.
RSA is largely determined by vagal influences on the heart,
providing a noninvasive index of parasympathetic activity, social
functioning, and cognitive performances (Patriquin et al., 2013,
2014). The RSA component from tachogram signal is extracted
using the Empirical Model Decomposition (EMD) (Balocchi
et al., 2004).
Data Collection and Measurement
Definition
Data were collected using the technological platform described
above during a therapeutic session of each participant included
in this study. The Biosignal Sensor Unit and the Video Mobile
Unit were connected to the CU and a new acquisition session
was recorded for each child. The EEG data were acquired using
Enobio at 500 Hz while for ECG signals a sampling frequency of
200 Hz was chosen to avoid too much noise and to optimize data
transfer.
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Data collected were analyzed in post-processing. Each
recording session was first imported in the “Video analysis
toolbox” and then coded by clinicians who reviewed the videos to
define the events of interest. In particular, in this study we focused
on the alternation of the “States,” i.e., the Engagement and the
Disengagement, during the therapeutic session.
Two coders were trained to use the coding system, by
observing and coding videos of children with ASD, who were
not included in the study. The 1 month training period enabled
the coders to become familiar with the meaning of the features,
to identify them correctly, and to acquire ability in coding
procedures. The coders were required to achieve a satisfactory
level of agreement between them (Cohen’s Kappa ≥0.70) and
with two expert clinicians (AN and SC) for each Event behavior
(imitation) and for each State behaviors (Engagement and
Disengagement).
The tolerance window regarding time discrepancy between
coding was set at 1 s for event behaviors and at 3 s for state
behaviors. The coding recorded outside these windows was
reported as a coding error and was considered a disagreement.
Intercoder agreement was calculated for each item, and the values
of k were ≥0.70.
Themean Intercoder reliability showed satisfactory agreement
(k = 0.81). In order to verify the ongoing agreement, 25% of the
collection of sequences were coded by both coders.
Themean Intercoder agreement calculated on these sequences
was k = 0.84, and the values of k were ≥ 0.70. In all cases of
discordance between coders, the expert coders advice was used.
For a definition of a baseline, both for EEG and ECG, signals
were acquired for about 3 min before the beginning of the task.
The Event File containing the information about coding was
used to extract EEG and ECG segments in order to link different
physiological patterns with different states of the children.
For the EEG analysis, data acquired were divided in
“Engagement” and “Disengagement” states using the information
contained in the Event File. First the segments were imported
in the EEGLAB Toolbox and pre-processed. The baseline signal
was removed from the two state signals. The cleaned segments
were then imported in the QEEG analysis GUI to extract features
of interest. The proportion of data retained after cleaning was
not different between Engagement and Disengagement phases
(Engagement: 7.34%, Disengagement: 7.85%). Finally, features
extracted for each segment type of each type of State were
averaged.
For the purpose of data reduction, four EEG lead-groupings
were considered to compute coherence (Coben et al., 2008;
Machado et al., 2015; see Supplementary Materials).
ECG data were imported in the ECG analysis GUI and
after pre-processing relevant features were extracted. The tool
generates plots, which show the trend of the features over
time, and also stores data for a further numerical analysis.
To evaluate how the therapeutic stimuli influence the cardiac
activity, physiological events were defined for each feature when
the parameter undergoes or exceeds established values. A crucial
step lies in the definition of thresholds, which denote the
occurrence of a physiological event related to the feature of
interest. Reference values were customized for each child at
each acquisition since environmental, subjective, and current
emotional states could heavily affect the HR baseline.
The values for “higher HR” and “lower HR” were respectively
calculated by the 90th and the 5th percentile of the baseline signal.
The event of “lower RMSSD” referred to values undergoing the 20
ms threshold and denoted more effective participation from the
child (Althaus et al., 1999). The threshold for “lower RSA” ranged
in an interval from 6.3 to 6.5 ln(ms2) (Porges et al., 2013).
For each State the mean and the standard deviation of the
feature extracted as well as the percentage of physiological
events detected were recorded. The percentage of physiological
events was evaluated as the ratio of occurrences of the events
to the total engagement time The approach described allowed
to evaluate, both with a visual and a quantitative method, the
physiological response of the child to the stimuli received with
distinct reference to the different phases identified during the
treatment.
Data Analysis
A preliminary statistical analysis was performed to evaluate
differences in the features extracted between Engagement and
Disengagement. Statistical analyses were performed in SPSS
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The Shapiro-Wilk test was
applied to test the normality of the variables. For normal
distributed variables a paired-samples t-test was applied, while
for nonparametric variables aWilcoxon-test was adopted. Results
were considered significant for p < 0.05.
RESULTS
Feasibility Evaluation
The children did not show sensory-motor and/or behavioral
issues in wearing the devices and completing all the tasks,
administered within a friendly, and supportive environment
without any difficulties or constraints.
We used labeled data generated through Manual Annotation
to validate the system. In particular, the synchronization between
Video and the other signals was crucial, since the video was
the reference for the validation process. However, the required
constraints on synchronization were not particularly strict
considering that:
• the Video footage, which is the reference, has a frame rate
considerably smaller compared to the EEG sample rate (25 vs.
500 Hz);
• even in behavioral annotation performed by a trained
psychologist, a lag of 1 s is acceptable.
Therefore, the residual synchronization error due to the latency
time between the data sampling and the reception by the
synchronized machine is marginal considering that, whatever is
the instant annotated as the start of the State, we considered the
whole duration of the State for the analysis.
The synchronization tests have been performed by inserting a
spike in the signal and comparing the video timestamp with the
sensor data timestamps. The resultant accuracy with this setup
is in the order of tenths of second, which is acceptable for our
purpose.
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FIGURE 2 | Architecture overview.
EEG Results
Although each child showed his own individual pattern of
brain activity and connectivity, all the children displayed
visible changes of EEG pattern between the Engagement and
Disengagement phases. Some of these changes were common
among all the children and are summarized hereafter.
Figure 5 shows the location of the electrodes with statistically
significant differences in PSD between Engagement and
Disengagement phases.
Almost all the children displayed a significant relative power
increase in most of the brain regions during the Engagement
(Figure 5). At a group level analysis all the children showed
significant power increase in frontal regions in delta band (p =
0.04). All but one child (Subject 3) also exhibited power increase
in parietal regions in beta band (p = 0.04) and in occipital
areas in theta, alpha, beta and gamma bands (p = 0.04). In
Subject 3 there was not a significantly change in the PSD
between Engagement and Disengagement in these frequency
bands.
In the Engagement a transition from leftward to rightward
asymmetry could be observed for almost all the frequency bands
over the parietal areas. In particular this shift was significant in
alpha and beta bands (p = 0.04). There was also a significant
transition from rightward to leftward asymmetry in temporal
areas in gamma band (p= 0.04).
Figure 6 shows statistically significant difference in coherence
(coherence Engagement–coherence Disengagement) at the
different cortical regions, in the different frequency bands.
A widespread increase of coherence was observed in almost
all subjects during the Engagement in particular in theta,
alpha and beta bands (Figure 6). The group level analysis
revealed a significant increased in intrahemispheric coherence
in posterior right and left areas in theta, alpha and beta bands
(p = 0.04). Interhemispheric coherence increased at a central
level in alpha and beta bands (p = 0.04) and at posterior
level in beta band (p = 0.04). Although not significant at a
group level analysis, it is possible to observe an increase of
coherence in anterior regions in alpha band in almost all the
subjects.
ECG Results
The system proved that the cardiac activity is strongly influenced
by social engagement states and the ECG patterns turned out to
be subjected to similar changes in the five subjects in response
to changed psychological conditions. Figure 7 shows example
of plots of the HR, RMSSD, and RSA trends over time during
acquisition intervals for Subjects 1 and 3, corresponding to
the Engagement and Disengagement phases. Markers locate
physiological events according to the thresholds previously
described. The ECG analysis showed a clear correlation between
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FIGURE 3 | Real-time acquisition of two camera video, ECG signal, and EEG signal during a therapeutic session.
FIGURE 4 | Graphical User Interface for re-play and annotation of the recorded video session.
the detection of physiological events and the child’s degree of
involvement in the therapy. The plots reveal a greater presence of
physiological events of “higher HR” and “lower HRV” and “lower
RSA” in the Engagement as compared with the Disengagement.
It was also evident that subjects displayed a remarkable RSA
suppression compared with basal values in the Engagement.
Furthermore, “lower HR” values turned out to be more frequent
during the Disengagement.
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FIGURE 5 | Location of electrodes with significant differences in relative power in Engagement vs. Disengagement phase for each subject in each
frequency band: black dots represent location of increase, gray dots location of decrease. Boxes represent brain regions with significant increase in relative
power at a group level analysis.
Table 2 shows that children displayed an increased mean
HR and a slightly significant greater percent number of “higher
HR” physiological events during the Engagement compared to
the Disengagement, excluding Subject 5 (p = 0.07). The mean
RMSSD and mean RSA generally decreased during Engagement:
therefore, the percent number of “lower HRV” and “lower RSA”
events was significantly increased (p = 0.04 and p = 0.005
respectively).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to develop and test innovative
technologies to overcome some limitations of the present
applications of physiological assessment in ASD (Bölte et al.,
2016), including the artificial and constrained situations in which
data are acquired and the need of a special compliance from the
subjects, which prevented an ecological assessment so far.
This preliminary work represents an initial step to study
the social cognition from an interactor point of view, based
on the assumption that there is something fundamentally
different when we are actively engaged with others in real-
time social interaction as compared to when we merely observe
them (Pfeiffer et al., 2012). The main contribution of this
approach is that, if validated in a larger sample of subjects,
would allow for more naturalistic paradigms that allow real
world stimuli to be incorporated into EEG/psychophysiological
studies.
In this pilot study, we have presented a paradigm for the
acquisition of neurophysiological and physiological signals in a
semi-naturalistic setting where children can interact with the
examiner and play with different objects. Particular efforts have
been provided to customize the ECG hardware, to integrate the
videos, the ECG and the EEG units and to realize a user-friendly
toolbox for data analysis.
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FIGURE 6 | Areas of significant increase in coherence in Engagement vs. Disengagement phase for each subject in each frequency band. Long dashed
lines represent transversal coherence while short dashed lines represent short coherence. Shaded areas represent regions of significant increase at a group level
analysis.
The wireless EEG cap and the chest strap containing the
ECG demonstrated how unobtrusive tools can be suitable
for young children and can be used with semi-naturalistic
paradigms. This study confirmed our previous results about the
feasibility of the application of wearable sensors and wireless
technologies in young subjects with neuropsychiatric disorders
(Billeci et al., 2015). The interaction with the examiner rather
than with a screen like in most EEG paradigms, is another
very important feature of this study, and allows recreating a
more real situation with social interactions and cues. In this
paradigm, we can assume that the signals acquired from the
brain and the autonomic system are much more similar to
what is generated while the child interacts in common life
situations. This setting, relatively simple to be implemented, can
be considered as one step toward a more behaviorally-driven
analysis of neurophysiological activity.
The acquisition of physiological signals during treatment
could provide important cues about the response of the child,
which is commonly just observed from a behavioral point of view
by clinicians. This can be extremely important to objectivize the
effect of the treatment and to implement more effective therapies.
In particular, literature shows the importance of the
QEEG technique for assessing brain connectivity and for the
development of an individualized treatment program (Billeci
et al., 2013). Previous QEEG studies showed how autistic children
have differences in power spectra, coherence, and symmetry
measures with respect to controls (Cantor and Chabot, 2009).
This is true both when signals are acquired in a resting condition,
with open or closed eyes, and when specific tasks are performed
(Cantor and Chabot, 2009). Furthermore, it has been observed
that it is possible to link a specific pattern of brain activation,
characterized by specific features, to certain specific behaviors.
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FIGURE 7 | Plot of Heart Rate (HR), Root Mean Square of the Successive Differences (RMSSD), and Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA) trends during
Disengagement (A,C) and Engagement (B,D) for Subject 1 and 3 with detection of physiological events: star markers represent HR value exceeding
the high HR threshold while triangular markers represent HR, RMSSD, or RSA values undergoing the low HR, low RMSSD, and low RSA thresholds
respectively.
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TABLE 2 | Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), and percent number of physiological events for HR (bps), RMSSD (ms), and RSA (ln(ms2)) values during
Engagement and Disengagement.
Subjects Feature Disengagement Engagement
Mean ± SD %Physiological events Mean ± SD %Physiological events
Subject 1 HR 104.33±3.21 15.8 104.68± 3.11 16.80
RMSSD 36.22±5.65 45.16 28.78± 5.53 47.64
RSA 6.36±0.05 3.22 6.36± 0.03 6.65
Subject 2 HR 97.64±9.61 9.09 100.03± 9.29 16.63
RMSSD 38.94±14.12 42.13 44.69± 8.24 44.24
RSA 6.44±0.10 2.72 6.35± 0.25 4.47
Subject 3 HR 82.43±2.93 3.43 85.26± 5.45 6.24
RMSSD 48.41±13.40 9.79 42.24± 8.79 13.4
RSA 6.59±0.03 7.90 6.57± 0.05 9.50
Subject 4 HR 92.58±1.20 10.15 80.33± 0.41 15.20
RMSSD 46.17±2.35 10.35 30.60± 4.21 13.54
RSA 6.45±0.32 1.05 6.62± 0.26 5.04
Subject 5 HR 108.23±0.23 66.65 95.39± 1.31 13.52
RMSSD 17.15±4.58 26.47 44.25± 3.53 66.54
RSA 6.32±0.12 1.01 6.47± 0.11 4.70
Physiological events: higher HR, lower RMSSD, and lower RSA.
In this study, we showed that with this approach is possible
to measure changes in the EEG pattern during treatment elicited
by interaction of the child with the therapist. An increase in
relative power in Engagement compared with Disengagement
emerged in the group analysis. The increase in frontal delta
during cognitive tasks has been previously linked to perceptual
switching of objects (Okada et al., 2009), an ability which is
elicited during the imitation tasks with cubes during the imitation
protocol. Occipital activity is mainly due to visual stimuli during
the imitation task linked to tactile components (gamma and beta
activity) (Bauer et al., 2009) and auditory component (alpha and
theta) (Gladwin and de Jong, 2005). The activation of beta band
within parietal regions has been linked to planning and execution
of movement, although its functional role is still matter of debate
(Zaepffel et al., 2013).
Interestingly, we also observed a general increase in coherence
during Engagement. EEG coherence, being the covariance of
spectral activity at two electrode sites, is a measure for the
synchrony of neuronal activity and thus can be used as an
indicator of effective cortical connectivity. Coherence mainly
increased in theta, alpha and beta bands both intra- and inter-
hemispheres. The increased coherence in these bands may reveal
the increase of attention control during the participation in
the cognitive task (Sacchet et al., 2015). Interestingly the level
of coherence in frontal-parietal region in alpha band has been
linked to different performances in an imitation task (Van der
Helden et al., 2010). Moreover, several studies have shown a
positive correlation between coherence in theta, alpha and beta
and task associated with motor processing and execution (von
Stein et al., 1999; Sauseng et al., 2005; Wheaton et al., 2005; Rilk
et al., 2011).
A modification in asymmetry during Engagement was also
observed. Previous studies have shown altered asymmetry in
ASD brain both structurally and functionally. In particular, left-
side prevalence in alpha and beta bands was found compared
with controls both in visual and non-visual areas at rest.
Right asymmetry in alpha and beta bands has been previously
associated with discrimination of speech prosody (Kujala et al.,
2005), processing gaze direction in face perception (Senju et al.,
2005), and sustained visual attention (Stroganova et al., 2007).
On the contrary, left temporal asymmetry in gamma band has
been associated with language processing (Kojima et al., 2013)
and an atypical asymmetry (rightward) of gamma band has been
observed in ASD at rest (Maxwell et al., 2015). It seems from this
study that the pattern of asymmetry shifts to the typical pattern
during the Engagement phase.
It is worth noting that only two of the five subjects exhibit
mu desynchronization during the imitation tasks, which could
suggest a deficit in the mirror neuron system at least in some
of the subjects enrolled in the study (MNS, Oberman et al.,
2005). Given that all the children were able to perform the task
is it possible that increase in alpha and beta coherence rather
than mu desynchronization is a more reliable predictor of good
performance in vasomotor tasks as suggested by Rilk et al. (2011).
ECG analysis confirmed previous findings and demonstrated
that the system developed is able to detect ASD children’s level of
engagement (Park et al., 2013).
Some studies have shown that mental effort causes an
increase in physiological arousal as measured for example by HR
(Lundberg and Frankenhaeuser, 1980; Peters et al., 1998). Thus,
subjective perception of mental effort may reflect changes in
arousal during performance of attentive tasks. Precedent studies
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demonstrated how decreased RMSSD (Nagendra et al., 2015) and
RSA (Overbeek et al., 2014) represented meaningful indicators
for a positive response to attention demanding stimuli and is
positively associated with cognitive function, including better
processing speed, working memory, learning, and receptive
language skills.
The ECG features could represent a valid marker to evaluate
the engagement and the social interaction of the child in real time
(Moore et al., 2009).
Importantly, besides showing some common pattern of
modification in physiological parameters in the enrolled subjects,
the implemented protocols allowed to evidence some inter-
individual differences fostering the application of this platform
for a personalization of the therapeutic protocol. In particular, as
regards EEG it is clearly evident that Subject 3 did not showed
significant differences between Engagement and Disengagement
in many cortical areas. The clinical profile of this subject shows
that he has an important concentration deficit and this can
explain why, despite from the behavioral observation he seemed
to be engaged in the tasks proposed by the therapist as the
other subjects, his brain activated differently. In addition the
desynchronization of the MNS is not observed in all the subjects.
If the possibility of using the proposed system for characterizing
the physiological profile of specific endophenotype of ASDwould
be confirmed in a larger sample, it would be very useful to guide
the therapist, representing a step forward in the implementation
of individual therapeutic programs in ASD.
Some important issues emerged from this study that suggest
future developments. First of all, the need of a standardized,
objective and clear distinction of the different behaviors of
each task promotes rigorous segmentation of the signals. In the
future annotation of the video could be done not only with
manual markers but also with automatic or semi-automatic
action recognition from the video recording.
Moreover, real-time feature extraction algorithms could be
implemented, which provide the therapist a feedback about the
status of the child. In this way the therapist could decide to
potentiate some tasks of the therapy that cause a particular
engagement of the child or, on the contrary, change the therapy
if the child appears to be disengaged, stressed or not interested by
the task proposed.
Overall, the system presented in this study was proven
to be suitable for a similar clinical scenario. The children
highly accepted the monitoring platform, as demonstrated
by the low dropout rate in the study and by the fact that
the children included in the study did not express any
discomfort/annoyance at the system. Thus, the high grade of
acceptability of the monitoring platform is promising for further
development and implementation of the tool. Furthermore, the
smart sensorized system allowed a reliable psychophysiological
characterization of the children enrolled. Such evidence fosters
the applicability of the system proposed in a clinical setting,
where it could be used as a smart monitoring tool to support
the clinicians during the treatment. In the future the proposed
system could supply useful feedback to the therapist in the
treatment of ASD and even in other neurodevelopmental
disabilities.
Further data collections will be needed to confirm these
preliminary results. At first, larger studies would be useful to
generalize the findings of this feasibility pilot study and to obtain
a clearer picture of the parameters examined in ASD children.
Then, when confirmed on larger cohorts, the psychophysiological
characterization of the children with ASD related to different
behaviors will possibly allow to personalize the treatment and
to longitudinally verify the treatment effect through objective
measures of brain and autonomic function of children with ASD.
In conclusion, this kind of evaluation holds promise for future
developments in instrumental evaluations of ASD.
Limitations
Some limitations need to be considered when interpreting the
results. A first limitation is the small sample size. The study
was designed as a feasibility study, thus only a small number of
patients was recruited to test the applicability of the technology
and the methodology.
The findings of the study need to be replicated with
larger sample to prove the efficacy of the approach and the
transferability in a clinical scenario. Larger sample will also allow
for the evaluation of how different could be the physiological
response of subgroups of children with ASD.
Another limitation is the absence of a control group, which
prevents to discuss the nature of brain and autonomic response
specific to ASD. In the future the comparison with a control
group of age-matched children with typically development will
allow to evaluate not only how different is the pattern between
Engagement and Disengagement phases in ASD but also how this
patterns are different from a typical pattern of response.
Finally another possible limitation is that we did not control
for effects of physical movement. However, in our protocol
the children were seated in a chair throughout the interaction
and thus relatively restrained in their physical activity. As
regards ECG, Porges et al. (2007) found that low intensity
motor movements did not influence RSA or HRV in school-age
children, so that movement were unlikely to have had a major
impact on our results. As regards EEGwe have removedmuscular
artifacts however visual inspection to is subjected to human error.
In the future surface electromyography sensors could be used to
control for children’ muscular artifacts.
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The brain’s life-long capacity for experience-dependent plasticity allows adaptation to
new environments or to changes in the environment, and to changes in internal brain
states such as occurs in brain damage. Since the initial discovery by Hebb (1947)
that environmental enrichment (EE) was able to confer improvements in cognitive
behavior, EE has been investigated as a powerful form of experience-dependent plasticity.
Animal studies have shown that exposure to EE results in a number of molecular and
morphological alterations, which are thought to underpin changes in neuronal function and
ultimately, behavior. These consequences of EE make it ideally suited for investigation
into its use as a potential therapy after neurological disorders, such as traumatic brain
injury (TBI). In this review, we aim to first briefly discuss the effects of EE on behavior
and neuronal function, followed by a review of the underlying molecular and structural
changes that account for EE-dependent plasticity in the normal (uninjured) adult brain.
We then extend this review to specifically address the role of EE in the treatment of
experimental TBI, where we will discuss the demonstrated sensorimotor and cognitive
benefits associated with exposure to EE, and their possible mechanisms. Finally, we
will explore the use of EE-based rehabilitation in the treatment of human TBI patients,
highlighting the remaining questions regarding the effects of EE.
Keywords: EE, sensory cortices, traumatic brain injury, neuronal excitability
Experience-dependent plasticity encompasses a vast number of
paradigms that range from deprivation to alterations and enrich-
ments in the environment, and has been investigated in great
detail across development through to adulthood (see reviews by
Hubel and Wiesel, 1970; Hubel, 1978; Kaas, 1991; Klintsova and
Greenough, 1999; Sur and Leamey, 2001; De Villers-Sidani and
Merzenich, 2011; Bengoetxea et al., 2012). For the purposes of the
present review, we chose to focus on plasticity conferred by global
changes to the environment, termed environmental enrichment
(EE). We will focus only on the changes evoked by this manipula-
tion when applied in adulthood as our final aim is to demonstrate
that it represents an exciting potential therapy in adult traumatic
brain injury (TBI). As we shall review, EE alters neuronal function
through a range of morphological and molecular interactions,
which lead to alterations in sensorimotor and cognitive behav-
ior. These changes make EE an ideal candidate in the treatment of
TBI. To lead to this thesis, we first commence with a review of EE’s
capacity to evoke plasticity in the uninjured brain, to provide the
context in which we will cast the role of EE in TBI. We focus here
on EE-induced changes in sensory cortices due to the demon-
strated effects of TBI on altering neuronal function in sensory
cortices (Hall and Lifshitz, 2010; Ding et al., 2011; Alwis et al.,
2012; Johnstone et al., 2013); it is also our view that changes in
neuronal activity in sensory cortices after injury must underlie
a significant portion of the persistent cognitive deficits found in
TBI (Caeyenberghs et al., 2009; Davis and Dean, 2010; Lew et al.,
2010; Folmer et al., 2011). The review of EE effects in the normal
brain is also necessary to understand the mechanisms whereby
EE produces changes in neuronal function in the normal brain,
before we can begin to hypothesize about how EE exerts its ben-
eficial effects after brain injury. Finally, we discuss the current
literature regarding the use of EE as a potential therapy post-
TBI, in animal studies with induced TBI, and in studies of human
rehabilitation after injury.
WHAT IS EE?
EE refers to an experimental paradigm in which laboratory ani-
mals are housed in an environment allowing cognitive, motor and
sensory stimulation at levels much greater than those which occur
under standard laboratory housing conditions (Hebb, 1947, 1949;
Van Praag et al., 2000). Early studies in animals have shown that
the enhanced stimulation from EE produces many remarkable
benefits at anatomical, molecular and behavioral levels (Hebb,
1947; Bennett et al., 1969; Diamond et al., 1972, 1976; Greenough
and Volkmar, 1973; Torasdotter et al., 1998), with numerous stud-
ies following on from this work to further characterize the effects
of EE (see reviews by Van Praag et al., 2000; Nithianantharajah
and Hannan, 2006). In EE, the housing environment is modified
by providing a larger enclosure, natural bedding and a variety of
novel objects, in the expectation that this will promote greater
physical activity in exploration and interaction with a novel and
complex environment (Benaroya-Milshtein et al., 2004; Zebunke
et al., 2013). Social enrichment in the EE environment, involving
housing animals with multiple cagemates to encourage complex
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social interactions (Rosenzweig et al., 1978; Mesa-Gresa et al.,
2013), is also believed to contribute to an enhanced sensori-
motor and cognitive experience. Enhanced physical activity and
enhanced social interaction each provide benefits to the brain;
physical activity on its own improves cognitive performance in
parallel with a range of neural changes including enhanced neu-
rogenesis and increased levels of neurotrophic growth factors and
increased neurotransmitter subunit expression (Van Praag et al.,
1999; Farmer et al., 2004; Erickson et al., 2011), while social
enrichment on its own has been shown to result in an increase
in brain weight (Rosenzweig et al., 1978). When the two are com-
bined in an appropriately enriched environment, a much more
extensive set of cerebral changes occurs (Rosenzweig et al., 1978;
Johansson and Ohlsson, 1996; Sozda et al., 2010).
The combination of social, physical and cognitive stimulation
is most often used in studies of EE and we term this “generic”
EE, wherein the whole environment is non-selectively enriched.
However, in some instances, in what we term “specific” EE,
enrichment has been targeted to affect a specific system, e.g.,
auditory-specific enrichment (Engineer et al., 2004; Percaccio
et al., 2005, 2007; Jakkamsetti et al., 2012) consisting of com-
ponents of generic EE in combination with systems designed to
produce a variety of salient sounds; or tactile-specific enrichment
(Bourgeon et al., 2004; Xerri et al., 2005) where rats were raised
in an environment consisting of objects with various textures.
Differences in generic and specific EE will be highlighted further,
in the context of EE effects on neuronal function in the cortex.
BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF EE ON BEHAVIOR
EE exposure results in a range of sensorimotor and cognitive
benefits in laboratory animals, which we only briefly summa-
rize as these have been well reviewed elsewhere (Van Praag
et al., 2000; Nithianantharajah and Hannan, 2006; Simpson and
Kelly, 2011). In normal animals, EE significantly improves spatial
and non-spatial learning and memory, novel object discrimina-
tion, increases the speed of spatial learning and enhances spatial
searching strategies (Van Praag et al., 2000; Schrijver et al., 2002;
Nithianantharajah and Hannan, 2006; Kulesskaya et al., 2011;
Vedovelli et al., 2011; Leger et al., 2012). EE appears to decrease
anxiety, as evidenced in a variety of tests (Fernandez-Teruel et al.,
2002; Larsson et al., 2002; Galani et al., 2007; Harati et al., 2013).
EE also improves task-learning, and recent and remote mem-
ory retrieval (Harati et al., 2013), likely due to a greater ability
to consolidate and retain information because of social enrich-
ment (Gardner et al., 1975). However, effects are not all positive
and studies have shown both increases and decreases in aggres-
sive social behavior after EE (Abou-Ismail, 2011; Workman et al.,
2011; McQuaid et al., 2012; Mesa-Gresa et al., 2013), possibly
due to factors such as differences in EE housing conditions, strain
differences, and experimental design.
In a similar vein, the consensus (Nithianantharajah and
Hannan, 2006; Kazlauckas et al., 2011; Landers et al., 2011) is that
EE encourages activity and exploratory behavior though there
are some inconsistencies: some studies show increased activity in
novel environments (Benaroya-Milshtein et al., 2004), and oth-
ers show faster habituation and less activity (Zimmermann et al.,
2001; Schrijver et al., 2002; Elliott and Grunberg, 2005), when
compared with animals housed in standard or impoverished envi-
ronments (Varty et al., 2000; Zimmermann et al., 2001). Recently,
Zebunke et al. (2013) showed a decrease in general activity during
an open field test, with an increase in duration of exploration of
novel objects by pigs exposed to cognitive enrichment. Similarly,
Mesa-Gresa et al. (2013) also found that EE rats exhibited longer
durations of novel object exploration, while Schrijver et al. (2002)
found an increase in activity in a light/dark box in EE rats. Bruel-
Jungerman et al. (2005) have also reported that EE animals were
capable of retaining memory during a novel object recognition
test for up to 48 h after initial exposure, despite a lower object
exploration time during the learning phase of the test.
Among the most robust of findings is that EE and sen-
sory training/learning improves stimulus discrimination (Gibson,
1953; Kendrick et al., 1992; Recanzone et al., 1993). Mandairon
et al. (2006a,b) have shown that olfactory enrichment results in an
improved ability to discriminate between odor pairs, likely due to
changes in neuronal response properties (Buonviso and Chaput,
2000; Fletcher and Wilson, 2003). Similarly, EE enhances spatial
discrimination of sound source, with faster reaction times and
improved discrimination accuracy (Cai et al., 2009). Bourgeon
et al. (2004) reported that while EE housing did not affect an
animal’s tactile ability to discriminate between textured surfaces,
enriched animals did learn to perform the discrimination task
faster. The changes in behavior reported above must occur as a
consequence of the effects of EE on neuronal function, which in
turn, occur as a result of the various molecular and morphological
changes mediated by EE.
NEURONAL FUNCTIONAL CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH
EXPOSURE TO EE
The EE-induced changes in behavior can be linked to specific
changes in neuronal functionality. This has been studied in best
detail for behavior associated with hippocampal function (Van
Praag et al., 2000; Eckert and Abraham, 2013) and we briefly
describe these as a prelude to describing the changes seen in adult
sensory cortices, the particular brain regions of interest here in the
context of our over-arching thesis (Alwis et al., 2012) that many
persistent cognitive and motor deficits in TBI have sensory deficits
as an underlying cause. The studies discussed below have used
electrophysiological techniques such as in vivo and in vitro intra
and extracellular recordings to specifically investigate EE-induced
changes in neuronal function.
EE-induced improvements in hippocampal-dependent mem-
ory function have been linked to experience-dependent changes
in hippocampal synaptic strength (Kempermann et al., 1997;
Schrijver et al., 2002; Vedovelli et al., 2011), with reports of
increases in excitatory post-synaptic potential (EPSP) amplitudes
and evoked population spikes in rats exposed to generic EE,
both in in vivo studies (Sharp et al., 1985; Irvine and Abraham,
2005; Irvine et al., 2006) and in in vitro studies of slices from
the dentate gyrus (Green and Greenough, 1986; Foster et al.,
1996) or the CA3-CA1 pathway (Foster and Dumas, 2001; Malik
and Chattarji, 2012). The enhanced synaptic efficacy in dentate
gyrus appears likely to act through AMPA and NMDA recep-
tor mediated mechanisms (Foster et al., 1996). Interestingly,
these increases did not outlast the termination of EE housing
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(Green and Greenough, 1986), even though EE-induced changes
in behavior and morphology persist after discontinuation of EE
(Camel et al., 1986; Cheng et al., 2012), suggesting that informa-
tion stored in the dentate gyrus may be related to more transient
behavioral effects of EE. However, there is also contradiction in
studies of EE-induced long-term hippocampal plasticity. Eckert
and Abraham (2010) reported that long-term exposure to EE did
not result in enhanced synaptic transmission in the hippocam-
pus, both in vivo and in vitro, suggesting that the variability in
these studies may have be due to different EE paradigms, or to
homeostatic mechanisms to re-establish normal synaptic trans-
mission (Turrigiano, 1999, 2008). Foster and colleagues (Foster
et al., 1996; Foster and Dumas, 2001) demonstrated that EE
housing inhibits LTP induction in the perforant pathway, sug-
gesting that both experience-dependent synaptic plasticity and
LTP expression share similar yet-unknown underlying mecha-
nisms. Conversely, increased LTP expression has been reported
after EE exposure (Duffy et al., 2001; Artola et al., 2006; Eckert
and Abraham, 2010; Malik and Chattarji, 2012). One resolution
for these effects, other than differences in the EE conditions, is
that LTP induction after EE may be differentially regulated in
different regions of the hippocampus.
It is worth noting here that short-term plasticity in the hip-
pocampus has not been shown to be affected by EE (Foster et al.,
1996; Foster and Dumas, 2001; Eckert and Abraham, 2010; Malik
and Chattarji, 2012).
In contrast to the hippocampus, little is known about EE-
induced changes in neuronal functionality in cortex. What
changes there are in cortical neuronal function have mainly been
examined at the level of the sensory cortices and we discuss these
studies in detail below. EE-induced changes in neuronal function
in the normal (uninjured) sensory cortices are particularly salient
to our thesis and may provide us with insights into the role of
EE on neuronal function after brain injury, of which nothing is
known as yet.
EE AND SENSORY CORTICES
The effects of EE have been studied most extensively in audi-
tory cortex, in some detail in somatosensory cortex, and only to a
limited degree in visual cortex.
In auditory cortex, the effect of EE has been studied at lev-
els ranging from brain slices through to extracellular recordings
from neurons in anaesthetized animals. In the investigation of the
effects of EE on the auditory cortex, studies have used enriched
environments that include specific auditory enrichment in the
form of playback of various sounds within the housing environ-
ment (Engineer et al., 2004; Percaccio et al., 2005, 2007; Nichols
et al., 2007). Many studies report effects that mirror those seen in
the hippocampus, of increased synaptic efficiency. Thus, auditory
cortex slices show that specific EE induces an increase in exci-
tatory post-synaptic current (EPSC) amplitudes, coupled with a
decrease in current rise-times in supragranular cortical layers and
no changes in infragranular layer V (Nichols et al., 2007). In vivo
recordings from the anaesthetized rat, primarily from Layers 4/5
of adult primary auditory cortex after specific auditory EE, have
demonstrated an increase in cortical responsiveness (both sponta-
neous and stimulus-evoked), decreased response latencies, and an
increase in frequency selectivity (Engineer et al., 2004; Percaccio
et al., 2005; Cai et al., 2009). Percaccio et al. (2005, 2007) also
found that EE increased paired pulse depression (PPD) in the
rat auditory cortex, indicating an increased probability of synap-
tic transmitter release and thus, enhanced synaptic transmission.
Other studies in auditory cortex found EE could cause reor-
ganization of the cortical tonotopic map (Norena et al., 2006;
Pienkowski and Eggermont, 2009; Zhou et al., 2011; Kim and Bao,
2013), and alterations in stimulus frequency selectivity over either
a range of frequencies (Zhou et al., 2011) or for frequencies spe-
cific to those used as a part of the enrichment condition (Norena
et al., 2006; Pienkowski and Eggermont, 2009).
The effects of auditory enrichment are not restricted to pri-
mary auditory cortex, and Jakkamsetti et al. (2012) have reported
that responses in posterior auditory field (PAF) are also increased
when compared with animals housed in standard environments.
These increased firing rates were accompanied by decreases in
response latency and duration, and a reduction in receptive field
size, as seen in primary auditory cortex (Engineer et al., 2004;
Zhou et al., 2011; Jakkamsetti et al., 2012).
Unlike the above-noted reports, some studies do not report
increased neuronal responsiveness and sharper frequency tuning
after exposure to auditory enrichment (Condon and Weinberger,
1991; Bao et al., 2003). Instead, these studies found that a repeated
auditory stimulus decreased responsiveness to frequencies used in
the stimulus (Condon and Weinberger, 1991), and exposure to
noise burst trains produced broadly tuned receptive fields (Bao
et al., 2003). Percaccio et al. (2007) have suggested that a criti-
cal variable in eliciting EE effects in auditory cortex is the nature
of the enrichment, i.e., how engaging or complex the stimuli
are. This would explain the increased neuronal responsiveness
reported by Percaccio et al. (2007) in rats receiving even pas-
sive exposure to specific auditory EE, which included situation-
dependent stimuli from the environment and from cagemates, as
opposed to simple, less behaviorally relevant stimuli.
Similar to studies in auditory cortex, generic EE (i.e., non-
specific enrichment) results in reorganized cortical topographic
maps, decreased receptive field sizes, increased response selectiv-
ity and increased sensory evoked potentials in the somatosensory
cortex (Xerri et al., 1996; Coq and Xerri, 1998; Polley et al., 2004;
Devonshire et al., 2010). One interesting effect demonstrated here
is that EE effects on receptive field sizes and responses to stim-
ulation of the main topographic input to the neurons may be
laminar selective (an effect that does not appear to have been
explored in auditory cortex). Thus, in the rodent barrel cor-
tex that receives tactile input from the mystacial whiskers, EE
caused a decrease in receptive field size and in neuronal responses
evoked by stimulation of the “Principal Whisker” (the topograph-
ically matched whisker providing the main input to a group of
neurons in the barrel cortex) in supragranular cortical Layers
2/3, but there were no changes in response strength or receptive
field size in input Layer 4 (Polley et al., 2004). It is worth not-
ing that Guic et al. (2008) found that EE caused an increase in
cortical representational area in Layer 4. However, these effects
were seen after stimulation of only a few selective whiskers, while
other whiskers were trimmed whereas Polley et al. (2004) used a
non-deprived paradigm where all whiskers remained untrimmed.
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These different effects are likely a reflection of variations in
experimental design of the EE conditions, consistent with the
conclusions drawn from studies in auditory cortex that the nature
of EE conditions influences neuronal outcomes.
These studies, where the emphasis was on measuring recep-
tive field sizes and responses only to simple input from the main
topographically-matched region of the body, indicated laminar
specificity of effects. However, when neuronal encoding of sophis-
ticated sensory input is the metric, the effects of generic EE occur
globally across all cortical layers. Thus, in our own studies, 8–
10 weeks of EE exposure increased neuronal firing rates globally
across all layers 2–5 of the rat barrel cortex, and did so in response
to both simple stimuli and a variety of complex, naturalistic stim-
uli (Alwis and Rajan, 2013). It is interesting to note that these
effects occur even to the complex stimuli as our previous work on
TBI (Alwis et al., 2012) had suggested that the complex stimuli
may engage a diversity of intra-cortical processing mechanisms
not seen with the simple stimuli. These effects occurred without
any change in response latency, suggesting that the effects were
specific to cortex and not due to changes at lower levels of the
somatic pathways to cortex.
Although not often studied on its own in somatosensory cor-
tex, recently EE has been combined with another manipulation
that induces experience-dependent plasticity in barrel cortex, viz.
whisker trimming and/or stimulation (Armstrong-James et al.,
1992; Diamond et al., 1993, 1994; Rema et al., 2006; Guic et al.,
2008; Megevand et al., 2009). Here the picture is rather murky,
with one study suggesting that EE operates through different
mechanisms than other plasticity mechanisms in barrel cor-
tex, but another suggesting that it operates through the same
mechanisms. The first seems to apply in the case of whisker trim-
ming: when whisker pairing (all whiskers on one side of the
face trimmed except for a pair of adjacent whiskers) is coupled
with short (15 h) generic EE exposure, there is an accentuation
of the effects induced by whisker trimming alone: a faster shift
of receptive field bias toward the untrimmed whiskers, stronger
evoked responses to the intact paired whisker than to deprived
whiskers, and increased spontaneous activity in supra-granular
and granular layers (Rema et al., 2006). In contrast EE may oper-
ate through the same mechanisms as some other plasticity cases.
Thus, a short duration of whisker stimulation at a frequency
often used during exploratory whisking behavior increases stim-
ulus evoked potentials in both supra-granular and granular barrel
cortex layers (Megevand et al., 2009)—but, addition of EE to
the whisker stimulation paradigm does not further potentiate
responses (Megevand et al., 2009).
Finally, only a limited number of studies have examined the
effects of EE in the normal visual cortex. In area 17 of the adult
visual cortex, similar to effects seen in the auditory cortex, generic
EE results in sharper bandwidths in orientation tuned cells,
increased neuronal responses to light stimuli, increased visual
acuity, as well as increased stimulus contrast and temporal selec-
tivity (Beaulieu and Cynader, 1990a,b; Mainardi et al., 2010). In
addition to these effects in normal adult visual cortex, studies of
EE-induced plasticity in the adult visual cortex have also exam-
ined effects in the context of monocular deprivation (MD) and
amblyopia. MD during developmentally critical periods induces
a shift in ocular dominance (OD) so that more neurons respond
to stimulation of the open eye (Frenkel and Bear, 2004; Mrsic-
Flogel et al., 2007). Such plasticity is normally not seen when
MD is started in adulthood, but EE housing for 3 weeks re-
activates cortical plasticity in supragranular layers of adult visual
cortex such that OD changes are possible again and visual evoked
potentials (VEPs) elicited by stimulation of the deprived eye are
greatly depressed (Baroncelli et al., 2010b). In amblyopia, indi-
vidual components of EE such as motor and visual stimulation, as
well as the combination of these components, also recover visual
acuity and restore OD plasticity and binocularity in supragranu-
lar layers of adult visual cortex (Sale et al., 2007; Baroncelli et al.,
2012; Tognini et al., 2012).
Taken together, these studies of EE effects in sensory cor-
tices show that generic EE is potent at producing many changes
in neuronal responses, such as stronger responses and greater
stimulus selectivity; that the receptive field effects may be
laminar-selective and depend on the type of enrichment but
that effects on more sophisticated neuronal processing, par-
ticularly of naturalistic stimuli that mimic everyday events,
occur across all cortical laminae; and finally, that EE may
operate independent of some other mechanisms of cortical
plasticity.
MECHANISMS UNDERLYING EE-INDUCED CHANGES IN
NEURONAL FUNCTION
There are numerous well-documented structural and biochem-
ical consequences of EE which may underlie the effects of EE
on neuronal function. We broadly review these changes with EE
(summarized in Figure 1). It must be noted that in most cases,
we do not know how these structural and molecular changes
contribute to EE-induced changes in neuronal function: to date,
there has been very limited attempt only to directly manipulate
these fine-scale changes to determine to what extent they cause
EE-related changes in neuronal functionality.
MORPHOLOGICAL CHANGES
It was very early recognized that exposure to complex, enriched
environments causes gross morphological changes in an overall
increase in brain weight, particularly in cortical and hippocam-
pal weight and thickness (Bennett et al., 1969; Walsh et al., 1969;
Diamond et al., 1972, 1976). The factors contributing to these
gross morphological changes include increased neuronal density
and size, increased dendritic branching and length, increased den-
dritic spine density, and increased turnover in pyramidal and
stellate cells (Holloway, 1966; Diamond et al., 1967; Volkmar and
Greenough, 1972; Globus et al., 1973; Greenough and Volkmar,
1973; Greenough et al., 1973; Uylings et al., 1978; Connor et al.,
1982; Turner and Greenough, 1985; Kempermann et al., 1997;
Leggio et al., 2005; Jung and Herms, 2012). Unsurprisingly, the
changes in dendritic morphology are accompanied by synaptic
alterations, with EE resulting in increased numbers of synapses
and synaptic contacts (Jones et al., 1997; Briones et al., 2004;
Landers et al., 2011), which could enhance cortical synaptic trans-
mission and hence, alter cortical excitation/inhibition balances.
One particularly notable EE-induced change is neurogene-
sis, which may contribute to enhanced cognitive performance
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FIGURE 1 | Environmental enrichment induces morphological and
molecular changes in the brain. An overview of the number of
structural and molecular mechanisms that contribute to the changes in
neuronal function, and ultimately, changes in behavior, seen after EE
exposure. These mechanisms are thought to underlie EE-induced neural
plasticity.
(Kempermann et al., 1997, 1998; Nilsson et al., 1999; Bruel-
Jungerman et al., 2005). Cell proliferation, improved neuronal
survival and functional integration of new neurons have all
been demonstrated to occur in the adult dentate gyrus after EE
(Kempermann et al., 1997, 1998; Van Praag et al., 2000; Lu et al.,
2003; Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2005) and pharmacological inhibi-
tion of cell proliferation during EE prevented hippocampal neu-
rogenesis and any improvement in a hippocampal-based memory
task (Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2005). Decreased neurogenesis has
been linked to cognitive decline (Drapeau et al., 2003, 2007),
and restoration of neuronal proliferation and survival leads to an
improvement in cognitive behavior (Kempermann, 2002).
The enhanced hippocampal neurogenesis, improved neuronal
cell survival, increased synaptic density and dendritic branch-
ing (Kempermann et al., 1997, 1998; Bruel-Jungerman et al.,
2005), and the growth factor up-regulation that is discussed
below, have all been suggested to be responsible for EE-induced
improvements in spatial and non-spatial learning and mem-
ory and enhanced spatial searching strategies (Van Praag et al.,
2000; Schrijver et al., 2002; Nithianantharajah and Hannan, 2006;
Kulesskaya et al., 2011; Vedovelli et al., 2011; Leger et al., 2012).
Increased habituation to novel objects has also been attributed
to a decrease in activation of hippocampal neurons during novel
object exposure in enriched animals, in contrast to the increased
activation seen in animals housed in standard conditions when
exposed to objects in novel environments (Zhu et al., 1997; Leger
et al., 2012). These results support the idea that EE-induced mor-
phological changes contribute to alterations in behavior, through
changes in overall neuronal function.
It must be noted here that similar neurogenesis has not been
demonstrated to occur in cortex after EE, but this may be for a
want of study not for an absence of the effect. In the absence
of this effect, it is difficult to speculate to what extent neuro-
genesis contributes to EE-induced changes in cortical neuronal
functionality or cortex-based processes. We will argue below that,
in any case, neurogenesis is not required to occur in cortex to
produce the EE-induced changes in responses and in function-
ality and that those changes can be produced by alterations in
the balance between excitation/inhibition interplay that shapes
neuronal responses and function.
MOLECULAR CHANGES
The EE-induced structural and functional changes described
above occur through molecular cascades that involve increases
in neurotrophic factor and neurotransmitter levels (Van Praag
et al., 2000; Mohammed et al., 2002; Will et al., 2004;
Nithianantharajah and Hannan, 2006), and increased expression
of regulatory proteins that enhance the number and stability of
synapses, increase cell proliferation, and promote neurotrans-
mitter release (Rampon et al., 2000; Frick and Fernandez, 2003;
Nithianantharajah et al., 2004).
Neurotrophic factors of particular importance to EE include
brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and nerve growth
factor (NGF), with levels of both increasing following expo-
sure to exercise and EE (Pham et al., 1999; Birch et al., 2013)
in brain regions including cortex, hippocampus and cerebellum
(Torasdotter et al., 1998; Angelucci et al., 2009). In the adult
brain, BDNF and NGF promote experience-dependent plasticity
by enhancing synaptic plasticity, signaling, learning and mem-
ory (Kang and Schuman, 1995; Torasdotter et al., 1998; Pham
et al., 1999; Bekinschtein et al., 2011). Increases in neurotrophins
appear to underlie improved motor and cognitive function after
EE (Falkenberg et al., 1992; Henriksson et al., 1992; Linnarsson
et al., 1997; Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Gelfo et al., 2011; Bechara
and Kelly, 2013; Birch et al., 2013) since suppression of BDNF lev-
els causes deficits in neurogenesis, learning behavior and memory
(Linnarsson et al., 1997; Minichiello et al., 1999; Rossi et al., 2006;
Heldt et al., 2007; Furini et al., 2010).
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Similarly, neurotransmitter levels are also affected by exposure
to EE, suggesting a role in the mediation of brain plasticity.
Serotonin is important in promoting neuroplasticity (Maya
Vetencourt et al., 2008; Baroncelli et al., 2010a), and EE induces
an increase in serotonin receptor expression and in serotonin lev-
els (Rasmuson et al., 1998; Koh et al., 2007; Baroncelli et al.,
2010a). Levels of other neurotransmitters associated with synaptic
plasticity, such as acetylcholine and noradrenaline, also increase
following EE (Por et al., 1982; Galani et al., 2007; Brenes et al.,
2009). Increased cortical responsiveness may then be attributed to
increases in synaptic transmission efficacy and synaptic strength
(Mainardi et al., 2010) brought about by EE-induced molecular
changes.
In conjunction with these changes in neurotransmitter levels,
excitatory activity also shifts following EE housing, with increases
in hippocampal extracellular glutamate levels coupled with an
enhanced expression of AMPA and NMDA receptors (Tang et al.,
2001; Naka et al., 2005; Segovia et al., 2006). Changes in hip-
pocampal field potentials have been attributed to factors that
include increased AMPA receptor-mediated transmitter binding,
increased expression of AMPA and NMDA receptor subunits,
increased dendritic spine density and upregulation of growth fac-
tors (Sharp et al., 1985; Green and Greenough, 1986; Foster and
Dumas, 2001; Eckert and Abraham, 2010). There is also evidence
of synaptic plasticity, in the form of increased dentate gyrus LTP,
in the hippocampus after physical activity, which is an impor-
tant component of the EE experience (Van Praag et al., 1999).
The role of these changes in excitation will be discussed in greater
detail below where we argue that a principal mechanism through
which EE alters brain function and behavior is by promoting a
shift toward excitation in neuronal responses.
ROLE OF CHANGES IN CORTICAL EXCITATION/INHIBITION BALANCE IN
EE-INDUCED CHANGES IN NEURONAL FUNCTIONALITY
As shown above, EE-induced brain plasticity is likely to occur
through the combination of structural and biochemical changes
that can impact on neuronal functionality. We believe that there
is substantive evidence that one particularly important end-effect
through which EE alters neuronal function is alterations in the
balance between excitation and inhibition in cortex (Engineer
et al., 2004; Percaccio et al., 2005, 2007). This E/I balance is a criti-
cal factor in regulating cortical neuronal functionality and critical
periods of cortical plasticity which occur throughout develop-
ment are governed by this E/I balance (Hensch and Fagiolini,
2005; Levelt and Hubener, 2012) whereby immaturity of corti-
cal inhibition promotes plasticity while maturation of inhibitory
circuits results in the decrease in plasticity associated with corti-
cal maturation (Huang et al., 1999; Fagiolini and Hensch, 2000).
Shifts in this E/I balance may also play a major role in the
experience-dependent cortical plasticity, which includes plasticity
induced by EE or deprivation, that occurs outside developmen-
tal critical periods (Hensch and Fagiolini, 2005; Sale et al., 2007;
Benali et al., 2008; Maya Vetencourt et al., 2008; Megevand et al.,
2009; Baroncelli et al., 2010b, 2011; Luz and Shamir, 2012; Maya-
Vetencourt et al., 2012). Changes in neuronal function in the
adult brain suggest that EE exposure causes a reactivation of
forms of neuronal plasticity generally seen only in the developing,
immature brain (Chang and Merzenich, 2003; Chang et al., 2005)
in which inhibitory mechanisms are immature.
Experience-dependent changes in response strength and sen-
sitivity in adult sensory cortices have been attributed to decreased
levels of cortical inhibition (Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998;
Baroncelli et al., 2011), which shift cortical E/I ratios to favor
excitation. Studies have demonstrated the importance of GABA
synthesis in promoting plasticity (Hensch et al., 1998; Harauzov
et al., 2010) after MD, and disruption of GABA-ergic inhibition
through pharmacological treatments or EE reinstates plasticity
to restore OD plasticity in adult visual cortex (Sale et al., 2007;
Maya Vetencourt et al., 2008; Harauzov et al., 2010; Zhou et al.,
2011; Maya-Vetencourt et al., 2012). Similarly, Zhou et al. (2011)
found that EE-induced plasticity in auditory cortex was accom-
panied by a decrease in GABA receptor subunit expression. Sale
et al. (2007) have also shown that EE exposure results in a
decrease in basal extracellular GABA levels in the visual cortex,
and that EE-induced plasticity can be countered by pharmaco-
logically increasing inhibitory activity. EE-induced decreases in
cortical inhibition have been demonstrated in studies of auditory
and visual cortex, through decreases in GABA receptor subunit
expression, inhibitory synapse density and basal levels of GABA
(Beaulieu and Colonnier, 1987; Zhou et al., 2011; Jakkamsetti
et al., 2012), while GAD67 expression has also been shown to
decrease following exposure to EE (Scali et al., 2012; Tognini et al.,
2012).
However, decreased inhibition may just be one mecha-
nism underlying EE-induced plasticity via shifts in the excita-
tion/inhibition balance, with studies also suggesting an increase in
cortical excitation with EE. Nichols et al. (2007) have shown that
exposure to EE induces an AMPA-receptor mediated increase in
EPSC amplitudes in supragranular layers of the auditory cortex,
with no changes in GABA-ergic transmission, while the increase
in PPD after EE demonstrated by Percaccio et al. (2005) suggests
an increase in the transmitter release probability of excitatory
synapses.
Taken together, the results presented in this section suggest that
EE exerts its effects through molecular changes, which in turn
support changes in morphology and neuronal function. These
results also suggest that in conditions such as brain injury, which
result in abnormal neuronal activity, EE-induced plasticity may
have the potential as a therapy to steer neuronal activity toward a
more functionally relevant state. This is particularly the case when
it is considered that excitation/inhibition shifts may also occur in
brain injury (Ding et al., 2008; Alwis et al., 2012; Johnstone et al.,
2013).
EE AND THE DAMAGED BRAIN
Considering that the brain plasticity evoked by EE results in vari-
ous behavioral benefits, it is hardly surprising that EE (and specif-
ically the form we have termed “generic” EE) has been proposed
as a putative therapy for neurological conditions ranging from
Alzheimer’s disease through to ischemia/stroke (Faherty et al.,
2005; Jadavji et al., 2006; Buchhold et al., 2007; Nithianantharajah
et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2008; Hu et al., 2010; Valero et al.,
2011; Du et al., 2012). Indeed, EE ameliorates the behavioral and
pathological deficits associated with many of these conditions:
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for example, in models of Alzheimer’s disease, EE enhances neu-
ronal proliferation, survival and maturation, leading to improved
cognition (Hu et al., 2010; Valero et al., 2011), while in studies
of stroke/ischemia, EE improves sensorimotor function, such as
impaired gait and limb placement (Buchhold et al., 2007; Wang
et al., 2008).
Our focus in this review is on the potential role of EE as a
therapy for TBI, based on its known effects on brain changes
induced by TBI, especially in the sensory cortices. For this con-
sideration, it is necessary to first define some of the basic features
of TBI and its effects on brain and behavior. There are two major
forms of TBI—focal and diffuse. Focal brain injury is caused
by direct, localized damage to the brain, while diffuse injury is
most commonly caused by indirect forces, such as during rapid
acceleration/deceleration of the head (Andriessen et al., 2010;
Alwis et al., 2013). TBI affects approximately 2 million indi-
viduals every year in the US alone (Faul et al., 2010) and has
been shown to result in a number of persistent sensory deficits,
which are thought to underlie TBI-associated cognitive disabili-
ties (Caeyenberghs et al., 2009; Davis and Dean, 2010; Lew et al.,
2010; Folmer et al., 2011). People with mild to moderate diffuse
TBI usually recover motor skills fully, but have other prolonged
deficits, including cognitive deficits and memory loss, likely from
axonal injury (Strich, 1956; Adams et al., 1999; Graham et al.,
2000; Little et al., 2010).
In TBI there are often substantial and prolonged functional
deficits in cognition, memory and movement (Gagnon et al.,
1998; Draper and Ponsford, 2008; Park et al., 2008; Faul et al.,
2010; Risdall and Menon, 2011) and these are invariably viewed as
resulting from damage to brain areas specific to those functions.
What has been consistently overlooked is that most TBI suffer-
ers show deficits in how they process sensory information. What
we see, hear, touch is used to understand the world and guide
complex behaviors like thinking, movement, or memory; sensory
processing deficits easily affect these behaviors. It has been recog-
nized that at least some impairments may involve disruption of
the integration of sensory input (Brosseau-Lachaine et al., 2008;
Patel et al., 2011). In humans, speeded motor tasks and response
time tasks are also affected in mild/moderate TBI (Bawden et al.,
1985; Haaland et al., 1994), and animal studies have shown per-
sistent abnormal sensory behavior (McNamara et al., 2010), again
suggesting disturbances in sensorimotor processing, and there are
many long-lasting sensory and cognitive impairments even after
motor function has recovered (Narayan et al., 2002; Draper and
Ponsford, 2009; Faul et al., 2010; Risdall and Menon, 2011).
Consistent with this hypothesis of a sensory cortices basis for
persistent cognitive, memory and motor deficits in TBI, exper-
imental TBI causes significant time-dependent changes in neu-
ronal excitability in sensory cortices (Hall and Lifshitz, 2010; Ding
et al., 2011; Alwis et al., 2012). In the immediate post-TBI period,
changes in neuronal activity occur across all cortical layers, and
consist in a depth-dependent (from the cortical surface) suppres-
sion of responses to all types of simple and complex naturalistic
stimuli (Johnstone et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2013). However, by the
long-term (8–10 weeks post-TBI), effects are found only in the
upper cortical layers, layers 2 and upper layer 3, and decrease
with cortical depth such that there are no long-term changes
in input layer 4 (Alwis et al., 2012); further the changes in the
upper layers are no longer a suppression of responses but, rather,
a hyper-excitation (Alwis et al., 2012). These persistent effects
are consistent with an imbalance in cortical excitation/inhibition
(Ding et al., 2011; Alwis et al., 2012).
Given the known effects of EE on the E/I balance in cortex, we
believe that there is potential for EE to remediate TBI-induced
changes in neuronal function by restoring the cortical excita-
tion/inhibition balance, to improve sensorimotor and cognitive
behavior. However, there is no current literature probing the
effects of EE specifically on neuronal function post-TBI, high-
lighting the need for studies examining the mechanisms under-
lying the EE-induced functional improvements that have been
reported in the literature. Hence, in the following section of the
review, we will first consolidate and discuss studies that have
examined the effects of EE after experimental brain injury, which
have focussed on mainly behavioral effects. We will then discuss
possible mechanisms through which EE acts to improve func-
tional outcomes post-injury, based on the known mechanisms
underlying the effects of EE (as discussed above). Finally, we will
review the implementation and efficacy of EE as a therapeutic
option to remediate brain injury in a clinical setting.
THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF EE POST-TBI
Only a few studies have investigated the effects of EE on func-
tional recovery post-experimental TBI and shown that exposure
to EE ameliorates motor and cognitive deficits and TBI-induced
histopathologies (Hamm et al., 1996; Passineau et al., 2001; Hicks
et al., 2002; Sozda et al., 2010; De Witt et al., 2011; Matter et al.,
2011; Monaco et al., 2013; Bondi et al., 2014), with some very
limited work on the effect of EE on TBI-induced sensory mor-
bidities. These studies have predominantly studied the use of
generic EE in the treatment of TBI, except for some work that has
included the use of multi-modal sensory stimulation with generic
EE (discussed further below).
EE improves TBI-induced cellular histopathologies: EE-
treated animals show decreases in lesion volume, increased neu-
ronal survival, and reduced neuronal degeneration in cortex
(Passineau et al., 2001; Lippert-Gruner et al., 2007; Monaco et al.,
2013). Muthuraju et al. (2012) recently reported an EE-mediated
decrease in cell death, in conjunction with an increase in neuroge-
nesis in the striatum, post-TBI. Additionally, in correlation with
the positive effects on motor and cognitive function, decreased
apoptosis and lesion volume have also been shown using a com-
bination of multi-modal sensory stimulation and EE (Maegele
et al., 2005a; Lippert-Gruner et al., 2007). These effects suggest
that EE may be able to ameliorate or attenuate damage caused by
secondary injury processes, which are often complex and dynamic
in nature.
The effects of EE on motor and cognitive function after TBI
have only been investigated in TBI models that cause a mixture of
focal and diffuse TBI (Hamm et al., 1996; Passineau et al., 2001;
Hicks et al., 2002; Hoffman et al., 2008; Sozda et al., 2010; De Witt
et al., 2011; Matter et al., 2011; Monaco et al., 2013), and to date,
no studies have examined the effect of EE after a purely diffuse
model of TBI. The studies of EE effects in mixed model TBI have
demonstrated positive effects of EE on neuromotor and cognitive
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function, especially for spatial navigation and memory. Hamm
et al. (1996) found that at 11–15 days after mixed-model TBI,
animals exposed to generic EE displayed elevated spatial memory
function in the Morris Water Maze (MWM) test, when compared
with TBI animals housed in standard conditions. EE housing also
improved cognitive functioning to levels comparable to those of
sham controls (Hamm et al., 1996). These findings are similar
to reports demonstrating EE-induced recovery of spatial naviga-
tion and spatial memory after hippocampal/cortical lesions (Will
et al., 1977; Einon et al., 1980; Whishaw et al., 1984). EE-induced
improvements in spatial navigation, increases in spatial acquisi-
tion task rate, as well as improved spatial memory, have been
demonstrated in other experimental models of mixed-model TBI
(Passineau et al., 2001; Hicks et al., 2002; Wagner et al., 2002; De
Witt et al., 2011; Matter et al., 2011; Monaco et al., 2013). EE-
mediated recovery of locomotor activity and motor function in
beam-walking and rotatod tasks has also been documented post-
TBI (Wagner et al., 2002; De Witt et al., 2011; Matter et al., 2011;
Monaco et al., 2013), while EE exposure also improved recovery
time of forelimb function after CCI (controlled cortical impact)
injury (Smith et al., 2007).
While EE on its own has all of these benefits for motor and
cognitive function, there is also evidence that the use of addi-
tional multi-modal sensorimotor stimulation together with EE
can improve cognitive and motor function (Maegele et al., 2005b;
Lippert-Gruener et al., 2007; Lippert-Gruner et al., 2007, 2011) at
both acute (7 and 15d; Maegele et al., 2005a,b; Lippert-Gruner
et al., 2007), and chronic (30d; Lippert-Gruener et al., 2007)
time-points post-injury. Such enhanced stimulation is thought to
better mimic rehabilitation paradigms used in clinical settings in
the treatment of brain injury. Maegele et al. (2005a) have demon-
strated that enhanced sensory stimulation in combination with
EE improves behavioral outcomes more than the use of EE on
its own (Maegele et al., 2005a), suggesting that any neuroplas-
ticity conferred by increased stimulation may be therapeutically
relevant.
Only a very few studies have examined the efficacy of EE
in ameliorating sensory deficits after TBI, with only one study
(Johnson et al., 2013) reporting that EE exposure completely
recovers TBI-induced sensory neglect, a condition where there is
a reduction in responsiveness to sensorimotor stimuli (Kim et al.,
1999). Conversely, in a unilateral cortical lesion model of brain
injury, Rose et al. (1987) found that EE did not facilitate recov-
ery from sensory neglect post-lesion. These contradictory results
may be explained by differences in the nature of injury, or even
the timing of EE exposure: in the Johnson et al. (2013) study, 15
days of EE exposure occurred immediately prior to TBI, whilst
Rose et al. (1987) examined the effects of 6 weeks of EE exposure
commencing 10–12 days post-lesion. We will demonstrate below
that the timing of the application of EE is absolutely critical for
ameliorating TBI-induced behavior deficits.
In most of these studies, the type of EE applied has been what
we have termed “generic” EE. Whether fortuitous or planned, this
form of EE, which must engage a range of sensory, motor, cog-
nitive and social behaviors, appears to greatly improve recovery
post-TBI. Thus, Hoffman et al. (2008) indicate that EE-induced
functional recovery may depend on task-specific experience:
post-TBI, animals show enhanced recovery of motor function
(e.g., beam traversing and balancing) and spatial learning and
memory (decreased latency to locate a platform in the MWM),
when exposed to both EE and task-specific training for the motor
and cognitive tests. They also suggest that the enhanced motor,
social and cognitive stimulation provided by housing in EE con-
ditions could, in themselves, contribute to the improved motor
and cognitive they observed. It is possible that exposure to gen-
eral EE vs. specific EE dictates the level of functionality that is
conferred; although it is true that often studies using specific
EE focus on tasks related to the aspect of EE that they enhance.
Considering the ambiguity that remains concerning this issue,
further investigations are required to determine whether expo-
sure to task-specific experience or specific EE can improve overall
functionality in a range of tasks.
It has been suggested that improved sensorimotor function
after brain injury may actually be attributed to behavioral com-
pensation rather than functional recovery; improvements on
multi-sensory tasks, such as a MWM test, could be due to the
use of cues from alternate (presumably undamaged) modalities
(Finger, 1978; Rose et al., 1987, 1993; Kolb et al., 1996). This
view receives support from studies that show that EE has much
more limited or negligible benefit in tasks involving a single sen-
sory modality (Rose et al., 1987, 1988). However, there is also no
reason why the two effects could not o-exist and in keeping with
this possibility, studies have shown a degree of EE-induced func-
tional recovery after cortical injury, accompanied by an observed
difference in the movements of the animals during task perfor-
mance such as skilled reaching post-injury (Whishaw et al., 1991;
Rowntree and Kolb, 1997; Kolb, 1999), suggesting that perhaps
both recovery and compensation may account for improved func-
tional outcomes after injury, possibly through the recruitment of
uninjured cortical circuits (Kolb, 1999). We therefore turn now
to a consideration of the potential mechanisms whereby EE could
improve outcomes after TBI.
MECHANISMS PROMOTING IMPROVED BEHAVIORAL AND
PATHOLOGICAL RECOVERY
To understand how EE could promote recovery after TBI, it is nec-
essary to understand some of the mechanisms underlying TBI.
This is not a simple endeavor since neurodegeneration caused
by TBI occurs as a result of a number of complex and dynamic
inter-related mechanisms (Smith et al., 1991; Hicks et al., 1993;
Pierce et al., 1998; Hall and Lifshitz, 2010; McNamara et al., 2010).
Only a few studies have examined how EE impacts on these com-
plex molecular and anatomical factors affected in TBI or any
other form of brain injury. Thus, ideas of how EE might pro-
duce improvements in sensorimotor and cognitive behavior after
TBI or any brain injury are often based on extrapolations of the
known actions of EE in the normal brain.
In uninjured animals, EE enhances neurogenesis, improves
neuronal survival, and decreases apoptotic cell death
(Kempermann et al., 1997; Van Praag et al., 2000; Lu et al.,
2003; Bruel-Jungerman et al., 2005), all of which have been
linked to improved behavioral recovery after TBI (Passineau
et al., 2001; Gaulke et al., 2005; Sozda et al., 2010; Monaco
et al., 2013). Additionally, Miller et al. (2013) have also recently
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demonstrated a decrease in hippocampal volume loss in TBI
patients, with increased engagement with cognitively, physically
and socially demanding activities, supporting the role of EE in
directly preventing neuronal death.
Post-injury EE housing has been shown to decrease injury-
induced lesion volume, increase synaptic density, increase post-
synaptic density (PSD) thickness, increase dendritic spine density
and dendritic branching in supragranular and infragranular lay-
ers of injured cortex (Biernaskie and Corbett, 2001; Ip et al., 2002;
Johansson and Belichenko, 2002; Xu et al., 2009a,b). Such struc-
tural changes may lead to EE-enabled compensation and recovery
of function after injury (Rose et al., 1987; Kolb and Gibb, 1991;
Whishaw et al., 1991; Passineau et al., 2001; Will et al., 2004).
Under uninjured conditions, EE-induced structural changes are
thought to occur due to upregulation of trophic factors such as
VEGF and BDNF which promote cell survival and plasticity, and
an increase in activation of transcription factors of proteins medi-
ating plasticity (Young et al., 1999; Rampon et al., 2000; Keyvani
et al., 2004; Will et al., 2004; Gaulke et al., 2005; Hoffman et al.,
2008; Sozda et al., 2010; Monaco et al., 2013; Ortuzar et al., 2013).
Interestingly, studies have reported an increase in BDNF expres-
sion after TBI (Hicks et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2005), with no
further increase following exposure to EE (Chen et al., 2005) sug-
gesting that EE-induced benefits for recovery after TBI may not
depend on increasing the levels of trophic factors.
The effects of TBI may also be exerted through inflammatory
processes: as we have noted previously (Alwis et al., 2013), acti-
vation of inflammatory cascades as part of the normal cellular
response to injury can cause further injury to the already dam-
aged brain (Menge et al., 2001; Morganti-Kossmann et al., 2002).
The inflammatory response in TBI involves production of pro-
inflammatory cytokines like interleukin-1 (IL-1), IL-6 and tumor
necrosis factor (TNF-a), and anti-inflammatory cytokines such
as IL-10 and IL-12, all of which are seen in the cerebrospinal
fluid of TBI patients within a few hours of the primary injury.
Inflammatory cytokines IL-1a, IL-1b, and IL-18 are also increased
after TBI (Menge et al., 2001; Morganti-Kossmann et al., 2002).
Interestingly, EE is able to decrease levels of pro-inflammatory
molecules such as tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) and
interleukin 1b (IL-1b; Briones et al., 2013) in the cortex and
hippocampus post-injury. Given the up-regulation of these fac-
tors by TBI, the EE effect may attenuate secondary-injury related
damage.
EE also induces an increase in neurotransmitter levels such as
noradrenaline and dopamine, NMDA receptor expression, and
brain metabolic activity, all of which are altered in TBI and have
been implicated in impairment of motor and cognitive function;
thus, exposure to EE could possibly regulate TBI-induced changes
in these factors (Brenner et al., 1983; Boyeson and Feeney, 1990;
Liljequist et al., 1993; Dietrich et al., 1994; Hamm et al., 1996).
We noted above that some work indicates that EE in animal
models of epilepsy attenuates onset of seizures, a functional con-
sequence of aberrant neuronal excitability after TBI (Pitkanen
and McIntosh, 2006; Hunt et al., 2013; Shultz et al., 2013).
While the exact mechanisms underlying this protective effect are
unknown, it is thought to occur through an EE-induced enhance-
ment of trophic support, changes in receptor expression and
enhanced neurogenesis (as previously described; Liu et al., 1993;
Cheng et al., 1995; Young et al., 1999; Reibel et al., 2000; Korbey
et al., 2008).
This review shows that overall, there are insufficient data avail-
able to decide if EE effects on all of the TBI-induced molecular
events noted above are all (or any of them) involved in the benefi-
cial effects of EE in TBI. Given the limited amount of knowledge
of the effects of EE specifically in TBI, it is worth also consider-
ing how EE acts therapeutically in other neurological disorders.
The general trend of how EE has benefits in other brain disor-
ders is summarized in Table 1, where it can be seen that EE acts
to increase neurogenesis, dendritic branching and spine density,
and increase the expression of growth factors (Johansson and
Ohlsson, 1996; Young et al., 1999; Jadavji et al., 2006; Pereira
et al., 2007; Gelfo et al., 2011; Valero et al., 2011). Similarly, recent
work by Koopmans et al. (2012) has also demonstrated increased
spinal cord progenitor cell differentiation and increased seroton-
ergic innervation after experimental SCI, while others have shown
increased dendritic spine density in the motor cortex (Kim et al.,
2008) and increased BDNF levels (Berrocal et al., 2007). These
studies, as well as those focussing on TBI, show that EE appears
to be a promising post-injury treatment to improve sensorimotor
and cognitive function in brain injury, most likely due to simi-
lar underlying structural and molecular mechanisms. Due to the
wide and inter-connected nature of the effects of EE, it is likely
that a combination of both molecular and morphological changes
needs to occur in order to see improvements in neuronal function
and behavior.
TIMING OF THE USE OF EE AS A THERAPY AFTER TBI
Some clues as to the potential mechanism by which EE could res-
cue brain function in TBI comes from the finding that the timing
and duration of EE are important factors governing motor and
cognitive recovery post-TBI (Figure 2; Hoffman et al., 2008; De
Witt et al., 2011; Matter et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2012). Thus,
Hoffman et al. (2008) reported that recovery of motor and cog-
nitive function, such as beam-walking and spatial learning and
memory, depended on an optimal time and length of EE exposure
relative to time after injury. After mixed focal-diffuse TBI, even a
short period of EE exposure (6 h) was sufficient to improve motor
and cognitive behavior to a level comparable to the enhanced per-
formance seen after much longer (3 weeks), continuous exposure
to EE (Hoffman et al., 2008; De Witt et al., 2011; Matter et al.,
2011). The benefits of EE were not dose-dependent, however, as
task performance in animals exposed to shorter periods of EE (2
and 4 h) did not differ significantly from those of injured animals
housed in standard conditions, suggesting a minimal threshold of
EE exposure is needed for beneficial effects (De Witt et al., 2011).
EE-induced plasticity has persisting effects such that even lim-
ited exposure (3 weeks) to EE post-TBI can result in long-term
protection from memory deficits, as assessed by the MWM task,
for up to 6 months after animals are withdrawn from EE condi-
tions (Cheng et al., 2012), making it an ideal candidate for therapy
post-TBI.
Recent studies have also demonstrated that even pre-injury
exposure to EE is neuroprotective (Kozlowski et al., 2004; Johnson
et al., 2013). Kozlowski et al. (2004) showed that brief (15d) EE
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Table 1 | Behavioral, morphological, and molecular effects of EE in various neurological disease conditions.
Neurological
disorder







(Novel object recognition test)
Improved spatial learning and
memory (Morris water maze,
Radial arm maze)
Increased dendritic length and
branching in cortex
Preserved dendritic spine density
loss/increased spine density in
hippocampus, cortex




Ohlsson and Johansson, 1995;
Johansson and Ohlsson, 1996;
Biernaskie and Corbett, 2001;
Johansson and Belichenko, 2002;
Risedal et al., 2002; Dahlqvist et al.,
2004; Gobbo and O’Mara, 2004;
Komitova et al., 2006; Buchhold
et al., 2007; Pereira et al., 2007;
Rojas et al., 2013
Lesions Improved motor function
(posture, ladder climb)
Improved spatial learning and
memory (Morris water maze)
Increased dendritic length in
cerebellum
Increased dendritic branching and




Kelche and Will, 1982; Held et al.,
1985; Kolb and Gibb, 1991; Bindu
et al., 2007; Frechette et al., 2009;
De Bartolo et al., 2011; Gelfo et al.,
2011
Epilepsy Increased seizure resistance
Increased exploratory activity
(Open field)
Improved spatial learning (Morris
water maze)







Young et al., 1999; Auvergne et al.,
2002; Faverjon et al., 2002; Rutten




Delayed onset of motor deficits
Improved spatial memory
(Barnes maze, Morris water
maze)
Delays degenerative loss of
cerebral volume
Attenuates deficits in hippocampal
neurogenesis






Van Dellen et al., 2000; Hockly et al.,
2002; Spires et al., 2004; Lazic et al.,
2006; Nithianantharajah et al., 2008;
Wood et al., 2010
Alzheimer’s
disease
Improved spatial learning and
memory (Morris water maze,
Barnes maze)
Improved working memory
(Radial arm water maze)
Increased/decreased Aβ and
amyloid deposition
Increased neuronal progenitor cell
proliferation
Increased/decreased neurogenesis





Jankowsky et al., 2003, 2005; Levi
et al., 2003; Arendash et al., 2004;
Wen et al., 2004; Lazarov et al.,
2005; Berardi et al., 2007;
Cracchiolo et al., 2007; Levi and
Michaelson, 2007; Valero et al., 2011
Parkinson’s
disease







Bezard et al., 2003; Faherty et al.,
2005; Jadavji et al., 2006
Summary of findings from studies that have investigated the effects of EE after various neurological conditions.
exposure in immature rats at p21, prior to TBI in adulthood
(approximately 3 months old), results in a paradoxical increase
in cortical lesion volume, but coupled with faster recovery of
forelimb function, assessed by foot fault and asymmetry tests.
Similarly, exposure to 15 days of EE immediately pre-TBI atten-
uates spatial and long-term memory deficits in the MWM task,
in a manner similar to that seen after post-injury EE exposure
(Johnson et al., 2013). However, the relevance of such a model
in a clinical setting is limited. It is however, likely that, in accord
with the Hebbian theory of plasticity, pre-injury exposure to EE
acts mainly to strengthen existing connections in the uninjured
brain, which may carry forward post-injury. This is likely to occur
through the upregulation of trophic factors such as BDNF, which
are shown to increase after exposure to motor enrichment before
and after injury (Kleim et al., 2003). In contrast, post-injury EE
exposure acts mainly to develop and strengthen new/previously
silent/remaining connections to compensate for the damage in
existing pathways (Taub et al., 2002), while elevated growth fac-
tor expression acts to limit the spread of damage (Kleim et al.,
2003). This would suggest that although pre- and post-injury EE-
exposure is beneficial for protection and/or recovery from injury,
the underlying mechanisms may be different.
The fact that even pre-injury exposure to EE can ameliorate
the effects of TBI may be taken to indicate that the benefits of
EE are independent of the TBI-induced molecular and struc-
tural changes that cause deficits to brain and behavior. However,
this is, as yet, an unsafe assumption for the reasons that brain
processes are so highly inter-linked and often use common path-
ways. For example, as noted above, TBI increases inflammatory
cascades while EE reduces many of the same cascades; thus
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral benefits conferred by the timing/duration of EE
relative to creation of TBI. The efficacy of EE treatment when
administered pre/post-injury is represented by green full-line arrows which
indicate EE timing conditions that ameliorated behaviors, while white
dashed arrows indicate EE timing conditions that failed to ameliorate
behaviors.
down-regulation of these cascades by pre-exposure to EE may
reduce subsequent TBI-induced activation of the inflamma-
tory mechanisms and thereby reduce secondary injury processes,
producing neuroprotection.
BEYOND THE BENCH
The current body of literature on the effects of EE in neurolog-
ical disease indicates that EE represents significant therapeutic
potential, on its own and in combination with pharmacolog-
ical treatments (Kline et al., 2007, 2010, 2012), by inducing
neuroprotective mechanisms involving molecular, structural, and
functional processes to improve histopathologies and behavioral
outcomes. Considering the many positive effects of EE demon-
strated after experimental brain injury, it would be logical to try
to aid recovery by applying EE in a clinical setting. Certainly, intel-
lectually, physically and socially active lifestyles (that are akin to
EE) have been linked to improved cognitive function and lower
incidences of cognitive impairment, particularly in older, unin-
jured adults (Seeman et al., 2001; Scarmeas and Stern, 2003;
Wilson et al., 2003; Newson and Kemps, 2005; Fujiwara et al.,
2009; Voss et al., 2011). Similarly, cognitive enrichment early in
life has also been linked to improved cognitive abilities in later
life (Milgram et al., 2006), while Kramer et al. (2004) have sug-
gested that enhanced cognitive enrichment results in improved
crystallized intelligence.
Indeed, the use of EE as a rehabilitative treatment for humans
post-TBI has been suggested to be effective in positively influenc-
ing long-term outcomes. However, the concept of EE for humans
is more complex to define than what constitutes as EE for animals,
as factors such as engagement and motivation play a role in clas-
sifying the level of enrichment an individual receives. In a clinical
setting, EE can be broadly classified as a paradigm that specifi-
cally enhances and promotes engagement with cognitive, social
and physical stimulation. An important caveat to the discussion
about the role of EE in the treatment of TBI is that post-TBI
rehabilitation programs are widely considered to be comparable
to enriched environments, in that these programs often com-
prise of multiple components that are considered hallmarks of EE,
which include physical and cognitive therapy, multi-modal stimu-
lation, novelty, duration, functional relevance, and social integra-
tion. It has to be noted, however, that specific skill rehabilitation
paradigms often do not result in improved general performance
in the post-discharge environment, and instead act to improve
task-specific performance (Sohlberg et al., 2000; Park and Ingles,
2001). It has instead been suggested that a more generalized treat-
ment would be beneficial in improving overall function (Toglia,
1991; Toglia et al., 2010). Rehabilitation paradigms treating brain
injury are often implemented in the acute stages post-injury, in
an in-patient hospital setting. Rehabilitation based on EE princi-
ples in TBI patients results in better general functional outcomes,
such as improved cognitive and motor skills (Willer et al., 1999;
Powell et al., 2002; Cifu et al., 2003; Boman et al., 2004; Hayden
et al., 2013), and better community integration (Zhu et al., 2001;
Cicerone et al., 2004). A number of studies have also shown that
increasing the duration and intensity of exposure to rehabilita-
tive therapy results in improved recovery times (Blackerby, 1990;
Spivack et al., 1992; Shiel et al., 2001; Zhu et al., 2001, 2007; Slade
et al., 2002; Cifu et al., 2003; Cicerone et al., 2004).
It has also been suggested that a lack or an absence of EE is
linked to cognitive decline post-injury (Till et al., 2008; Frasca
et al., 2013), demonstrating the importance of continued expo-
sure to EE in the post-discharge stages after brain injury. In
that sense, a number of factors could contribute to the pro-
vision of an appropriate level of enrichment once a patient
has left an intensive rehabilitative environment. These factors
include ease of access to activities and resources that are cog-
nitively, physically and socially stimulating, as well as support
that encourages participation and integration with these environ-
ments (Frasca et al., 2013). Frasca et al. (2013) have also suggested
that although patients eventually return to an environment that
could be considered enriched post-TBI, interactions with these
environments may be restricted due to limitations in cognitive
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and/or physical deficits. This is especially relevant during the
transition from the in-patient rehabilitation environment, to
post-discharge home environments, where complexity of, and
engagement with environments may reduce. A reduction in
enrichment in the post-acute period could be detrimental to
recovery as studies have shown that functions gained during
stimulation of neural pathways (such as during rehabilitation)
can be lost through under-use (Rubinov et al., 2009; Warraich
and Kleim, 2010; Frasca et al., 2013). Post-discharge, the major
forms of therapy mapped onto EE principles include community-
based and home-based rehabilitation, with the aim that these
programs would aid in improving behaviors and skills required
for everyday functioning, improving community integration, and
preventing cognitive decline (Fryer and Haffey, 1987; Frasca et al.,
2013). Studies have shown that continued enrichment in the
form of cognitive rehabilitation in the post-discharge setting (i.e.,
domestic or vocational environments) increases neuropsycholog-
ical function, learning and memory (Willer et al., 1999; Boman
et al., 2004).
Given the complexity and ethics of manipulations of the envi-
ronment in humans recovering from TBI, in addition to the
difficulties in accurately comparing the effectiveness of various
rehabilitation paradigms, questions of the correlation between
these effects and EE-induced functional changes remain. Injury
heterogeneity also raises challenges in defining exactly what level
of enrichment is optimal and beneficial. However, the findings
presented in this section strongly suggest that EE or EE-based
therapy tailored to the patient’s needs could significantly improve
outcomes when applied in both the in-patient, acute and post-
discharge, chronic settings.
CONCLUSION
The studies described here well support the use of EE as a ther-
apeutic paradigm in the treatment of TBI. However, while the
results of these studies all show promise in improving TBI-
induced histopathologies and sensorimotor and cognitive deficits,
there is still much work to be done to clarify our understanding
of how EE exerts its effects in disease conditions. Paramount to
the understanding of how EE improves behavioral outcomes after
injury is the investigation of how EE changes neuronal function
post-TBI, of which we know nothing. Only once these effects are
unveiled will we be able to implement EE as a treatment option
post-injury at its maximum potential.
It is also worth adding the caution that while EE holds promise
in its application as a therapeutic tool after brain injury in
humans, the complex nature of utilizing EE in a clinical setting
makes it difficult to standardize treatment and compare out-
comes. It is also true that EE as an experimental paradigm in
animal studies has yet to be standardized, with housing condi-
tions, environmental stimuli, number of animals per cage, age of
animals at onset of enrichment, as well as the duration of enrich-
ment, varying markedly between studies. The extent of contri-
bution of these factors is particularly relevant when considering
the demonstrated neuroprotective effects of EE in neurological
disease states, where little is known about how improved func-
tional outcomes relate to changes in neuronal function. Using
experimental models that are easily controlled and manipulated,
however, would provide us with valuable insight into the thera-
peutic potential of EE, both in laboratory and clinical settings.
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Modified mesenchymal stromal cells (MSCs) display a unique mechanism of action
during the repair phase of traumatic brain injury by exhibiting the ability to build a
biobridge between the neurogenic niche and the site of injury. Immunohistochemistry
and laser capture assay have visualized this biobridge in the area between the neurogenic
subventricular zone and the injured cortex. This biobridge expresses high levels of
extracellular matrix metalloproteinases (MMPs), which are initially co-localized with a
stream of transplanted MSCs, but later this region contains only few to non-detectable
grafts and becomes overgrown by newly recruited host cells. We have reported that
long-distance migration of host cells from the neurogenic niche to the injured brain
site can be attained via these transplanted stem cell-paved biobridges, which serve as
a key regenerative process for the initiation of endogenous repair mechanisms. Thus,
far the two major schools of discipline in stem cell repair mechanisms support the
idea of “cell replacement” and the bystander effects of “trophic factor secretion.” Our
novel observation of stem cell-paved biobridges as pathways for directed migration of
host cells from neurogenic niche toward the injured brain site adds another mode of
action underlying stem cell therapy. More in-depth investigations on graft-host interaction
will likely aid translational research focused on advancing this stem cell-paved biobridge
from its current place, as an equally potent repair mechanism as cell replacement and
trophic factor secretion, into a new treatment strategy for traumatic brain injury and other
neurological disorders.
Keywords: trauma, cell transplantation, regenerative medicine, neurogenesis, extracellular matrix
A NOVEL BRAIN REPAIR MECHANISM OF TRANSPLANTED
STEM CELLS
Stem cell research offers an avenue for an in-depth study of
cell biology, as well as in the development of new strategies to
treat diseases (Yasuhara et al., 2006, 2008; Tajiri et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, much remains to be understood about the mech-
anisms underlying the beneficial effects of stem cell therapy. To
date, there are two major schools of discipline in stem cell-
mediated repair mechanism in brain damage caused by injury
or neurodegenerative disorders (Borlongan et al., 2004; Pastori
et al., 2008). The first concept supports the idea of “cell replace-
ment,” i.e., stem cells implanted into the brain directly replace
dead or dying cells (Figure 1A), whereas the other argues that
transplanted stem cells secrete growth factors that indirectly res-
cue the injured tissue (i.e., bystander effects of stem cells) (Lee
et al., 2007; Redmond et al., 2007) (Figure 1B).
Stem cells exist through adulthood (Ma et al., 2010), and pos-
sess the capacity for self-renewal and differentiation into multiple
lineages. They have also been shown to contribute to the mainte-
nance of homeostasis (Kim et al., 2011), exert therapeutic benefits
both endogenously (Barha et al., 2011; Borlongan, 2011; Jaskelioff
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011) and following transplantation
into injured organs, e.g., the brain (Mazzocchi-Jones et al., 2009;
Hargus et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Andres et al., 2011; Liu et al.,
2011; Mezey, 2011; Yasuda et al., 2011). There are two major stem
cell niches in the brain namely, the subventricular zone (SVZ)
of the lateral ventricles and the subgranular zone of the hip-
pocampus dentate gyrus (DG) (Carlén et al., 2009; Sanai et al.,
2011), although quiescent neural stem cells (NSCs) have been
found in other brain regions (Robel et al., 2011). The discov-
ery that stem cells are activated following injury opened up new
research frontiers in regenerative medicine (Yasuhara et al., 2006;
Mazzocchi-Jones et al., 2009; Hargus et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010;
Andres et al., 2011; Barha et al., 2011; Borlongan, 2011; Jaskelioff
et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011; Mezey, 2011; Wang et al., 2011; Yasuda
et al., 2011; Tajiri et al., 2012). Consequently, this research paved
the way for translation of laboratory studies on stem cells into
limited clinical trials for brain disorders (Pollock et al., 2006;
Yasuhara et al., 2009; Seol et al., 2011). Despite these scientific
advances and clinical applications, the mechanisms underlying
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple mechanisms underlying stem cell therapy. (A) Cell
replacement entails that transplanted cells replace dead or dying host cells,
which would require neuronal differentiation of stem cells and reconstruction
of the damaged synaptic circuitry. (B) By-stander effects involve secretion of
neurotrophic factors, anti-inflammatory substances, and anti-oxidative stress
molecules by the transplanted cells, which subsequently rescue spared host
cells or stimulate neurogenesis. (C) Stem cell-paved biobridges show that
transplanted cells form a biological pathway, enriched in MMPs, and ferries
newly born host stem cells from the neurogenic niche SVZ to the injured host
tissue.
stem cell-mediated repair in brain injury are not yet completely
understood.
In a recent study, we demonstrated motor and neurologi-
cal improvements in rats subjected to traumatic brain injury
(TBI) and transplanted intracerebrally with cultured Notch-
induced human bone marrow-derived mesenchymal stromal cells
(referred to as SB623, supplied by SanBio Inc.) While we obtained
important results that corroborate the putative therapeutic ben-
efits of stem cell transplantation for TBI, our research on the
mechanism of action of SB623 revealed breakthrough findings
which support the discovery of a novel stem-cell mediated repair
mechanism in brain injury. Accordingly, we observed the capac-
ity of transplanted stem cells to harness a “biobridge” between
the neurogenic niche and the site of brain injury, enabling long-
distance migration of host neurogenic cells and consequently,
initiating endogenous repair mechanisms. In this paper, we dis-
cuss the properties and characteristics of these stem cell paved-
biobridges, elaborate on the unique mechanism by which these
biobridges facilitate repair in a rat model of TBI, and importantly,
suggest the clinical significance of exploiting this novel stem cell-
mediated concept of brain repair for the treatment of brain injury
and other neurological disorders.
BREAKTHROUGH DISCOVERY: STEM CELL-PAVED
FORMATION OF “BIOBRIDGES” IN EXPERIMENTAL MODELS
OF TBI
Rats subjected to TBI were intracerebrally transplanted with
SB623 (gene-modified human mesenchymal stromal cells) (Zhao
et al., 2007; Yasuhara et al., 2009). Thereafter, the motor and
neurological functions of these rats were evaluated at 1, 2, and
3 months post-TBI, and histological studies were performed
to assess the therapeutic effects of SB623 transplantation. The
behavioral studies showed significant motor and neurological
improvement in TBI rats which received SB623. Histological stud-
ies also showed profound reduction in TBI-induced damages
to the cortical core and the peri-injured cortical areas in
SB623-transplanted TBI rats. The behavioral and histological
improvements, however, were achieved despite minimal graft
survival—0.60 and 0.16% at 1 and 3 months, respectively. These
findings led us to examine the condition of the host tissue, in view
of functional recovery despite lack of graft persistence.
At 1 month post-TBI, we observed notable increases in
endogenous cellular proliferation (Ki67) as well as immature neu-
ral differentiation (nestin) in the peri-injured cortical areas and
SVZ, along with a stream of migrating cells along the corpus cal-
losum (CC) of SB623 transplanted TBI animals. Furthermore,
at 3 months post-TBI, we observed enhanced cellular prolifera-
tion and neural differentiation in the peri-injured cortical (CTX)
areas of SB623 transplanted TBI animals, accompanied by a solid
stream of neuronally-labeled cells (nestin and DCX) migrating
not only along but also across the CC from the SVZ to the
impacted CTX. Contrastingly, TBI rats which received vehicle
infusion exhibited elevated cellular proliferation; however the
newly formed cells were “trapped” within the SVZ and CTX and
did not migrate to the impacted CTX.
We next analyzed the formation of the biobridge by means of
the cells leaving the SVZ and moving toward the site of injury was
laser captured in the animals receiving the SB623 cells.
The biobridge between the SVZ and the impacted cortex
was composed of highly proliferative, neutrally committed, and
migratory cells. These animals showed a 2 and 9-fold upreg-
ulation of the matrix metalloproteinase-9 (MMP) activity and
expression at 1 and 3 months post-TBI, respectively. Further
in vitro studies also showed the ability of SB623 cells to enhance
cell migration via this MMP-rich signaling cues. These signals are
crucial to the migration of endogenous cells which can then assist
with functional recovery of damaged tissue. Merely 1 month post-
TBI, a surge of proliferative Ki67 positive cells and neurally imma-
ture nestin labeled cells in the peri-injured areas and SVZ were
discerned. The high level of MMP-9 in the biobridge indicates the
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importance of this neurovascular proteinase. Interestingly, this
proteinase was upregulated in the vehicle group, but reverted back
to control-sham levels at 3 months post-TBI. This illustrates the
role of MMP in long-term recovery and adds another facet to the
mechanism through which stem cells aid in recovery of damaged
tissue.
To provide further evidence that the implanted SB623 cells
facilitated the formation of the biobridge, thus enabling the
migration of host stem cells from the SVZ to the site of injury
and the up-regulation of endogenous cells, an in vitro study
was performed with primary rat cortical cells grown both alone
and co-cultured with SB623 cells. These were grown either in
the presence or absence of the MMP-9 inhibitor Cyclosporin-A.
Migratory cell assay revealed noticeably enhanced migration of
primary rat cortical cells in the chamber containing SB623, which
was then significantly suppressed by treatment with the MMP-9
inhibitor. Treatment with the inhibitor alone, combined treat-
ment with SB623 and the inhibitor, and absence of both SB623
and the inhibitor did not significantly alter migratory potential.
Although endogenous repair mechanisms are initiated post-
TBI, these effects are typically limited to the neurogenic SVZ
and quiescent neurogenic resident cells around the impacted cor-
tex. Accordingly, these endogenous mechanisms are not robust
enough to provide a solid defense against TBI or other disease-
induced cell death cascades necessitating introduction of exoge-
nous cells to aid migration of endogenous stem cells from the
neurogenic niche to the site of injury. Stem cell transplantation
into the peri-injured cortical areas purportedly creates a bio-
bridge comprised of a neurovascular matrix which allows newly
formed endogenous cells to migrate efficiently to the site of injury.
Moreover, biobridge is established, exogenous cells slowly fade
away, supplanted by newly formed endogenous cells that can
maintain recovery even in the absence of transplanted stem cells.
A BIOBRIDGE BETWEEN THE NEUROGENIC NICHE AND THE
ISCHEMIC TISSUE
The results show SB623 transplants aid in regeneration of the
traumatically injured brain by constructing a biobridge between
the SVZ and the peri-injured cortex (Figure 1C). This novel
mechanism opens new doors for cell therapy by allowing the
creation of similar biobridges between neurogenic and non-
neurogenic sites to aid in injury-specific migration of cells across
tissues that are barriers to cellular motility.
A phase I/IIa study of SB623 cell transplantation in chronic
stroke patients has already been initiated. Transplantation of
SB623 cells has been shown to mitigate histological and behav-
ioral deficits associated with stroke, spinal cord injury, and
Parkinson’s Disease in both cell culture and animal models of
brain disorders. The use of SB623 cells in TBI patients is an inno-
vative concept that has already been FDA approved for a limited
clinical trial based on the data presented.
Understanding SB623’s role in facilitating the migration of
endogenous cells via a biobridge exposes the active role of MMPs
and ECMs in stroke pathology (Park et al., 2009; el Zoppo et al.,
2012) and highlights their increasingly prominent role as thera-
peutic targets for stroke. Functions and levels of MMPs and ECMs
have been shown to be influenced by a variety of cells coming
from variable sources including umbilical cord blood, periph-
eral blood, and the adult brain (Barkho et al., 2008; Sobrino
et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2013). This suggests a potential for these
molecules to serve as biobridges similar to the current function of
Notch-induced SB623 mesenchymal stromal cells.
While documented neurogenic niches such as the SVZ exist in
the adult brain and contain cells that play a critical role in repair-
ing the stroke brain (Ekdahl et al., 2009; Ducruet et al., 2012;
Hassani et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Trueman et al., 2013),
it has been shown that a major limiting factor for endogenous
repair is the lack of successful migration of newly formed host
cells to the site of injury. Currently, results show SB623 cell trans-
plantation boosts endogenous repair mechanisms by guiding the
transition of new cells from the neurogenic SVZ, across a non-
neurogenic brain area, to the site of injury. The ability of SB623
cells to form biobridges containing MMPs and ECMs which can
then entice newly formed cells from the niche into the ischemic
tissue appears to be a fundamental mechanism of action. Once the
transplanted SB623 cells have pioneered the formation of these
biobridges, they allow the endogenous stem cells to take over the
remodeling process.
The precise mechanism by which the graft cells are integrated
into the recipient brain tissue and subsequently interact with the
host cells to result in functional restoration remains unknown.
This essential interaction between the transplanted cell and host
cell becomes even more obscure when graft survival is minimal.
This indicates that the role of the SB623 is to set in motion robust
and stable therapeutic benefits, particularly by leading the way for
host cells to reach the injured site even across non-neurogenic and
injured tissues. MMP has been implicated in chronic brain injury
recovery through studies that inhibited MMPs, which conse-
quently halted neurogenic migration from the SVZ into damaged
tissues. The result was a noticeable retardation in neurovascular
remodeling. This supports the concept that exogenously added
cells can express MMPs and thereby reinforce the neurovascu-
lar unit, aiding in the transplant-mediated host cell migration
toward the site of injury. This potentially allows for the formation
of biobridges, thereby affording functional recovery in TBI.
BEYOND TBI: EXPLOITING STEM CELL-PAVED BIOBRIDGES
FOR THE TREATMENT OF OTHER NEUROLOGICAL
DISORDERS
The most adult stem cells in the brain are found in the SVZ of
the lateral ventricles and the subgranular zone of the hippocam-
pus dentate gyrus. The microenvironment of a stem cell niche is
maintained by the signaling molecules, growth factors, and recep-
tors. In adults, these stem cells typically remain in a dormant
non-dividing state until activated by an insult. When an insult
occurs motility ensues and the endogenous stem cells find them-
selves trapped and unable to reach the site of injury. The novel
discovery that grafted cells can facilitate endogenous stem cell
migration from the neurogenic niche to the site of injury is indeed
a significant progress in the both stem cell and TBI research.
Our recent study (Tajiri et al., 2013) advances the concept of
the biobridge mechanism as a cell mediated repair strategy in TBI,
and opens new avenues for translational applications of cell ther-
apy in TBI. Monitoring long term safety and efficacy of SB623
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cell therapy in TBI animal models in order to optimize the con-
duct of clinical trials involving these cells in TBI patients is a
priority. Gaining a more concrete understanding of the stem cell
mechanism is the next step which will help to push forth the
boundaries of stem cell research and explain the mechanism of
cellular therapy in neurological disease.
In addition to TBI, a number of other neurological disor-
ders are characterized by a “biological gap” between the site of
injury and intact tissue. In this regard, disorders like stroke and
Parkinson’s disease may benefit from a deeper understanding on
the concept of stem cell-paved biobridge because both disor-
ders present with a site of cellular degeneration that is physically
separated from the area of the brain that could aid in the recov-
ery of dead tissue or lost cells. For example, stroke entails an
ischemic core and penumbra residing next to intact tissue. While
the ischemic core damage cannot be recovered, the potential for
neural repair has been demonstrated by targeting the penumbra.
Accordingly, a biobridge between the penumbra and the intact
tissue (i.e., neurogenic niche) could potentially aid in stroke.
Parkinson’s disease involves the degeneration of the nigrostri-
atal dopaminergic pathway, which could improve drastically with
directed migration of host stem cells toward this region in the
form of a biobridge. Further investigations are warranted to deter-
mine how the concept of stem-cell paved biobridge could be
exploited for the treatment of other neurological disorders.
MULTI-PRONGED MECHANISMS UNDERLYING STEM CELL
THERAPY
As noted above, stem cell-mediated repair mechanisms have been
widely purported as afforded via cell replacement and bystander
effects (Snyder et al., 1997; Borlongan et al., 2004; Lee et al.,
2007; Redmond et al., 2007; Pastori et al., 2008; Acosta et al.,
2014). Our proposed third mechanism describes the recruitment
of endogenous stem cells from the stem cell niches (Alvarez-
Buylla et al., 2008) to the injured site through the transplanted
stem cell-formed biobridge. This begs the question of whether the
biobridge provides the scaffold or trophic factors to promote stem
cell migration. Interestingly, new reports suggest candidate ECMs
may serve as a scaffold or trophic factor-rich soluble molecules.
For example, a study observed that the limits of interstitial cell
migration depends upon scaffold porosity and deformation of the
nucleus, with pericellular collagenolysis and mechanocoupling as
modulators acting as scaffolds and assisting with biobridge for-
mation (i.e., stem cell migration) (Wolf et al., 2013). Alternatively,
a study found that functional analysis of mesenchymal stem cell
proliferation, migration, and adhesion to ECMs revealed that IL-
1β did not affect proliferation but served to induce the secretion
of trophic factors and adhesion to ECM components such as
collagen and laminin (Carrero et al., 2012).
In the end, stem cell functionality is a key factor to achieve
clinically relevant outcomes of stem cell therapy. Of note, neuro-
genesis per se does not equate to these new neurons integrating
with the damaged area, and that physiological and functional
assays (e.g., synaptic circuitry reconstruction, evoked potentials,
long-term potentiation, etc.) will be necessary to unequivocally
reveal the contribution of these newly formed cells in the result-
ing behavioral recovery. Depending on the target disease of stem
cell therapy, it is likely that neuronal differentiation to spe-
cific disease-phenotype (Hong et al., 2011), as in the case of
Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s disease, may be needed to
produce functional effects. However, we caution that such neu-
ronal differentiation may occur in both exogenously transplanted
cells and the mobilized endogenous stem cells. Our concept of
biobridge formation highlights the need for these stem cells to
be guided toward the site of injury, which may facilitate the ther-
apeutic effects of these newly formed cells that have committed
to neuronally differentiated cells. Alternatively or a complement
mechanism in the absence of neuronal differentiation, we also
propose the biobridge-facilitated by-stander effects, in that with
the directed migration of these stem cells toward the site of injury,
the biobridge is able to harness the secretion of growth fac-
tors, anti-inflammatory substances, and/or anti-oxidative stress
molecules close to the damaged area.
The concept of stem cell-paved biobridge may have some sim-
ilarities with the use of olfactory ensheathing glia in spinal cord
injury. Compelling evidence from animal models and clinical
studies suggest that transplantation of olfactory ensheathing cells
(OECs), specialized glia in the olfactory system, combined with
specific training may be therapeutically useful in central ner-
vous system (CNS) injuries and neurodegenerative diseases. The
unique function of OECs could be attributed to both produc-
tion of cell adhesion molecules and secretion of growth factors
in OECs, which support neuron survival and neurite outgrowth
(He et al., 2013). Another study showed that transplantation of
OEG and Schwann cell (SCs) in a sub-acute phase can improve
anatomical outcomes after a contusion injury to the spinal cord by
increasing the number of spared/regenerated supraspinal fibers,
reducing cavitation, and enhancing tissue integrity (Barbour
et al., 2013). Most spinal cord injury models evaluating the ther-
apeutic efficacy of OEC transplants have reported functional
recovery via indirect and direct reparative pathways involving
growth factor secretion, neuronal and axonal regeneration, and
remyelination (Roet et al., 2013).
Although similarities exist between the biobridge seen with
OECs in spinal cord injury and our observed biobridge in TBI,
the biobridge seen in spinal cord injury involves the ensheating
features of OECs, as well as the fabrication of scaffolds (such
as laminin and fibronectin) and seeding the stem cells onto
these matrices in order to create a biobridge. In contrast, our
observed biobridge involves a natural process of the stem cells
themselves serving as matrices in facilitating the migration of
endogenous stem cells from the neurogenic niche toward the
injured host tissue. With this in mind, a similar biobridge strategy
was documented in Parkinson’s disease whereby the transplanted
dopamine-secreting cells were deposited along the nigrostriatal
system (instead of merely transplanting the cells into the stria-
tum) to closely reconstruct the major dopaminergic afferent and
efferent pathways (Wang et al., 1996; Tang et al., 1998; Chiang
et al., 2001). Compared to our observed biobridge formation,
this bridging graft in Parkinson’s disease is an artificial recon-
struction of the dopaminergic system whereby micro-deposits
of immature cells are undertaken along the nigrostriatal path-
way, whereas our biobridge formation reveals a natural process
of the transplanted stem cells homing from the neurogenic niche
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and forming a bridge toward the injured site, and subsequently
attracting endogenous stem cells to populate the biobridge and to
eventually continue the brain reparative process.
Altogether, these observations suggest that while distinct
mechanisms of action may be individually facilitating the neural
repair of transplanted stem cells in the injured brain, overlap-
ping regenerative processes involving cell replacement, by-stander
effects, and biobridge formation may be working in tandem in
realizing the therapeutic benefits of stem cell therapy.
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Background: The modulation efficacy of Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on
consciousness improvement of patient with disorder of consciousness (DOC) has not
been definitely confirmed.
Objective: This study proposes TMS-EEG to assess effects of repetitive TMS (rTMS)
on brain modulation of DOC.
Methods: Twenty sessions of 10Hz rTMS were applied over the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex for a patient with DOC. Measures of Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)
score, TMS-evoked potential (TEP), perturbation complexity index (PCI), and global mean
field power (GMFP) were used to evaluate the consciousness level of the patient at three
intervals: before the rTMS protocol (T0), immediately after one session rTMS (T1), and
immediately after 20 sessions (T2).
Results: It was found that the patient was diagnosed of a minimally conscious state
minus (MCS-) by means of CRS-R at the interval of T0, however the TEP and PCI
indicated the patient was vegetative state (VS). At the interval of T1, there was not any
clinical behavioral improvement in CRS-R, but we could find significant changes in TEP,
PCI, and GMFP. At the interval of T2 there was a significant increase of consciousness
level according by CRS-R score, PCI value, TEP, and GMFP after 20 sessions of 10Hz
rTMS on the patient with DOC.
Conclusions: We demonstrated that TMS-EEG might be an efficient assessment tool
for evaluating rTMS protocol therapeutic efficiency in DOC.
Keywords: TMS-EEG, disorder of consciousness, rTMS, perturbation complexity index, EEG
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INTRODUCTION
Although, some studies have attempted to demonstrate some
pharmacologic or nonpharmacologic effects, until now there
were no evidence-based guidelines regarding the treatment of
patients with DOC (Bernat et al., 2006). Recently, few case
reports have addressed the application of rTMS on consciousness
improve in patients of vegetative state (VS) or minimally
consciousness state (MCS) (Lefaucheur et al., 2014). Effects of
high frequency rTMS on MCS have been reported in several
patients. A recent case report demonstrated that a patient inMCS
has meaningful behaviors increase after received three sessions
20Hz rTMS on the primary motor cortex (M1), it suggested that
the rTMSmight improve consciousness ofMCS patient (Piccione
et al., 2011). In a previous study (Manganotti et al., 2013), six
patients in VS and MCS received one session of 20Hz rTMS on
M1 region, and one MCS patient has significant clinical and EEG
modification. In a study (Naro et al., 2015), by using a protocol of
10 Hz rTMS over dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), three
of ten patients with MCS have significant clinical improvement.
Also, it was found that there was a significant improvement for
VS patients after rTMS modulation. Until now, a case study
was only reported that, when TMS deliver to DLPFC, a 30
sessions rTMS protocol could improve neurobehavioral change
of VS patient (Louise-Bender Pape et al., 2009). Basically, rTMS
modulation for DOC patient might be available.
How to evaluate the modulation of rTMS on the DOC
patient is a critical issue. The current gold standard for
assessing consciousness state is based on the standard behavioral
assessment (Monti and Sannita, 2016). However, possible
confounding factors and mechanisms underlying impaired brain
function may not be fully considered. The absence of behavioral
evidence of command following was not necessarily indicative
of the true absence of consciousness (Owen et al., 2006). It was
reported that the behavioral abilities could fluctuate across time
which would cause mis-diagnostic (Monti and Sannita, 2016).
Recently, several “stimulate-response” methods, such as short-
latency evoked potentials (Cavinato et al., 2009; Ragazzoni et al.,
2013), event-related potentials (Kotchoubey et al., 2005; Rohaut
et al., 2015), and motor evoked amplitude (Naro et al., 2015)
have been used as more objective assessment methods for the
consciousness level of patient with DOC. However, the proposed
methods did not consider the integrity of sensory or peripheral
nerve pathways of DOC. Thus, it is necessary to develop a new
and reliable method to accurately assess the clinical variety in
DOC treatment.
Recently TMS-EEG was proposed to evaluate the
consciousness state in severely brain-injured and disable of
communication patients (Rosanova et al., 2012), and it could
invariably trigger complex activations that sequentially involved
distant cortical areas ipsi- and contralateral to the site of
stimulation in MCS which was different from VS. TMS-EEG
technique could directly detect the relationship between non-
invasive stimulation and cortical response, and it should not
depend on the condition of participant.
Although, TMS-EEG has been demonstrated helpful in
differentiating MCS from VS, there were rarely studies using this
technology to assess the efficiency of present therapy in DOC.
The primary aim of this study was to explore TMS-EEG evidence
in consciousness recovery during a therapy of rTMS protocol.
The second aim was to support an example of using TMS-EEG
to assess the therapy efficiency in DOC.
BACKGROUND
The patient is a woman age 47 with brain injury induced by
hypertensive cerebral hemorrhage of right basal ganglia region.
Post-injury, the patient remained behaviorally unresponsive for
a period of 2 months based on available records and appeared
unstable source location of pain after 8 weeks of injury. At
about 10 weeks post-injury, the patient was transferred to a
comprehensive inpatient brain injury rehabilitation program
where physical, occupational, speech, and related therapies
were performed for the next 7 months. But no distinct
behaviorally improvement during this period. It was 9 months
after-injury when she began to accept rTMS therapy, she
was diagnosed as MCS- by CRS-R. She could open her eyes
spontaneously, and blink when received big sound stimulation
like clap but can’t locate the sound source, noxious stimulation
withdrawing the respective limb from the pain source. She
can’t sound and had no any commands following response,
her mouth had reflex movement. Her caregivers reports that,




Written informed consent to participate in the study was
obtained from the patient’s caregivers. In order to indicate the
difference of TMS-evoked potential (TEP) between the patient
with DOC and controls, five age matched female healthy subjects
age 43–50 participated to this study to obtain the mean control
TEP. Written informed consent to subjects in the study was
obtained. The present study was approved by ethics committee
of Beijing Army General Hospital.
Stimulation Protocol
The process of the intervention and evaluation could be found
in Figure 1. The patient received active 10Hz rTMS over
left DLPFC. Different from similar study (Naro et al., 2015),
our protocol lasted 20 consecutive days. Daily sessions of
intervention consisted of 1000 pulses (10Hz) at an intensity of
90% RMT. The stimulation of one session included 10 trains,
each train lasted 10 s with a 60 s inter-train pause. The rise
time of the magnetic monophasic stimulus was about 100 µs
and time to zero was about 800 µs. TMS pulses were delivered
using a Magstim R2 stimulator with a 70mm figure-of-eight
coil (Magstim Company Limited, Whitland, UK). Stimulation
intensity varied across this experiment was determined relative
to the resting motor threshold (RMT), defined as the lowest
TMS intensity which could evoke at least 5 out of 10 EMG
with an amplitude >50 µV peak-to-peak in the relaxed
first dorsal interosseous muscle of the right hand. To avoid
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FIGURE 1 | TMS protocol for the patient. (A) Time points of the protocol, TMS were delivered at left-DLPFC lasting for 20 consecutive days. CRS-R score was
assessed each day from the baseline to day 30. (B) Single pulse TMS evoked EEG recording before the protocol were used as baseline (T0) and that immediately after
one session were used as the one session assessment (T1). From day 2 to day 19, there were no TMS and EEG evaluation. Single pulse TMS evoked EEG recorded
immediately after the 20 sessions were used as assessment of the whole protocol (T2).
contamination of TMS-evoked potential by auditory potentials
evoked by the click associated with the TMS discharge, patient
was wearing inserted earplugs continuously playing a masking
noise.
CSR-R
The CRS-R is a tool to characterize the level of consciousness
and to monitor neuro-behavioral recovery in patients with DOC
(Giacino et al., 2004). Scoring is based on the presence or absence
of specific behavioral responses to sensory stimuli administered
in a standardized manner, with low item represents reflexive
activity and high items represent cognitively mediated behaviors.
In this study, CRS-R was assessed daily from 1 day before rTMS
protocol to30 days after this protocol.
TMS-EEG Recordings
In the experiment, we used TMS-compatible EEG recorder
(BrainAmp 64 MRplus, BrainProducts), EEG was continuously
acquired from 62 channels with positions of the international
10–10 system. The equipment used TMS-compatible sintered
Ag/AgCl-pin electrodes. We set a band-pass filtered at DC
to 1000Hz in the recorder, and the EEG signal was digitized
at a sampling rate of 2.5 kHz. During the experiment,
the skin/electrode impedance was maintained below 5 k.
EEG was recorded in day 1 and day 20. As shown in
Figure 1B, at T0, 200 single pulses were delivered before
the protocol as baseline assessment and TMS evoked EEG
immediately recorded after 10Hz rTMS to evaluate the
efficacy of one session rTMS. At T2, 200 single pulses were
delivered immediately after rTMS to assess the performance
of whole protocol. EEG recordings were carried out while
patients were behaviorally awake (eyes open, EO) during the
modulation and assessment. If the patient showed signs of
sleepiness (prolonged eye closure, EC), the CRS-R arousal
facilitation protocol was applied, or the experiment was
suspended.
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EEG Analysis
Evoked Potential by TMS
Off-line analysis was performed with EEGLAB 12.0.2.5b, running
in a MATLAB environment (Version 2013b, MathWorks Inc.,
Natick, USA). The continuous EEG signal was segmented
into epochs starting the TMS pulse onset and ending 300ms
(Massimini et al., 2005; Ferrarelli et al., 2010; Ferreri et al.,
2011) after it. After this, data 20ms after TMS pulse were
removed from each trial to exclude the TMS artifact through
the cubic interpolation function of MATLAB (Thut et al., 2011).
Independent component analysis (ICA) function was used to
identify the TMS unrelated artifacts (such as eye movement and
muscle artifacts). Then each component was visually inspected
in terms of scalp distribution, frequency, timing, and amplitude.
The components deemed as artifact were removed with ICA
(Casula et al., 2014). The 50 Hz artifact was removed from
remaining trials using a notch filter. Then, EEG data were
average referenced; down-sampled to 500 Hz, band pass filtered
(1–80Hz), and baseline corrected over 300ms pre-stimulus.
Single trails were carefully inspected to ensure absence of residual
TMS artifacts. Each TMS-evoked response was obtained by
averaging 150–200 artifact-free trials.
Perturbation Complexity Index
An index of consciousness, called the perturbation complexity
index (PCI), was applied to evaluate the consciousness level
of the patient. The PCI was proposed before (Casali et al.,
2013), the calculation mainly includes three steps. Firstly,
TMS evoked cortical perturbation (300ms after TMS pulse)
which was recorded by high-density EEG (62 channels in this
study). Then source modeling was performed and nonparametric
statistics extracted a binary matrix [SS(x, t)] which describes
the spatiotemporal pattern of activation caused by the TMS
perturbation. At last, the Lempel-Ziv complexity index was used
to compress the matrix. The PCI index was calculated as the
normalized Lempel-Ziv complexity. The PCI is expected to be
low if there is reduced interaction among cortical areas and will
be high if interaction of the cortical areas increased. As suggested
(Casali et al., 2013), the PCI values in VS were range of 0.19–0.31
and in MCS were range of 0.32–0.49.
Global Mean Field Power
In order to obtain the overall amount of electrical activity
induced by TMS, the global mean field power (GMFP) was
calculated with the multichannel average signals as follows








where k means the number of channels, Vi means the amplitude




CRS-R were used to assess the consciousness level of the patient
(Table 1). CRS-R score of 8 was marked at baseline. With the
rTMS protocol starting, the score remained unchanged for the
first 8 days. Although the patient care claimed that the patient
showed more excitation, more sensitive to stimulation and
less sleeping time, there were no significant clinical behavioral
improvement expressed in CRS-R. In the day 9, some simple
finger movements were found, and the CRS-R score increased to
10. From the day 15 to 20, the patient represented stable simply
movement following the command with score of 13, and her eyes
could trackmovement of objects like mobile phone with video. In
the last week of this protocol, there was one score increased for
her concentration on something for a time. The shadow area in
the Table 1 shows the CRS-R values in 20 days with 10Hz rTMS.
In the shadow area, the consciousness level of the patient arose
from MCS− to MCS+ with score from 8 to 13.
TMS-EEG
TEP
Single pulse evoked potential over DLPFC was calculated at T0,
T1, and T2, could be seen in Figure 2A. Black line shows the
TEP over DLPFC calculating of mean of healthy subjects. We
could see that the TEP of T0 shows simple positive-negative EEG
response with positive peak at about 35ms and negative peak at
about 60ms. The TEP of the T1 shows more channels’ response
activity than T0 while the TEP of the T2 shows more complex
than the T1 with bigger amplitude of the fluctuation. Comparing
with the TEP of the healthy subjects, the TEP of T2 appears
similar fluctuation: positive peak at about 180ms, which never
occurred before.
Figures 2B–D show the butterfly plots of the TEP at three time
point, respectively. There have nearly same temporal distribution
of the peaks for T0 and T1, but very different from T2.
Then PCI was calculated for quantifying the TEP. The first
row under the butterfly plot shows the source modeling of
corresponding TEP peaks. And then nonparametric statistics was
performed to obtain a significant activation distribution (last row
of each figure), where the black regions in the cortical represent
significant cortical activation induced by the stimulation. The
TABLE 1 | Data of the CRS-R score in this protocol.
Time CRS-R CS
(day) Auditory Visual Motor Oro-motor Comm Arousal Total
Baseline 1 1 3 1 0 2 8 MCS−
1–8 1 1 3 1 0 2 8 MCS−
9–14 3 1 3 1 0 2 10 MCS+
15–20 4 3 3 1 0 2 13 MCS+
20–22 4 3 3 1 0 2 13 MCS+
23–30 4 3 3 1 0 3 14 MCS+
Shadow area shows the score during rTMS sessions. Comm, communication; CS,
consciousness state.
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FIGURE 2 | TMS evoked potential and butterfly plots at three time
points: T0, T1, and T2. (A) TMS evoked potentials of mean of healthy
subjects and patient at three time points. Shadow area means 10ms before to
20ms after the TMS onset. (B–D) Butterfly plots of patient at three time points.
Source modeling corresponding to each TEP peaks is given under the butterfly
plots. Last row of each figure gives the significant activation distribution. White
cross shows the stimulation site.
activation distribution of T0-T1-T2 indicate a trend of from local
to global and from ipsilateral to contralateral. After compressing
the binary matrix, the PCI was obtained. At T0, the PCI value
was 0.28 and after one session rTMS, the PCI value raised to 0.30.
After all the protocol, the PCI value raised to 0.37.
GMFP
TheGMFP is depicted in Figure 3. The black line shows themean
GMFP of the healthy subjects and the red lines show the GMFP
of the patient at three different time. The correlation coefficient
(Matlab code: corrcoef.m) were calculated of the GMFP after
stimulation between the patient and the healthy subjects. At
T0, the correlation is 0.2 and T1 the correlation arose to 0.22.
Different from the mean value of healthy subjects, the activation
power of the global brain for the T0 and T1 mainly distributed
within 100ms after stimulation. And during the time window
from 250 to 400ms, the global brain power were activated at
T0 and T1 while the healthy subject didn’t show any activation.
After all the rTMS protocol, the GMFP pattern of the patient was
similar with the mean GMFP of healthy subjects with correlation
0.86. Meanwhile, the time window of main activation power of
the patient was well-matched with the healthy subjects, and main
power occurred within 300 ms after stimulation.
DISCUSSION
TEP
Measuring the EEG responses to TMS to differentiate different
consciousness states had been proposed (Rosanova et al.,
2012). Similar with that observed in unconscious sleeping or
anesthetized subjects (Massimini et al., 2005; Ferrarelli et al.,
2010), in awake VS patients, TMS triggered a simple, local slow
response that indicated a breakdown in effective connectivity.
While TMS triggered complex activations that sequentially
involved distant cortical areas ipsilateral and contralateral
stimulation site in MCS patients. The baseline TEP of the patient
in this study showed a relative simple and slow curve similar
with VS introduced by Rosanova et al. (2012). It did exactly
matched the clinical behavioral result which was diagnosed as
MCS- with CRS-R score of 8. The possible reason is due to the
fluctuations in behavioral abilities across time. After one session
rTMS, TMS triggered more channels’ activity. After all the rTMS
protocol, the TEP represented a more complex curve, which
combined with the theory linking integration and differentiation
to consciousness indicated a positive modulation effects of rTMS
on this patient.
PCI
The PCI is a measurement to quantify the complexity of TEP
and it measures the amount of information integration and
differentiation within the brain’s response to perturbation. The
PCI value of the patient in this study arose from 0.28 to 0.37.
As described by Casali et al. (2013) the PCI ranged from 0.19 to
0.31 for a stable clinical diagnosis of VS, and ranged from 0.32 to
0.49 for MCS patients. Therefore, according to the PCI values,
the patient was diagnosed as a VS before rolling in this TMS
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FIGURE 3 | GMFP calculated of patient at three time points and the mean of healthy subjects. Red lines show the GMFP curves of the patient at T0 (A), T1
(B), and T2 (C). Black lines show the mean GMFP curves of healthy subjects. The gray and red shadow means standard deviation of patient and healthy subjects,
respectively. Black area with white line show 10ms before and 20ms after TMS onset.
protocol, and it was still staying in VS after one rTMS session
despite an increase of PCI value. After all the protocol rTMS,
the PCI indicated that the patient was staying in MCS+. The
TEP results and CRS-R score were consistent with the variation
tendency of PCI and both indexes indicated an improvement
of consciousness state. But the PCI values showed VS state
of the patient at baseline which was not agreement with the
CRS-R score. Consistent with the TEP results, the PCI values
also showed that patient was still in vegetate state, although
appeared much fast oscillation in TEP after one session rTMS, it
indicated the patient didn’t emerge from vegetate state. Indeed,
the boundary of PCI used to differentiate VS from MCS was
not perfectly accurate as the study just enrolled few patients
for calculating, six for VS and six for MCS. But the PCI values
might be useful as a significant potential diagnostic tool for
consciousness evaluation.
GMFP
The GMFP results of this study showed that, at a global
level, one session rTMS over the left DLPFC increased cortical
excitability in temporal windows of 30–100 and 200–400ms after
stimulation. Interestingly, when comparing with healthy subjects,
there was a global activation after 300ms of stimulation for
baseline and one session TEP, which nearly impossibly occurred
in healthy subjects even in consciousness reduced states such
as anesthesia (Ferrarelli et al., 2010) and sleep state (Massimini
et al., 2005). The possible reason is that the “overtime” activation
may be induced by abnormally electrical transmission evoked
by damaged brain region. Then after 20 sessions rTMS, the
brain activation pattern (amplitude and time) was tend to well-
matched with the healthy brain. Hence, combined with the
clinical behavioral assessment in CRS-R scores, we suggested
that GMFP might be also a significant marker for consciousness
recovery of DOC.
Overall, although there had some diversity in evaluating the
base line and one session, all the assessment methods proposed
in this case study consistently indicated that the consciousness
state was improved after all the rTMS protocol. This divergence
of the baseline assessment might be induced by fluctuation of
state of the patient and the sensitivity of assessment method
should be tested in quantity application. On the other hand, as
demonstrated in Naro et al. (2015), we suggest that one session
rTMS indeed has transiently improvement but it may difficult
leading to permanent clinical behavioral change. Thereby, in this
study, we used 20 sessions to use the accumulation efficacy of the
rTMS modulation. The incubation time was 8 days in this study
but 10 days was reported in a patient in Louise-Bender Pape et al.
(2009), we think that this modification efficiency may be variable
in individual level and depend on the time and intensity of
rTMS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This was first study on reporting TMS-EEG based characteristic
of consciousness recovery during rTMS protocol. The results
indicated that the TMS-EEG might lead to more objectively
evaluation of consciousness and might be an efficient assessment
tool for rTMS protocol therapeutic efficiency evaluation. Our
study was an example of using TMS-EEG method to assess an
therapy efficiency in DOC. And we suggest that methods of TMS-
EEG supported in this study may facilitate therapy improvement
in DOC.
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In the last decades interest in application of non-invasive brain stimulation for enhancing
neural functions is growing continuously. However, the use of such techniques in pediatric
populations remains rather limited and mainly confined to the treatment of severe
neurological and psychiatric diseases. In this article we provide a complete review of
non-invasive brain stimulation studies conducted in pediatric populations. We also provide
a brief discussion about the current limitations and future directions in a field of research
still very young and full of issues to be explored.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decades the interest in exploring therapeutic and/or
rehabilitative effects generated by non-invasive brain stimula-
tion techniques in neuropsychiatric diseases increased consid-
erably. Although this field of research encompasses numerous
stimulation techniques, neuroscientists have primarily focused
investigations on the use of two techniques, namely Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and transcranial Direct Current
Stimulation (tDCS). In healthy adults, these non-invasive brain
stimulation techniques are applied to monitor cortical excitabil-
ity/dynamics (e.g., single pulse TMS, double pulse TMS), and
as neuromodulatory techniques [e.g., repetitive TMS (rTMS),
tDCS]. Whereas TMS is primarily used to investigate brain physi-
ology (e.g., task-dependent alterations of cortical maps, excitabil-
ity, and so on, in health, and disease), the latter techniques
are applied to modify physiology, and performance. Accordingly,
these methods have been adopted to explore, and modulate
brain functions such as language (e.g., rTMS: Flöel et al., 2008;
tDCS: Vicario and Rumiati, 2012;), learning, and long-term
memory formation [e.g., single pulse TMS (spTMS): Vicario
et al., 2013a; tDCS: Nitsche et al., 2003], working memory
(WM) (e.g., TMS: Gaudeau-Bosma et al., 2013; tDCS: Fregni
et al., 2005a) perception (e.g., TMS: Hamilton et al., 2013;
tDCS: Vicario et al., 2013b), and attention (e.g., TMS: Lee
et al., 2013; tDCS: Tanoue et al., 2013), in healthy humans
(see Nitsche et al., 2003, 2008; Kuo and Nitsche, 2012 for fur-
ther examples and Nitsche and Paulus, 2011 for a complete
review).
Non-invasive brain stimulation is applied also to rehabili-
tate cortical functions in neuropsychiatric diseases via induction
of neuroplasticity. rTMS has been shown to improve cognitive
functions in Parkinson’s disease (Pascual-Leone et al., 1994), and
improved aphasia (Naeser et al., 2005), motor control after stroke
(Takeuchi et al., 2005), epilepsy (see Nitsche and Paulus, 2009 for
a review), and depression (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; O’Reardon
et al., 2007), amongst others (Kammer and Spitzer, 2012).
Encouraging clinical effects have been documented also for
tDCS, so far in pilot studies. tDCS improves motor and non-
motor stroke symptoms (e.g., Fregni et al., 2005b), depres-
sion, and might have effects on craving, schizophrenia, and
dementia, amongst others (for comprehensive reviews, see,
Flöel, 2013; Krause et al., 2013; Kuo et al., 2013). All these
results encourage the future therapeutic application of non-
invasive brain stimulation techniques also in pediatric popu-
lations affected by brain disorders. However, the number of
non-invasive brain stimulation studies conducted in childhood
is scanty, especially if compared to that available from adult
participants.
Two previous reviews (Quintana, 2005; Croarkin et al.,
2011) gave an overview of the application of rTMS in chil-
dren and adolescents. Here, we provide the reader with an
updated state of the art of application of non-invasive brain
stimulation in general (rTMS and tDCS) in pediatric popu-
lations. Moreover, we will discuss current limits and possible
future applications of these techniques for the treatment of
brain dysfunctions affecting childhood. It is beyond the scope
of this review to discuss the mechanisms of how TMS and
tDCS alter neural activity and induce brain plasticity in detail.
For obtaining this information, some recently published articles
provide a complete and exhaustive overview (see for exam-
ple Stagg and Nitsche, 2011; Freitas et al., 2013; Krause et al.,
2013).
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NON-INVASIVE BRAIN STIMULATION FOR ENHANCING
BRAIN DISORDERS IN CHILDHOOD
VASCULAR DISEASES
Pathophysiologically, stroke is associated with hemispheric dys-
balance, i.e., a reduction of the activity of the lesioned brain
area and an enhanced activity of the contra-lesional homologous
region, which limits re-gain of functions (see Grefkes and Fink,
2011 for a recent review).
Kirton et al. (2008) conducted the first randomized sham-
controlled rTMS trial in children (median age 13.25) affected
by arterial ischemic stroke. Patients were affected by unilateral
hand motor weakness. They received 8 days to 1 Hz rTMS of
the contralesional motor cortex, which inhibits regional brain
activity (Pascual-Leone et al., 2005) and increases contralateral
cortical excitability via reduction of interhemispheric inhibition
(Pal et al., 2005). Grip strength increased after real rTMS only,
and this effect persisted until day 17 after the start of treat-
ment. Furthermore, rTMS was well tolerated with no relevant side
effects.
Valle and colleagues (2007) applied a 5-day course of rTMS
upon the affected motor cortex in seventeen children (mean
age 9) affected by infantile cerebral palsy and spastic quadriple-
gia. The study was designed according to the hypothesis that an
increase of motor cortex activity would increase its inhibitory
influence on spinal excitability, and thus improve spasticity.
Patients received five consecutive sessions of rTMS in a random-
ized, sham controlled, double-blind, parallel, clinical trial design.
According to previous works (e.g., Quartarone et al., 2005) show-
ing that 5 Hz rTMS of the primary motor cortex induces an
overall increase of excitability of the corticospinal output system,
including spinal motoneurons, the authors report a significant
reduction of spasticity only in association to this stimulation pro-
tocol. Both studies show a potential of rTMS for rehabilitation of
motor symptoms originating from vascular injuries in childhood.
However, due to the limited number of studies, we are still far
from achieving a clear picture of the use of this technique to treat
vascular problems in children. No studies for the treatment of vas-
cular disorders in children or adolescents have been conducted
with tDCS so far.
EPILEPSY
The pathophysiological substrate of epilepsies and the proneness
to develop seizures is an enhanced cortical excitability, lead-
ing to paroxysmal depolarization shifts, an enhanced probability
of high-frequent and hyper-synchronous activity of neuronal
networks (Stafstrom, 2006; Dudek and Sutula, 2007). A reduc-
tion of neuronal excitability is the common aim of antiepileptic
therapies.
Fregni et al. (2005c), tested the effect of a single 0.5 Hz rTMS
session in an open study. Three pediatric patients with focal
epilepsy were included. The TMS coil was positioned over the
epileptogenic region, or, if this could not be clearly identified,
over Cz. rTMS significantly reduced the frequency of epilep-
tiform discharges (ED) for up to 15 and 30 days after rTMS
treatment.
The study of Brasil-Neto et al. (2004) included a 6 years
old patient. This patient was affected by left fronto-central slow
activity. 0.3 Hz rTMS was applied once per day for 3 months. In
this case, rTMS treatment was ineffective. Graff-Guerrero et al.
(2004) conducted one session of 20 Hz rTMS in two patients
(7 and 11 years old) suffering from epilepsia partialis continua
(EPC). The patients were first submitted to a single photon emis-
sion computed tomography (SPECT) session in order to localize
the focal frontal hyperperfused region to define the stimula-
tion site; after rTMS, patients were SPECT-monitored again in
order to identify perfusion alterations of the stimulated region.
Indeed, cortical perfusion of the stimulated area was reduced
in both patients. However, only in one patient epileptic seizures
decreased significantly. Morales et al. (2005) conducted a case
study involving 2 patients (8 and 16 years old) affected by EPC.
One Hertz/six Hertz rTMS were applied in different sessions. No
adverse effects occurred, but the treatment resulted in no clinical
effects. Kinoshita et al. (2005) treated a 16 years old male suffer-
ing from parietal lobe epilepsy with 0.9 Hz rTMS over 5 days. The
coil was placed over PCz. No significant improvements have been
documented for this patient.
San-Juan et al. (2011) applied cathodal tDCS over the F2
scalp site in a 17 years old patient affected by Rasmussen’s
encephalitis [4 tDCS sessions of 60 min (on days 0, 7, 30, and
60)]. At follow-up evaluations 6 and 12 months later, seizure
frequency was significantly reduced. Additionally, the patient
had improved levels of alertness and language. No side effects
have been reported. Yook et al. (2011) applied cathodal tDCS
applied upon the epileptogenic focus in a 11 year’s old patient.
The patient was diagnosed with congenital bilateral perisylvian
syndrome. Cathodal tDCS was applied over the right temporo-
parietal area that showed epileptiform activity in the EEG for
2 weeks. During the two-month period after treatment termi-
nation, only six seizures occurred (compared to eight seizures
a month before the treatment), and seizure duration decreased.
tDCS was repeated for another 2 weeks, 2 months after the first
intervention session. For the following two months, only one
seizure occurred. No notable side effects of stimulation were
observed.
In contrast, in a group of pediatric patients (age range 6–11)
showing continuous spikes and slow waves during sleep (CSWS),
one session of cathodal tDCS over the peak negativity of the
epileptogenic pattern revealed an effect on EEG patterns only in 3
patients (Varga et al., 2011). One reason for this negative result
might be that the multifocal/diffuse and poorly defined origin
of epileptic activity in CSWS makes it difficult to identify the
optimal region for stimulation (Brazzo et al., 2012). Moreover,
stimulation was performed with 1 mA in only one session in
the latter study, which might have not been sufficient to obtain
significant or lasting effects.
More recently, Auvichayapat et al. (2013) enrolled thirty six
children (age range 6–15 years) with focal epilepsy in a crossover
sham-controlled study. Participants received a single session of
cathodal tDCS upon the epileptogenic region. Active tDCS treat-
ment was associated with significant reductions in epileptic
discharge frequency immediately and 24 and 48 h after tDCS.
Moreover, 4 weeks after treatment, a small (clinically negligi-
ble but statistically significant) decrease in seizure frequency was
detected. All patients tolerated tDCS well.
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These studies deliver some preliminary hints for a possible effi-
cacy of rTMS, and tDCS, to treat epilepsy in children. However,
the heterogeneity of the results, possibly due to different stim-
ulation parameters, small numbers, and different etiologies of
participants, and the heterogeneous quality of the studies, do not
allow to draw definite conclusions.
ADHD
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a highly
prevalent and impairing disorder, characterized by inattention,
hyperactivity, and executive dysfunction. Functional neuroimag-
ing studies have shown functional and abnormalities in cingulate,
frontal and parietal cortical regions, including hypoactivation
(Bush, 2011). Thus, non-invasive brain stimulation procedures
to improve ADHD symptoms are oriented toward excitatory
protocols.
Weaver et al. (2008) performed a randomized, sham-
controlled, crossover study involving 9 participants affected by
ADHD. The age range of the 4 included adolescents was between
15 and 17 years. 10 Hz rTMS over 2 weeks was applied upon the
right DLPFC. Clinical global impression and the ADHD-IV scales
improved significantly, but similarly for active and sham rTMS.
No serious adverse effects did take place. No studies on childhood
ADHD have been performed with tDCS so far.
TOURETTE SYNDROME
Tourette’s syndrome (TS) is one of the most common neu-
robehavioral disorders in childhood (see American Academy of
Pediatrics, 2000). The pathology is characterized by the presence
of tics, which are rapid, stereotyped movements and vocaliza-
tions, virtually involving all body segments (Vicario et al., 2010).
The neuro-functional profile of childhood TS is characterized by
impairment of neural circuits linking the cerebral cortex to the
striatum and other sub-cortical regions (Swain et al., 2007; Bush,
2011).
Of interest for the current discussion is the Supplemental
Motor Area (SMA). The pre-motor cortex has been reported
to be hyperexcitable in patients with TS (George et al., 2001).
Therefore, excitability-reducing rTMS to the SMA may be an
effective way to treat TS, because this region is extensively con-
nected with regions implicated in motor control (Picard and
Strick, 2001).
In an open label 12 weeks cohort pilot study (Kwon et al.,
2011), 1Hz rTMS was applied over the SMA for 10 days. At the
end of each day subjects completed objective ratings of ADHD,
mood, anxiety, tics, and side effects. Statistically significant reduc-
tions were seen in the Yale Global TS Severity Scale over the
12 weeks of the study. Le et al. (2013) tested the effect of 1 Hz
rTMS upon the SMA in 25 children with TS (aged less than
16 years) for 20 days. Results document a significant improve-
ment of clinical symptoms. Interestingly, the benefits lasted for
up to 6 months in 68% of subjects. No studies for TS treat-
ment have been conducted with tDCS. The results provided in
these two studies are coherent in terms of therapeutic benefits,
stimulation site (SMA) and rTMS frequency (1 Hz). However,
an important limit of these studies is the lack of a control
group.
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER (ASD)
This syndrome is characterized by a marked decrease in social
integration and communication, and affects ∼1 in 150 children
(Fombonne, 2009). Increased gamma-band responses to several
cognitive processes in children with autism spectrum disorder
have been described (McFadden et al., 2012). While its precise role
is unclear, it is implied in a wide range of processes such as atten-
tion (Lakatos et al., 2008), WM (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1998), and
language (Tavabi et al., 2011). Non-invasive brain stimulation has
been adopted for modulating this physiological parameter and
therefore improve the related cognitive abilities.
Baruth et al. (2010) report clinical improvements in pedi-
atric ASD induced via rTMS (≤1 Hz) in a controlled study, the
electrophysiological effects of 12 low frequency rTMS sessions,
bilaterally applied to the DLPFC were explored in 25 subjects
(ages range 9–26) with ASD and 20 age-matched controls. rTMS
was administered once per week. The first six treatments were
performed over the left, and the remaining six over the right
DLPFC. Patients showed significant improvement in discrim-
inatory gamma activity and also significant improvements in
behavioral parameters. In another study (Sokhadze et al., 2010)
20 subjects (age range 10–19) with ASD received the same pro-
tocol. Performance was tested with the oddball paradigm, which
explores attentional shifting (García-Larrea et al., 1992). rTMS
minimized early cortical responses to irrelevant stimuli, increased
responses to relevant stimuli, reduced the error percentage and
repetitive-ritualistic behavior.
Schneider and Hopp (2011) conducted an open tDCS study
in children with autism. The purpose was to improve language
acquisition in patients with minimal verbal language. In this study
the authors selected 10 ASD participants (age range 16–21). Post-
anodal tDCS of the Broca area, mean vocabulary scores were
significantly higher than the pre-anodal tDCS scores.
The studies are suggestive for therapeutic benefits of non-
invasive brain stimulation in autistic children. However, due to
the small numbers of studies, in which different protocols had
effects on different target functions, statements about optimal
protocols are premature.
DEPRESSION
Depression in children and adolescents is associated with sig-
nificant functional disability in multiple environmental realms
(Cosgrove et al., 2013). Depression involves a distributed net-
work of cortical and limbic regions, including the DLPFC (espe-
cially the left), and subgenual cingulate gyrus, amongst others
(Mayberg, 2007). It has been shown (Fitzgerald et al., 2006) that
in depression these areas, and specifically the left-hemispherical
ones, may be hypoactive, whereas right-hemispheric hyper-
activation might take place, thus constituting an hemispheric
dysbalance of activation. The rationale of the brain stimulation
studies presented here is to increase the activity of the left DLPFC.
Walter et al. (2001) were the first to report the impact of
rTMS on depression in 3 patients younger than 18 years. The
patients received daily treatment over 2 weeks of 10 Hz rTMS
over the left DLPFC. Two participants improved clinically, but
one of them complained about tension headache during two of
the treatment sessions. In another case report series, Loo et al.
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(2006) tested the effect of 10 Hz rTMS upon the left DLPFC over
6 weeks on two 16-year-old adolescent girls affected by depres-
sion and ADHD. No improvements of ADHD symptoms, but
a reduction of depression symptoms was reported. Bloch et al.
(2008) conducted an open label rTMS study with nine adolescents
(16–18 age range) affected by severe treatment-resistant depres-
sion. Participants received 14 sessions of 10 Hz rTMS to the left
DLPFC. Depression scores of the participants improved signifi-
cantly. Two of them remained in clinical remission 1 year after
therapy (as judged by regular clinical follow-up). Five subjects
reported mild headaches. No other adverse effects were reported.
More recently, Wall et al. (2011) conducted an open-label trial
of adjunctive rTMS in eight adolescents with treatment-resistant
depression. These subjects were maintained on a stable dose of
a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI). All in all, thirty
daily 10 Hz rTMS treatments were given over the left dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex. The CDRS-Revised mean scores improved
significantly from baseline over the course of 30 treatments and
the 6-month follow-up. Pre- and post-treatment neurocognitive
testing did not reveal any decline in functioning. These data are
preliminary as no control group was included, but this study
shows that intensive treatment parameters were well tolerated by
adolescent patients. No studies for treatment of depression in
children have been conducted with tDCS.
The available studies suggest some therapeutic effect of rTMS
for the treatment of childhood depression. A recurring element
associated with a successful rTMS therapy is the stimulation of
left DLPFC at 10Hz. However, since these are open and/or case
report studies, the results of these studies should be interpreted
with caution.
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Childhood-onset schizophrenia is a rare and severe form of the
disorder (Nicolson and Rapoport, 1999), that is neurobiologically
and physiologically continuous with adult onset schizophrenia
(David et al., 2011). Hallucinations are, probably, the most dra-
matic clinical symptom that causes significant problems for the
life of patients with schizophrenia.
Physiological abnormalities have been reported in several neu-
ral regions including right medial temporal, lateral temporal,
inferior frontal cortex, and in the cingulate cortex bilaterally,
left DLPFC and left superior temporal gyrus (Vyas and Gogtay,
2012; Hayempour et al., 2013). However, neuroimaging stud-
ies have shown relatively less predictive value despite consistent
reports of progressive structural brain abnormalities associated
with schizophrenia. An increase of left temporoparietal cor-
tex excitability is associated with positive symptoms, specifically
auditory hallucinations (AHs) (Silbersweig et al., 1995; Shergill
et al., 2000). On the other hand, activity enhancement of the left
prefrontal region has been suggested to improve negative symp-
toms (Heimer et al., 1997), due to its effect on the release of
dopamine (Strafella et al., 2001). Therefore, excitability-reducing
stimulation is proposed to reduce activity of the left temporopari-
etal cortex, while excitatory non-invasive brain stimulation has
been used to increase left prefrontal region activation for ther-
apeutic application (see Freitas et al., 2009; Demirtas-Tatlidede
et al., 2013 for a complete review).
Jardri et al. (2007) report a single case study involving a 11-
year-old boy with medication-resistant schizophrenia. An fMRI
scan displayed increased auditory cortex activity with concur-
rent AHs. 10 sessions of 1 Hz rTMS were administered to the
left temporoparietal cortex. Verbal AHs decreased by 50%. The
improvement obtained with rTMS was maintained by repeat-
ing the sessions every 5 weeks. No adverse effects of rTMS were
reported. More recently, the same group (Jardri et al., 2012) estab-
lished a case series of adolescents diagnosed with childhood-onset
schizophrenia according to the Schedule for Affective Disorders
and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children (n = 10, 15.5 years
old). All participants had frequent and drug-resistant AHs. The
patients received 1 Hz rTMS to the T3-P3 site over 5 days. The
authors assessed scalp discomfort clinically and describe only
minor discomfort. AHRS scores decreased significantly from
baseline to the immediate post-treatment assessment, and from
baseline to the 1-month assessment. Furthermore, the Global
Assessment of Functioning scores improved significantly imme-
diately and 1 month after the treatment, as compared to baseline
values.
For tDCS, one study was recently published with regard to
childhood-onset schizophrenia (Mattai et al., 2011). This study
aimed to investigate the tolerability of tDCS in this patient group.
Twelve participants (12 children, age range 10–17) were assigned
to one of two groups: bilateral anodal DLPFC stimulation (n = 8)
or bilateral cathodal superior temporal gyrus (STG) stimulation
(n = 5). The stimulation protocol consisted of 20 min per day, per
2 weeks. No subjects reported significant discomfort at the elec-
trode sites. However, four individuals had transient redness of the
skin under the electrodes that resolved within about an hour after
treatment. Although no significant clinical improvement has been
reported, this study is the first to demonstrate that tDCS with the
applied parameters is well tolerated in adolescents. Complains of
fatigue reported by some patients could be related to unspecific
effects, such as medication regimens that frequently include the
atypical antipsychotic clozapine.
Taken together, knowledge about the effects of non-invasive
brain stimulation in childhood onset schizophrenia is still limited.
However, the rTMS case reports provided by Jardri et al. hint for
some efficacy in reducing hallucinations. The only available tDCS
study is in favor for good tolerability of this stimulation proto-
col. Systematic studies are needed to explore this field to a larger
degree.
DISCUSSION
In this work we reviewed the available literature about the effects
of non-invasive brain stimulation in pediatric populations (i.e.,
younger than 18 years) suffering from neuro-psychiatric diseases.
We focused our analysis on studies which have examined the ther-
apeutic efficacy of rTMS and tDCS for rehabilitating neurological
functions and ameliorating psychiatric syndromes in children.
In general, the studies provide preliminary evidence in support
for a therapeutic potential of non-invasive stimulation techniques
in children and adolescents. However, several limitations should
be taken into account.
Virtually no double-blinded sham controlled studies are avail-
able at present, which makes it difficult to make safe statements
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about efficacy. Since there seems to be a potential, these stud-
ies are urgently needed. Moreover, systematic studies to identify
optimal stimulation protocols based on physiology are missing,
including comparisons between different protocols, and a sys-
tematic evaluation of safety of non-invasive brain stimulation
with regard to the developing brain. It is important to note that,
although the examined literature does deliver no hint for major
adverse effects in children, the evidence currently available is
still rather scanty. Studies conducted in adult humans and ani-
mal models are probably not transferable one-to-one to children,
since anatomy and physiology differs relevantly between these
groups (Johnston, 2009). In this regard, it is important to con-
sider that the developing brain is characterized by “sensitive”
periods or rather periods during which the effects of the experi-
ence on the brain are unusually strong during a limited period in
development (Knudsen, 2004). This suggests that, during devel-
opment, the risk to induce maladaptive neural plasticity due to
brain stimulation techniques might be relatively high (Vicario
and Nitsche, 2013). Because of this, we suggest that neuroscien-
tists willing to apply non-invasive brain stimulation in children
should consider dose-finding studies, and a longitudinal moni-
toring of neural plasticity triggered by these methods (through
neuroimaging and/or electrophysiological techniques), to control
for functional and structural changes. In this connection, it will
be important to improve knowledge about physiological effects of
stimulation in children. This might provide important landmarks
for assessing the therapeutic effectiveness of the adopted stimu-
lation protocol as well as the presence of side effects. Moreover,
discoveries provided by research in “sensitive” periods at the cir-
cuit level might be helpful for this issue as they could supply
insights of paramount importance for predicting the trajectories
of neural plasticity induced by non-invasive brain stimulation
techniques and their related therapeutic results. Worthy of dis-
cussion is also the fact that the current state of investigations
involving the application of brain stimulation methods in pedi-
atric populations is unbalanced toward TMS (See Tables 1, 2 for
detailed summaries).
No published studies are currently available with regard to the
therapeutic efficacy of tDCS in childhood disorders such as stroke
and/or brain injury, TS, ADHD, and Depression. Nevertheless,
the interest in applying tDCS for treating pediatric populations
is growing.
FUTURE DIRECTION OF RESEARCH
The application of non-invasive brain stimulation for the reha-
bilitation and/or treatment of children might have the potential
advantage of promoting improvements superior to those achiev-
able in adulthood, according to the fact that the developing
brain is characterized by “sensitive periods” during which the
effects of the experience on the brain are unusually strong for
a limited period (Knudsen, 2004). Therefore, the improvement
of symptoms via non-invasive stimulation treatment in pediatric
age might be more stable, and consistent. However, as discussed
above, this same “sensitivity” might also be risky in terms of
induction of maladaptive neural plasticity.
In order to minimize this risk, future lines of research should
address the following, still limited, field of investigations:
– Exploration, also by using animal models, of the physiological
effects of non-invasive brain stimulation in children;
– Systematic exploration of childhood clinical populations to
clarify the pathophysiology of the respective diseases, which
could be objective to non-invasive brain stimulation. This is
important for defining optimal protocols.
– Systematic conduction of “dose-finding,” sham-controlled,
double-blinded studies, which will provide important infor-
mation not available from the open studies.
These aspects will help to clarify, at several levels of complexity,
the potential therapeutic efficacy of non-invasive brain stimula-
tion in children, delivering a realistic basis for clinical application
of such stimulation protocols on a large scale.
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Objectives: Reports in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) of a minicolumnopathy with
consequent deficits of lateral inhibition help explain observed behavioral and executive
dysfunctions. We propose that neuromodulation based on low frequency repetitive
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) will enhance lateral inhibition through activation
of inhibitory double bouquet interneurons and will be accompanied by improvements in
the prefrontal executive functions. In addition we proposed that rTMS will improve cortical
excitation/inhibition ratio and result in changes manifested in event-related potential (ERP)
recorded during cognitive tests.
Materials and Methods: Along with traditional clinical behavioral evaluations the current
study used ERPs in a visual oddball task with illusory figures. We compared clinical,
behavioral and electrocortical outcomes in two groups of children with autism (TMS, wait-
list group). We predicted that 18 session long course in autistic patients will have better
behavioral and ERP outcomes as compared to age- and IQ-matched WTL group. We used
18 sessions of 1 Hz rTMS applied over the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex in 27 individuals
with ASD diagnosis. The WTL group was comprised of 27 age-matched subjects with
ASD tested twice. Both TMS and WTL groups were assessed at the baseline and after
completion of 18 weekly sessions of rTMS (or wait period) using clinical behavioral
questionnaires and during performance on visual oddball task with Kanizsa illusory figures.
Results: Post-TMS evaluations showed decreased irritability and hyperactivity on the
Aberrant Behavior Checklist (ABC), and decreased stereotypic behaviors on the Repetitive
Behavior Scale (RBS-R). Following rTMS course we found decreased amplitude and
prolonged latency in the frontal and fronto-central N100, N200 and P300 (P3a) ERPs to
non-targets in active TMS treatment group. TMS resulted in increase of P2d (P2a to
targets minus P2a to non-targets) amplitude. These ERP changes along with increased
centro-parietal P100 and P300 (P3b) to targets are indicative of more efficient processing
of information post-TMS treatment. Another important finding was decrease of the latency
and increase of negativity of error-related negativity (ERN) during commission errors
that may reflect improvement in error monitoring and correction function. Enhanced
information processing was also manifested in lower error rate. In addition we calculated
normative post-error treaction time (RT) slowing response in both groups and found
that rTMS treatment was accompanied by post-error RT slowing and higher accuracy
of responses, whereas the WTL group kept on showing typical for ASD post-error RT
speeding and higher commission and omission error rates.
Conclusion: Results from our study indicate that rTMS improves executive functioning
in ASD as evidenced by normalization of ERP responses and behavioral reactions (RT,
accuracy) during executive function test, and also by improvements in clinical evaluations.
Keywords: TMS, autism, ERP, motor response time, behavioral performance
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INTRODUCTION
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are featured by severe deficits
in social communication, social interaction, and restricted,
repetitive patterns of behaviors, interests and activities (APA,
2013). Additionally, autistic individuals usually present excessive
reactions to the sensory environment such as aversive reactions
to visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli. These perception and
sensory reactivity abnormalities are found in majority of subjects
with ASD affecting their ability to effectively process information
(Gomes et al., 2008). In a series of electrophysiological studies
conducted by our group we explored specifics of event-related
potential (i.e., ERP) reflecting information processing during
performance on reaction time (RT) tasks in children with ASD
(Sokhadze et al., 2009a, 2012b, 2013a; Baruth et al., 2010c;
Casanova et al., 2012) Our studies were aimed to explore the
manifestations of the impaired functional connectivity, exces-
sive cortical excitation/inhibition ratio, and deficient executive
functioning in ASD by analyzing behavioral performance on
attention tasks with dense-array ERP recording. Analysis of ERP
components is one of the most informative dynamic meth-
ods of investigation and monitoring of information processing
stages in the human brain due to the high temporal resolu-
tion of this technique. Amplitude and latency of ERP waves
at selected topographies reflect both early sensory perception
processes and higher-level processing including attention, cortical
inhibition, memory update, as well as other cognitive activity
processes (Polich, 2007). ERPs provide both a method of study-
ing chronometry of information processing stages and a tool
by which to assess the neurobiology of cognitive dysfunctions
present in this neurodevelopmental disorder. ERP is a very useful
technique to characterize time course and amplitude of cortical
responses to stimulation (Jeste and Nelson, 2009). Generally,
early exogenous ERPs are believed to reflect sensory processing
of a stimulus attributes (Coles and Rugg, 1995; Herrmann and
Knight, 2001; Eichele et al., 2005; Folstein et al., 2008), whereas
late endogenous ERPs are thought to reflect higher level cogni-
tive processes such as attention, memory trace update, percep-
tual closure, etc. (Pritchard, 1981; Picton, 1992; Polich, 2003,
2007).
One of our first studies investigated ERPs that index selec-
tive attention processes in a visual novelty oddball task in
children with autism and an age-matched group of typically
developing children (Sokhadze et al., 2010a). The ASD group
had excessive magnitude to task-irrelevant visual cues as com-
pared to typically developing children and evidenced a lack
of visual target discrimination. In a follow-up investigation
we found augmented early cortical responses to novel dis-
tracters along with lower accuracy of motor response (MR)
in a three-stimuli oddball task with illusory Kanizsa figures
(Sokhadze et al., 2013a). We concluded that cortical responses
to visual stimulation in autism might be indiscriminative dur-
ing visual tasks negatively affecting selective attention. Large
magnitude of electrocortical activity in response to sensory
stimulation may be due to an increased ratio between excita-
tion and inhibition in the cortex of individuals with autism
(Casanova et al., 2002a,b; Rubenstein and Merzenich, 2003;
Casanova, 2005, 2007). Impaired habituation and normative
adaptation to repeated stimuli can be considered as an inhibitory
deficit manifested in typical symptoms of autism such as stereo-
typy, sensory hypersensitivity, deficient social interaction skills,
etc.
One of contemporary models of autism, so called “mini-
columnar theory of autism” (Casanova et al., 2003, 2006a,b;
Casanova, 2005, 2007) is based on neuropathological findings in
our laboratory. Autism in this model is associated with cortical
neurodevelopmental abnormalities. In brief, the reduced neu-
ropil space (periphery of the minicolumn) reported in autism
is the compartment where lateral inhibition sharpens the bor-
ders of minicolumns and increases their definition (Favorov
and Kelly, 1994a,b; DeFelipe, 1999, 2004). The primary source
of for this inhibitory effect may be derived from axon bun-
dles of double-bouquet cells (Favorov and Kelly, 1994a). The
axons of double bouquet cells arrange themselves in essen-
tially repeatable patterns varying between 15 and 30 µm wide,
depending on the cortical area examined (DeFelipe, 1999).
Increases in numbers and types of inhibitory interneurons, as
seen in the smaller minicolumns of autistic patients, result
in greater diversity and more nuanced modulation of mini-
columns. Double-bouquet cells in the peripheral neuropil space
of minicolumns provide a “vertical stream of negative inhibition”
(Mountcastle, 2003) surrounding the minicolumnar core. Other
GABAergic cells in the minicolumn, having collateral projec-
tions extending hundreds of microns tangentially, provide lateral
inhibition of surrounding minicolumns on a macrocolumnar
scale.
The value of each minicolumn’s output is insulated to a greater
or lesser degree from the activity of its neighbors by GABAergic
inhibition in its peripheral neuropil space. This allows for grada-
tions in amplitude of excitatory activity across a minicolumnar
field. Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003) have posited that reduc-
tions in GABAergic inhibitory activity may explain some symp-
tomatology of autism, including increased incidence of seizures
and auditory-tactile hypersensitivity (see also Casanova et al.,
2003, 2006a,b). Oblak et al. (2010) found decreased GABA recep-
tors in the cingulate cortex and fusiform gyrus in autism. These
results may explain some symptomatology of autism, including
increased incidence of seizures and sensory (e.g., auditory, tactile)
hypersensitivity (Casanova et al., 2003).
This hypothesis is consistent with findings of reduced mini-
columnar peripheral neuropil space in the neocortex of autistics
relative to controls (Casanova et al., 2002a,b,d). In this model,
a reduction in the peripheral neuropil space would result in
smaller minicolumns which would coalesce into discrete, isolated
islands of coordinated excitatory activity. There are considerable
consequences resulting from the significant reduction of neu-
ropil in minicolumns in autism. Reduced surround inhibition
may result in an increase in the ratio of cortical excitation
to inhibition and excessive amplification of sensory responses
reported by autistic individuals. Several important functions of
the prefrontal cortex, for instance executive functions might
be affected ability of individuals with autism focus on task-
relevant targets without being distracted by task-irrelevant cues
(Gray et al., 2003; Folstein et al., 2008; Matzel and Kolata,
2010). There are several reviews describing consequences of
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increased excitation-to-inhibition (E/I) ratio both in humans
and in animal models (Rubenstein and Merzenich, 2003; Renart
et al., 2010; Harris and Thiele, 2011; Pinto et al., 2013). Deficits
within the inhibitory elements that surround the cell minicol-
umn suggest a mechanistic explanation to the I/E imbalance in
autism (Casanova et al., 2003). Oscillations and synchronization
of pyramidal cells in and across minicolumns are maintained
by networks of inhibitory GABAergic interneurons. Local I/E
interactions shape neuronal representations of sensory, motor
and cognitive variables, and produce local electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) gamma oscillations. The I/E bias caused by
faulty pyramidal cell-interneuronal diads provides a receptive
scenario to induced gamma frequency and ERP abnormalities in
autism.
TMS offers a noninvasive method for altering excitability of
the neural circuits and for inducing a functional reorganization of
the cortex. We reported positive effects of repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) in ASD in our pilot studies using
shorter (6–12 sessions) rTMS course (Sokhadze et al., 2009b,
2010a, 2012a; Baruth et al., 2010a,b, 2011; Casanova et al., 2012).
TMS-based neuromodulation exerts effects on cortical excitability
(Maeda et al., 2000; Pascual-Leone et al., 2000, 2002; Frye et al.,
2008; Baruth et al., 2010b; Enticott et al., 2010; Sokhadze et al.,
2012a; Oberman et al., 2013). It is proposed that that low-
frequency (i.e., “slow”’) rTMS (≤1 Hz) has inhibitory effects on
stimulated cortex (Maeda et al., 2000), whereas high-frequency
rTMS (>1 Hz, e.g., 5 Hz, 10 Hz etc.) increases excitability of stim-
ulated cortex (Pascual-Leone et al., 1994, 2000, 2002; Daskalakis
et al., 2002; Schutter, 2009; Wassermann and Zimmermann, 2012;
Oberman et al., 2013). Probably the effect of low frequency rTMS
are mediated through increases in the activation of inhibitory
neurons (Hoffman and Cavus, 2002; Wagner et al., 2009). We
propose that inhibitory cells such as basket and chandelier inter-
neurons, whose projections keep no constant relation to the
surface of the cortex, of the double-bouquet neurons are ori-
ented in more geometrically exact manner and are located at
the periphery of the minicolumn and therefore they are more
appropriate candidate for induction by a TMS applied parallel
to cortex. Low frequency rTMS in autism, may lower the cortical
excitation/inhibition ratio, so called E/I ratio index.
In this study we were interested in how rTMS treatment affects
specific ERP components known to index processes in sensory
cortex, association cortical areas, and areas related to higher
level cognitive activity. As it was mentioned above, the exoge-
nous ERPs reflect early-stage, modality-specific, while endoge-
nous ones reflect modality non-specific associative higher order
processing of stimuli within the context of the task (Näätänen
et al., 1978; Luck et al., 1990; Coles and Rugg, 1995; Hillyard and
Annlo-Vento, 1998). Posterior visual P100 are generated within
the fusiform gyrus with contribution from parieto-occipital and
occipital cortices (Yamazaki et al., 2000). Frontal N100 ERP wave
occurs within a similar time window and probably originates from
more anterior frontal dipole generators (Clark et al., 1994).
The fronto-central P300 (so called P3a) reflects frontal lobe
activity (Friedman et al., 1993) and in a visual oddball task with
distracters is interpreted as an attentional “orienting”, whereas
centro-parietal and parietal P300 (P3b) is believed to reflect
sustain attention and other higher level processes. This cognitive
ERP component has multiple dipole sources (Townsend et al.,
2001).
Negative N200 component is recorded in visual tasks
over centro-parietal cortex around 200–300 ms post-stimulus
(Näätänen et al., 1978, 1993) and reflects processes of stimulus
categorization, perceptual closure and attention focusing sig-
naling that a perceptual representation has been formed (Potts
et al., 2004). A frontal positivity with a peak within (P2a, 180–
320 ms post-stimulus) over inferior prefrontal recording sites is
selectively responsive to the evaluation of the task relevance of
presented stimuli, and originates from the orbito-frontal cortex
(Potts et al., 1996, 1998, 2008). This frontal component may index
task-relevant features of the stimulus (Kenemans et al., 1993). The
fronto-central N200 according to some researchers (West, 2003;
Donkers and van Boxtel, 2004; West et al., 2004) is thought to
originate from the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and prefrontal
sources and may reflect processes related to potential response
conflict detection in a RT tasks and/or cortical inhibition of
inappropriate MR. All ERP components have certain variability,
but specific ERP measures selected for this study (frontal N100,
N200 and P300, and parietal P100, N200 and P300) are less
affected by variability in visual tasks and are relevant to the
study goal.
We proposed that after 18 sessions of 1 Hz rTMS—
administered to the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC)
participants with autism would demonstrate normalization of
electrocortical indices of attention both at the early (P100, N100,
100–200 ms post-stimulus) and the late (i.e., P200, N200, P300,
200–600 ms) stages of sensory and cognitive processing and show
improvements in MT accuracy. Mainly, we expected lower mag-
nitude and longer latencies to visual targets (i.e., better stimulus
discrimination), and attenuated reactivity to non-target illusory
figures and other non-target cues. Other anticipated improve-
ments were expected to be found in outcomes of social and
behavioral functioning questionnaire and surveys. The hypothesis
in this study proposed that low-frequency rTMS (i.e., inhibitory)
would exert its effects through increased cortical inhibitory tone
(i.e., lower E/I ratio) in the DLPFC with subsequent improve-
ment in performance in the visual attention task. In addition we
expected improvements in clinical social and behavioral evalua-
tion outcomes.
METHODS
Participants with ASD (age range 9–21 years) were recruited
through the University of Louisville Weisskopf Child Evaluation
Center (WCEC). Diagnosis was made according to the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR)
(APA, 2000) and further ascertained with the Autism Diagnos-
tic Interview—Revised (ADI-R; Le Couteur et al., 2003). They
also had a medical evaluation by a developmental pediatrician.
All subjects had normal hearing based on past hearing screens.
Participants with a history of seizure disorder, significant hear-
ing or visual impairment, a brain abnormality conclusive from
imaging studies or an identified genetic disorder were excluded.
Fifty participants were high-functioning persons with autism
diagnosis and four had Asperger Syndrome. All had full-scale IQ
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>80 assessed using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children,
Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003) or (for adolescents)
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler,
1999).
We enrolled 54 autistic patients, 44 males and 10 females,
with a mean age of 14.5 ± 2.9 years. Twenty-seven of them were
assigned to active 1.0 Hz TMS treatment (TMS group), while 27
were assigned to the WTL group. Mean age of subjects in the TMS
group was 14.8 ± 3.2 years, and 14.1 ± 2.6 years in the WTL
group. There was not a significant difference in either age or full-
scale IQ between the TMS and WTL groups.
The study complied with all relevant national regulations
and institutional policies and has been approved by the local
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Participating subjects and
their parents (or legal guardians) were provided with full infor-
mation about the study including the purpose, requirements,
responsibilities, reimbursement, risks, benefits, alternatives, and
role of the local IRB. The subjects were reimbursed only for
participation in two ERP tests ($25/per test). The consent and
assent forms approved by the IRB were reviewed and explained
to all subjects who expressed interest to participate. All ques-
tions were answered before consent signature was requested.
If the individual agreed to participate, both she/he and par-
ent/guardian signed and dated the consent or assent form and
received a copy countersigned by the investigator who obtained
consent.
THREE-STIMULI ODDBALL TASK WITH KANIZSA FIGURES
The stimuli employed in the test were Kanizsa square (target),
Kanizsa triangle (non-target), non-Kanizsa square, and non-
Kanizsa triangle (standards) (Kanizsa, 1976). The task represents
a classic three-stimuli oddball with infrequent illusory Kanizsa
target (square, 25%) and infrequent Kanizsa distracter (triangle,
25% ) figures presented for 250 ms among frequent non-Kanizsa
stimuli (so called standards, 50%) with inter-trial interval in
1,100–1,300 ms range (Figure 1). Totally 240 trials were presented
following a brief practice block. The practice block had 20 trials
only with the experimenter present in the room to make sure
that subject correctly understands test conditions and recognizes
target stimuli. The total time of the test including sensor applica-
tion and practice was under 30 min. For better habituation and
adaptation to experimental setting, the participants were encour-
aged to have at least one session for conditioning to brainwave
sensor net (without performing task) and getting familiar with
laboratory environment.
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL ACQUISITION AND
PROCESSING
Electroencephalographic (EEG) signals from 128 sites were
recorded with a dense-array EGI system (Electrical Geodesics,
Inc., Eugene, Oregon). Subjects were placed in electrically and
acoustically isolated camera from the Industrial Acoustics Co.
(Bronx, NY). Stimulus presentation and MT collection was con-
trolled using E-prime (PST, Inc., Pittsburg, PA). Visual stimuli
were presented on a flat monitor located in 45–50 cm from
the subject, and MTs were registered with a keypad (Serial Box,
Inc). Sampling rate of EEG was 500 Hz, and analog Notch
(60 Hz, infinite impulse response (IIR)) and analog elliptical
bandpass filters were set at 0.1–200 Hz. Impedances were under
40 KΩ. Stimulus-locked EEG data were segmented off-line into
200 ms pre-stimulus baseline to 800 ms epoch post-stimulus. EEG
recordings were screened for artifacts and trials with eye blinks,
gross movements etc were removed using EGI software artifact
rejection tools (Perrin et al., 1987; Fletcher et al., 1996; Srinivasan
et al., 1998; Luu et al., 2001). The remaining artifact-free EEG
data for trials with correct responses was digitally filtered using
Notch filter (IIR, 5th order) and 0.3–20 Hz IIR elliptical bandpass
filter. Averaged ERP data was baseline corrected (200 ms) and
ERPs after averaging and baseline correction were re-referenced
into an average reference frame. Response-locked EEGs were
segmented into 500 ms pre-response to 500 ms post-response
(i.e., commission error). More detailed account for experimen-
tal procedure and EEG data acquisition and processing can be
found in our prior publications that used similar methodology
(Baruth et al., 2010a,b; Casanova et al., 2012; Sokhadze et al.,
2012a,b).
EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS (ERP)
STIMULUS-LOCKED DEPENDENT ERP VARIABLES
Dependent variables for the frontal and fronto-central region-
of-interest (ROI) were N100 (80–180 ms), N200 (220–350 ms),
P2a (180–320 ms), and P3a (300–600 ms), and for the pari-
etal and parieto-occipital ROI were P100 (120–180 ms), N200
(180–320 ms) and P3b (320–600 ms) ERP waves. For P2d compo-
nent (i.e., differences wave of frontal P2a) we calculated difference
wave (P2a to targets minus P2a to non-targets) to detect mean
difference between two conditions both in amplitude and latency
within 180–320 ms post-stimulus window.
RESPONSE-LOCKED EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS (ERN/Pe)
Response locked dependent variables in this study were amplitude
and latency of the Error-related Negativity (ERN peaking within
40–150 ms post-error) and Error-related Positivity (Pe, peaking
within 100–300 ms post-error). The ROI for both ERN and
Pe components included FCz, sites between FCz and FC3-C1,
and between FCz and FC2-C2. Amplitude and latency analysis
of ERN/Pe was performed with a custom-made application in
Matlab (Clemans et al., 2011a). Validation of correct identi-
fication of ERN and Pe waves was further ascertained using
another custom Matlab application using wavelet transformation
(Clemans et al., 2011b).
TRANSCRANIAL MAGNETIC STIMULATION
Repetitive TMS was administered using a Magstim 220 device
(Magstim Corp., Sheffield, UK) with a 70-mm figure-eight coil.
Threshold of MT was identified for each hemisphere in all par-
ticipants with autism by increasing the output of the stimulator
by 5% until a 50 µV deflection or a visible twitch in the First
Dorsal Interosseous (FDI) muscle was detected in at least 3 trials
of stimulation over the motor cortex controlling the contralateral
FDI. Electromyographic (EMG ) responses were recorded with
a C-2 J&J Engineering Inc multichannel physiological moni-
toring device with Physiodata software (J&J Engineering, Inc.,
Bainbridge Island, WA).
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FIGURE 1 | Three-stimuli category visual oddball task with Kanizsa
illusory figures. The stimulus types are: Kanizsa square (target, 25%),
Kanizsa triangle (25%), non-Kanizsa square, and non-Kanizsa triangle.
The non-target Kanizsa triangle is introduced to differentiate processing
of Kanizsa figures and targets. The stimuli consist of either three or
four inducer disks, which are considered the shape feature, and they
either constitute an illusory figure (square, triangle) or not (collinearity
feature).
The rTMS was administered weekly for 18 weeks with the
1st six treatments were over the left DLPFC, while the next six
were over the right DLPFC, whereas remaining six treatments
were done bilaterally over the DLFC (evenly at the left and right
DLPFC). The DLPFC site for magnetic stimulation was found
by placing the TMS coil 5 cm anterior, and in a parasagital
plane, to the site of maximal FDI response. A swimming cap
was used to make the TMS coil positioning easier. TMS was
administered at 1.0 Hz frequency and 90% MT. There were total
of 180 pulses per day session with nine trains with 20 pulses each.
There were 20–30 s between the train intervals used. Decision to
select 90% of the MT was based on the prior publications where
rTMS was used for the stimulation of DLPFC in various neuro-
and psychiatric disorders (reviewed in Pascual-Leone et al., 2000;
Wassermann and Lisanby, 2001; Daskalakis et al., 2002; Gershon
et al., 2003; Loo and Mitchell, 2005; Greenberg, 2007; Oberman
et al., 2013).
CLINICAL SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL EVALUATION
OUTCOMES
For the evaluation of social and behavioral functioning we
utilized caregiver reports and clinician ratings of improve-
ment. Every participant was evaluated before TMS course
and within 2 weeks following TMS treatment. Aberrant
Behavior Checklist (ABC; Aman and Singh, 1994; Aman,
2004) is a clinician administered rating scale to assess Irri-
tability, Lethargy/Social Withdrawal, Stereotypy, Hyperactivity,
and Inappropriate Speech based on parent/caregiver report.
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS). Repetitive Behavior Scale—
Revised (RBS-R; Bodfish et al., 1999) is a caregiver completed
rating scale assessing stereotyped, self-injurious, compulsive,
ritualistic, sameness, and restricted range (Bodfish et al.,
2000).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The primary model for statistical analyses of subject-averaged
ERP and MT data was the two factor repeated measure ANOVA.
Dependent ERP variables were amplitude and latency of ERP at
pre-determined ROIs. The within-participant factors were fol-
lowings: Stimulus (Kanizsa target, Standard, Kanizsa Non-target),
Hemisphere (Left, Right), and Time (Baseline, Post-treatment).
The between-subject factor was Group (TMS, WTL). Post hoc
analyses were conducted where appropriate. RT, error rate (com-
mission, omission and total error rate), were analyzed using
Time and Group factor. For clinical behavioral rating scores a
Treatment (pre-vs. post-TMS/or waiting period) ANOVA was
completed to determine changes associated with active stimula-
tion and WTL conditions. Histograms with normal distribution
curves along with skewness and kurtosis data were obtained
for each dependent variables to determine normality of dis-
tribution and appropriateness of data for ANOVA and t-tests.
For more reliable determination of normality of distribution
residual plots (i.e., normal probability plot, histogram, vs. fits
and order) were created using Minitab statistical package to
indicate that treatment with ANOVA is justified. All dependent
variables in the study had normal distribution. Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected p-values were employed where appropriate in
all ANOVAs. A priori hypotheses were tested with the Student’s
t-tests for two groups with equal variance. Confidence intervals
(95% of mean, 95% CI) were calculated for each ERP data sets
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entered for t-tests. For the estimation of the effect size and
power (Murphy and Myors, 2004) we used Partial Eta Squared
(η2) and observed power computed using α = 0.05. SPSS 19.0
and Sigma Stat 3.1 statistical packages were used for analysis of
data.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES (REACTION TIME AND ACCURACY,
POST-ERROR RT)
Reaction Time (RT)
Effects of TMS on RT to targets were not significant. Comparison
of RT to targets yielded no Time X Group effects.
Accuracy
Commission and omission errors analysis yielded a significant
between-group difference in the commission error percentage,
F(1,52) = 4.32, p = 0.042. T-test showed significant decrease of
commission error rate in the TMS group (mean decrease −6.38 ±
2.54%, 95% CI from −11.61 to −1.15%, t(26) = 2.50, p = 0.019).
We could not find between group differences in omission error
rate. Total error rate (% errors) change also showed decrease only
in TMS group (−7.47 ± 2.82%, 95% CI from −13.26 to −1.67%,
t(26)=2.64, p = 0.013).
Post-error RT
Main effect of Time (Pre, Post) on normative post-error RT slow-
ing was highly significant (F(1,50)=15,14, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.134,
observed power = 0.795 at alpha (α) = 0.05).
Repeated measure ANOVA of post-error RT slowing revealed
that TMS and WTL group differences on post-error RT changes
were also statistically significant, i.e., Time X Group interaction,
F(1,52) = 8.05, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.134, observed power = 0.795.
The TMS group showed post-error RT increase with significant
positive change in post-error RT. This change was computed as
post TMS post-error RT change minus pre-treatment post-error
RT change (49.9 ± 55.4 ms, 95% CI from 26.42 to 69.41 ms,
t(26) = 4.57, p < 0.001). Figure 2 shows that at the baseline both
in WTL and TMS groups post-error RT was negative (mean post-
error speeding was −23.1 ± 34.7 ms and not different between
groups at pre-treatment stage), while in the TMS group post-error
RT became positive (i.e., showed normative slowing), whereas it
remained negative in the WTL group.
PARIETAL AND PARIETO-OCCIPITAL ERP COMPONENTS
P100
TMS course had main effects on P100 component’s both ampli-
tude (F(1,52) = 4.78, p = 0.033) and latency (F(1,52) = 15.00,
p = 0.001). Response of this parietal and parieto-occipital P100
component (positive peak within 130–160 ms post-stimulus)
to targets showed post-treatment between group difference in
amplitude (2.25 ± 2.93 µV, with 95% CI from 1.14 to 3.37
µV, in TMS vs. 4.37 ± 3.89 µV, 95% CI from 2.83 to 5.91
µV, in WTL, F(1,52) = 5.31, p = 0.025) and latency (153.3 ±
43.99 ms, 95% CI from 136 to 170 ms in TMS vs. 128 ±
18.42 ms, 95% CI from 121 to 135 ms in WTL, F(1,52) = 7.54,
p = 0.008). Group differences in response to Kanizsa tar-
gets and non-targets were more expressed in the latency of
FIGURE 2 | Post-error reaction time (RT) changes in TMS and wait-list
groups at the baseline and at the second test. Time X Group effect is
highly significant (F = 8.05, p = 0.006). At the baseline both groups showed
post-error RT speeding, while post-TMS post-error RT became positive.
Change of the post-error RT in TMS group was significant (t = 4.57, p <
0.001).
the P100 (F(1,52) = 4.91, p = 0.011). The Stimulus (Stan-
dard, Non-target Kanizsa, Target Kanizsa) X Time (Pre, Post)
X Group (TMS, WTL) effect was significant (F(2,52) = 4.34,
p = 0.015), and this effect was even more powerful for stan-
dard vs. target stimuli comparison (F(1,52) = 7.92, p = 0.007,
η2 = 0.128, observed power = 0.789). The effect can be
described as a reduced latency to non-targets and increased
latency to target stimuli post-TMS but not after wait period.
There were no hemispheric differences observed for P100
component.
N200
There were no group differences in amplitude of the parietal N200
component. Latency of N200 to targets showed post-treatment
between group difference in latency to targets (238.72 ± 58.58 ms,
95% CI from 215 to 261 ms, in TMS vs. 201.35 ± 24.27 ms, 95%
CI from 191 to 210 ms, in WTL group, F(1,52) = 9.34, p = 0.004)
and non-target illusory Kanizsa figures (242.31 ± 62.42 ms,
95% CI from 217 to 267 ms, in TMS vs. 208.27 ± 24.92 ms,
95% CI from 198 to 218 ms, in WTL group, F(1,52) = 6.92,
p = 0.011). ANOVA analysis of the latency of parietal N200 to
target and non-target Kanizsa stimuli showed a Stimulus (Target,
Non-target) X Time (Pre, Post) X Group (TMS, WTL) interaction,
F(2,52) = 3.69, p = 0.032. The effect was expressed as increased
latency for non-target stimuli in the TMS group post-treatment.
There were observed other interactions as well, for instance
hemispheric one, as the effect was featured by more delayed
latency at the right hemisphere in the TMS group (F(1,52) = 7.15,
p = 0.01, η2 = 0.121, power = 0.747). Other notable interaction
was significant Time X Group effect, F(1,52) = 4.60, p = 0.037,
η2 = 0.08, observed power = 0.558, with TMS showing more
prolonged N200 latency to non-target Kanizsa stimuli. Post hoc
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tests showed that in the active treatment group latency increased
(e.g., to non-targets, bilaterally 24.2 ± 11.8 ms, 95% CI from
3.7 to 51.0 ms, t(26) = 2.37, p = 0.025) along with attenuated
amplitude (−1.39 ± 3.26µV, 95% CI from −2.63 to −0.15 µV,
t(26) = 2.30, p = 0.029), while changes of latency and amplitude
of N200 in the WTL group were not significant (see Figure 3).
P300 (P3b)
We found between group differences in P3b amplitude that were
expressed as more attenuated component post-treatment in TMS
as compared to WTL group only to non-Kanisza standards (2.69
± 2.96 µV, 95% CI from 0.88 to 3.61 µV, in TMS vs. 5.09
± 3.98 µV, 95% CI from 3.21 to 6.14 µV, in WTL, F(1,52) = 5.25,
p = 0.026). We found no interactions of P3b amplitude using in
ANOVA Stimulus, Hemisphere, Time, and Group factors. Stimulus
(Target, Non-target Kanisza, Standard) factor had a main effect
on latency of P3b (F(2,53) = 11.59, p < 0.001). The latency of
P3b showed significant effects of Time factor on each stimuli:
latency of P3b to targets, 364.15 ± 63.08 ms, 95% CI from 340
to 380 ms, in TMS vs. 326.13 ± 28.27 ms, 95% CI from 314 to
337 ms, in WTL, F(1,52) = 8.16, p = 0.006; non-target Kanizsa,
356.68 ± 67.26 ms, 95% CI from 333 to 384 ms, in TMS vs. 322.93
± 21.55 ms, 95% CI from 314 to 331 ms, in WTL, F(1,52) = 6.94,
p = 0.011; and standards, 354.89 ± 64.68 ms, 95% CI from
330 to 379 ms, in TMS vs. 323.54 ± 20.68 ms, 95% CI from
315 to 331 ms, in WTL, (F(1,52) = 5.25, p = 0.026). Repeated
measure ANOVA analysis of the P3b latency also indicated a
significant between groups differences for all types of illusory
figures, for example, increased P3b latency as a result of rTMS
(Time × Group interaction, F(1,52) = 4.32, p = 0.044), that can be
described as a longer post-treatment latency in TMS, shorter in
WTL group.
FIGURE 3 | Parietal ERPs (P1, P3, P7 sites according to 10–10 International System) to target and non-target Kanizsa figures in TMS and wait-list
groups (N = 27/per group) before and after treatment (TMS/or wait-period).
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FRONTAL AND FRONTO-CENTRAL ERP COMPONENTS
N100
Comparison of post-treatment amplitude and latency of N100
ERP component showed decreased amplitude and prolonged
latency to both target and non-target Kanizsa figures in the
TMS group, while N100 magnitude was practically unchanged
in the WTL group. Effects of Time factor on amplitude and
latency to targets was significant (at post-TMS test, ampli-
tude, −1.54 ± 1.83 µV, 95% CI from −2.72 to −0.88 µV,
in TMS vs. −2.91 ± 2.96 µV, 95% CI from −3.59 to −1.74
µV, in WTL, F(1,52) = 4.62, p = 0.036; while latency, 140.85
± 32.76 ms, 95% CI from 127 to 153 ms, in TMS vs. 120.83
± 20.87 ms, 95% CI from 112 to 129 ms, in WTL group).
Effects of Time on frontal N100 to non-targets was also sta-
tistically significant (amplitude, −1.36 ± 1.63 µV in TMS vs.
−2.37 ± 2.07 µV in WTL, F(1,52) = 4.47, p = 0.04; latency,
140.59 ± 23.22 ms in TMS vs. 125.4 ± 13.38 ms in WTL,
F(1,52) = 8.58, p = 0.005). There were no interaction of N100
amplitude and latency on Stimulus, Hemisphere and Group
factors.
N200
There was observed significant between Group (TMS, WTL)
difference in N200 amplitude (F(1,52) = 8.24, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.119,
observed power = 0.804). A Stimulus (Target Kanizsa, Non-
Kanizsa standard) X Hemisphere (Left, Right) X Group (TMS,
WTL) interaction reached significance (F(1,52) = 4.64, p = 0.037)
pointing at a more negative N200 to targets with less negative
N200 to non-target Kanizsa as a result of rTMS (Figure 4).
The TMS group showed less hemispheric differences post-
treatment, while the WTL group had more negative amplitude
of N200 at the right hemisphere. A Time X Group effect for
FIGURE 4 | Frontal and frono-central ERPs (Fz, F2, F2-FCz, F1-FCz) to target and non-target Kanizsa figures in TMS and wait-list groups (N = 27/per
group) before and after treatment (TMS/ or wait-period). Frontal P2a components (280–320 ms post stimulus) is marked with a blue line.
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the latency of N200 was significant (F(1,52) = 7.26, p = 0.009,
η2 = 0.119, observed power = 0.754), yielding longed latency
to targets post-TMS. Additionally, post hoc analysis using t-
test showed that N200 latency became statistically more pro-
longed to target stimuli in TMS group across both hemispheres
(13.31 ± 34.03 ms, 95% CI from 26.2 to 0.36 ms, t(26) = 2.10,
p = 0.044).
P2d
The frontal P2a calculated as a mean difference between P2a
amplitude to target Kanizsa minus P2a amplitude to non-target
Kanizsa stimuli. TMS had significant effect at P2d amplitude
(F(1,52) = 6.56, p = 0.013). The baseline values in both groups
were similar (−2.35 µV in TMS vs. −2.51 µV in WTL) but
showed significant difference post-treatment (1.34 ± 4.65 µV
in TMS vs. −1.97 ± 3.56 in WTL group). ANOVA showed
significant Time X Group interaction, F(1,52) = 4.11, p = 0.048,
η2 = 0.075, observed power = 0.512. Effect can be described as
P2d becoming positive post-TMS, i.e., P2a component to targets
was larger than to non-targets. Paired sample t-test confirmed
that P2d amplitude increased significantly post-TMS (3.70 ± 7.47
µV, 95% CI from 6.71 to 0.68 µV, t(26) = 2.52, p = 0.018).
Differences in P2d latency between groups were not significant
(Figure 5).
P300 (P3a)
The treatment had main effect on the amplitude of the frontal
P300 (P3a) component (F(1,52) = 4.27, p = 0.044). The amplitude
of P3a showed a Time X Group effect that was statistically
significant (F(1,52) = 4.64, p = 0.036). The active TMS showed
post-treatment decrease of the P3a bilaterally across all stimuli,
FIGURE 5 | Amplitude of the frontal P2a difference wave (so called
P2d = [P2a to targets minus P2a to non-targets] ) across both
hemispheres shows Time X Group interactions effect (F = 4.11,
p = 0.048). Difference wave (P2d) was negative at the baseline in both
groups (i.e., lower amplitude to targets as compared to non-targets), but
becomes positive post-TMS. Increase of P2d was significant in the TMS
group (t = 2.52, p = 0.018).
whereas WTL group showed no differences at all. Paired sample
t-test showed that decrease of the amplitude in TMS group
was significant both for non-target Kanizsa (−1.93 ± 3.09 µV,
95% CI from −0.54 to −3.33 µV, t(26) = 2.85, p = 0.008) and
target Kanizsa stimuli (−2.91 ± 3.84 µV, 95% CI from −0.64
to −5.18 µV, t(26) = 2.64, p = 0.014). There were not detected
any main effects or interactions in the latency of the frontal
P3a.
RESPONSE-LOCKED FRONTAL AND FRONTO-CENTRAL ERN AND Pe
Two subjects did not show sufficient number of commission
errors and were excluded from the analysis. TMS and WTL groups
showed significant differences in ERN amplitude (F(1,50) = 6.20,
p = 0.016) and latency (F(1,50) = 5.82, p = 0.023). Ampli-
tude of ERN during commission errors across five frontal and
fronto-central sites showed marginal Time X Group interaction
(F(1,50) = 4.05, p = 0.05), and paired-sample t-test showed sig-
nificant increase of ERN negativity in the TMS group (by 2.97 ±
3.21 µV, 95% CI from 0.36 to 4.60 µV, t(26) = 2.40, p = 0.023,
see Figure 6). Analysis of ERN latency ANOVA yielded statisti-
cally significant Time X Group effect, (F(1,50) = 4.24, p = 0.041,
η2 = 0.099, observed power = 0.55). T-test of the ERN latency
changes in the TMS group showed significant decrease (−28.1 ±
13.8 ms, 95% CI from −4.22 to −52.1 ms, t(24) = 2.41, p = 0.023).
Amplitude and latency of Pe wave in both groups were not
significantly changed post-treatment. Figure 7 shows ERN and Pe
waveforms in two groups at the first (baseline) and at the second
test.
CLINICAL BEHAVIOR EVALUATIONS POST-TMS
We found a significant decrease in stereotype repetitive and
restricted behavior patterns following 18 sessions of bilateral
rTMS as measured by the RBS-R (Bodfish et al., 1999) and
analyzed them using a paired sample Student’s t-test. Total
RBS-R score decreased from 23.4 to 19.1, mean decrease being
FIGURE 6 | Error-related Negativity (ERN, 40–120 ms post-error) shows
Time X Group interaction (F = 4.05, p = 0.05). Post-TMS ERN amplitude
became significantly more negative (t = 2.40, p = 0.023). N = 26/per group,
as 2 subjects out of 54 committed no commission errors on the second
test.
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FIGURE 7 | Error-related Negativity (ERN) and Positivity (Pe) from the
fronto-central midline EEG sites. Grandaverage waveforms at the
fronto-central site (between F2 and FCz, N = 26 per group) show more
negative amplitude and shorter latency of the ERN in the TMS group
post-treatment. ERN peak occurring within 40–140 ms post-error is marked
by a blue line.
−4.29 ± 5.9, 95% CI from −1.95 to −6.63, t(26) = 6.63,
p = 0.001. Changes in individual subscale scores is depicted
at the Figure 8, where both Stereotypic Behavior subscale and
Ritualistic/Sameness behavior subscale scores show significant
decrease (accordingly −1.00 ± 1.77, 95% CI from −0.28 to
−1.71, t(26) = 2.89, p = 0.008 and −1.33 ± 2.21, 95% CI from
−0.45 to −2.21, t(26) = 3.12, p = 0.004). There was identified as
well a significant reduction in Irritability subscale as measured
by the ABC (Aman and Singh, 1994), i.e., −2.07 ± 5.12, 95%
CI from −0.40 to −4.10, t(26) = 2.10, p = 0.045. Lethargy and
Hyperactivity subscales showed even more pronounced score
reductions (Lethargy, −2.11 ± 3.93, 95% CI from −0.51 to
−3.72, t(26) = 2.71, p = 0.012; Hyperactivity, −4.03 ± 7.68,
95% from −0.99 to −7.07, t(26) = 2.72, p = 0.011). Changes
of individual subscale rating scores in TMS group are depicted
at the Figure 9. The WTL group had no significant differences
in any of RBS-R or ABC scale ratings as a result of the waiting
period.
DISCUSSION
Our results show significant changes in behavioral responses
(accuracy, post-error RT slowing) and both early and later-stage
ERP indices of task-relevant signal processing as a result of 18
sessions of low frequency rTMS treatment course in children with
ASD.
Participant in TMS group showed decreased amplitude and
prolonged latency of parietal P100 and N200 components to all
stimuli, more for non-target cues. Parietal P3b ERP component
was also prolonged without amplitude change in TMS group. In
our prior study (Sokhadze et al., 2009b, 2010a, 2013b) at the
parietal and parieto-occipital cortices the autism group showed
significantly prolonged latency of N100 and reduced amplitude
of N200 to targets as compared to neurotypical controls. Latency
of the P3b was longer to distracters, without any amplitude
group difference to targets and novels. The ASD group had
prolonged latencies to novels but not to targets, with effect
being better expressed in the right hemisphere. The results
indicate the excess of efforts needed for the differentiation of
targets from non-target novels in individuals with ASD. TMS
treatment enhanced the process of target recognition during
FIGURE 8 | Changes of Repetitive Behavior Scale (RBS-R) scores
post-TMS/wait-list treatment as compared to baseline levels in two
groups of children with ASD (N = 27/per group). Stereotype Behavior,
Ritualistic Behavior and Total RBS scores decreased significantly in the TMS
group.
FIGURE 9 | Changes of Aberrant Behavior Checklist (ABC) scores
post-TMS/wait-list treatment as compared to baseline levels in two
groups of children with ASD (N = 27/per group). Irritability, Lethargy, and
Hyperactivity rating scores decreased significantly post-TMS.
performance on task. Especially informative in this regard was
positive change of the frontal P2d difference wave that indi-
cates increase of P2a component to target Kanizsa stimuli vs.
non-target Kanizsa stimuli, thus reflecting easier discrimination
of target features of the stimuli (illusory square vs. illusory
triangle).
In addition, at the same frontal topography N200 component
was more negative to targets as compared to non-target illu-
sory figures and had longer latency resulting in globally higher
magnitude of N200 to targets. Following TMS course the N200
component at the frontal sites became more negative to targets,
and at the same time significantly less negative to both types of
non-target stimuli. The positive frontal P2a component followed
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by the negative ERP N200 component (both of them peaking
within 280–320 post-stimulus) in visual oddball tests tasks are
associated with categorization, perceptual closure and attention
focusing ultimately signaling that a perceptual representation
has been formed (Potts et al., 2004). This wave is enhanced if
the presented stimulus contains a feature or attribute defining
the target in the task according to Potts et al. (2004). It was
previous reported (Sokhadze et al., 2009a; Baruth et al., 2010c)
that individuals with ASD as compared to typical controls showed
enhanced N200 to task irrelevant as compared to task relevant
stimuli, and the finding that N200 became more negative to
target Kanizsa figures and less negative to non-target distracters
post-rTMS treatment indicates a trend to normalization of the
response pattern pointing at an improved visual signal processing
and a more effective discrimination of the target.
The results indicate a reduction of the frontal P3a both to
target and non-target stimuli post-TMS in our ASD patients.
In our earlier studies comparing ASD and typical controls we
reported that the ASD group showed prolonged N100, P100,
and P3b to targets stimuli, emphasizing a change indicative of
abnormalities of sustained attention compared to controls. At the
same time, the ASD group exhibited a prolonged P3a to novels,
and this can be considered as a marker of impaired orientation
to novelty, and ultimately decreased frontal associative and
integrative functioning. In the current study our results show no
differences in amplitude, though the latency of the P3a was still
delayed.
Over-activation in the parietal cortex at the early stages of pro-
cessing of non-targets, either standards or infrequent distracters,
and at the same time under-activation of integrative frontal
regions at the late stages of target processing was found to occur
in autism in a similar visual task that was using three-stimuli
paradigm with rare novel distracters (Sokhadze et al., 2009b,
2010a). Our results in a series of visual oddball tasks indicated
enhanced and prolonged early frontal ERPs and a delayed late
P3a to non-target stimuli, which would suggest low selectivity in
pre-processing and at a later stage under-activation of integra-
tive regions. Overall, this is an indication of an over-connected
network where sensory inputs evoke abnormally large evoked
potentials for unattended stimuli such as frequent standards and
rare novel distracters at all stages of visual signal processing with
signs of a reduced selectivity of the activation.
The results of the current study indicate that rTMS may
have facilitated attention and target discrimination by improving
conflict resolutions during processing task-relevant and task-
irrelevant stimuli. The latency of posterior P3b was prolonged
to targets but reduced to both non-target Kanzisa and non-
Kanizsa stimuli following rTMS. The P3b has been linked to task-
relevance and the decision- related character of the stimulus as
it indicates memory-updating and individual trial processing clo-
sure (Picton, 1992). Earlier we (Sokhadze et al., 2009a,b, 2012b)
noted that individuals with autism showed prolonged P300 peak
to irrelevant distracters as compared to typical controls, which
was similar to effects reported by other groups (Courchesne et al.,
1989; Townsend et al., 2001). The auditory and visual sensory
information processing abnormalities been described in ASD by
different researchers (Kemner et al., 1994, 1999; Bomba and Pang,
2004). However, most of these studies analyzed and reported
outcomes of late cognitive potentials such as centro-parietal P3b
(Courchesne et al., 1989; Ciesielski et al., 1990) and frontal P3a
(Townsend et al., 2001). There are only a few papers reporting
short latency ERP components’ differences in individuals with
autism. Majority of these studies emphasize over-activation as
well as an abnormal pattern of basic perceptual processes such
as low selectivity regardless of modality, abnormal top-down
attentional control including delayed attentional orienting to
novel stimuli, and deficits in information integration processes
(Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). In typically developing
children the fronto-central P3a occurs earlier in time as com-
pared to parietal P300 (P3b), but in autistic subjects the P3a
and P3b components were found to peak almost simultaneously
over the frontal and parietal sites in a spatial attention test
(Townsend et al., 2001). The latency of P3a is thought to be
associated with the speed of attentional orienting to significant
novel stimulus and reflects working memory processes in the
prefrontal cortex. Centro-parietal P3b is usually described as a
cognitive component that indexes context update and closure.
This cognitive potential was found to be delayed but was not
significantly attenuated in the group of children with autism as
compared to typical controls (Sokhadze et al., 2009a,b, 2010a,
2012b).
The results of the study may indicate facilitation of visual
target discrimination processes and enhanced habituation to
task-irrelevant distracters post-TMS. We report significant
improvement in the accuracy of MTs, lower total error rate
and improved normative post-error RT slowing following 18
session long rTMS course. These result support our earlier
findings outlining improvement in attention, executive control,
and irrelevant response inhibition post-TMS treatment in
autism.
In our initial rTMS pilot studies (Sokhadze et al., 2009b,
2010a) we used only six sessions of low frequency rTMS applied
only to the left DLPFC and assessed behavioral performance
in a visual attention task in children with autism. In a very
similar manner, our current study also found a notable reduction
in the frontal N200 and altered latency of the parietal P3b
to task-irrelevant stimuli. Additionally, similar to the present
investigation we also found a significant reduction in the response
errors rate following a shorter courses of the prefrontal rTMS
(Sokhadze et al., 2009b, 2012a; Baruth et al., 2010a). It might
be stated that we found even more pronounced changes in
cognitive ERPs such as P2d, N200and P3b in this study that had
the greater number of rTMS treatments (18 sessions). In another
study using this time 12 sessions of rTMS we found a significant
reduction in repetitive and restricted behavior patterns as well
as a significant reduction in irritability according to clinical and
behavioral questionnaires (Casanova et al., 2012).The results of
current 18 session-long rTMS treatment confirm and expand our
prior findings of reduced repetitive behaviors (Sokhadze et al.,
2009a,b, 2010a,b; Baruth et al., 2010b) and irritability (Baruth
et al., 2010a,b) following low-frequency rTMS course. It should
be noted that we found significant reductions in irritability only
as a result of 12 sessions of bilateral stimulation (Baruth et al.,
2010a), whereas reductions in repetitive behavior have been
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significant after six sessions of stimulation to the left DLPFC
(Sokhadze et al., 2009b, 2010a).
It was a very reasonable decision to select DLPFC as a site
for rTMS stimulation. The DLPFC processes components of
working memory, decision making process, and regulates the
ability to focus attention on task-relevant goals while inhibiting
responses to distracters (Gray et al., 2003; Enriquez-Geppert et al.,
2010; Matzel and Kolata, 2010). Suggested disruption in the ratio
between cortical excitation and inhibition especially within the
prefrontal cortex in individuals with autism (Casanova et al.,
2002a, 2006a,b) was confirmed in individuals with Asperger syn-
drome (Casanova et al., 2002c). Reduced cortical inhibitory tone
and an increased E/I ratio could adversely affect patterns of corti-
cal activation, possibly resulting in isolated islands of coordinated
excitatory activity and in a high comorbidity rate of ASD and
epilepsy (Tuchman and Rapin, 1997). We believe that a course
of 18 neuromodulatory sessions of low frequency rTMS may
restore the cortical E/I balance by selective activation of double-
bouquet cells at the periphery of cortical minicolumns (Casanova
et al., 2006a,b; Casanova, 2007). It was shown that minicolumnar
abnormalities in autism are most significant within the prefrontal
cortex, more specifically, the DLPFC and the ACC (Fernandez-
Duque et al., 2000; Mesulam, 2000; Casanova et al., 2002b,
2006a,b).
Rubenstein and Merzenich (2003) put forward a hypothesis
that at some forms of autism could be caused by a disproportion-
ate high level of excitation (E) or disproportionately weak inhi-
bition (I) resulting in a high E/I ratio. Cortical circuits with such
enhanced E/I level are proposed to be featured by poor functional
differentiation which may lead to broad-ranging abnormalities in
perception, memory and cognition, and motor control. Among
other defects, individuals with autism have well known perceptual
processing abnormalities, including a hypersensitivity to audi-
tory, visual and tactile stimulation (Gomot et al., 2002; Plaisted
et al., 2003). Studies of perceptual systems in animal models
may provide useful insights into mechanisms underlying sensory
disturbances in autism. In particular, investigations of auditory
development in rats using modulated noise manipulation showed
that the representation of sound inputs in the cortex remains
poorly differentiated when the cortex is undergoing develop-
ment under very poor signal-to-noise conditions (Chang and
Merzenich, 2003). The E/I balance in the cortex is controlled by
the relative numbers and functional activity of glutamatergic and
GABA-ergic neurons. Neurodevelopmental abnormalities may
lead to increased number, morphology or functional balance of
excitatory vs. inhibitory neurons and can lead to a hyper-excitable
state typical for autism. Excessive noise in cortical structures
processing information also negatively affects development of
normally differentiated representations. Relatively undifferenti-
ated representations of orienting signals or significant stimuli
would result in larger and less selective response. Such over-
representation by non-differentiated responses could account for
the strong aversive reactions to auditory, tactile and visual stimuli
that are common in autism.
Casanova et al. (2003) study indicated that minicolumns in
the brains of individuals with autism are narrow and have altered
internal organization. More specifically, their minicolumns have
less peripheral neuropil space, which is the conduit for inhibitory
local circuit projections. A defect in these GABAergic interneu-
rons may correlate with the increased E/I balance and prevalence
of seizures among autistic patients. The authors concluded that
GABAergic interneurons are vital for sensory signal process-
ing (e.g., filtering capacity, proper signal discrimination, etc.),
thus providing a putative correlate to autistic symptomatol-
ogy. As it was noted in a recent review on use of TMS in
ASD (Oberman et al., 2013), TMS could be particularly infor-
mative in detecting abnormalities in E/I ratios in ASD given
theoretical studies regarding role of GABAergic interneurons in
autism etiology (Hussman, 2001) and specifically role of high
E/I balance in autism (Casanova et al., 2003; Rubenstein and
Merzenich, 2003). Our current study is supportive of idea that
rTMS is capable to improve E/I ratio as manifested in electrocor-
tical responses to sensory stimulus processing in visual selective
attention test.
This TMS study was guided by the “minicolumnar” theory of
autism. The hierarchical basis of the modular organization of the
cerebral cortex is well recognized in the literature. The cerebral
cortex originates during brain development as germinal cells from
the ventricular and later on the subventricular zones divide asym-
metrically and the resulting neuroblasts migrate towards the pial
surface (for review see Casanova and Trippe, 2006). The migrat-
ing neuroblasts split the preplate to form the incipient cortex
wherein arriving cells acquire an orderly inside-out configuration
by using either somal translocation or radial glia projections as a
scaffold (Marín-Padilla, 1998). The resulting vertical arrangement
of cells within this dynamic system serves as an attractor for
satellite interneurons to populate its peripheral neuropil space.
Radially migrating neurons provide for future pyramidal cells
while those that follow a tangential path, primarily from the
ganglionic eminences, are destined to be interneurons. Different
types of interneurons form dyadic units with pyramidal cells and
the resulting ensemble of cells, along with their afferent/efferent
projections, constitute information processing units better known
as minicolumns (Marin-Padilla, 2010). Recent studies indicate
that higher cognitive functions including our executive functions
derive from the workings of these modules or minicolumns
(Opris et al., 2013).
Topographical studies of minicolumnar morphometry in ASD
have shown the greatest deviance from neurotypicals within the
prefrontal cortex (Casanova et al., 2002d, 2006a, 2010). Some
investigators have explained this fact as resulting from the pro-
longed maturation time of this structure which thus provides a
larger time window of opportunity for exogenous factors to alter
its development (Opris and Casanova, 2014). Within the rostral
brain region abnormalities within the DLPFC could serve as a
pathological correlate to observed executive function deficits in
autism (Opris and Casanova, 2014). Given the vertical orientation
of inhibitory elements within the periphery of the minicolumns
(e.g., double bouquet cells) it has been proposed that rTMS in
ASD could preferentially help build the inhibitory surround of
these modular structures. Since the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
has been a source of significant minicolumnopathy in published
postmortem studies it could be viewed as a target for stimula-
tion using rTMS (Casanova et al., 2002b, 2012). Furthermore,
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considering the trans-synaptic effects of rTMS, the large number
of DLPFC connections could provide a therapeutic cascading
effect in other parts of the brain. In autism computerized image
analysis suggests the presence of a minicolumnopathy charac-
terized by an increased density of modules and a diminution
in their peripheral neuropil space (Casanova et al., 2002a). The
deficits previously described by our group have been corrobo-
rated using a variety of neuronomorphometric techniques (e.g.,
Euclidean minimum spanning tree, gray level index), in an inde-
pendent sample conducted by an international study where the
investigators were blind to the study variables, and in the pub-
lished results of other investigators (Casanova et al., 2002d, 2006a;
Buxhoeveden et al., 2006). The diminished width of the mini-
columnar peripheral neuropil space is seen throughout laminae
II-VI, suggesting a deficit of an anatomical element in-common
to all layers (Casanova et al., 2010). Since inhibitory elements
populate all layers of the lateral compartment of the minicolumn
pathology involving these elements could contribute to a deficit
in the lateral or peripheral inhibitory surround of these modules.
These findings gain credence from EEG recordings using lateral
masking paradigms and threshold studies using flutter stimuli
that sustain the presence of a lateral inhibitory deficit in autism
(Kéïta et al., 2011; Puts et al., 2014). It is plausible to propose that
low frequency rTMS is increasing inhibitory tone and improving
lateral inhibition, and this may result in an enhancement of
executive functions.
Executive function deficits were always in the center of
attention in autism research. Executive function of behavioral
performance monitoring comprises error detection and response
conflict monitoring, functions that can be measured using
response-locked ERPs such as ERN and Pe (Gehring et al., 1993;
Carter et al., 1998; Van Veen and Carter, 2002; Mars et al., 2005;
Arbel and Donchin, 2009, 2011). The ERN is a well-studied
component whose parameters were investigated under different
experimental task conditions, and its ties to error processing
have been well established (Carter et al., 1998; Falkenstein et al.,
2000; Gehring and Knight, 2000; Van Veen and Carter, 2002).
There is an increased number of research studies examining ERN
during commission errors in children (Davies et al., 2004). It is
established that executive functions normally improve with age
(Huizinga et al., 2006) along with demonstration that the ACC,
which is now associated with executive performance monitoring,
undergoes important maturation changes from childhood into
adolescence, and then into adulthood (Arbel and Donchin, 2009,
2011). Furthermore, the studying error processing maturation
can be used to understand mechanisms of various neurodevel-
opmental disorders, such as ADHD and ASD, which feature
impairments in execute control (Liotti et al., 2005; Vlamings
et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Sokhadze et al., 2010b). The
ERN abnormalities are interpreted as reflecting early error pro-
cessing impairments. A number of studies have investigated the
functional relationship between the ERN and the fronto-central
stimulus-locked N200, while some suggest that they represent
distinct neurophysiological processes (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004),
others suggest they represent different time points of the same
process of response conflict monitoring (Yeung and Cohen,
2006).
One of the most important findings of current study was
replication of the increase of ERN amplitude and shortened
latency post-TMS reported in previous study using 12 sessions
of rTMS (Sokhadze et al., 2012a). In accord with our previous
study (Sokhadze et al., 2012a), the Pe component did not change
post-TMS. This component has a more posterior topography and
is expressed as a positivity elicited after the ERN (Falkenstein
et al., 2000; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Overbeek et al., 2005).
In our earlier study with rTMS application in ASD (Sokhadze
et al., 2009a,b, 2010a; Baruth et al., 2010c) we found that most
of EEG changes such as ERP and evoked EEG gamma frequency
oscillations occurred at the early stages of visual stimulus process-
ing (e.g., less than 200 ms post-stimulus), and resulted in a better
discrimination of target from non-target stimuli. Facilitation of
target recognition following TMS treatment and more effective
early inhibition of non-target distracters leads to less pronounced
carryover of non-target over-processing. We suggested earlier that
more expressed positive neuromodulation effects in the early
ERPs rather than in the late ERPs might be due to enhanced
suppression of task- irrelevant stimuli and less effortful dis-
crimination of targets from non-targets during attention task
performance.
One more critical methodological issue to be considered in
absence of significant TMS effects on Pe in autism might be
related to the number of commission errors as this measure
depends on the actual number of committed errors (Franken
et al., 2007). It is feasible to suggest that the magnitude of the
Pe was affected by the reduced number of commission errors in
active TMS group. Our prior investigation of ERN/Pe complex
in autism (Sokhadze et al., 2010b) also did show Pe differences
between ASD and typical children on the similar visual odd-
ball task, but these differences were found only in a form of a
significantly prolonged latency of the Pe in ASD group. There is a
possibility of a dissociation of ERN and Pe effects since generation
of Pe wave might be affected by the absence of feedback about
the accuracy of the MR resulting in that lower awareness of error
(Hewig et al., 2011).
In general, our findings are in concordance with a recent
review of rTMS applications in autism research and treatment
(Oberman et al., 2010, 2013). In that review the authors con-
cluded that, though results of published studies are promising
suggesting that specific rTMS protocols (Enticott et al., 2010,
2012, 2013; Fecteau et al., 2011) targeting selected regions of
cortex may lead to improvement in behavioral deficits in some
individuals with ASD, the therapeutic results have been still of
preliminary character and additionally, the large-scale, controlled
trials necessary to establish the safety and efficacy these neu-
romodulation protocols have to be conducted (Oberman et al.,
2010, 2013).
Some limitations to the study should be taken into account.
It is often reported in rTMS studies that effects of magnetic
stimulation usually do not wash out in approximately one week.
We believe that switching to once per week session regimen,
(e.g., Casanova et al., 2012; Sokhadze et al., 2012a) improved
our protocol and resulted in better clinical outcome measures.
Probably the length of staying in the rTMS treatment rather than
intensity is one of the main keys of behavioral and electrocrtical
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improvements that we observe in our later rTMS trials in ASD
(Baruth et al., 2010b, 2011; Sokhadze et al., 2010a, 2012a;
Casanova et al., 2012). It should be recognized that the power
(90%) and schedule (number of magnetic pulses delivered per
each session, 10–20 s break between trains, etc.) of our rTMS
is relatively lower than those used by other TMS treatment pro-
tocols. However, it must be mentioned that other known TMS
protocols were targeting psychopathologies such as treatment-
resistant major depression, or neurological disorders such as for
instance Parkinson disease in adults. One more limitation of the
study is the use a waiting-list group as a control group rather
than using a randomized clinical trial (RCT) design with a sham
rTMS condition. Even though our group has a custom-made
sham Magstim TMS coil and interface enabling blinding of TMS
delivery, we considered this study as a preliminary pilot with a
WTL group design, and plan to consider progression to a RCT
design on the future stages. It is possible to consider as a limita-
tion also the difficulty of proving in non-invasive human brain
research that low frequency rTMS is activating primarily double-
bouquet inter-neurons. We hope that future neurophysiological
studies on animal models would be able to find support for our
hypothesis.
In conclusion, the study showed that treatment with “slow”
rTMS improved ERP indices of attention to targets, reduced over-
reactivity to non-targets, significantly reduced MT errors to target
stimuli, and enhanced response-locked potentials reflective of
error monitoring and correction (e.g., ERN to commission errors,
post-error RT slowing, etc). We also found significant reductions
in both repetitive and stereotypic behaviors, reduced repeti-
tive behaviors, hyperactivity and irritability scores according to
social and behavioral clinical evaluations post-TMS. We consider
that it is possible to conclude that neuromodulation using low
frequency, inhibitory rTMS improved executive functioning and
behavior in autism. This study provides further support to the
statement that TMS can be regarded as a perspective treatment
targeting core symptoms of ASD such as executive function
deficits.
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Symptoms of visuospatial neglect occur frequently after unilateral brain damage. Neglect
hampers rehabilitation progress and is associated with reduced quality of life. However,
existing treatment methods show limited efficacy. Transcranial direct current stimulation
(tDCS) is a neuromodulatory technique, which can be used to increase or decrease brain
excitability. Its combination with conventional neglect therapy may enhance treatment
efficacy. A 72-year-old male with a subacute ischemic stroke of the right posterior cerebral
artery suffering from visuospatial neglect, hemianopia, and hemiparesis was treated
with biparietal tDCS and cognitive neglect therapy in a double-blind, sham-controlled
single-case study. Four weeks of daily treatment sessions (5 days per week, 30 min) were
started 26 days post-stroke. During week 1 and 4 the patient received conventional neglect
therapy, during week 2, conventional neglect therapy was combined once with sham
and once with real biparietal tDCS. Week 3 consisted of daily sessions of real biparietal
tDCS (1 mA, 20 min) combined with neglect therapy. Outcome measures were assessed
before, immediately after, as well as 1 week and 3 months after the end of treatment.
They included subtests of the Test for Attentional Performance (TAP): covert attention
(main outcome), alertness, visual field; the Neglect-Test (NET): line bisection, cancelation,
copying; and activities of daily living (ADL). After real stimulation, covert attention allocation
toward left-sided invalid stimuli was significantly improved, and line bisection and copying
improved qualitatively as compared to sham stimulation. ADL were only improved at the
3-month follow-up. This single-case study demonstrates for the first time that combined
application of tDCS and cognitive training may enhance training-induced improvements in
measures of visuospatial neglect and is applicable in a clinical context.
Keywords: transcranial direct current stimulation, visuospatial neglect, rehabilitation, cognitive therapy, stroke
INTRODUCTION
Neglect is a higher-order, supramodal cognitive deficit, which
affects space-related behavior not caused by an elementary
sensorimotor deficit (Kerkhoff, 2001), and is mainly caused
by lesions in frontoparietal cortical and subcortical networks
(Doricchi et al., 2008). Symptoms are heterogeneous and are
expressed in different sensory-spatial modalities (visual, audi-
tory, tactile, olfactory). Visuospatial neglect occurs in over 40%
of right brain-lesioned patients and in 20% of left brain-
lesioned patients (Ringman et al., 2004) and more than 60%
of the patients remain impaired after the end of rehabilita-
tion (Carod-Artal et al., 2000; Clarke et al., 2002). Importantly,
visuospatial neglect also limits the success of other neurore-
habilitative interventions, such as physical and occupational
therapy.
Treatment options to date show limited efficiency (Bowen
et al., 2013) despite being time-intense. They mostly aim to com-
pensate (e.g., optokinetic stimulation or neck muscle vibration)
or substitute functions (e.g., prism adaptation), and few aim
to restitute functions (e.g., mental imagery). In the clinical set-
ting, different therapeutic approaches are often combined and
individually adapted to the needs of each patient.
In the past decade researchers started to investigate the use
of non-invasive brain stimulation in the treatment of neglect.
The rationale for using brain stimulation for patients with
neglect is based on the “hemispheric rivalry model” proposed
by Kinsbourne (1987, 1993). According to this model alloca-
tion of visuospatial attention toward both hemifields is balanced
by mutual transcallosal inhibition, where each hemisphere com-
petes to direct attention to the contralateral hemifield. Brain
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lesions disturb this balance, and while the unimpaired hemi-
sphere becomes hyperexcitable, the impaired hemisphere expe-
riences a reduction in excitability. Supporting evidence for this
model was first presented by Vuilleumier et al. (1996). They
described a patient who suffered from visuospatial neglect after a
stroke affecting the right angular gyrus, which however improved
after a second stroke affecting the left frontal eye fields. Both of
these areas are important for shifting attention via connections
with subcortical structures, moreover supporting the assumption
of a widespread network subserving spatial attention.
Later studies using brain stimulation methods further sup-
ported Kinsbourne’s model. Non-invasive brain stimulation
methods can be applied to either increase brain excitability in
the lesioned hemisphere or reduce hyperexcitability in the unle-
sioned hemisphere. Several groups applied repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) during a single session (Oliveri
et al., 2001; Koch et al., 2008), or over several days (Brighina
et al., 2003; Shindo et al., 2006; Song et al., 2009; Lim et al.,
2010; Kim et al., 2013), with the latter leading to improve-
ments for up to 2–6 weeks after the end of treatment. Two
studies reported symptom improvement after a single session of
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (Ko et al., 2008;
Sparing et al., 2009). Generally, studies using multiple sessions
of TMS showed stronger effects that lasted over a longer period
of time.
Diagnostic guidelines for neglect are limited (e.g., Duncan
et al., 2005; Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 2008) and rec-
ommend a multidisciplinary diagnostic approach. In order to
diagnose visuospatial neglect, various diagnostic tools should be
combined with clinical observation, as individual deficits vary
greatly between patients. Covert attention measures provide a
sensitive tool to assess the impact of visuospatial neglect and are
used as the main outcome measure for this study. Posner et al.
(1984) stressed the importance of the parietal lobe in covert atten-
tion processes, specifically the disengagement operation, when
the target is located in the contralateral hemifield. Furthermore,
alertness functions are known to draw on a right-lateralized
fronto-parietal network (Sturm and Willmes, 2001; Jäncke et al.,
2003) and improvements in alertness are thought to contribute
to neglect recovery. Alertness was therefore used as a control
parameter. We furthermore applied more traditional tests such as
line bisection, cancelation, and copying and furthermore assessed
visual field deficits and ADL.
The rational to use bilateral tDCS in this study is based on
Kinsbourne’s interhemispheric rivalry model and the hypothe-
sis that concurrent biparietal modulation would have a stronger
and longer-lasting impact on interhemispheric balance than
unilateral stimulation. Biparietal stimulation (anode right, cath-
ode left) was applied to concomitantly increase brain excitabil-
ity in the lesioned right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and
reduce hyperexcitability in the unlesioned left PPC. Furthermore,
we hypothesized that combining stimulation with conventional
neglect therapy could have synergistic effects and therefore
enhance treatment efficacy.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to report the combined
impact of repeated biparietal tDCS sessions and cognitive neglect
therapy on rehabilitation outcome.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PATIENT
We studied a 72-year-old, ambidextrous male who was admit-
ted to the neurorehabilitation unit 23 days after the onset of a
moderate ischemic stroke (NIHSS 11/42) of the right posterior
cerebral artery of unknown etiology (TOAST 5). At admission
he suffered from a left-sided hemiparesis of the arm and face,
hemianopia, and severe neglect symptoms. Structural magnetic
resonance imaging showed extensive lesions within the right
hemisphere affecting mostly subcortical areas of the temporal,
parietal and occipital lobe (Figure 1).
Neglect symptoms included sensory as well as motor com-
ponents (directional hypokinesia). Visuospatial symptoms were
more space- than object-centered and N.H. showed a gaze devi-
ation toward the right. Imaginary spatial representation was well
preserved as compared to his reduced exploratory-perceptional
performance. Alertness performance was initially reduced and
fluctuating. Furthermore, impairments in spontaneous speech
functions (finding words, dysarthria), and a moderate impair-
ment of verbal and non-verbal memory functions, as well as
executive functions (inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility) were
observed. On discharge, 12 weeks after stroke onset, he had
improved attention allocation toward the left hemi-space, how-
ever, transfer to activities of daily living (ADL) was limited,
specifically in situations with many external distractors. Executive
functions and non-verbal memory improved during rehabilita-
tion but were still impaired at discharge. Verbal memory as well as
speech functions normalized. N.H. gave written and oral consent
according to the Declaration of Helsinki (1964). Family mem-
bers were informed about all study procedures and approved of
his participation. The protocol was approved by the local ethics
committee.
STUDY DESIGN
This double-blind, sham-controlled single-case study consisted of
4 weeks of daily treatment sessions (5 days per week, 30 min)
starting 26 days post-stroke (Figure 2). During week 1 and 4
the patient received conventional cognitive neglect therapy, dur-
ing week 2, conventional therapy was combined once with sham
tDCS and once with real biparietal tDCS. Week 3 consisted of
daily sessions of real biparietal tDCS (1 mA, 20 min) combined
with neglect therapy and covert attention was measured immedi-
ately after every session. Outcome measures were assessed before
and after baseline (week 1), single stimulation sessions (week 2),
repeated stimulation sessions (week 3), as well as 1 week and 3
months after the end of treatment. After the end of combined
treatment, the patient received 7 more weeks of standard neu-
rorehabilitative care before being discharged from the hospital.
Assessors and the patient were blinded with regards to stimula-
tion protocols. During the 4-week treatment N.H. furthermore
attended occupational (daily), physical (daily), and music therapy
(twice per week).
ASSESSMENTS
Covert attention, alertness (intrinsic and phasic), and visual
field were assessed with subtests of the Test for Attentional
Performance (TAP 2.2, Zimmermann and Fimm, 2002). The
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FIGURE 1 | sMRI T2 after admission to acute hospital.
subtests to assess intrinsic and phasic alertness consist of sim-
ple reaction paradigms that require keystrokes as selective reac-
tions to non-verbal stimuli (cross displayed in the middle of the
screen). Intrinsic alertness measures the general alertness of the
subject, while phasic alertness measures the ability to increase
and maintain attention in expectancy of a stimulus. The subtest
“Covert Attention” measures the ability to direct visual atten-
tion toward a stimulus without change of gaze direction (Posner,
1980) and is a sensitive measure of visual neglect. A central cue
(arrow) indicates the side on which a target stimulus (cross) may
appear (presentation time of 2 s). The arrow either points in the
direction of where the stimulus appears (valid trials) or in the
opposite direction (invalid trials). As in invalid trials attentional
focus is initially shifted in the opposite direction, re-orientation
is needed. Visuospatial neglect is indicated by prolonged reaction
times (RTs) in invalid trials toward the contralesional hemi-field.
RT to invalid left-sided stimuli was therefore the main out-
come measure. Visual field deficits were assessed with the subtest
“Visual Field.” In this test peripheral flicker stimuli appear on a
black screen (with fixation control) and the subject indicates with
a keystroke whether it was perceived.
Line bisection, cancelation, and copying figures were assessed
with subtests of the Neglect-Test (NET, Fels and Geissner, 1996),
which is a German adaptation of the “Behavioral Inattention
Test” (BIT, Wilson et al., 1987). In order to control for transfer
effects on ADL, a questionnaire to measure visuospatial disorders
(Beobachtungsbogen für räumliche Störungen, BRS, Neumann
and Kerkhoff, 2007) was filled out by the occupational therapist
and a family member. It measures impairments in ADL such as
eating, self-care, dressing, and communication. Furthermore, side
effects of tDCS were assessed with a questionnaire.
TREATMENT
Computerized training batteries (OK-Neglect: Psycware,
Sulzbach-Rosenberg, Germany; RehaCom: Schuhfried GmbH,
Moedling, Austria) were presented on a large screen (ca.
1.5 × 2 m) with the patient seated on the right side of the screen.
Training was started 5 min after the onset of stimulation and
continued for 30 min. Therapies were adapted to the patient’s
individual needs according to best clinical practice. The main
focus was on amelioration of smooth pursuit eye movements
(SPEM) and training of saccades toward the neglected hemi-
field, as well as visual exploration and reading combined with
optokinetic stimulation.
Direct current of 1 mA was delivered for 20 min via two saline-
soaked sponge electrodes (7 × 5 cm), which were fixed on the
head with a rubber bandage (NeuroConn DC-stimulator, Eldith,
Electro-Diagnostic and Therapeutic Systems GmbH, Ilmenau,
Germany). The anode was placed over P4 and the cathode was
placed over P3 (international 10–20 EEG system). The current
intensity used in this study has been used in several publications
with stroke patients (Fregni et al., 2005; Hummel et al., 2005,
2006; Hummel and Cohen, 2005; Boggio et al., 2007). In order
to achieve comparable sensations for sham stimulation, all ses-
sions started with a slow up-ramping of current over 30 s. At the
end of the stimulation current was turned off slowly in order not
to elicit perceptions (Gandiga et al., 2006).
ANALYSIS
The TAP provides norms for adults (TAP 2.2, Zimmermann and
Fimm, 2002). Significance levels of intraindividual single-subject
differences of T-values for the used subtests (intrinsic and pha-
sic alertness, covert attention) were calculated with the software
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FIGURE 2 | Study design. N.H. received daily standard cognitive neglect
therapy for 4 weeks (20 sessions). During W1 the patient received standard
therapy only (5 sessions). During W2 the patient additionally received sham
tDCS on the first day and real biparietal tDCS on the fifth day. During W3 the
patient additionally received real biparietal tDCS (5 sessions) and covert
attention was assessed after each session. Post-stimulation measures of day 5
(Real post) served as pre-measures for FU1 and FU2. During W4 he received
standard therapy only (5 sessions, FU1). Long-term outcome was assessed 3
months after the end of the stimulation (FU2). BL, baseline assessment; FU,
follow-up; W, week. Shaded cells depict real stimulation.
CASE123 (Willmes, 1985, 1990; Guillot and Willmes, 1993) using
T-values (percent ranks transformed into standard values), test–
retest reliability, and subtest correlations. CASE123 is used to
perform psychometric single-case analyses according to Huber
(1973), which are based on the classical test theory model and
are used for tests with standard norms from large standardiza-
tion samples with satisfactory reliability estimates such as the
used TAP. We compared performance pre- vs. post each single
session (Sham 1, Real 1, Real 1/5), pre vs. post repeated ses-
sions (Real 5/5), pre vs. post the 1-week control period (FU1),
as well as pre vs. post the 3-month control period (FU2). Post-
stimulation measures (Real 5/5) served as pre-measures for FU1
and FU2. Paper-pencil test results (line bisection, cancelation,
figure copying) are described qualitatively.
In order to evaluate whether coupling stimulation with cog-
nitive training was more effective than cognitive training alone,
a 2 × 4 × 3 ANOVA was performed with the within-subjects
factors of Time (Pre and Post), Condition (Single Sham, Single
Active, Repeated Active, Repeated Training Only), and Test
(Invalid Left, Invalid Right, Phasic Alertness).
RESULTS
COMPUTERIZED MEASURES
At admission a complete hemianopia of the left visual field was
diagnosed, which persisted until long-term follow up 3 months
after the end of stimulation.
Intrinsic and phasic alertness were impaired at admission
(intrinsic: T = 40; phasic: T = 38) with phasic alertness improv-
ing significantly after 1 week of standard therapy (T = 45, p =
0.002). After the single sham session combined with neglect
therapy alertness worsened significantly (intrinsic: T = 39, p <
0.001; phasic: T = 38, p < 0.001), whereas after the single real
session, alertness improved significantly (intrinsic: T = 45, p =
0.008; phasic: T = 49, p < 0.001). Both alertness parameters
remained within normal levels after the first combined real tDCS
treatment (Tables 1, 2, Figures 3E,F).
Covert attention to valid right-sided stimuli was within nor-
mal performance levels throughout the study. Covert attention
to valid left-sided stimuli was strongly impaired at admission,
showed significant improvements during standard therapy also
reaching a stable and normal level after the first combined real
tDCS treatment, and was maintained until long-term follow-up
(Tables 1, 2).
Covert attention to invalid right-sided stimuli fluctuated at
training onset, but stayed below average levels before stimula-
tion onset. After the first single real stimulation it also reached
normal levels (T = 50). After the weekend on the first day of
repeated stimulations RTs had declined again (T = 34), but again
showed a significant improvement immediately after the first of
the repeated stimulation sessions (T = 50, p < 0.001), remained
within normal levels during repeated stimulation sessions (T =
44, p < 0.001), further improved after the end of stimulation
until follow-up 1 (T = 53, p < 0.001), and returned to post-
stimulation levels until the long-term follow-up (T = 42, p =
0.232) (Tables 1, 2, Figure 3).
Invalid left-sided stimuli were not perceived at baseline. By
the beginning of week 2 the patient was able to perceive them,
however, he showed no improvement after single sham stim-
ulation (T < 20, no p-value), while significant improvements
were observed after a single real stimulation (T = 28, p = 0.025).
Similar as for invalid right-sided stimuli this improvement was
not maintained, however, performance improved again even fur-
ther after the first stimulation session of repeated stimulations
(T = 43, p < 0.001) and remained significantly improved after
repeated stimulations (T = 31, p = 0.002). During the 1-week
follow-up with standard therapy performance remained within
post-stimulation levels (T = 29, p = 0.576) and was maintained
until long-term follow-up (T = 31, p = 1.000) (Tables 1, 2,
Figure 3).
The main interaction of Time, Condition, and Test was highly
significant [F(12, 456) = 19.51, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34]. This inter-
action was due to a significant interaction for Time and Condition
for RTs for left invalid stimuli [F(1, 80) = 7.42, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.22], but not for right invalid stimuli [F(3, 64) = 0.50, p = 0.687,
η2p = 0.23], or phasic alertness [F(3, 312) = 2.00, p = 0.113, η2p =
0.02]. The significant interaction for left invalid stimuli was partly
explained by a strong trend of the single active condition lead-
ing to a larger improvement than the single sham condition
[F(1, 40) = 4.00, p = 0.052, η2p = 0.09], but was mainly explained
by a significantly larger improvement after repeated combined
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FIGURE 3 | Covert attention task (Posner paradigm, A–D) and
alertness (E,F). (A) Median reaction time (±SD) to invalid left-sided
stimuli pre (dark gray bars) and post (light gray bars) treatment:
single-sham (Sham 1), single-real (Real 1), single-real on the first day of
repetitive stimulation (Real 1/5), repeated-real during 5 days (Real 5/5),
standard therapy during 1 week after the end of stimulation (Follow-up
1), and 3 months after the end of stimulation (Follow-up 2). (B) Median
reaction time (±SD) to invalid left-sided stimuli on three different days
before real stimulation (pre-measures), after five consecutive sessions
with real stimulation (post-measures), and at Follow-up 1 and 2. (C) Ratio
of median reaction time post-pre to invalid left- and right-sided stimuli
after single-sham (Sham 1), single-real (Real 1), single-real on the first
day of repetitive stimulation (Real 1/5), and (D) after repeated-real during
5 days, and standard therapy during 1 week after the end of stimulation
(Follow-up 1). (E,F) Median reaction time (±SD) in intrinsic (E) and phasic
(F) alertness. ∗at least p < 0.05.
treatment as compared to cognitive training alone [F(1, 40) =
21.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35].
PAPER-PENCIL MEASURES
Star cancelation performance fluctuated over the course of reha-
bilitation and did not vary with stimulation. However, both
line bisection and figure copying improved after real stimulation
sessions.
Line bisection was deviated toward the right after the single real
stimulation session (5.3 ± 1.5 cm) and before beginning repeated
stimulation (4.7 ± 1.4 cm). By the end of the stimulation-week
the bisection had deviated toward the left side (−2.5 ± 1.7 cm)
and was maintained over 3 days without stimulation (−1.8 ±
1.6 cm). However, by the end of the 1-week follow-up it returned
to a rightward deviation (3.9 ± 0.7 cm), but reimproved until the
long-term follow-up (0.9 ± 2.3 cm) (Figure 4).
Figure copying was clearly impaired at baseline (5/9 points).
After the single real stimulation it improved by 1 point (6/9
points) and improved another 2 points (8/9 points) after repeated
stimulation sessions. However, performance declined again after
the end of real stimulation (6/9 points both at the 1-week as well
as the 3-month follow-up) (Figure 5).
ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING
During his stay at the rehabilitation center, N.H. did not show
an improvement in ADL as measured with the BRS (Baseline: 0.9
points; after repeated stimulations: 1.22 points). Only at the 3-
month follow-up all parameters showed an improvement (0.16
points).
SIDE-EFFECTS
The patient reported tingling sensations after the single sham as
well as after each of the real stimulation sessions.
DISCUSSION
This single-case study investigated the long-term impact of repet-
itive, biparietal tDCS on neglect symptoms in subacute stroke.
We found a significantly larger improvement in therapy outcome
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after combined biparietal tDCS and cognitive training, while cog-
nitive training on its own after single treatment sessions as well
as repeated sessions over a time-period of 5 days did not lead to
significant changes. Improvements in covert attention as well as
alertness were maintained over a follow-up period of 1 week as
well as a follow-up period of 3 months after the end of stimu-
lation, whereas performance improvements in paper-pencil tasks
were transient, returning to pre-stimulation levels at follow-up.
The main outcome measure (covert attention to left-sided
stimuli according to the Posner paradigm) showed the strongest
improvement, which was maintained until long-term follow-up,
however, without reaching normal levels. Though RTs to invalid
stimuli presented in the right hemi-field were also significantly
modulated by stimulation, the effects were not as strong as for
RTs to left-sided invalid stimuli. When comparing stimulation
effects on RTs toward left and right invalid stimuli as well as alert-
ness over the different stimulation conditions (single/repeated,
with/without tDCS), only RTs toward left invalid stimuli were
FIGURE 4 | Line bisection. A right-sided deviation was observed at
baseline and remained right-sided after one real stimulation session.
However, after five daily stimulation sessions the deviation turned to
the left (over-compensation) and remained left-sided for another 3 days
of standard therapy. At the 1-week follow-up as well as at the 3-month
follow-up the deviation returned to the right again. Values are presented
as mean ± standard deviation (SD).
significantly modulated by stimulation. This finding supports the
assumption of an asymmetrical distribution of brain activity in
spatial attention, where the right hemisphere is dominant for ori-
entation of covert attention to either hemi-field (Heilman and
Van Den Abell, 1980; Corbetta et al., 1993). On the other hand
it corroborates the hypothesis that reducing over-excitability in
the undamaged hemisphere can have a beneficial impact.
Alertness measures were used as control measures. After one
session of sham tDCS combined with neglect therapy intrinsic
and phasic alertness were reduced, which could be due to fatigue.
However, after one session of real tDCS, alertness improved sig-
nificantly. Right frontoparietal areas are specifically important for
alertness functions, which might explain why the placement of the
anode over the right parietal cortex showed a beneficial impact.
Nevertheless, alertness was not the driving factor for the improve-
ment in the RTs toward left-invalid stimuli as we could show that
after this initial improvement alertness measures remained within
an age-matched norm level and did not show the same pattern of
change as RTs toward left-invalid stimuli.
Interestingly, an improvement in most cognitive measures was
observed after only one real stimulation session. However, further
improvement and stabilization might arise only during repeated
and specific combined treatment, which might trigger physio-
logical processes that promote ongoing spontaneous recovery
processes. Previous studies found significant long-term changes
after only one tDCS session (e.g., Flöel et al., 2012). Effects
of tDCS have been associated with NMDA-receptor dependent
changes that reflect processes of long-term potentiation (LTP)
and depression (LTD) that can become apparent even during
or immediately after non-invasive brain stimulation (Liebetanz
et al., 2002; Nitsche et al., 2003).
Qualitative performance in the cancelation task was not mod-
ulated by stimulation, while performance in figure copying as
well as line bisection showed a maximal increase after 5 days
of repeated stimulation. In the line bisection task an initially
strong ipsilesional deviation, which can be typically observed
in neglect patients, turned into a contralesional deviation after
repeated tDCS sessions. Such a pattern can be interpreted as over-
compensation and occurs usually in patients with hemianopia.
Interestingly, over-compensation could still be observed 3 days
FIGURE 5 | Figure copying. (A) Before single real stimulation (5/9 points); (B) after single real stimulation (6/9 points); (C) before 5 daily real stimulations (6/9
points); (D) after 5 daily real stimulations (8/9 points).
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after the end of stimulation but returned to an ipsilesional
deviation at the 1-week follow-up, and finally approached nor-
mal levels at the 3-month follow-up. Sparing et al. (2009) also
observed a reduction of deviation in a line bisection task but
no over-compensation. This effect may be related to the bilat-
eral approach used in the present study. In sum, improvements
in paper-pencil tasks were not maintained until the 1-week and
3-month follow-up.
During the rehabilitation period, no measurable transfer of
positive effects on ADL was observed. Improvements were only
noticeable at the 3-month follow-up. Therefore, it is not possible
to determine the association of changes in ADL with stimulation
effects. However, in a study by Shindo et al. (2006) most improve-
ment occurred 2–4 weeks after repeated rTMS sessions, which
supports the assumption of a kick-off effect of stimulation, which
may only later translate into ADL improvements.
It remains to be confirmed in future studies in larger patient
samples and including a longer follow-up period that repeated
sessions may not only result in a long-term improvement but
also have a positive transfer effect on ADL functions. Additional
assessments of physiological correlates could furthermore help to
elucidate possible delayed stimulation effects.
Several drawbacks of this study need to be mentioned, which
are mostly due to the fact that the investigation took place dur-
ing the subacute stage. First, spontaneous recovery processes
need to be taken into account (Cramer, 2008). Furthermore, we
cannot rule out the possibility that effects are due to cognitive
training alone. Second, the patient participated in other neu-
rorehabilitative programs and practiced by himself. Both of these
factors could explain the observed improvements. However, spe-
cific effects during the active and sham single sessions contradict
these explanations. Furthermore, we would expect continuous
improvement over time. Third, some of the paper-pencil tasks
could not be assessed at all test-times due to fatigue and time
restrictions. Fourth, one could argue that positive effects were
caused by a mere improvement of alertness. Though alertness
functions might modulate neglect symptoms (Sturm et al., 2006),
they do not alone account for this improvement (e.g., after
sham stimulation we observe opposite effects on alertness and
covert attention). Furthermore, while alertness remained vari-
able within normal levels during repeated stimulation, RTs to
invalid stimuli in the covert attention measure improved fur-
ther. Nyffeler et al. (2009) also suggested that effects were not
due to an unspecific increase of alertness, as RTs to right-sided
stimuli did not change significantly in their study. We found
neither a significant modulating effect of stimulation for alert-
ness nor for invalid right-sided stimuli. Finally, it is in the
nature of single-case studies that it is not possible to gen-
eralize results to a greater population. Nevertheless, they are
helpful in guiding future studies with larger patient popula-
tions and can give us valuable insight into specific diseases,
providing unique information that might be useful for indi-
vidualized treatment approaches. Specifically in the subacute
stage after a stroke many factors contribute to a large variabil-
ity, which is a reason why few studies investigate the impact
of brain stimulation in subacute patients, although this might
be the most fruitful period to stimulate the brain. We may be
able to support and guide ongoing compensatory and restitution
processes not only through behavioral therapies, but combine
them with non-invasive brain stimulation in order to increase
beneficial effects.
In sum, during combined therapy functional improvement
was significantly higher than during standard therapy alone and
was maintained over a follow-up period of 1 week and 3 months.
A transfer effect to ADL was only observed at the long-term follow
up. Future studies should investigate larger patient populations
and longer treatments periods.
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A large amount of studies of the last decades revealed an association between human
behavior and oscillatory activity in the human brain. Alike, abnormalities of oscillatory
activity were related with pathological behavior in many neuropsychiatric disorders,
such as in Parkinson’s disease (PD) or in schizophrenia (SCZ). As a therapeutic
tool, non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) has demonstrated the potential to improve
behavioral performance in patients suffering from neuropsychiatric disorders. Since
evidence accumulates that NIBS might be able to modulate oscillatory activity and
related behavior in a scientific setting, this review focuses on discussing potential
interventional strategies to target abnormalities in oscillatory activity in neuropsychiatric
disorders. In particular, we will review oscillatory changes described in patients after
stroke, with PD or suffering from SCZ. Potential ways of targeting interventionally the
underlying pathological oscillations to improve related pathological behavior will be
further discussed.
Keywords: non-invasive brain stimulation, oscillatory activity, stroke, Parkinson’s disease, schizophrenia
Importance of Oscillations for Information Processing in the
Healthy Brain
Since Berger first described oscillatory activity of the brain in the 1920s, oscillations have been
investigated extensively and research revealed clear relevance of human brain oscillations for
information processing and behavior (Singer and Gray, 1995; Engel et al., 2001; Brown, 2003;
Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004; Pfurtscheller et al., 2005; Schoffelen et al., 2005; Fries, 2009; Jensen
and Mazaheri, 2010).
Generally, an oscillation is a periodic fluctuation caused by changes in excitability of
a group of neurons, measured on the scalp as differences in voltage with techniques like
electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetencephalography (MEG). Oscillations are suggested to be
able to temporally coordinate and control neuronal firing and are proposed to be one basic principle
of information processing in the human brain (Engel et al., 2001; Varela et al., 2001; Buzsáki and
Draguhn, 2004). Based on phenomenological observations, a division in frequency bands has been
established. Usually, oscillation frequencies are categorized as delta-band (1.5--4 Hz), theta-band
(4--7 Hz), alpha-band (8--12 Hz), beta-band (12--30 Hz) and gamma-band (30--80 Hz). Since
this review will focus on specific aspects of pathological oscillatory activity, the next paragraph
will briefly introduce selected relevant findings for each frequency band in the healthy brain.
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Slow delta-band resting-state oscillations are prominent in
sleep and are, like theta-band oscillations, associated with
memory consolidation (Marshall et al., 2006; Rasch and Born,
2013). Alpha-band oscillations are prominent oscillations in
the resting brain and alpha-band activity is associated with a
wide range of brain functions like visual perception (Busch
et al., 2009), working memory and short-term-memory retention
(Palva and Palva, 2007). Alpha-band responses to eyes closing
and opening respectively have been described since the first
EEG-recordings and have been interpreted as desynchronization
of affected neurons by information processing. This task-
related suppression of alpha-band activity has been extensively
investigated for other areas like motor cortex, and is called
event-related desynchronization (Pfurtscheller, 1992; Klimesch
et al., 2007). Besides event-related desynchronisation, there
is event-related synchronization, which has been proposed to
reflect cortical idling (Pfurtscheller et al., 1996). Furthermore,
alpha-band activity was induced during inhibitory control
processes (Hummel et al., 2002; Haegens et al., 2010; Jensen
and Mazaheri, 2010; Sauseng et al., 2013). Beta-band oscillations
are, like alpha-band oscillations, involved in perceptual processes
(Engel and Fries, 2010). Another functional relevance of
beta-band oscillations is sensorimotor control, their activity
has been described during motor tasks and maintenance of
contractions (Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999; Kilner
et al., 2000; Engel and Fries, 2010). Since beta oscillations
are described to be associated with a steady state of the
motor system, it has been hypothesized that they signal
the ‘‘status quo’’ (Gilbertson et al., 2005; Engel and Fries,
2010). Having been extensively investigated, task-related or
evoked gamma-band oscillations respectively are thought to
be involved into a broad range of behavioral components
like visual perception and attention, and are associated with
several memory functions (Singer and Gray, 1995; Tallon-
Baudry et al., 1998; Herrmann et al., 2004; Jensen et al.,
2007).
Moreover, besides local phenomena, mechanisms of
oscillatory communication have been identified. For example
synchronization of phases is suggested to be one basic
principle for long range communication and is a component of
connectivity measurements like coherence (Varela et al., 2001;
Hummel and Gerloff, 2005; Schoffelen et al., 2005). Furthermore
high frequency activity has been described as being depended on
low frequency phase (Osipova et al., 2008; Jensen and Mazaheri,
2010; Buzsáki and Wang, 2012).
Underlining a potential causal relationship, both oscillatory
activity and behavior were modulated by non-invasive brain
stimulation (NIBS) in several studies. Before focussing on
abnormal oscillations and pathological behavior, the influence of
NIBS on oscillations of the healthy brain will be discussed in the
next section.
Modulation of Oscillations by Rhythmic
NIBS in the Healthy Brain
Several recent studies combining NIBS and EEG revealed that
NIBS is able to modulate oscillations in the healthy brain
(Plewnia et al., 2008; Pogosyan et al., 2009; Zaehle et al.,
2010; Thut et al., 2011; Vernet et al., 2013). Generally, one
basic technique of NIBS is Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
(TMS). By depolarization of neurons, a TMS single pulse
applied over the hand knob area typically leads to a motor
evoked potential in the contralateral hand (Hummel and Cohen,
2005; Hallett, 2007). Combining TMS with EEG, an increase
of the intrinsic frequency of the TMS-affected area and their
thalamic loops respectively has been observed (Rosanova et al.,
2009). Another basic method of NIBS is Transcranial Electric
Stimulation (TES). In contrast to TMS, TES is suggested to
tune oscillators by modulating the membrane potential of
neurons and their spontaneous firing rates (Nitsche and Paulus,
2000).
Regarding rhythmic applications of TMS, there is e.g.,
the theta burst stimulation (TBS) protocol, in which a
triple pulse with an interpulse frequency of 50 Hz is
applied in a theta rhythm. Applied continuously, TBS has
an inhibitory effect, applied in an intermittent mode TBS
has an excitatory effect (Huang et al., 2005; Hallett, 2007).
Furthermore, repetitive TMS (rTMS) applied in a frequency
below or at 1 Hz has an inhibitory effect, application
of frequencies at faster rates (>5 Hz) leads to excitation
(Pascual-Leone et al., 1994; Hummel and Cohen, 2005).
Regarding patterned applications of TES, there is transcranial
alternating current stimulation (tACS), a sinusoidal stimulation
with spatially alternating anodal and cathodal components.
Furthermore, there are transcranial random noise stimulation
(tRNS) and direct current stimulation with a sinusoidal
component, called oscillatory tDCS (Siebner and Ziemann,
2010).
Depending on their effect on oscillations, a division of
rhythmic applications of NIBS into two concepts has been
proposed (Siebner and Ziemann, 2010). On the one hand
rhythmic NIBS can be applied in an oscillatory mode in
the frequency of the targeted oscillation or its oscillator,
respectively (Pogosyan et al., 2009; Zaehle et al., 2010; Thut
et al., 2011). In the following, this mode will be called
‘‘direct’’, because there is a direct interference of stimulation
frequency and the frequency of the oscillator. On the other
hand, one can apply rhythmic NIBS in a non oscillatory
mode, not reflecting the targeted oscillations or the frequency
of the targeted oscillator. In this case NIBS is suggested
to modulate underlying oscillatory mechanisms (Nitsche and
Paulus, 2000; Lapenta et al., 2013; Vernet et al., 2013).
This non oscillatory mode will be called ‘‘indirect’’ in the
following.
In a study on ‘‘direct’’ modulation of ongoing oscillations,
five pulses of TMS with an adjusted individual alpha frequency
were able to entrain a parietal alpha oscillator specifically
in its natural frequency (Thut et al., 2011). tACS entrained
individual parietal-central alpha oscillations if applied in the
endogenous frequency at the occipital pole (Zaehle et al.,
2010). Furthermore, 10 Hz repetitive bifocal TMS over
left primary motor cortex and over visual cortex led to an
increase of alpha-band and lower beta coherence between
the stimulated sites (Plewnia et al., 2008), supporting the
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exciting concept to not only influence local oscillatory
activity but also long-range oscillatory interactions by
NIBS.
CombiningNIBSwith EEG, ‘‘direct’’ applications of NIBS also
modulated both oscillatory activity and behavioral components,
thereby providing evidence for a causal role of oscillations
and its modulation. In a visuomotor task tACS applied at
20 Hz reduced peak velocity on the one hand and increased
coherence between scalp-recorded activity and EMG activity
at 20 Hz on the other hand (Pogosyan et al., 2009). Recently
it has been shown by concurrent EEG-tACS that 10 Hz
stimulation can entrain parieto-occipital alpha activity and
modulate target detection performance in an oddball task
in a phase-dependent manner (Helfrich et al., 2014). In an
auditory experiment perception thresholds were dependent on
the phase of the entrained oscillation using 10 Hz oscillatory
tDCS (Neuling et al., 2012). Furthermore slow wave oscillatory
tDCS in a frequency of 0.75 Hz applied during non-rapid-eye-
movement sleep induced an increase of slow wave oscillations
and enhanced the retention of declarative memories (Marshall
et al., 2006). However, this study was critically evaluated by
the same group showing that the total amount of current
and not the oscillatory component of the oscillatory tDCS
might have been the main effective variable (Groppa et al.,
2010).
As an ‘‘indirect’’ rhythmic application of NIBS, continuous
theta burst stimulation (cTBS) increased theta-band power
and decreased beta-band power in an eyes-closed resting
experiment (Vernet et al., 2013). As an underlying mechanism
the authors suggest that cTBS modulates synchronization of
relevant oscillators. In a non resting setup cTBS increased event-
related lower beta power applied over primary motor cortex for
at least 30 min (Noh et al., 2012) and 40 trains of ten excitatory
TMS pulses at 20 Hz increased alpha and beta-band event-
related synchronization at the stimulation site (Veniero et al.,
2011).
Like ‘‘direct’’ applications, also ‘‘indirect’’ applications were
able to modulate both oscillations and behavior. Inhibitory
1 Hz rTMS on right prefrontal cortex reduced both response
times for congruent cued targets and ipsilateral alpha amplitude
(Sauseng et al., 2011). In another study 5 Hz tDCS (theta tDCS)
decreased both slow wave activity, frontal slow EEG spindle
power and consolidation of declarative memory (Marshall et al.,
2011).
Taken together evidence is increasing that oscillations, being
one basic principle of information processing in the human
brain, can be modulated by NIBS. In many cases, this suggests
a possible mechanism for how NIBS may exert its effects on
cognitive processes or behavior.
In the following paragraph, alteration of oscillatory activity
will be discussed as a pathophysiological mechanism in
neuropsychiatric disorders. As examples, we will consider
oscillatory changes in the alpha-band after stroke, beta-band
changes in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) and altered
gamma-band activity in patients suffering from schizophrenia
(SCZ). Next, we will discuss potential applications of rhythmic
NIBS like rTMS and tACS in order to modulate pathological
oscillations and potentially improve the clinical outcome in
patients.
Role of Oscillatory Activity in the
Pathophysiology of Neuropsychiatric
Disorders
Stroke is one of the leading causes for acquired long-term
disability in industrialized countries (Kolominsky-Rabas et al.,
2001) and, therefore, studies on neurophysiological changes
accompanying and following stroke have received considerable
interest.
Several studies have observed changes in alpha-band activity
recorded over the affected hemisphere (AH) after stroke in the
resting brain (Tecchio et al., 2005, 2006; Dubovik et al., 2012;
Westlake et al., 2012; Laaksonen et al., 2013). Thirty-two patients
with stroke of the middle cerebral artery within the first 10 days
(Tecchio et al., 2005) and 56 stroke patients in a chronic stage
(Tecchio et al., 2006) showed a reduction of the individual alpha
frequency in the AH. In 16 patients with affected upper limp
function, amplitude of alpha-band oscillations increased in the
AH compared to the unaffected hemisphere (UH) and to control
subjects 1 month and 3 months after stroke (Laaksonen et al.,
2013). In the latter study, alpha oscillations had a burst-like
pattern and were found both in rolandic and in parietal regions.
However, these changes in alpha-band activity did not correlate
with the clinical outcome in patients (Tecchio et al., 2005, 2006;
Laaksonen et al., 2013).
In contrast, two studies addressing interregional resting-
state functional connectivity (FC, based on imaginary coherence,
IC) were able to correlate changes of alpha-band activity
with performance (Dubovik et al., 2012) and motor recovery
(Westlake et al., 2012) after stroke. Twenty patients showed a
decrease of alpha-band FC of central electrodes over the lesions
to all other electrodes 3 months after stroke of middle or/and
anterior cerebral artery (Dubovik et al., 2012). Moreover, motor
functions correlated with IC values of the precentral gyrus and
all other investigated brain regions. Since FC changes were
not restricted to the boundaries of the lesions but restricted
to a specific frequency, the authors emphasize that oscillatory
changes are probably not due to tissue loss but to changes in
affected tissue. Furthermore the study showed that changes in
FC are probably due to changes in alpha phase synchrony rather
than to changes in alpha amplitude (Stam et al., 2007; Dubovik
et al., 2012). Another study found changes in alpha-band activity
in the acute phase of stroke (Westlake et al., 2012). Greater
initial functional alpha-band connectivity of ipsilesional primary
sensory cortex and prefrontal cortex in the acute phase correlated
with better clinical improvement 8--12 weeks after stroke in
fourteen patients with motor impairment of the upper limb.
Next to changes in alpha-band activity, also changes of
slow wave oscillations were found after brain injuries like head
trauma and stroke (Lewine et al., 1999; Butz et al., 2004). In
line with these results a shift from fast to slow rhythms could
be observed after stroke (Dubovik et al., 2012) and slow delta
wave oscillations of the UH have been shown to be correlated
with clinical outcome after stroke (Tecchio et al., 2007). Patients
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with persisting abnormal slow wave oscillations (abnormal low
frequency magnetic activity) had a significantly worse clinical
outcome compared to patients without persisting slow wave
oscillatory components (Laaksonen et al., 2013).
Besides clinical observations, slow wave activity has also
been investigated in an animal stroke model, in which slow
wave oscillations were associated with axonal sprouting after
thermal-ischemic lesioning (Carmichael and Chesselet, 2002). In
this model, a treatment with tetrodotoxin reduced both slow
oscillations and axonal sprouting. In another study neuronal
bursts were able to reduce inhibitory factors that surround axons
(Ming et al., 2001). In a recent publication it could be shown that
new patterns of axonal sprouting mediated recovery after stroke
in an animal model (Overman et al., 2012). Taken together, these
data provided first evidence that there might be an association of
slow neuronal firing, axonal sprouting and behavioral recovery.
PD has a high prevalence in aging populations (von
Campenhausen et al., 2005). Evidence is increasing that clinical
symptoms of PD are related to abnormalities in beta-band
activity (Levy et al., 2002; Kühn et al., 2008, 2009; Crowell
et al., 2012; Heinrichs-Graham et al., 2014; Herz et al., 2014).
Prominent beta-band activity has been recorded in the basal
ganglia in animal models of PD and in PD patients with deep
brain stimulation (DBS; Levy et al., 2000, 2002; Kühn et al., 2008;
Bergmann et al., 2012; Heinrichs-Graham et al., 2014; Herz et al.,
2014). Both dopamine treatment and DBS have been shown to
reduce beta-band activity (Brown et al., 2001; Levy et al., 2002;
Kühn et al., 2008). The modulation of beta-band activity by
dopaminergic treatment (Kühn et al., 2009) and by DBS (Ray
et al., 2008) was associated with a reduction of bradykinesia and
rigidity. A recent study in PD also revealed that treatment with
levodopa reinforced beta-band coupling between primary motor
cortex and lateral premotor cortex (Herz et al., 2014). Another
study demonstrated a lack of physiological event-related beta
desynchronization which could be modulated by levodopa in PD
(Heinrichs-Graham et al., 2014). Taken together, in PD abnormal
beta oscillations are a consistent finding with a strong relation
to abnormal behavior. Hence, beta-band oscillations could be a
promising target for interventional strategies based on rhythmic
NIBS.
SCZ has a life-time prevalence of 0.4% and belongs to the
thirty most disabling disorders worldwide (Murray and Lopez,
1997; McGrath et al., 2008). Besides psychotic symptoms patients
with SCZ show abnormalities in cognitive performance, e.g.,
in working memory, cognitive control and sensory gating.
These cognitive deficits are, on the one hand, associated with
clinical and functional outcome (Green et al., 2000; Gold, 2004;
McGrath et al., 2008). On the other hand they are related
with abnormalities in gamma-band oscillations (Johannesen
et al., 2005; Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Barr et al., 2010; Sun et al.,
2011). Compared to healthy controls, patients with SCZ showed
excessive gamma-band oscillations in conditions with high
memory load (Barr et al., 2010). Altered gamma-band activity
was also found in the resting brain of SCZ patients (Andreou
et al., 2014). Furthermore, evoked gamma power and phase
synchronization were reduced after auditory stimulation in
patients with SCZ (Light et al., 2006). In line with these results,
after a 40 Hz binaural stimulation a reduced phase locking
between primary auditory cortices was observed in patients with
SCZ, which correlated with auditory hallucination scores (Mulert
et al., 2011).
Moreover, combination of TMS and EEG has been used in
SCZ research by using a TMS double pulse paradigm (Farzan
et al., 2009) called long intracortical inhibition (LICI). LICI
is an established, probably GABAB mediated measurement
for cortical inhibition in motor cortex using motor-evoked
potentials as a readout (McDonnell et al., 2006). Both GABAA
and GABAB suggested to be involved in the generation of
gamma-band oscillations (Wang and Buzsáki, 1996; Brown
et al., 2007). Recently, EEG parameters were established as
another readout for double pulse TMS paradigms in non motor
areas like DLPFC (Daskalakis et al., 2008). A study in healthy
subjects demonstrated that applying a TMS LICI protocol
over DLPFC led to a decrease of gamma oscillations whereas
gamma oscillations over motor cortex did not change after
LICI application (Farzan et al., 2009). In contrast, patients with
SCZ showed an impaired LICI-mediated inhibition of gamma
oscillations in DLPFC compared to healthy participants and
patients with bipolar disorder (Farzan et al., 2010a).
In summary, gamma-band oscillations have been related with
cognitive performance in the healthy brain (Tallon-Baudry et al.,
1998; Herrmann et al., 2004). In SCZ abnormal gamma-band
activity was associated with behavioral impairment (Johannesen
et al., 2005; Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Barr et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2011;
Andreou et al., 2014). In line with these results, gamma-band
activity could be one potential target of NIBS in SCZ.
Targeting Pathological Oscillations by
Non-Invasive Brain Stimulation
This section will address the question of how rhythmic NIBS
could be used to modulate pathological oscillations and thereby
modulate behavior and clinical symptoms in stroke, PD and SCZ.
Several studies have demonstrated that NIBS can improve
functional outcome of stroke patients (Hummel and Cohen,
2005; Hummel et al., 2005, 2006; Kim et al., 2006; Cazzoli et al.,
2012; for review Schulz et al., 2013). To our knowledge, however,
there is to date limited data on the effect of NIBS on oscillations in
stroke. In six patients with severe hemiparesis, tDCS modulated
alpha-band oscillations of sensorimotor areas during imaginary
movements of the affected hand (Kasashima et al., 2012). Since
detection of stable brain rhythms can be difficult in damaged
brain areas after stroke, the aim of the latter study was to enhance
oscillatory activity in the lesioned hemisphere by tDCS in order
to be able to achieve a stable and well distinguishable brain
signal for use in a brain-computer-interface (BCI). Event related
alpha-band desynchronisation, a correlate of local activation, was
significantly enhanced after tDCS stimulation compared to sham
stimulation, making the signal more suitable for a BCI.
Although several studies have applied NIBS in stroke patients,
only one case report has used rhythmic NIBS to modulate
oscillations. In a patient with aphasia 10 Hz rTMS modulated
both oscillatory activity and clinical outcome (Dammekens et al.,
2014). In the treated patient the stroke lesion affected the left
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inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which is part of the language
network (Crosson et al., 2007). Generally, according to the
concept of an interhemispheric rivalry in stroke (Murase et al.,
2004; Duque et al., 2005), inhibitory rTMS protocols of 1 Hz
stimulation frequency are applied to the healthy hemisphere
in order to prevent interhemispheric maladaptive processes
in contralesional networks. Another approach is to excite the
damaged hemisphere with rTMS protocols with a frequency
above 5 Hz (Lefaucheur, 2006). In the latter study, excitatory
rTMS was applied over the damaged left IFG in daily sessions
over 3 weeks leading to an increase of FC between left and right
IFG in the theta- and high beta-band. Behaviorally, the patient
improved on repetition tasks for naming and comprehension.
In addition to being a case report, this study does certainly not
establish a causal relation between modulation of oscillations
and changes in behavior. Nevertheless, this study provides first
hints that rhythmic NIBS might be effective in modulating both
oscillatory activity and clinical outcome.
Based on the emerging understanding about the relationship
between NIBS and the modulation or induction of oscillatory
activity in the last decad, hypotheses on how to enhance brain
functioning and ameliorate impaired behavior after focal brain
lesions can be defined. These hypotheses would be amenable
to evaluation in controlled clinical trials in stroke patients.
Combining the evidence that (1) changes in alpha-band activity
are correlated with recovery and performance after stroke
(Dubovik et al., 2012; Westlake et al., 2012) and that (2)
NIBS is able modulate alpha-band activity (Plewnia et al., 2008;
Thut et al., 2011) one could consider applying rhythmic alpha-
NIBS after stroke. As illustrated schematically in Figure 1A,
bifocal TMS at alpha frequency could entrain alpha-band activity
between lesioned areas and relevant neighboring regions. In this
context, bifocal application should potentially be performed with
a certain phase lag between the targeted areas. An application
of less focal alpha tACS in a montage covering both targeted
areas would be another option. In both cases rhythmic NIBS
would potentially lead to a synchronization in the alpha-band
of lesioned sites and relevant connected areas like ipsilateral
and contralateral premotor cortices respectively (Johansen-Berg
et al., 2002; Ward et al., 2003; Gerloff et al., 2006; Rehme et al.,
2011; Dubovik et al., 2012; Westlake et al., 2012).
Another option to entrain alpha-band activity could be to add
noise, as shown in Figure 1B. tRNS is a technique which has
been used to modulate cortical excitability and BOLD activity
(Terney et al., 2008; Saiote et al., 2013). It has been suggested that,
by adding noise, tRNS is able to augment cortical oscillations of
different frequencies (Antal and Paulus, 2013). In stroke patients,
tRNS could elevate reduced alpha-band activity in affected parts
of the brain back to suprathreshold levels (Moss et al., 2004) and
thereby restore important connective functions. Analogue to the
potential effects on the aging brain, rhythmic or patterned NIBS
like tRNS, tACS and rTMS could be used to entrain recruitment
of other brain areas to support both affected networks and
functional outcome (Gutchess, 2014).
Regarding the results of reduced alpha peak frequency and
increased alpha amplitude in the AH after stroke (Tecchio
et al., 2005) one could argue that behavioral changes might be
FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic: Bifocal repetitive TMS (rTMS) restores alpha-band
activity. After stroke, alpha oscillators (red line, left) of the affected area (red X,
primary motor cortex) show unsteady phase properties. Since physiological
behavior depends on a constant phase relation of alpha oscillations between
the affected area and connected networks (blue O, blue line, left, premotor
areas), the patient is impaired (behavior, left, e.g., muscle contractions). After
application of bifocal, rTMS at alpha frequency over both areas with a lag
reflecting physiological offset of oscillators, oscillatory activity is synchronized
(blue and red line, right) in terms of a constant phase lag. Behavior improves
(right). Please note that conditions are highly simplified. First, next to phase,
also amplitude is important for signal processing. Second, in the presented
physiological condition (right) phases are completely locked, which is artificial.
Naturally, phases would fluctuate. (B) Schematic: tRNS augments alpha
oscillators. After stroke alpha activity (red line, left) of the affected area (red X)
is reduced. Threshold for establishing information processing with a related
network (blue line, left) is not reached and dependent normal behavior is
reduced. tRNS applied over the affected oscillator augments alpha activity by
adding noise (red line, right). Information processing is re-established and
behavior improves. Please note that conditions are very much simplified. In
both cases, phase is totally locked without any phase lag. Biological signals
would fluctuate.
related to alpha induced inhibition (Jensen and Mazaheri, 2010).
In contrast to changes in FC (Dubovik et al., 2012; Westlake
et al., 2012), these changes were not correlated with behavioral
changes, however, and gaining clinical benefit by modulating
these features of local oscillatory activity remains an untested
possibility.
In addition to the modulation of electrophysiological
dynamics, NIBS might also influence molecular environment
of neurons. By modulating slow wave activity occurring after
stroke (Tecchio et al., 2005; Dubovik et al., 2012; Laaksonen
et al., 2013) related neural repair might be modulated. Since
there is first evidence in an animal model that there might
be an association of slow neuronal firing, axonal recovery
and recovery of function (Ming et al., 2001; Carmichael
and Chesselet, 2002; Overman et al., 2012), one should
consider a slow frequency stimulation as performed before
in different contexts (Marshall et al., 2011) to gain axonal
sprouting and improve clinical outcome after brain injury like
stroke.
As discussed in the preceding section, pathological beta
oscillations are a consistent finding in basal ganglia correlated
with behavioral changes in PD patients (Levy et al., 2002; Kühn
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et al., 2008, 2009; Crowell et al., 2012; Heinrichs-Graham et al.,
2014; Herz et al., 2014). It is known that these abnormal beta-
band oscillations can bemodulated by established DBS protocols.
In addition, a number of studies investigated the effects of NIBS
on motor function in patients with PD. Applying 5 Hz rTMS
over primary motor cortex led to a short term increase of motor
function in six PD patients (Siebner et al., 2000). A 5 Hz rTMS
protocol consisting of 2000 pulses per day over ten days led to
significant reduction of motor impairment (Khedr et al., 2003).
Moreover, rTMS over inferior frontal cortex modulated event-
related potentials in the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in patients
with implanted DBS electrodes (Rektor et al., 2010). Though
different stimulation locations were used for both techniques,
resting-state functional-connectivity MRI analysis revealed, that
targets of stimulation might be nodes in the same network (Fox
et al., 2014).
In our view, the clinical effectiveness of these two stimulation
techniques and their probably network-associated ability to
modulate cortex-basal ganglia dynamics point to the great
potential of NIBS applications in PD. As discussed above,
pathological beta oscillations could be a promising target for
rhythmic NIBS. A recent study has demonstrated the possibility
to enhance the ‘‘akinetic’’ effect of beta oscillations. In a task
where subjects got a cue to stop a planned grip-movement, tACS
stimulation with 20 Hz significantly reduced grip force in that
condition (Joundi et al., 2012). One the one hand these results
underline the potential impact of enhanced beta oscillations in
‘‘akinetic’’ disorders like PD. On the other hand, the results point
out the ability of cortical NIBS to affect loops involving the basal
ganglia.
To our knowledge, however, it has not been possible to
reduce pathological beta oscillations in PD by NIBS. Potentially,
reducing beta activity could be achieved by phase cancellation.
Phase cancellation by application of tACS has already been
used for tremor reduction in PD. Targeting tremor-associated
oscillations in such an approach in patients with tremor-
dominant PD led to an almost 50% suppression of resting
tremor (Brittain et al., 2013). As a first step in the study, the
individual tremor frequency of each patient was measured. In a
second step, tremor-frequency adjusted tACS was applied over
the primary motor cortex at different phase angles. Certain
phase angles led to tremor reduction whereas stimulation
at different angles led to an increase of tremor. This study
underlines the great potential of individualized application of
rhythmic NIBS and suggests the potential efficacy of phase
cancellation. Based on monkey data, phase cancellation has also
been suggested as a physiological mechanism for controlling
tremor in spinal cord networks (Williams et al., 2010). As
illustrated schematically in Figure 2A, phase cancellation might
be applied to pathological beta oscillations in PD potentially
targeting bradykinesia and rigidity (Ray et al., 2008; Kühn et al.,
2009).
Since tremor shifted to a different frequency in some of the
patients in the study by Brittain et al. (2013), tACS application
should be adjusted to ongoing tremor activity to provide an
effective modulation, as shown schematically in Figure 2B. To
this end, online read-out techniques that allow stimulation in
dependence on ongoing oscillatory activity (Berényi et al., 2012;
Bergmann et al., 2012) will be highly advantageous in order
to adjust NIBS to changing pathologic frequency and provide
effective phase cancellation and reduction of symptoms. In
a clinical setting such an ‘‘online’’, closed-loop approach has
already been tested successfully: in PD DBS has been triggered
based on recorded local field potentials (Little et al., 2013).
These interventional strategies are interesting and potentially
promising for amelioration of symptoms not well responsive
to DBS.
In SCZ, combining single or double pulse TMS with
EEG revealed abnormalities of cortical inhibition of gamma
oscillations (Farzan et al., 2009, 2010b). Both studies point
towards a scientific benefit of combining these methods and
suggest that measurements on TMS-evoked oscillatory activity
could be useful as a ‘‘biomarker’’ for neuropsychiatric disorders.
Applying a similar approach, TMS evoked EEG activity has
been proposed to add information to diagnostic procedures for
chronic disorders of consciousness (Ragazzoni et al., 2013).
Abnormal gamma-band oscillations of patients with SCZ have
been modulated by rTMS (Barr et al., 2011). In an N-back
working memory task, subjects were asked to compare stimuli
with those from previous trials. 20 Hz TMS applied bilaterally
to DLPFC in reduced gamma activity in the SCZ patients (Barr
et al., 2011). This approach, which is schematically presented
in Figure 2C, could be considered as an ‘‘indirect’’ application,
in which underlying gamma oscillators were modulated by
an excitatory 20 Hz rTMS protocol not directly targeted at
gamma frequencies. Since rTMS of a single session in the latter
study did not change working memory behavior, the same
group performed a pilot study with 20 Hz rTMS over DLPFC
bilateraly for twenty sessions in a randomized double-blinded
sham-controlled manner. This application led to a significant
improvement of accuracy in working memory underlining that
rTMS might potentially improve cognitive impairments in SCZ
patients (Barr et al., 2013). Moreover, these results point towards
the need for repetitive sessions of NIBS to gain long term effects.
However, changes in gamma oscillations were not addressed in
this follow-up study (Barr et al., 2013).
Taken together, application of rTMS seem to be promising
for the treatment of negative symptoms of SCZ, although so
far only demonstrated in proof-of-principle studies. Gamma
oscillations show a high diversity in SCZ (Sun et al., 2011)
and, hence, a direct link between the modulation of gamma
oscillations and an improved cognitive performance in SCZ
remains speculative. Nevertheless, further applications for the
treatment of negative symptoms based on safe and low cost NIBS
techniques addressing specifically gamma oscillations should be
further developed and evaluated in detail in future studies.
Summary and Further Perspectives of
NIBS
Evidence is increasing that NIBS may provide a novel and
promising strategy to modulate both oscillatory activity and
related behavior in the healthy brain. To date only a limited
number of studies have employed NIBS to modulate oscillatory
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Schematic: tACS in Parkinson’s disease (PD).
Abnormal beta oscillations (red line, left and right) are related to
rigidity and bradykinesia. Application of tACS with a phase lag of
180◦ (blue line, right) leads to a reduction of these pathological
oscillations (black line, right) by phase cancellation (right). As a
result, rigidity and bradykinesia are reduced. Please note that to
date phase cancellation has been thought to be able to reduce
tremor in PD by affecting tremor related cortical frequencies. To our
knowledge, beta frequency has not yet been targeted by NIBS
using the phase cancellation concept. (B) Schematic: tACS in PD
using online readout techniques. Since it has been reported that
during tACS application tremor frequency changed in patients with
PD, more online readout techniques should be developed to adjust
NIBS applications. After application of 20 Hz tACS (see panel A),
pathological beta rhythm changes its frequency to 15 Hz (red line,
left). tACS of 20 Hz with 180◦ phase lag (blue line, left) looses its
effect (black line, left). After online adjustment, tACS shifts to 15 Hz
(blue line, right). Pathological beta (red line, right) is again reduced
(black line, right). (C) Schematic: rTMS in schizophrenia (SCZ). By
modulating oscillators of abnormal gamma-band activity (red line,
left), amplitude is reduced (black line, right) and related behavioral
impairments are reduced.
abnormalities in neuropsychiatric disorders as a treatment
strategy. As discussed above, this concept is supported by studies
suggesting, for example, that tACS can reduce tremor in PD
(Brittain et al., 2013) or that rhythmic TMS can improve both
working memory (Barr et al., 2013) and impaired gamma activity
in patients with SCZ (Barr et al., 2011). In stroke, NIBS might
modulate both oscillatory activity and clinical performance
(Dammekens et al., 2014). Taken together, the application of
rhythmic NIBS in order to modulate underlying, disease related
oscillations is a very promising approach.
Next steps will be the development and evaluation of safe
and low-cost applications of patterned NIBS in order to target
pathological oscillatory activity to achieve improvement of
clinical symptoms of neuropsychiatric patients impacting on
their daily life. Demonstrating the expected effects of NIBS in
patients might have an incremental impact on treatment of
neuropsychiatric disorders and subsequently the health system,
as novel devices has been developed for home-based, self-
application of NIBS. As soon as such approaches will be
proven save in the home-based environment, they may offer
a cost-effective strategy to significantly enhance treatment
intensity.
Still one can argue critically that oscillatory changes
after NIBS application are not a cause but a by-product
merely associated with behavioral changes. However, combining
NIBS with electrophysiological recordings bears great potential
to establish the specificity and reliability of oscillations as
biomarkers.
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This mini-review focuses on noninvasive brain stimulation techniques as an augmentation
method for the treatment of persistent auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) in patients with
schizophrenia. Paradigmatically, we place emphasis on transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS). We specifically discuss rationales of stimulation and consider methodological
questions together with issues of phenotypic diversity in individuals with drug-refractory
and persistent AVH. Eventually, we provide a brief outlook for future investigations and
treatment directions. Taken together, current evidence suggests TMS as a promising
method in the treatment of AVH. Low-frequency stimulation of the superior temporal
cortex (STC) may reduce symptom severity and frequency. Yet clinical effects are
of relatively short duration and effect sizes appear to decrease over time along
with publication of larger trials. Apart from considering other innovative stimulation
techniques, such as transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS), and optimizing
stimulation protocols, treatment of AVH using noninvasive brain stimulation will essentially
rely on accurate identification of potential responders and non-responders for these
treatment modalities. In this regard, future studies will need to consider distinct
phenotypic presentations of AVH in patients with schizophrenia, together with the
putative functional neurocircuitry underlying these phenotypes.
Keywords: transcranial magnetic stimulation, auditory verbal hallucinations, phenotypes, schizophrenia, brain
stimulation, brain function
Introduction
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) are defined as auditive perceptions involving a verbal
aspect in the absence of a provoking external stimulus (Aleman and de Haan, 1998). They
represent a core symptom of schizophrenia and related spectrum disorders, but they also
frequently occur in other psychiatric entities and in the non-psychiatric general population.
In schizophrenia the term AVH comprises a multi-dimensional and heterogeneous group of
symptoms that can be differentiated by certain phenomenological aspects such as subjective
loudness, acoustic clarity, location and subjective reality. About 60–80% of patients affected
by schizophrenia experience AVH (Aleman and de Haan, 1998; Hugdahl et al., 2008), such
as conversing, commenting or imperative spoken speech in distinct voices. These symptoms,
especially when the verbal content is experienced as negative, intrusive or persecutory,
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often induce high levels of distress and lead to significant
psychosocial impairment. AVH are a highly relevant feature
of schizophrenia that have attracted extensive clinical,
phenomenological and neurobiological interest, yet treating
these symptoms, especially in persons suffering from persistent
AVH which do either not or not sufficiently respond to
psychopharmacotherapy, is still a major clinical challenge. In
approximately 25% of patients with schizophrenia, AVH are
refractory to psychotropic drug treatment and can chronically
persist (Shergill et al., 1998). Currently, there are no randomized
controlled trials available which specifically investigated effects
of psychopharmacotherapy (either monotherapy or combined
drug regimes) on AVH severity reduction or full symptom
remission. In a recent review (Sommer et al., 2012), data from
the European First-Episode Schizophrenia Trial (EUFEST)
was used to assess effects of five antipsychotic agents on AVH
severity. Superiority of one treatment option against another was
not confirmed for AVH severity (Sommer et al., 2012). Clinically,
clozapine is still the drug of choice for patients with AVH who
are resistant to two other antipsychotic agents. At present, no
clinical trial has been published that specifically compares the
efficacy of clozapine in comparison to other antipsychotic agents
in the treatment of drug-resistant AVH.
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
Given the need for effective treatment modalities, it is
not surprising to see that over the past decade brain
stimulation techniques have been increasingly used to ameliorate
symptom burden in patients with schizophrenia suffering from
persistent and mostly pharmacorefractory AVH. Among these
approaches, a possible augmentation strategy for the treatment
of psychiatric disorders (in particular catatonia and severe
depression) is elctroconvulsive therapy (ECT). For patients
with schizophrenia a meta-analysis of 10 double-blind RCT
showed a significant effect for ECT (Tharyan and Adams, 2005),
although none of the studies provided any specific details on
AVH improvement (Sommer et al., 2012). In a recent review
Nieuwdorp and colleagues summarized different stimulation
methods including transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
ECT and transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS)
in patients with medication-resistant psychosis (Nieuwdorp
et al., 2015). The authors concluded that currently there
is only weak evidence for stimulation techniques to relieve
pharmacorefractory psychosis. Specifically considering AVH,
further studies are needed to draw any strong conclusions
about ECT as a treatment option for patients presenting with
persistent AVH.
In the last decade, TMS has evolved into a therapeutic
modality for several psychiatric and neurological symptoms. In
particular, TMS is widely used to treat patients with major
depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and specific
symptoms of schizophrenia (AVH and negative symptoms)
(Slotema et al., 2010). Its application as an adjunctive therapy is
currently proposed by European specialists with evidence level C
(Lefaucheur et al., 2014) taking into account that it is generally
regarded as safe. We consider the application of TMS for treating
individuals presenting with persistent AVH as paradigmatic. The
use of TMS impressively illustrates a translational approach from
basic neuroscience/neuroimaging to clinical treatment. However,
it also illustrates fundamental methodological, neurobiological
and phenomenological questions and challenges, which we will
refer to in the following paragraphs.
TMS: Putative Mechanisms of Action
TMS is a technique which allows a non-invasive stimulation
of cortical neurons through the scalp. Originally, TMS was
implemented as a neurophysiological tool for the study of the
human motor system (Barker et al., 1985). Put simply, TMS
uses a strong pulse of electrical current in a coil which is
placed over the brain generating rapidly pulsating magnetic
fields, which pass through the scalp, skull, and meninges,
into the brain (Wassermann and Zimmermann, 2012). Thus,
changing magnetic fields produce electrical impulses that
stimulate superficial cortical neurons 2–3 cm below the device
(Wassermann and Zimmermann, 2012). Modern devices can
generate a rapid succession of pulses, called repetitive TMS
(rTMS) by producing a relatively powerful magnetic field
(about 1.5–3T), but only lasting very shortly (ms) (George
and Aston-Jones, 2010). Frequencies of 1 Hz or lower are
considered to be inhibitory, while frequencies of 5 Hz and
higher are considered to be excitatory (Aleman, 2013). The
specific topology of the induced electrical field in the brain
is a source of uncertainty, because it is influenced by the
complex shape and diverse conductivity of the cranial contents
(Wassermann and Zimmermann, 2012), e.g., cerebrospinal
fluid and foraminas in cranial bone. Long-term potentiation
(LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) are believed to be key
processes underlying long-term effects of rTMS (Chervyakov
et al., 2015). In vitro experiments of hippocampal slice cultures
suggest that rTMS can alter cortical excitability in terms of
LTP of synaptic transmission inducing an increase in synaptic
strength and postsynaptic AMPA receptor changes (Vlachos
et al., 2012). At the level of functional connectivity, long-
lasting enhancement is reflected by increased hippocampal-
cortical network coupling after rTMS (Wang and Voss,
2015).
How Effective is rTMS in the Treatment of AVH?
As a target region for rTMS in patients with AVH the superior
temporal cortex (STC) is of special interest given converging
multimodal imaging evidence suggesting a crucial role in
AVH generation and perception (Allen et al., 2008; Waters
et al., 2012). The rationale for stimulating this region is to
inhibit cortical overactivity and potentially influence generative
phenomena (i.e., AVH) which are thought to be closely
associated with regionally increased cortical activity. Up to now,
several randomized sham-controlled studies targeting the left
temporoparietal cortex have been conducted and summarized
in seven meta-analyses revealing effect sizes (Hedges’ ‘‘g’’)
ranging from 0.42 (i.e., a close to moderate effect) to 1.04
(regarded as high effect; Aleman et al., 2007; Tranulis et al.,
2008; Freitas et al., 2009; Slotema et al., 2012, 2014). With the
inclusion of the studies with larger patient samples, the mean
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weighted effect size of rTMS directed at the left temporoparietal
area for AVH appears to decrease over time, although the
effect is still significant (Slotema et al., 2012, 2014; Hoffman
et al., 2013). Of note, Slotema and colleagues showed that the
effect of rTMS was no longer significant at one month of
follow-up revealing a mean weighted effect size of 0.40 (95%
confidence interval = −0.23–0.102; Slotema et al., 2012). For
a detailed description of the included studies, please see tables
provided by Slotema and colleagues. Side effects were mild
and the number of dropouts in the real TMS group was not
significantly higher than in the sham group. Only few MRI
studies investigated other regions than the left temporoparietal
area as target regions for rTMS. Abnormal activation of the
right hemisphere regions such as the inferior frontal gyrus
and the postcentral gyrus is a frequently reported finding in
patients who experience persistent AVH (Kuhn and Gallinat,
2012). Activation changes have been most consistently shown
for areas of the prefrontal and temporal cortices (Allen et al.,
2007; Sommer et al., 2008; Raij et al., 2009). Based on former
findings in neuroimaging studies that both the right and the
left temporal activation are associated with AVH (Shergill et al.,
2000; Sommer et al., 2007) three studies directed rTMS at the
right comparing with the left temporoparietal gyrus for the
treatment of AVH (Lee et al., 2005; Jandl et al., 2006; Loo
et al., 2010). According to these studies, no superior effects of
right-sided stimulation (Slotema et al., 2014) were observed.
Correspondingly, neither stimulation of Brocaś area nor its
contralateral homologue was an effective target (Schonfeldt-
Lecuona et al., 2004). Overall, these findings support the notion
that deficient generation, monitoring and perception of inner
speech rather than speech expression are disrupted functions
in patients with persistent AVH (Shergill et al., 2000; Wolf
et al., 2011). Abnormal STC function clearly plays a critical
role in the expression of AVH, especially in those patients
presenting with chronic and treatment-refractory symptoms.
Recent studies showed that stimulation of this region with
low-frequency rTMS may reduce the severity and frequency
of AVH in schizophrenia patients, but the duration of the
effect of rTMS may be less than one month (Slotema et al.,
2012).
Methodological Issues with TMS and the
Challenge of Treating Phenotypic Diversity
As briefly discussed in the previous paragraph, it is noteworthy
that therapeutic effects of rTMS in AVH patients are not
long-lasting, and that along with publication of studies with
larger patient populations, the effect size of rTMS over the left
temporoparietal area has decreased over time (Slotema et al.,
2012, 2014). Several studies published between 2004 and 2014
did not observe beneficial effects of rTMS in the treatment of
persistent AVH (Schonfeldt-Lecuona et al., 2004; Slotema et al.,
2011; Blumberger et al., 2012; Rosenberg et al., 2012; Bais et al.,
2014). Several reasons may account for these phenomena. Two
specific aspects of stimulation will be discussed, which may be
superior to left sided STC intervention and which may also
account for these variable results. Subsequently we will address
the problem of the phenotypic diversity which is inherent to
AVH both at the neural and phenomenological level.
Is Bilateral Stimulation Superior?
It may be conceivable that bilateral could be superior over
unilateral stimulation, especially given known dissociations of
left- vs. right-hemispheric function. Up to now, however, only
one study examined bilateral rTMS of the TPJ (Bais et al., 2014).
The authors suggested that AVH frequency might be one of
the most sufficient parameters to measure the responsiveness
of left sided rTMS. In comparison, right-sided rTMS allows for
a more complete management of AVH in terms of emotional
and non-linguistic aspects which are suggested to originate in
the right hemisphere. Contrary to their prediction, however,
Bais and could not show any beneficial effect of bilateral rTMS
in comparison to left sided rTMS and sham in improving
AVH (Bais et al., 2014). Neurophysiological aspects such as
transcallosal inhibition, and fewer rTMS impulses (50%) in a
bilateral design (Thiel et al., 2006; Bais et al., 2014) might account
for these negative results.
Is STC stimulation alone sufficient?
The functional dominance of STC stimulation over other brain
regions has been questioned by accumulating neuroimaging
data acquired in patients with AVH. For instance, an
association between AVH-severity and STC gray matter
volume loss has been suggested by univariate voxel-based
morphometry studies (Modinos et al., 2013). In contrast,
using a multivariate statistical approach for structural data
analysis, two distinct abnormal structural networks were
recently identified in patients with persistent AVH, including
a bilateral prefrontal system and a bilateral temporal/medial
frontal network (Kubera et al., 2014). The latter structural
network also differed between patients with persistent AVH
compared to non-hallucinating patients (Kubera et al., 2014).
It is possible that unilateral temporoparietal stimulation might
not be sufficient to induce a relevant neuronal change
in both networks, whose mutual interplay has still to be
determined. Also, the relationship between structure and
function still remains unresolved, e.g., in individuals with
persistent AVH the impact of neural loss to neural network
transmission, including effects in more remote neural networks,
is unclear.
From a functional point of view, both ‘‘symptom capture’’
(i.e., inferring AVH-related brain activity from symptom
occurrence) and ‘‘symptom interference’’ (i.e., inferring AVH-
related brain dysfunction from paradigm-driven data) MRI
studies have been conducted to investigate neural activation
patterns in schizophrenia patients experiencing treatment-
resistant AVH (Lawrie et al., 2002; Mechelli et al., 2007;
Wolf et al., 2011). The vast majority of these studies focused
on brain activity in speech-related pathways (Lavigne et al.,
2015), according to the prevailing model of AVH suggesting
a link between symptom generation and dysfunctional inner
speech perception and monitoring (Hugdahl et al., 2008).
From these studies, the left STC emerged as regions linked to
AVH and in turn set the rationale for targeted stimulation.
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Yet the left temporal cortex, although a crucial neural node
for hallucinatory symptom expression, is not the sole region
which is thought to be involved in AVH generation and
persistence. The prefrontal cortices have been frequently found
to exhibit abnormal neural activity in patients with AVH, both
at the level of regional function and at the level of functional
connectivity (Kuhn and Gallinat, 2012; Alderson-Day et al.,
2015). Although the processes subserved by abnormal prefrontal
activity in patients experiencing AVH are not fully elucidated
at present, several explanations have been put forward, such
as deficient attentional and executive control over speech- and
self-monitoring relevant brain regions. In addition, converging
evidence suggests that AVH are not related to regional brain
dysfunction alone, but rather to abnormal neural network
coupling in several distinct neural networks including systems
engaged in language, attention, executive function, memory and
self-referential processing (Stephane et al., 2001; Allen et al.,
2008; Wolf et al., 2011; Diederen et al., 2013). Thus, single-
site stimulation may not fully cover all key regions involved
in AVH pathophysiology. In this regard, bilateral or bifocal
stimulation could be a promising approach. Based on the
hypothesis of temporal hyperactivity and frontal hypoactivation
in schizophrenia patients presenting with AVH, Brunelin and
colleagues used a different non-invasive stimulation method,
i.e., tDCS (Brunelin et al., 2012). Unlike TMS, in tDCS a weak
direct current passes through the brain between two electrodes,
i.e., modulation of two spatially remote regions is possible.
Brunelin and co-workers used cathodal left temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) stimulation and anodal left dorsolateral prefrontal
stimulation. After five days of treatment a significant decrease
of hallucinatory symptoms was shown, and this effect remained
significant three months after stimulation. These findings
were recently replicated (Mondino et al., 2015) and provides
a promising outlook for further clinical trials. Nevertheless,
given that tDCS is a relatively new technique employed in
AVH treatment, several stimulation parameters (e.g., electrode
placement and stimulation intensity, frequency and duration)
have to be investigated in more detail to optimize future
treatment options (Koops et al., 2015).
It is noteworthy that although the lateral prefrontal and
temporal cortices clearly are involved in AVH generation, there
is also good evidence suggesting a role of cortical midline
regions in AVH symptom expression. Abnormal cerebral blood
flow could also be detected not only in the primary temporal
cortex and Broca’s area, but also in the cingulate cortex (Wolf
et al., 2012; Kindler et al., 2013). In a recent study exploring
resting-state functional connectivity of the brain, cross-network
abnormalities could be detected between the so called ‘‘default
mode network’’ (DMN) and the ‘‘salience network,’’ including
core midline regions such as the bilateral paracingulate cortex
and bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (Alonso-Solís et al., 2015).
Of note, DMN subsystems have been essentially involved in
self-referential and mnemonic processes (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010; Sambataro et al., 2013). Abnormal network interactions
between the DMN and language-processing and auditory
networks could well explain deficient self-monitoring and a
lack of self-referential attribution of voices (Northoff and Qin,
2011). This body of evidence indicates important contributions
of cortical midline regions to the pathomechanisms of persistent
AVH. TMS alone might be insufficient to stimulate these regions
in treatment-resistant patients.
The Challenge of Phenotypic Diversity
When treating AVH in patients with schizophrenia using focal
stimulation techniques, the clinical endpoint appears to be clearly
defined. In the vast majority of cases, this is at least a reduction
in overall AVH severity. Yet it should be kept in mind that
schizophrenia is a phenomenologically heterogeneous disorder
with several distinct phenotypic presentations at both the clinical
and neurobiological level, and the very same heterogeneity
also applies to persons with chronic AVH. In addition, the
multidimensionality of AVH has been long acknowledged by
phenomenological research (Kronmüller et al., 2011; McCarthy-
Jones et al., 2014), but research has only recently begun to
specifically explore therapeutic effects on distinct symptom
domains (Leff et al., 2013).
Apart from refining and technically developing stimulation
techniques per se, a major focus of future research will be
the identification of markers which can predict stimulation
treatment response. An approach which might prove to
be helpful for predicting responders and non-responders in
the future is subtyping AVH patients according to both
neurobiological and clinical criteria. For instance, it has been
attempted, albeit with limited success, to improve responsiveness
to rTMS by targeting the site of maximal neural activation
associated with the hallucinatory event (Slotema et al., 2011).
More recently, Homan and colleagues (Homan et al., 2012)
showed that higher resting-brain perfusion as measured with
arterial spin labeling in the left STC prior to treatment predicted
a clinical response to rTMS (Homan et al., 2012). This marker
may guide stratification strategies in future interventional trials.
Also, it is important to acknowledge that certain symptom
characteristics, such as location of voices in inner our outer
space, may map to distinct neural correlates. In this respect, a
relationship between white matter volume in the right temporal
junction and spatial features such as outer vs. inner location
of voices has been identified (Plaze et al., 2011). However,
stimulation of the right temporal lobe could not show a superior
treatment effect. A possible explanation is that there may well
be structural differences between hallucinating characterized by
‘‘physical’’ features with yet unknown consequences for brain
function and treatment response. Another explanation for non-
response to stimulation could include neural ceiling effects, e.g.,
related to various degrees of subjective symptom control. Over
time, patients with persistent AVH seek for ways of coping
with their voices, e.g., by deliberately directing their attentional
focus to specific external stimuli (which can be auditory) or
by employing individual modes of verbal control. The degree
of control over AVH is associated with distinct frontotemporal
cortical correlates in contrast to physical or affective symptom
dimensions (Wolf et al., 2012). Also, increased frontotemporal
connectivity in hallucinating patients is modulated by the degree
of control over verbal material (Lavigne et al., 2015). Thus, it
is possible that different degrees of control over AVH severity
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prior to therapeutic stimulation could influence treatment
response.
McCarthy-Jones and colleagues proposed different subtypes
of AVH, which might respond to different treatment modalities.
These subtypes may be identified at the levels phenomenology,
cognition, neurology, etiology, treatment response, diagnosis,
and voice hearer’s own interpretation (McCarthy-Jones et al.,
2014). Particularly, an AVH subtype characterized at a neural
level by chronic deafferentiation of the auditory cortex is
proposed, according to the hypothesis of AVH as misattributed
forms of inner speech (Ford and Mathalon, 2005). This subtype
might be specifically responsive to focal stimulation treatment,
i.e., rTMS or tDCS. Furthermore, specific subtypes might
show both common and distinct regions of activation in both
‘‘symptom capture’’ and ‘‘symptom interference’’ studies, so
that future neuroimaging studies may consider specific subtypes
in their protocol and report details of AVH phenomenology.
The majority of functional neuroimaging studies used total
severity and frequency scores of hallucinations (Auditory
Hallucinations Rating Scale (AHRS), Auditory Hallucinations
Subscale/Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale [AHS/PSYRATS]) as
main outcome parameters. To discriminate more fine-grained
aspects of change in hallucinations, especially in homogenous
subgroups, it might be advantageous to describe different
phenomenological dimensions before and their changes after
focal therapy. The PSYRATS and a 4-dimensional model within
the AHS has previous been recommended to integrate into
research and clinical applications (Woodward et al., 2014).
Conclusion
In the past decade non-invasive brain stimulation techniques
became increasingly relevant for the treatment of drug-refractory
AVH. Evidence for ECT for specifically treating AVH is very
limited. There is evidence for beneficial effects of rTMS over
left temporal and temporoparietal areas, but effect sizes for
this treatment modality are moderate, and beneficial long-
term effects are unlikely. It has been suggested that rTMS
may reduce aberrant internally generated activity associated
with AVH at the site of stimulation. Still, the role of rTMS
in changing aberrant network function putatively involved
in the generation of AVH has to be clarified. A further
major challenge for future research is identifying of patients
who do respond to treatment and those who do not or
only insufficient. Supported by neuroimaging evidence, the
magnitude of left STC activity has been promoted as a potential
predictor of clinical improvement. Given the phenomenological
diversity of schizophrenia and AVH in particular, it is
expected that subtyping patients with AVH will essentially
contribute to identify responders from non-responders for focal
augmentative therapies. In this respect, in accordance with
other authors we strongly advocate further development of
reliable and valid psychometric assessments and neurobiological
markers paralleling the optimization of future stimulation
protocols. Other neuromodulatory interventions, such as tDCS
provide very promising data as well but larger trials are
needed.
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Background: In the last few years, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) has
emerged as an appealing therapeutic option to improve brain functions. Promising data
support the role of prefrontal tDCS in augmenting cognitive performance and ameliorating
several neuropsychiatric symptoms, namely pain, fatigue, mood disturbances, and
attentional impairment. Such symptoms are commonly encountered in patients with
multiple sclerosis (MS).
Objective: The main objective of the current work was to evaluate the tDCS effects
over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) on pain in MS patients.Our secondary
outcomes were to study its influence on attention, fatigue, and mood.
Materials and Methods: Sixteen MS patients with chronic neuropathic pain were
enrolled in a randomized, sham-controlled, and cross-over study.Patients randomly
received two anodal tDCS blocks (active or sham), each consisting of three consecutive
daily tDCS sessions, and held apart by 3 weeks. Evaluations took place before and
after each block. To evaluate pain, we used the Brief Pain Inventory (BPI) and the Visual
Analog Scale (VAS). Attention was assessed using neurophysiological parameters and
the Attention Network Test (ANT). Changes in mood and fatigue were measured using
various scales.
Results: Compared to sham, active tDCS yielded significant analgesic effects according
to VAS and BPI global scales.There were no effects of any block on mood, fatigue, or
attention.
Conclusion: Based on our results, anodal tDCS over the left DLPFC appears to act in a
selective manner and would ameliorate specific symptoms, particularly neuropathic pain.
Analgesia might have occurred through the modulation of the emotional pain network.
Attention, mood, and fatigue were not improved in this work. This could be partly
attributed to the short protocol duration, the small sample size, and the heterogeneity of
our MS cohort. Future large-scale studies can benefit from comparing the tDCS effects
over different cortical sites, changing the stimulation montage, prolonging the duration of
protocol, and coupling tDCS with neuroimaging techniques for a better understanding
of its possible mechanism of action.
Keywords: pain, attention, multiple sclerosis, transcranial direct current stimulation, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
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INTRODUCTION
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic progressive inflammatory
disease of the central nervous system, and represents the major
cause of non-traumatic disability in young adults (Noseworthy
et al., 2000; Compston and Coles, 2008). During the course of
the disease, the patients may develop sensorimotor, cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral symptoms. For instance, although
MS was previously considered a painless disease, chronic pain
has been recently reported as a debilitating symptom (Ehde
et al., 2005), with a prevalence varying between 29 and 86%
(O’Connor et al., 2008). The lower limbs dysesthesias remain
the most common and difficult to treat painful symptoms,
attributed to demyelination and axonal degeneration processes
involving the central sensory pathways (O’Connor et al., 2008).
Psychiatric comorbidities are also common (Marrie et al., 2015).
In particular, anxiety and depression were found to occur in
about 21.9 and 23.7% of MS patients, respectively (Marrie et al.,
2015). Moreover, up to 75% of MS patients can face fatigue at
some point during the disease course; such a symptom was found
to have a drastic impact on their quality of life (Chalah et al.,
2015). Furthermore, abnormalities in the attentional capacities
have been described in MS patients (Urbanek et al., 2010; Crivelli
et al., 2012; Omisade et al., 2012; Vázquez-Marrufo et al., 2014;
Ayache et al., 2015).
The interaction between pain and attention has gained an
increasing interest in the last decade. Although pain serves
as a warning signal for responding to potential hazards, its
relationship with the intensity of a stimulus is not linear. It
is rather modulated by several factors, among which attention
appears to play a major role (Van Damme et al., 2010). On
the one hand, distraction was documented to decrease the
perceived intensity of provoked pain (Legrain et al., 2002). On
the other hand, pain can capture the attentional processes, in a
way that prohibits good performance on cognitive tasks, even
with a voluntary neglect of the nociceptive stimuli (Eccleston
and Crombez, 1999; Legrain et al., 2009a,b; Van Damme et al.,
2010). In this perspective, the neurocognitive model of attention
to pain explains the aforementioned interaction by two modes
of selection: the top-down attention, which prioritizes relevant
information and prevents irrelevant stimuli such as pain from
capturing attention, and the bottom-up attention by which
unintentional stimulus captures the attention (Legrain et al.,
2009a).
The current advances in neuroimaging and
neurophysiological modalities have unveiled the key role of
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in the circuits of pain
(Lorenz et al., 2003), fatigue (Chalah et al., 2015), depression
(Gobbi et al., 2014), and attention (Petersen and Posner, 2012),
including the attentional circuit dedicated to noxious stimuli
(Legrain et al., 2009a). Among the available literature regarding
experimental pain, one study has revealed negative correlations
between the activation patterns within the DLPFC bilaterally and
each of pain intensity and unpleasantness (Lorenz et al., 2003).
Here, the DLPFC was thought to modulate pain perception
through corticosubcortical and corticocortical pathways. In
addition, DLPFC seems to be a major component of the so-called
cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical fatigue loop in MS (Chalah
et al., 2015). Moreover, the middle frontal gyrus, which embeds
the DLPFC, was found to be selectively related to depression
in MS (Gobbi et al., 2014). Furthermore, DLPFC constitutes
a main component of the attentional circuits, particularly the
fronto-parietal executive control network (Petersen and Posner,
2012). This was based on lesions studies in human where the
DLPFC appears to be involved in switching from one set of
tasks to the other (Petersen and Posner, 2012). Nevertheless,
experimental research investigating the interaction between
bottom-up and top-down attention has highlighted the role of
DLPFC in processing the painful stimuli (Legrain et al., 2009a).
By maintaining the attentional load, this cortical area prioritizes
goal-relevant information in order to prevent the attentional
capture by pain (Legrain et al., 2009a). Therefore, one can
assume that acting on DLPFC might have an impact on pain
perception, attentional resources, mood, and fatigue.
Noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) is currently being
investigated for the management of neuropsychiatric symptoms
when pharmacological interventions fail. Among those
techniques, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)
has gained a particular interest in recent years, and appears to
be a promising tool for the treatment of several neurological
disorders. It acts by changing the cortical excitability (Nitsche
and Paulus, 2000, 2001; Nitsche and Fregni, 2007; Nitsche et al.,
2008), notably by depolarizing (activating) and hyperpolarizing
(inhibiting) the cortical circuits, in the case of anodal and
cathodal stimulation, respectively.
In the present work, we applied anodal tDCS over the left
DLPFC. Our primary endpoint was to evaluate its effects on
neuropathic pain in MS patients. Our secondary outcomes were
to assess its impact on attention, mood, and fatigue.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
This is a prospective, randomized, cross-over, sham-controlled
study, conducted according to the declaration of Helsinki,
and approved by the local ethical committee (CPP-Ile de
France VI, registered as N◦ 2012-A00721-42). The trial is
registered at the Deutsches Register Klinischer Studien (drks-
neu.uniklinik-freiburg.de) and has the following registration
number: DRKS00005296. All participants were well instructed
about the protocol and voluntarily gave their written informed
consent prior to inclusion.
Study Participants
Patients were enrolled by M.A., M.S., D.D., and A.C. from
the Neurology department of Henri Mondor Hospital, Créteil,
France, between November 2012 and November 2014 according
to the following criteria: (i) a definite MS diagnosis according
to the 2010 revised McDonald criteria (Polman et al., 2011);
(ii) age between 18 and 70 years; (iii) right handedness based
on the Edinburgh inventory (Oldfield, 1971); and (iv) a history
of neuropathic pain since more than 3 months as per the
Neuropathic Pain Symptom Inventory (NPSI; Bouhassira et al.,
2004), with an intensity >40 on the visual analog scale from 0
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to 100 (VAS0−100), obtained as the average of daily scores over a
representative week.
Exclusion criteria consisted of the following: (i) MS relapses
within the last 2 months; (ii) changes in pharmacological and
physical therapies during the last month; (iii) the presence of
comorbid neurodegenerative or psychiatric disorders; (iv) history
of substance abuse; (v) absence of measurable pain related
evoked potentials (PREPs) at the right hand; (vi) severe deficit
in the visual acuity or fields as documented by an ophthalmic
exam; and (vii) severe right upper limb impairment as per
the Medical Research Council scale for muscle power (MRC)
(Medical Research Council, 1981). For the latter, we applied the
MRC score to the four muscle groups involved in pinching,
wrist extension, forearm flexion, and arm abduction, so that the
sum of their scores could vary between 0 (null strength) and 20
(full strength); an MRC score <12 excluded the individual from
participation.
A standard neurological examination was performed in all
patients including a documentation of the disability level based
on the expanded disability status scale (EDSS; Kurtzke, 1983),
and a thorough pain evaluation.
tDCS
A battery driven multi-channel direct current stimulator
(Starstim, Neuroelectrics, Barcelona, Spain) delivered the direct
current over the scalp through sponge electrodes (surface
area = 25 cm2), soaked in a saline solution to minimize the
risk of skin irritation (Palm et al., 2014). The stimulation
electrodes were directly positioned on an adult sized cap worn
by the patients, and labeled according to the 10–20 EEG system
of electrode positioning (Starstim, Neuroelectrics, Barcelona,
Spain). To stimulate the left DLPFC, the anode was placed over
F3, and its corresponding cathode over the right supraorbital
region (Figure 1). The used current intensity was 2 mA (total
current density over the stimulated area: 0.06mA/cm2) which
is below the threshold for tissue damage (Poreisz et al., 2007;
Nitsche et al., 2008). For the active stimulation, the current
was ramped up during the first 15 s to a maximum of 2 mA
that was maintained throughout the 20-min stimulation session.
As for the sham stimulation, the current was ramped down
immediately after ramping up in order to achieve an effective
blinding (Gandiga et al., 2006; Ambrus et al., 2012).
Sham or active anodal tDCS blocks were tested in a
random order and were held apart by at least 3 weeks. Each
block consisted of three consecutive daily tDCS sessions. The
stimulations were performed by well-trained physicians. The
sessions took place in a quiet and illuminated room. The patients
were at rest in an armchair and were not performing any
cognitive task. Only the performing physician (S.S.A) was aware
of the stimulationmode (real or sham tDCS). The evaluators (U.P
and M.A.C) and the patients were blind to it.
Primary Outcomes: Pain Scales
For pain evaluation, we relied on the self-reported VAS0−100 and
the short version of the Brief Pain Inventory (BPI). The latter
is a validated and reliable tool to measure pain intensity and its
interference with patient’s life (Cleeland and Ryan, 1994).
Secondary Outcomes
Cognitive Task
Attention was evaluated using a computerized test: The Attention
Network Test (ANT; Fan et al., 2002). Briefly, this test evaluates
the three main attentional networks: the alerting network that
consists of controlling vigilance and task performance, the
orienting network responsible for the orientation to external
stimuli, and the executive function network in charge of conflict
resolution (Fan et al., 2002; Petersen and Posner, 2012). The
test was performed in a quiet room, with the participants sitting
in front of a monitor aligned to their midsagittal plane. The
stimulus consists of a row of five horizontal black arrows, against
a white background: a “central” arrow surrounded on each
side by two others called “flankers” which can be pointing left-
or right-ward. Several possible conditions arise: a “congruent”
condition takes place when the flankers and the central arrow
are in same direction; an “incongruent” condition occurs when
the flankers and the central arrow are in opposite direction; and a
“neutral” condition occurs when the flankers are replaced instead
by four strokes. The participants indicated the direction of the
central arrow by clicking on the left or right mouse buttons,
with either the right index or the right middle finger, when
the central arrowhead pointed to the left or right, respectively.
During the total duration of the test, the subjects are asked to fix
a central cross, and are informed about a warning “cue,” which
consists of a star-shaped signal that may precede the stimulus
in question, and thus might either help or not in localizing the
latter. Here, four possibilities exist: “no cue” condition when
there is no preceding signal, “center cue” condition when it
appears at the center of the screen, “double cue” condition
when signals are simultaneously provided above and below the
central cross, and a “spatial” cue condition when the signal
is presented either up or down the cross. We used the 1.3.0
version of ANT, which includes one practice sequence (24
trials), and three identical sequences of 96 trials each, separated
by an optional resting period. The participants should answer
correctly as fast as possible, and the test provides the mean
accuracy (MA) and the mean reaction time (MRT), which reflect
the errors rate and the time required by the participant to
answer, respectively. Moreover, all conditions are analyzed to
assess the integrity of the attentional networks. For instance,
the alerting network is evaluated when the participant fixes
the central cross; the orienting network is put into play when
the warning signal is presented prior to the stimulus; and the
executive function network is recruited when the subject is
trying to solve the conflict and takes a decision in order to
answer.
Neuropsychological Assessment
Mood and fatigue were evaluated using the 14-item Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Snaith and Zigmond,
1986) and the 21-item Modified Fatigue Impact Scale (MFIS),
respectively (Fatigue guidelines development panel of the
multiple sclerosis council for clinical practice guidelines, 1998;
Téllez et al., 2005). MFIS accounts for the physical (9 items),
cognitive (10 items), and psychosocial (2 items) components of
fatigue.
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FIGURE 1 | An illustration of the tDCS montage in this study (Starstim, Neuroelectrics, Barcelona, Spain); with a cathode over AF8 (A), an anode over
F3 (A,B) according to the international 10–20 EEG system. A simulation of the electric field generated between F3 (in red) and AF8 (in blue) is shown in (C).
Neurophysiological Testing
Pain related evoked potentials (PREPs)
PREPs can be generated at the cortical level by a variety
of noxious stimuli (Kakigi et al., 2005; Arendt-Nielsen and
Andersen, 2006), namely the lasers (Arendt-Nielsen and Chen,
2003). Their amplitudes serve as physiological correlates for the
amount of attention paid toward noxious stimuli, and reflect
the functionality of the involved neural networks (Garcia-Larrea
et al., 2002; Lorenz and Garcia-Larrea, 2003). A concentric planar
electrode—which was previously found to be an alternative to
laser in inducing PREPs—has served the purpose in this work
(Kaube et al., 2000; Lefaucheur et al., 2012).
The first step consisted of defining the pain perception
threshold (PPT). The PPT was determined by the method of
limits, which consists of raising the stimulus intensity from zero
to the point where the stimulus is perceived as painful sensation
at intensity of 60–70 on VAS0−100. The threshold was determined
three times. The average of the three trials was defined as
the PPT.
Stimulation was carried out using a concentric electrode
designed to excite the superficial skin layers, hence the
nociceptive axons (Lefaucheur et al., 2012). Stimuli were applied
at the first dorsal interosseous space of the right hand, the
cutaneous area located on the dorsal and lateral aspect of
the hand between the extensor pollicis longus tendon and the
extensor indicis tendon. A single stimulus was a train of three
pulses that lasts 0.5ms, with an inter-pulse interval (IS) of 5ms.
After determining the PPT, two sets of twenty stimuli were
performed at irregular intervals, at VAS60−70.The PREPs were
recorded via 10mm Genuine Grass Gold Cup Electrodes (Grass
Products, Astro-Med, Inc., Natus Neurology, Warwick, RI 02886
U.S.A.), fixed to the scalp surface using a special paste (Grass
Products, Astro-Med, Inc., Natus Neurology, Warwick, RI 02886
U.S.A.). The electrodes were positioned as the following: the
recording one at Cz (international 10–20 EEG system of electrode
positioning), the reference one at the left earlobe, and the
ground one with a Velcro strap around the right forearm (Ref
NT-S07ALPINE ground electrode with Velcro Strap, Alpine
Biomed, Skovlunde, Denmark). In addition, electro-oculogram
was obtained via pre-gelled adhesive surface electrodes (Ref
9013S0242, Alpine Biomed, Skovlunde, Denmark) placed at the
right infraorbital lateral margin.
The recorded signal was bandpass filtered at 0.5–30Hz and
stored for analysis using a Keypoint machine (Dantec Dynamics,
Bristol, United Kingdom). The final step consisted of averaging
the signals offline, and excluding the contaminated recordings
(saccadic eye movements or blinks, and raw signals above 70V).
We then analyzed the collected N2-P2 responses and measured
their baseline-to-peak amplitudes, peak-to-peak amplitudes, and
latencies.
Frontal midline theta activity
The frontal midline theta (Fm2) is an oscillatory activity in
the theta band (4–7 Hz) that appears in the medial frontal
region at any time during the performance of a cognitive
task, reaching 6–7Hz in frequency and 30–60mV in amplitude
(Ishihara and Yoshi, 1972; Mizuki et al., 1980). We looked
for this activity by recording EEG during the second ANT
sequence. The recording electrodes were located on the patients’
cap at Fpz and Fz (according to the international 10–20 EEG
system of electrode positioning), and connected to the recording
device (Starstim, Neuroelectrics, Barcelona, Spain). The raw EEG
signals were stored for offline processing and analysis. These
signals were then pass-band-filtered in the frequency range [0.5–
30Hz] to keep only the rhythms of interest delta, theta, alpha
and beta.
An important step before doing any analysis would be to
reject ocular and blink artifacts that are highly abundant in raw
data. For this, prior to any analysis, we applied on all data an
algorithm that detects, localizes, and rejects artifacts in a single-
channel biosignal. An example of the artifact rejection is shown
in Figure 2.
EEG analysis
EEG analysis was performed by T.A. and A.B. To obtain
a good estimate of the percentage held by the dominant
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FIGURE 2 | An example of artifact rejection in a single EEG record.
FIGURE 3 | Schematic diagram of the experimental protocol. Two tDCS blocks, each consisting of 3 consecutive daily stimulations of either sham tDCS or
active tDCS (randomized order); held apart by a 3-week interval.ANT, Attention Network Test; BPI, Brief Pain Inventory; CGI, Clinical Global Impression; CRQ, Comfort
Rating Questionnaire; EEG, recording at Fpz and Pz during ANT; EDSS, Expanded Disability Status Scale; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; MFIS,
Modified Fatigue Impact Scale; NPSI, Neuropathic Pain Symptoms Inventory; PREPs, Pain Related Evoked Potentials; VAS*, Visual Analog Scale for pain assessed 7
days prior to the first stimulation session (D1) and 7 days after the last stimulation session (D3) of each block.
rhythms (delta, theta, alpha, and beta) in a given raw EEG
signals we determined the frequencies that dominate each
signal.
First, the signals were band-pass filtered in the frequency
bands [0.5–3.5Hz], [4–7Hz], [8–12Hz], and [13–30Hz]
corresponding to the rhythms delta, theta, alpha, and
beta respectively. To take into account the difference
in the amplitudes of these rhythms, we determined the
gradient of their amplitudes, looked for their envelopes,
and calculated the modulus of the Hilbert transform of
the gradients in question (Marple, 1999). At each sample
of the given EEG signal, we selected the maximum
modulus. Finally, the percentage of each frequency
band in the given EEG signal of each patient was
determined.
Experimental Protocol
After the inclusion session, patients were randomized to receive
either sham or active tDCS block (Figure 3). The randomization
schedule was generated by U.P. prior to the beginning of
the study using a dedicated software (“true” random number
generation without any restriction, stored in a computer until the
patient was assigned to the intervention).
Keeping in mind the fluctuating nature of neuropathic pain,
and the effects of circadian rhythm on attentional capacities, the
patients underwent the experimental protocol at the same time
of the day (Knight and Mather, 2013). They were also asked to
restrict stimulants consumption, like caffeine or nicotine, at least
3 h prior to their appointment. No blocks were performed during
summer time to avoid any influence of temperature on fatigue
(Chalah et al., 2015).
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FIGURE 4 | Schematic flow chart of patients through the study.
The patients daily recorded the average of their pain intensity
1 week before and 1 week after each block using VAS0−100. At the
first day of each block (D1), they were asked to fill questionnaires
for pain (BPI), fatigue (MFIS), anxiety and depression (HADS).
This was followed by PREPs recording, the performance of ANT
test, and finally the tDCS session. The latter was repeated at the
second (D2) and third (D3) day of each block. At D3, the above-
mentioned evaluations were repeated following the stimulation
session, and the patients’ degree of satisfaction regarding the
protocol was assessed using the Comfort Rating Questionnaire
(CRQ) and the Global Clinical Impression (GCI). At the end
of each block, the patients were asked to guess the mode of
stimulation (active/sham). A schematic diagram is shown in
Figure 3.
Data Analysis
For the ANT parameters, we excluded from the analysis the
reaction times of trials with either error or with a reaction time
value above or below the mean ± 2 standard deviations (SD).
Statistical analyses were performed using the StatView and InStat
software. Our Data followed normal distributions according to
the method of Kolmogorov and Smirnov. Data collected before
and after each block were analyzed with paired t-tests, and those
with a p < 0.05 were considered significant. This included PREPs
(amplitudes and latencies), ANT parameters (MA and RT),
frontal theta activity percentages, and self-rating questionnaires
scores for pain (VAS0−100, BPI), fatigue (MFIS), anxiety and
depression (HADS).
RESULTS
Demographic and Clinical Data
Twenty MS patients were enrolled, and four were excluded
(one declined to participate, and three were not eligible).
Sixteen patients (13 women, 3 men, mean age 48.9 ±
10.0 years, age range 38–67 years) completed the study
(Figure 4 illustrates the flowchart of all participants). All
had neuropathic pain; their mean NPSI was 5.12 ± 2.4
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at enrollment. Their mean EDSS was 4.25 ± 1.4. Eleven
patients had relapsing remitting MS (RRMS), four were in the
secondary progressive phase (SPMS) and one had a primary
progressive type (PPMS). The mean disease duration was
11.8 ± 9.4 years and the progressive phase duration was 6 ± 3.2
years.
All patients had concomitant medication intake, consisting
of antiepileptic drugs (nine patients; one of them with two
drugs), antidepressants (nine patients, one of them with two
drugs), opioids (five patients, one of them with two drugs)
and immunomodulating agents (13 patients). Pharmacological
treatment was continued and kept stable throughout the
experimental protocol.
Adverse Effects, Comfort Rating, and
Blinding Integrity
After both active and sham stimulation, six patients reported
insomnia. Nausea was reported by five patients after active
stimulation and by four patients after sham stimulation. Severe
headache occurred in three patients after active stimulation and
in one patient after sham stimulation. Phosphenes were reported
by one patient after sham stimulation.
No significant difference was found between both conditions
regarding the CRQ sum scores during (p = 0.96) and after
stimulation (p = 0.43). No significant differences were observed
between both stimulation conditions on the overall discomfort
(p= 0.79) or the mean GCI (p= 0.82; Friedman test). Details are
provided in Table 1.
Pain Perception
The mean VAS0−100 pain ratings 7 days before and 7 days
after stimulation showed significant decrease after active tDCS
(p = 0.024), but no change after sham tDCS (p = 0.66).
Analogously, the mean VAS0−100 pain ratings for days 1–3
before and after stimulation showed significant decrease after
active tDCS (p = 0.021), and no improvement after sham tDCS
(p= 0.56).
Active stimulation resulted in a significant improvement of
BPI global score (p = 0.02), and its interference subscale (p =
0.01), but had no significant effects on the severity subscale. Sham
did not have any significant effects on BPI scores or its subscales.
Pain scores are found in Table 2.
Cognitive Results
There were no significant changes in any of the ANT parameters
after both sham and active stimulation (Table 3).
Neuropsychological Scores
The baseline mean global MFIS score, HADS anxiety and
depression subscales were 52.6 ± 12.2, 9.2 ± 4.0, and 6.6 ± 3.2,
respectively.
No significant differences were observed following both
stimulation conditions for the MFIS total scores, HADS total
scores and subscales. The neuropsychological scores are detailed
in Table 4.
TABLE 1 | Confort rating questionnaire (CRQ) and global clinical
impression (GCI) for sham and active tDCS.
Sham tDCS paired t-test
CRQ sum scores
during stimulation
18.3 ± 12.3 19.1 ± 11.5 P = 0.96
CRQ sum scores after
stimulation
20.7 ± 13.8 17.5 ± 9.6 P = 0.43
Overall discomfort after
stimulation
2.4 ± 2.0 2.6 ± 2.3 P = 0.79
Mean GCI after
stimulation
4.6 ± 0.8 4.6 ± 0.9 P = 0.82
Neurophysiological Testing
PREPs
PREPs results did not significantly differ between active and sham
stimulation (Table 5).
EEG Results
A trendwise or significant increase in the theta bandwas observed
following sham and active stimulation, respectively. Theta Fpz
showed a trendwise increase after sham stimulation (p = 0.09),
and theta Fz showed significant increase after sham stimulation
(p = 0.04). After active stimulation, theta Fpz and Fz increased
by trend (p= 0.09 and p= 0.09, respectively; Table 5).
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to explore the impact of prefrontal tDCS on
pain in 16MS patients. Active anodal but not sham tDCS showed
significant analgesic effects on VAS0−100 pain ratings in the first 3
days and over 1 week after stimulation. These effects were further
reflected by a significant decrease in the BPI total score and
its interference subscale following only active stimulation. No
relevant changes in BPI severity subscale were found after either
stimulation conditions. Similarly, neither intervention had any
effects on PREPs (amplitudes and latencies), ANT parameters,
fatigue and mood scales. Lastly, a trendwise or a significant
increase in the frontal theta activity was observed following active
or sham stimulation, respectively.
Effects on Pain
The most prominent effect of tDCS treatment was analgesia.
Such findings are of high interest and in line with previous
studies. In fact, the DLPFC is known to have a crucial role in
modulating pain (Lorenz et al., 2003). Interestingly, changes in
pain perception following tDCS have been documented in several
experimental protocols where anodal tDCS over the DLPFC
increased the pain thresholds induced by electrical and heat
stimuli in healthy volunteers (Boggio et al., 2008; Mylius et al.,
2012).
As for the BPI scale, the fact that anodal tDCS over the
prefrontal cortex ameliorated the interference but not the
severity subscale might be accounted by the pathophysiologic
mechanisms of pain. Actually, a pain matrix was conceptualized
and includes three interacting networks (Garcia-Larrea and
Peyron, 2013). A first order nociceptive network comprises
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TABLE 2 | VAS and BPI scores (Mean ± SD) before and after sham and active tDCS.
Before sham After sham Paired t-test Before tDCS After tDCS Paired t-test
VAS mean/7days 52.1 ± 19.6 50.3 ± 19.7 P = 0.66 51.2 ± 19.2 43.1 ± 26.2 P = 0.02
VAS mean/Day 1–3 48.8 ± 22.0 51.3 ± 18.8 P = 0.56 53.1 ± 20.2 43.1 ± 26.2 P = 0.02
BPI global score 9.9 ± 3.5 9.2 ± 3.4 P = 0.19 9.2 ± 3.4 8.2 ± 3.5 P = 0.02
BPI severity subscale 4.8 ± 2.4 4.6 ± 2.1 P = 0.40 4.8 ± 2.4 4.3 ± 2.1 P = 0.15
BPI interference subscale 5.0 ± 1.5 4.6 ± 1.6 P = 0.18 4.5 ± 1.6 3.9 ± 1.6 P = 0.01
TABLE 3 | ANT results (Mean ± SD) before and after sham and active tDCS.
Before sham After sham Paired t-test Before tDCS After tDCS Paired t-test
ANT alertness 61.7 ± 60.5 58.8 ± 66.0 P = 0.78 36.5 ± 42.0 52.1 ± 36.0 P = 0.08
ANT orientation 53.7 ± 33.2 53.4 ± 27.5 P = 0.98 41.0 ± 30.5 50.2 ± 27.4 P = 0.33
ANT conflict 143.0 ± 67.9 141.8 ± 53.2 P = 0.95 143.1 ± 75.8 153.9 ± 69.0 P = 0.43
ANT mean reaction time 768.3 ± 95.0 766.1 ± 130.3 P = 0.94 725.4 ± 93.8 742.3 ± 99.7 P = 0.38
ANT accuracy 86.1 ± 21.7 90.2 ± 14.6 P = 0.43 92.4 ± 9.2 88.4 ± 15.0 P = 0.17
TABLE 4 | Neuropsychological results (Mean ± SD) before and after sham and active tDCS.
Before sham After sham t-test Before tDCS After tDCS t-test
Mean HADS total score 14.4 ± 5.9 14.5 ± 6.5 P = 0.80 14.1 ± 6.3 13.6 ± 5.8 P = 0.52
Mean HADS anxiety 8.1 ± 3.4 8.3 ± 3.9 P = 0.70 7.7 ± 3.0 7.6 ± 3.6 P = 0.90
Mean HADS depression 6.3 ± 3.0 6.2 ± 3.3 P = 0.81 6.4 ± 3.9 6.0 ± 3.3 P = 0.35
MFIS global score 48.2 ± 15.5 47.4 ± 17.7 P = 0.76 49.5 ± 14.4 49.0 ± 15.2 P = 0.42
the posterior operculoinsular area receiving spinothalamic
projections. A second order network consists of the posterior
parietal, prefrontal and anterior insular areas, and is responsible
of the transition from cortical nociception to conscious
perception. A third network is composed of the orbitofrontal,
perigenual and limbic areas, by which the pain perception can
be modified in function of expectations, emotions and beliefs.
Therefore, our results suggest that tDCS could have acted on the
second and third order networks of the pain matrix where the
prefrontal cortex majorly contributes (Garcia-Larrea and Peyron,
2013).
Effects on Attention
Concerning attention, ANT variables did not significantly change
after any of the tDCS interventions. In fact, we hypothesized that
tDCS over the DLPFC could improve attentional capacities by
modifying the sensitivity of stimulus-specific neural responses, in
a way that enhances the top-down selection type or inhibits the
bottom-up one; notably, by amplifying or inhibiting the activity
of neurons which respond, respectively, to relevant or irrelevant
stimuli (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). In accordance with our
speculation, anodal tDCS over the left DLPFC have found to
improve the attentional bias acquisition in one study (Clarke
et al., 2014), and sustained attention in another one (Nelson
et al., 2014). However, the lack of significant improvement of
ANT parameters in our study can be explained by many facts.
First, ANT is known to represent a complex task which measures
three different attentional networks and hence involves several
cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical connections. Second, in
contrast to previous tDCS studies in healthy subjects, MS patients
are known to have a dysfunction in the attentional networks,
notably in the alerting and/or the orienting ones (Urbanek et al.,
2010; Crivelli et al., 2012; Omisade et al., 2012; Vázquez-Marrufo
et al., 2014; Ayache et al., 2015) which might have prevented
tDCS from causing any improvement. Third, our tDCS design
might not have been optimal to ameliorate ANT variables. It is
noteworthy that a lateralization in the attentional performance
exists between left and right hemispheric structures (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002; Raz and Buhle, 2006; Lückmann et al., 2014).
In fact, the left and right hemispheres are thought to be involved
in phasic and tonic alertness, respectively (Raz and Buhle, 2006).
In this model, the right DLPFC has an executory capacity which
enables it to monitor the attentional performance and hence
regulates it accordingly, while the right inferior parietal region
seems to have a role in endogenous and exogenous alerting. In
line with this topography, one study found that anodal tDCS
over the right frontal cortex (F10 of the 10–10 EEG system of
electrodes positioning) could improve the alerting network of
attention (Coffman et al., 2012). Another study compared the
effects of anodal tDCS over different cortical targets in terms of
attentional improvement and showed significant effects following
the stimulation of the right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) but
not the left DLPFC (Roy et al., 2015). This suggests that unlike
our design, which targeted the left hemisphere, stimulation of
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TABLE 5 | Neurophysiological (EEG and PREPS) results (Mean ± SD) before and after sham and active tDCS.
Before sham After sham Paired t-test Before tDCS After tDCS Paired t-test
Theta Fpz 51.1 ± 14.6 58.9 ± 10.2 P = 0.09 53.8 ± 13.9 62.1 ± 11.1 P = 0.09
Theta Fz 53.9 ± 9.8 59.3 ± 7.9 P = 0.04 54.9 ± 15.1 62.6 ± 10.5 P = 0.09
Mean N2 latency 118.9 ± 34.8 131.7 ± 25.6 P = 0.16 138.1 ± 44.6 141.8 ± 33.2 P = 0.66
Mean P2 latency 178.0 ± 48.8 187.0 ± 36.0 P = 0.41 202.2 ± 58.5 199.6 ± 45.9 P = 0.80
Mean N2 amplitude 11.3 ± 7.6 14.1 ± 6.5 P = 0.16 12.6 ± 9.9 12.0 ± 7.4 P = 0.77
Mean P2 amplitude 10.5 ± 4.3 10.4 ± 7.6 P = 0.96 15.1 ± 10.7 13.2 ± 9.4 P = 0.57
Mean N2-P2 amplitude 21.4 ± 8.9 22.4 ± 9.2 P = 0.64 25.2 ± 9.0 23.6 ± 13.0 P = 0.50
the right fronto-parietal structures might have better effects
on attention. Fourth, our protocol consisted of performing
ANT before the first stimulation session (D1) and after the
last one (D3) of each block, but did not contain a “within-
day control” of attention. This was based on the hypothesis
that a tDCS-induced cumulative effect might result from the
repetition of the stimulation sessions. However, three consecutive
daily sessions might not be enough to induce such an effect,
and therefore a within-day control for attention would have
revealed better outcomes. Fifth, concerning the tDCS montage
adopted in this study, the anode was placed at the left DLPFC
while its reference electrode was the right supraorbital region.
We should note that the chosen reference is not neutral. In
fact the orbitofrontal cortex has an important role inemotional
and cognitive processing, including the attentional processes to
emotional stimuli. Therefore, applying a cathodal stimulation on
that region might have impacted our results.
These data altogether suggest that future studies might benefit
from comparing the effects of tDCS over different cortical
areas (e.g., left/right DLPFC and left/right PPC), prolonging the
duration of the stimulation period, adding a within-day control
for attention, and adopting a different reference site, before
drawing any conclusion.
Effects on Mood and Fatigue
As for mood changes, although there are evidence regarding the
antidepressant effects of anodal tDCS over the DLPFC (Kalu
et al., 2012; Loo et al., 2012; Berlim et al., 2013; Brunoni et al.,
2013), the lack of mood changes in our patients cohort can be
attributed to the short stimulation period adapted in this study. In
this perspective, depression studies have shown dose-dependent
effects of tDCS in mood improvement that could extend over
several weeks. Our results are supported by another study where
no improvement in mood scores has occurred following five
tDCS sessions over the left DLPFC (Saiote et al., 2014).
Concerning fatigue, we found no effects of tDCS on the MFIS
scores. A lack of improvement in fatigue following tDCS has
already been reported by two studies (Ferrucci et al., 2014; Saiote
et al., 2014).
Effects on Neurophysiological Parameters
PREPs
PREPs amplitudes were not changed following both active and
sham tDCS. Although PREPs can correlate with the subjective
pain sensation, it is commonly accepted that PREPs amplitude
reflects the integrity of the spino-thalamo-cortical tract (Casey
et al., 1996; Wu et al., 1999; Garcia-Larrea et al., 2002). In this
view, most of the neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that
MS patients with neuropathic pain had several demyelinating
lesions within the spinal cord, brainstem, and thalamus (Seixas
et al., 2014). Furthermore, PREPs amplitude is known to depend
on the attentional level toward the stimulated limb (Garcia-
Larrea et al., 2002), in this context, attentional dysfunction has
been frequently reported in MS patients. Taken together, these
disturbances might have prohibited tDCS from having any effect
on PREPs parameters in our cohort.
EEG
As for the frontal midline theta activity, their increase following
both stimulation blocks can be explained by different approaches.
In fact, anxiety improvement has previously been correlated with
the appearance of such waves following anxiolytic treatment
(Mizuki et al., 1983, 1989). In addition, an emotionally
positive state was found to be associated with theta power
in frontal midline leads (Aftanas and Golocheikine, 2001).
In this perspective, it might be possible that medical care
itself, regardless of stimulation block type, had accounted for a
subtle decrease in patients’ anxiety, despite the absence of any
significant changes in HADS scores.
Limitations
It is important to note that, in our patients’ cohort, the observed
tDCS effects could have been influenced by antiepileptic
treatments. The latter are known to inhibit long-term-
potentiation induced neuroplasticity changes by blockade
of voltage-gated ion channels (Nitsche et al., 2012). However,
in most of the studies dealing with chronic neuropathic pain,
patients commonly suffer from a severe pain which is resistant to
multiple drugs. Particularly, the available tDCS studies for central
neuropathic pain have included patients taking antiepileptics,
antidepressants, and opioid analgesics (Fregni et al., 2006; Soler
et al., 2010; Wrigley et al., 2013). Similar to our work, the
authors asked their patients to keep their routine medications
throughout the study period. Another limitation would be the
lack of functional or structural neuroimaging data in our work.
Future studies can benefit from combining imaging with tDCS
application, in order to understand the mechanisms of action of
tDCS on the studied brain networks, and to correlate the clinical
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response to gray matter and white matter pathologies (Chalah
et al., 2015). In addition, the small sample size and heterogeneity
of our MS cohort could have prohibited the emergence of any
positive effect in terms of attention, mood and fatigue. Finally,
MS-related symptoms can fluctuate during the course of the
disease; such a fluctuation should be taken into account prior to
the interpretation of any intervention results. In this context, our
study could have benefited from testing the difference between
baseline scores prior to tDCS and sham conditions. However,
we believe that our inclusion criteria (e.g., the presence of a
neuropathic pain since more than 3 months with an intensity
greater than 40 on VAS; the absence of MS relapses since at last
2 months, a stable therapy since 1 month) might have restricted
such an influence. We also controlled for the impact of some
variables on attention, pain, and fatigue; namely by restricting
the consumption of psychostimulants, and performing the
stimulation block at the same time during the day, with no
blocks occurring in summer.
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The effect of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is cumulative. Treatment
protocols typically require multiple consecutive sessions spanning weeks or months.
However, traveling to clinic for a tDCS session can present an obstacle to subjects
and their caregivers. With modified devices and headgear, tDCS treatment can be
administered remotely under clinical supervision, potentially enhancing recruitment,
throughput, and convenience. Here we propose standards and protocols for clinical
trials utilizing remotely-supervised tDCS with the goal of providing safe, reproducible
and well-tolerated stimulation therapy outside of the clinic. The recommendations
include: (1) training of staff in tDCS treatment and supervision; (2) assessment of
the user’s capability to participate in tDCS remotely; (3) ongoing training procedures
and materials including assessments of the user and/or caregiver; (4) simple and
fail-safe electrode preparation techniques and tDCS headgear; (5) strict dose control
for each session; (6) ongoing monitoring to quantify compliance (device preparation,
electrode saturation/placement, stimulation protocol), with corresponding corrective
steps as required; (7) monitoring for treatment-emergent adverse effects; (8) guidelines
for discontinuation of a session and/or study participation including emergency failsafe
procedures tailored to the treatment population’s level of need. These guidelines are
intended to provide a minimal level of methodological rigor for clinical trials seeking
to apply tDCS outside a specialized treatment center. We outline indication-specific
applications (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Depression, Multiple Sclerosis,
Palliative Care) following these recommendations that support a standardized framework
for evaluating the tolerability and reproducibility of remote-supervised tDCS that, once
established, will allow for translation of tDCS clinical trials to a greater size and range of
patient populations.
Keywords: tDCS, clinical trials, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression, multiple sclerosis, palliative
care
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Introduction
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a noninvasive
brain stimulation (NIBS) technique that utilizes low amplitude
direct currents (typically less than 2.5 mA current and
0.08 mA/cm2 average electrode current density) to induce
changes in cortical excitability. Advantages of tDCS compared
to other methods of NIBS, such as transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS), include ease-of-use, low cost, and tolerability
(Vanneste et al., 2010). Using clinical grade equipment and
following strict protocols with trained operators, tDCS has been
tested in hundreds of clinical trials and is considered to be both
safe and well-tolerated for study in a wide range of subjects
(Nitsche et al., 2008; Brunoni et al., 2012b; Kalu et al., 2012).
tDCS can influence sensory, motor, cognitive and psychiatric
processes that could be applied directly to the treatment of
common yet refractory symptoms that represent major areas of
unmet treatment need, such as depressed mood, pain, fatigue,
sensory and motor recovery, and cognitive impairment (Ball
et al., 2002; Fregni et al., 2006; Mori et al., 2010, 2013; Andrews
et al., 2011; Acler et al., 2013; Brunoni et al., 2013b; Cuypers et al.,
2013; Bennabi et al., 2014), typically occurring in the context of a
neurologic or psychiatric condition.
Remote Delivery Will Expand tDCS Clinical Study
Neurophysiologic and clinical trials with tDCS increasingly
reinforce that efficacy increases with multiple sessions (Mori
et al., 2010, 2013; Acler et al., 2013; Ferrucci et al., 2014;
Meesen et al., 2014; Tecchio et al., 2014), with effects thought
to be cumulative. Many clinical investigators apply tDCS in
conjunction with a behaviorally-based treatment approach to
improve outcome (Demirtas-Tatlidede et al., 2013; Martin et al.,
2013b; Brunoni and Vanderhasselt, 2014; Brunoni et al., 2014;
Flöel, 2014), which must be repeated alongside tDCS. The
clinical utility of tDCS must be established through trials that
are sufficiently-powered, with adequate dose (Peterchev et al.,
2012) and session number, and with precise protocol control.
However, multiple sessions require subjects to repeatedly travel
to the clinic for each treatment, placing significant and often
insurmountable burden to patients and their caregivers, at the
same time associated with significant provider time and cost,
especially as the sample size increases (Brunoni et al., 2012a;
Holland and Crinion, 2012; Ferrucci et al., 2014; Meesen et al.,
2014; Shiozawa et al., 2014; Vaseghi et al., 2014). For example,
in a sample of 64 subjects treated for depression, Loo et al.
administered 30 sessions across 6 weeks (Loo et al., 2012),
followed by up to 20 maintenance treatment sessions spaced over
6 months (Martin et al., 2013a). Similarly, during the 6 month
follow up of a depression trial, Valiengo and colleagues showed
a dropout rate of 17 of 42 subjects---with almost all dropouts
citing the burden of regular visits to the clinic (Valiengo et al.,
2013).
A remedy to this feasibility problem is controlled remote
tDCS application, with a common protocol that ensures
safe, well-tolerated and reproducible remotely-supervised tDCS.
Combining this remote approach with behaviorally-based
treatments (e.g., cognitive or physical rehabilitation exercises
completed at home, or behavioral therapy delivered through
remote, web-based platforms) will allow investigators to reach
subjects either through satellite clinic locations or directly from
their home or care facility.
While there has not yet been a clinical trial involving
remotely-supervised tDCS, the home use of tDCS over a 3 year
period has been reported as both safe and effective in the case
of a patient with schizophrenia through 20 minute daily sessions
administered by a medically licensed caregiver (Andrade,
2013).We propose here a protocol for remotely-supervised
delivery of tDCS for clinical trials, with the expectation of
maintaining the same level of uniformity and compliance that
would be seen with tDCS sessions administered in the clinic.
This step represents an extension of currently-accepted tDCS
methodology to allow for trials to include more subjects and
to remove any logistical limits on the number of sessions
studied.
The approach proposed for remotely-supervised tDCS can
be applied to double-blind trials. tDCS clinical trial devices
have been developed which deliver active or sham stimulation
depending on the individual subject code keyed in, leaving both
device operator and subject blinded to treatment assignment.
There is no reason why blinding should be any less available
when the subject (or proxy) operates the device under remote
supervision.
The Potential and Limitations of tDCS Away
From Clinic
Below, we outline a set of what we consider to be essential
features for this next step of remotely-supervised tDCS delivery.
While the tDCS may be self- or proxy-administered, an
important distinction is the difference with this controlled and
remotely-supervised extension as compared to direct home
use. One recent report described the challenges of prescribing
tDCS directly for self-administered home use, without remote
supervision. Using a crossover design to treat pain in patients
with trigeminal neuralgia, investigators (Hagenacker et al., 2014),
instructed subjects and one other adult to apply tDCS at home
using a device pre-programmed to alternate active and sham
stimulation across 14 sessions over 2 weeks, recording any
adverse effects in a diary. All subjects tolerated the stimulation
well with no adverse events reported; active treatment was found
to be effective in reducing pain. However, many subjects reported
difficulty with the tDCS application with an associated high
dropout rate (41%). The authors concluded that a more specific
and detailed education and training protocol could improve
delivery. Of further concern, there was minimal guidance or
structure during the course of sessions, possibly leading to
variability of method across subjects and no explicit safety
monitoring.
It is clear that a structured protocol is needed to identify
subjects who are appropriate candidates for remote study, and
to ensure that they---or a proxy who will administer the tDCS
for them (e.g., caregiver)---are adequately trained. This training
and certification, must be gauged against the usability of the
(specially-designed) device and headgear, the likelihood that
the subject may fluctuate in ability to operate the equipment
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(e.g., due to fluctuations in physical or mental state), the risks
associated with the specific trial, and other relevant study factors
such as the nature of ongoing monitoring.
As a qualifier, specialized equipment designed for this remote
study purpose is a minimum requirement. State-of-the-art
clinical tDCS equipment and accessories have been developed
and validated in controlled clinical trials, with trained operators.
It is not safe or prudent to simply provide subjects with
specialized clinical equipment, including devices and headgear,
not designed for home use. Doing so without accounting for
variability in skill, training, and environment puts subjects at
risk and compromises reproducibility (e.g., dose control). The
distinction betweenmedical equipment designed for professional
operators vs. subjects and their caregivers is evident across
physical medicine, and is no less important for tDCS. It is
misguided to conflate the inherent simplicity and tolerability of
clinical tDCS with the assumption that devices not designed for
subject use applied by untrained operators pose no risk (Bikson
et al., 2013) and allow for reproducible protocols (Peterchev et al.,
2012).
Our guidelines are built around ongoing supervision in real-
time, even with subjects who have completed training and
demonstrated competency to self-administer. While the level of
supervision may vary across patient group or risk level at the
subject level, we believe that consistency is essential for every
tDCS session to ensure safety and tolerability, as well as to




The recommendations listed here are governed by the principle
that remote tDCS administration must be safe, structured and
reproducible across study sites. Items are generally categorized by
training of staff and subjects/caregivers, design of headgear and
stimulators, and ongoing monitoring. These items are interrelated
and are itemized here for emphasis of key points---in clinical trial
design they will be implemented holistically.
Training of the tDCS Research Staff
Study research staff will first be trained in tDCS treatment
technique and in administering tDCS to others. Staff will be
trained using standard-operating-procedures (SOP) specifying
all subject interactions as well as device usage. In terms of
subject interaction, study research staff will be trained to monitor
for study-specific ‘‘stop’’ criteria following a decision-tree-based
flowchart that allows for evaluation of eligibility to continue at
each progressive step. At baseline visits (in clinic) tDCS research
staff will complete a checklist to screen subjects for at home tDCS
(see Figure 1 for an example).
Following training on screening procedures, study research
staff will be briefed on the usage of the device and the location
of headset placement. In addition, selected research staff will
be trained with and have access to a guide that details (e.g.,
the device manual), in a step-by-step fashion, the procedures
that are required to configure and program devices prior to
FIGURE 1 | Example of subject checklist.
release to subjects, for example programming device unlock
codes for one-time use to be provided prior to each session.
Prior to releasing a device to a subject, selected research staff
must program the intensity, duration, and condition (active or
sham) of each planned session, along with code that limits the
number and frequency of sessions. In the case of code-based
session release, research staff will be instructed to withhold any
one-time use codes until subject device placement and setup are
deemed appropriate.
Research staff will be trained in the preparation and testing
of any devices and accessories (e.g., kits) release to subjects,
as documentation of material release. Through the duration
of the study, technicians will be trained to monitor subjects
for any unexpected adverse events (e.g., atypical discomfort) or
misuse of the device. At the end of the study, technicians will be
instructed on how to evaluate retrieved physical device materials
(e.g., headgear/stimulator condition, expendables) and download
any data stored on the device (e.g., completion codes for each
subject’s study sessions, stimulation history of each code issued)
as relevant to confirm compliance (Figure 2).
In addition to training specific to the implementation of
remotely-supervised tDCS as describe above, the clinical research
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FIGURE 2 | Guidelines for training.
team needs to be skilled in other aspects of clinical trial
methodology, including screening of subjects, monitoring of
subject progress and evaluation of outcomes.
Initial and Ongoing Assessment of the User’s
Capability to Participate in tDCS Remotely
A precisely defined protocol (decision-tree-based flowchart) will
be closely followed through the duration of the study for each
subject. Study ‘‘stop’’ criteria (Figure 3) will be reviewed at
each stage of the trial: screening, baseline, study sessions, and
follow-up. If stop criteria are met at any time throughout the
study, the session and/or trial participation will be terminated
as specified in the protocol. Following an initial screening,
at least one baseline visit will confirm the subject’s tDCS
aptitude and tolerability. Before any subject is sent home with
a device, it will be determined whether the subject-or designated
proxy- can properly follow the steps to ensure correct electrode
preparation and placement, low impedance and safe removal of
the device, and whether the subject can tolerate the stimulation
period.
Throughout the study, general compliance will be maintained
through stop criteria that exclude subjects who continually
fail to set up a device properly or fail to attend regularly
scheduled sessions. In addition, if any subject reports an
unexpected level of discomfort, pain, or desire to withdraw, the
session and/or ongoing study participation may be terminated.
At the end of the study, the record of completed and
uncompleted sessions, recorded by the device itself, will
be reviewed for all subjects who successfully met study
criteria. This will be used to determine both individual
subject and overall trial compliance based on pre-determined
criteria.
Supportive Training Procedures and Materials
(Including Assessments of the User and/or
Caregiver)
The protocol will be supported by a manual of operating
procedures for study staff. For designs with remote supervision
of self- or proxy-administered tDCS, that there be at least two
in-person training sessions with study staff, including training
and practice for the real-time remote supervision procedures
(e.g., a training session with a study staff member that includes
connection to another remotely-located study staff member via
secure internet-based video conference).
For subjects who meet criteria for study continuation,
subsequent sessions will be completed with the remote technician
alone, with the nature and length of ongoing monitoring to be
specific to the subject or trial. For instance, some subjects may
require remote monitoring indefinitely, while other trials may
use remote monitoring for a training period only.
The protocol will include sequential safety, tolerability
and compliance ‘‘stops’’ administered by the supervising
study staff throughout the course of the treatment sessions
to ensure appropriate use. For instance, potential concerns
include failure to place the headset and electrodes correctly,
selecting incorrect electrode polarity, inadequate electrode
saturation, lack of compliance, and loss of precision in electrode
placement.
Each subject will be provided with supportive and readily-
accessible training materials (Figure 2). These should include an
instruction manual (potentially supported with an instructional
video) and a method to self-report (electronic or binder). These
materials are designed as a resource to the subject to reference
or confirm study details. In addition, they serve the purpose
of remotely training subjects or caregivers who look to clarify
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FIGURE 3 | Example of study flowchart with stop criteria.
items of set-up or device usage. The self-report binder will
provide the subject with forms that measure adverse events,
assess tolerance, along with study-specific measures (e.g., mood).
While the manual and video (if used) will serve as ongoing
training procedures, the self-report forms will enable the subject
and caregiver to assess the experience throughout the study. Any
remotely-delivered adjunctive behavioral therapy (e.g., cognitive
or physical training) will be trial-specific with a supplemental
protocol and procedures.
Simple and Fail-Safe Electrode Preparation and
Positioning
The essential aspects of reproducible tDCS dose (defined in
Peterchev et al., 2012) are electrode preparation and montage
(addressed in this section) and waveform (addressed in the
next). Remotely-supervised tDCS administration would reduce
barriers to reliably apply tDCS away from the treatment
center.
The headgear should be designed to allow simple and
consistent placement of electrode at desired locations on the scalp
(Figures 4, 5)---for example headband snaps for the sponges to be
placed on the headband to ensure consistent correct placement.
Subjects will be screened for aptitude with the specific
headgear as part of inclusion/enrollment. Participation is
contingent on the ability to properly apply the headset and
correctly operate the device. The headgear may be marked in a
way that facilitates reliable setup, for example the headset will
be labeled ‘‘RED’’ and ‘‘BLACK’’ to confirm that color coded
cables are properly placed, ensuring anode (RED) and cathode
(BLACK) placement (white can be substituted for red if color
blindness is a concern). The headset should be designed to fit
reliably on the head, for example designed with a market to align
with the bridge of the nose at midline. Headsets may come in
multiple sizes and/or allow adjustment by research staff. The
device includes an impedance meter and will not allow access
until headgear and electrodes are accurately and correctly placed.
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FIGURE 4 | Example of hardware-based waveform control. Users are
provided with an individual device and accessories such as the 5x-Session
Home Kit (A)The subject checks in with the supervisor before and after each
session (B). The supervisor unlocks operation before each session by providing
a code (B). The subject enters only the code provided with no access to device
programming or stimulation settings. The subject uses custom fit headgear to
position electrodes (C,D). The device automatically collects compliance data
and may also prompt the user for information (E). Details of implementation will
be customized to each clinical trial while maintaining the principles of supervised
neuromodulation (F,G). (Image courtesy of Soterix Medical Inc.)
The headset should be designed tominimize error in electrode
placement, ideally allowing just the montage designed for the
specific trial (Figure 6), e.g., bifrontal montage (for dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex target application) or M1-SO montage (for
motor cortex target applications).
Subjects/proxies should be provided with kits which include
all of the necessary supplies for the entire study or until
expendable can be replenished (by either a visit to the clinic or
visit by study personnel to the subjects’ home or care-facility).
Components should be labeled properly in order to simplify
application, minimize confusion, and prevent error (e.g., mark
each pair of sponges by session number). The subject manual
should clearly explain the contents of the kit and the correct use
of each component.
Also of note, re-use of sponges across subjects is not hygienic.
Re-use of the sponge across sessions, even when cleaned, is
not recommended for supervised home use- single-use sponges
increase tolerability, cleanliness, and reproducibility. Medical
grade sponges are required to comply with biocompatibility
requirements, and labeling for re-use would require testing under
the intended conditions of use---which are complex and variable
in the case of home-application. Reliable control of cleanliness,
much less contamination, would prove difficult in home use
(would not for example be reliably detected by impedance check
or remote observation).In addition, attempt to remediate these
sponge re-use concerns would increase the operator and patient
burden for monitoring and preparation (e.g., concerns about
storage, residue from skin/hair product).
Strict Dose Control for Each Session
Control of stimulation parameters is the second essential aspect
after electrode placement. For tDCS essential parameters are the
intensity, duration (along with any ramp), and condition (active
or sham) of stimulation. For multiple sessions, the number
and interval of sessions is critical. For remotely-supervised
tDCS, limitations on the number and timing of sessions, along
with control of each session intensity and duration is pivotal
(Figure 6). Providing subjects with clinical stimulators that
do not limit either is not safe or supportive of reproducible
protocols.
Two general approaches to control stimulation parameters
under remotely supervised-tDCS can be considered. In the first
case, ‘‘hardware’’ based limitation (Figure 4) provides subjects
with equipment that is pre-programmed to provide a limited
number of sessions with limited interval. For example, the
stimulator will provide only 10 sessions, with pre-set intensity,
duration, and condition, with a maximum of one session every
23 h. Once 10 sessions have exhausted, the device no longer
provides output until the entire hardware or a component
(storage disk) is replaced. With ‘‘hardware’’ limitations, it
is not necessarily possible to remotely stop use before the
10 sessions are activated. The Soterix Medical/Neuroconn
Mobile transcranial Direct Current Stimulator (Mobile) and
Magstim/Neuronica HDC-Kit are example of ‘‘hardware’’ based
limitation. Subjects or caregivers are required to return to
the clinic to replenish expended hardware---supervisors may be
provide a ‘‘pack’’ containing multiple dose-control hardware
units (e.g., 10 storage disks with 10 sessions each for 100 sessions)
but this effectively extends the window where control of dose is
limited.
In the second case, ‘‘software’’ based limitation (Figure 5)
subjects are provided with a device which is deactivated
until a code is provided by the research staff. The code
typically unlocks a single session which a pre-set duration and
intensity. After a single discharge, the device is inert until
a new code is provided. This allows the remote supervisor
to tightly control compliance, for example not providing a
code until proper electrode set-up is confirmed by video,
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FIGURE 5 | Example of software-based waveform control. Users are
provided with an individual stimulator, a discharge key, and accessories
such as the 5x-Session Home Kit. The supervisor limits stimulation by
programming the discharge key. The subject plugs the discharge key into
the device and presses a single button to activate stimulation. The subject
uses custom fit headgear to position electrodes. The device automatically
collects compliance data which is stored in the discharge key. Details of
device implementation will be customized to each clinical trial while
maintaining the principles of supervised neuromodulation. (Image courtesy
of Soterix Medical Inc.)
provides an opportunity for supervisor to directly interact with
subject and gather feedback and data for each trial. In this
situation, the remote supervisor may vary the provided code
based on subject experience. Soterix Medical transcranial Direct
Current Stimulator mini-Clinical Trials system (Mini-CT) is one
example of ‘‘software’’ based limitation. Given stimulators can
be programmed with excess of codes (e.g., thousands), there
is no need for subjects to return to the clinic to replenish
hardware.
In both ‘‘hardware’’ and ‘‘software’’ based governing for
remote supervision, the subject or caregiver does not program
session intensity of duration which enhances safety and
reproducibility. In case of blinded treatment, the subject may
not know which device/code is real or sham treatment. Double
blinding may also be implemented by blinding the remote
supervisor.
The user manual should clearly explain the hardware contents
of the kit and the correct set-up of the device, such as entering a
code or reading the display.
Ongoing Monitoring for Compliance
While in-person monitoring will be completed during the
initial sessions, subjects may be monitored and/or contacted
to confirm compliance throughout the remaining sessions.
Subject interaction will be maintained (e.g., through secure
video) to quantify compliance (device preparation, electrode
saturation/placement, stimulation protocol) with corresponding
corrective steps. As an example, secure video will be scheduled
and maintained with each subject daily. Visual confirmation
will ensure proper set up, appropriate home environment,
and acceptable impedance. Following these checks during
monitoring, subjects will be given their one time use code for that
session (Figure 7).
Ongoing Monitoring for Treatment-Emergent
Adverse Effects
Before starting a session, study staff will ask the subject about
any adverse events since the last session, with clearly defined
stop criteria if anything is reported that is of clinical concern
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FIGURE 6 | Guidelines for study equipment.
related to safety or tolerability. In addition, subjects will be asked
to report pain and/or discomfort level at set points during the
stimulation. If pain crosses a given threshold, there will be an
immediate stop in place in order to prevent any risk of skin burn
(Loo et al., 2011) and the supervising staff will assess whether
this has occurred due to suboptimal treatment technique. If tDCS
causes pain above the given threshold despite adequate treatment
technique, subjects will be withdrawn from the study. After the
session, subjects will be again assessed by study staff for any
adverse events. Subjects will also record their experience in the
study-specific materials.
Guidance to Identify and Implement
Discontinuation of a Session and/or Study
Participation (Including Emergency Failsafe
Procedures) Tailored to the Treatment
Population’s Level of Need
Finally, during training and in reference materials, subjects will
be instructed to abort the session if they need to immediately
discontinue stimulation by allowing ramp down and then
removing their headset. These instructions will be used if any
subject reports significant discomfort or other adverse event,
otherwise needs to discontinue a session, or if study staff
determines that the session should be discontinued.
Examples of Clinical Trial Applications and
Population-specific Adaptations
The authors’ interest in remote (non-clinic) tDCS for clinical trials
has facilitated effort to develop study protocols for specific patient
populations. Below, we provide examples of population-specific
considerations that may navigate tailoring the guidelines described
above to specific populations with differing limitations and needs.
These summaries are not intended to be exhaustive but rather
illustrate salient features of applying the above eight principles
to specific applications. Once population specific protocols have
been implemented, and the feasibility of these methods has been
confirmed within the target groups, more expansive clinical trials
can apply them to study the effectiveness of the treatment.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
The immediate facilitatory effects of tDCS on cognitive abilities
often seen impaired in ADHD has prompted interest in whether
or not the technique might have a therapeutic effect. For
instance, a recent study of ADHD-diagnosed children in another
experiment showed that 0.75 Hz oscillating tDCS increased EEG-
recorded slow wave oscillation during sleep, and subsequent
memory recall the next day (Prehn-Kristensen et al., 2014). One
brief tDCS trial in non-ADHD subjects showed better response
inhibition task performance after 5 consecutive days of training
with concurrent 1.5 mA anodal tDCS stimulation than training
alone (Ditye et al., 2012). The latter suggests that tDCS paired
with cognitive training/rehabilitation techniques might have
the highest potential for efficacy in minimizing ADHD-related
behavioral dysfunction. However, previous trials that combine
these therapeutic approaches typically last 1--3 weeks, making
clinic visits impractical for a typical family that contends with
school demands and extra-curricular activities, worsened when
there is more than one school-aged child in the home. Any
clinic-based tDCS trial for ADHD not only would be plagued
by poor compliance and high dropout, but it is also likely that
only the most motivated of families and subjects would complete
treatment, complicating generalizability and efficacy inferences.
Remotely-supervised tDCS performed is an obvious approach
to circumvent the main obstacles, but the age and behavioral
characteristics of the patient population introduce unique issues
to any home-based tDCS clinical trial. ADHD is a behavioral
disorder whose hallmarks are distractibility, restlessness, and
motivational issues--all of which must be managed effectively
within a standardized tDCS delivery protocol. Although
self-administered tDCS for adults diagnosed with ADHD
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FIGURE 7 | Guidelines for ongoing assessment.
certainly is feasible, it is more likely that trials will consider tDCS
with older children or adolescents, as tDCS has been shown
to be safe with these age groups. However, most institutional
review boards will not likely approve trial protocols where youth
are asked to set up and administer tDCS themselves, suggesting
effective trials must plan to overcome and troubleshoot issues
arising from parent training to administer tDCS properly. Such
issues include effective parent screening/training, attention
to how dyadic interactions influence motivation, and special
care in assessing compliance and outcome. To accommodate
these special considerations, we recommend a trial design that
at minimum includes: (1) a clinic visit for consent, clinical
assessment, and training with particular attention paid to
educating families that treatment must be a ‘‘whole family’’
cooperative effort, (2) an ‘‘at home’’ visit prior to treatment so
that research staff can assess and advise tDCS equipment set up
and other technical issues, (3) careful consideration of whether
every tDCS session should be remotely-supervised (e.g., via video
teleconferencing) to ensure optimal protocol adherence; and
(4) formal consideration in trial design of how ADHD-related
behavior interacts with both treatment delivery, motivation, or
outcome.
Some specific recommendations for ADHD protocols
include:
- Parent preparedness, training, and motivational issues:
Informed consent for a remotely-supervised tDCS trial
should emphasize the multiple types of training required for
parents who will administer tDCS. At minimum, parental
tDCS technical proficiency should be demonstrated as
suggested above, with at least 1 clinic visit and 1 remotely-
supervised session, if not at each daily session. If computer-
administered cognitive training techniques will accompany
tDCS stimulation, separate training should be provided in
how to start, stop, and evaluate the successful implementation
of such techniques. In addition, parent training should be
provided in how to properly motivate their ADHD-diagnosed
child. Obviously, an important goal is to avoid punitiveness
or coercion that might occur if parents are more motivated
than their children, but it is equally as important is to
standardize and measure motivation across the trial. For
example, simple behavioral contingency management
techniques should be considered as standard, especially for
younger age groups. Protocol-specific guidelines on how
and when to provide positive reinforcements should be
made explicit; their use should be quantified by trial staff
weekly.
- Dyadic interaction impact: It is not yet known what interaction
styles or personality factors might make some parents more
effective in operating and supervising tDCS at home than
others. Until such study has been done, we recommend that
each trial should make effort to formally assess the nature
of parent-child dyadic interactions or familial relationships
styles to see if they moderate treatment compliance or
outcome.
- Preparation for tDCS delivery and Monitoring of Potential
Treatment Barriers: Homes with children are different
than those without. For tDCS with a child or teenager,
tDCS should be set up in a specially-designated quiet
room and performed without distraction or interruption,
preferably with the cooperation of the whole family during
treatment delivery to reduce distractions. Protocols should
set clear guidelines for whether or not breaks are permitted
during training and set guidelines for them. A standardized
compliance checklist should be used for each session, which
emphasizes whether ADHD-related behaviors that could
have interfered with treatment occurred and how they were
managed. Any concurrently-done computer-administered
cognitive training ideally will be internet-enabled. This will
allow research staff to remotely verify that any exercises
were set up and run correctly, as well as offers the
potential for any behavioral performance data to be uploaded
for secure storage at the clinic site after each treatment
session.
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- Careful Choice of Outcome Measures: Although it is likely that
the primary outcome measures of any tDCS trial would be
performance on tests of a specific cognitive domain, (either
because it is specifically targeted by concurrent cognitive
training or merely because it is one of several domains
often impaired in ADHD), secondary outcome measures
should include ADHD symptom severity checklists or ADHD
‘‘problem behavior’’ inventories (e.g., Brown ADD Scales).
Because of the subjective nature of the latter types of
assessments, it is important to use multiple respondents (e.g.,
parent and teacher). Similarly, the most effective trials will
include appropriate placebo conditions in order to mitigate
expectancy effects.
Depression
There is a long history of the use of ‘‘brain polarization’’,
essentially an earlier form of tDCS often given at lower stimulus
intensities, to treat depression (Arul-Anandam and Loo, 2009).
Over the last decade, in the context of the emergence of
brain stimulation treatments for depression (e.g., transcranial
magnetic stimulation) and developments in tDCS equipment,
methodology and scientific understanding, interest has rapidly
emerged in tDCS as a treatment for depression. tDCS has
been applied both to treatment resistant depression (i.e., in
subjects who have failed to improve after treatment with
antidepressant medication) and to non pharmacotherapy
resistant depression, as some patients may prefer a non
medication form of treatment. From 2006, evidence from several
placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials has indicated
significant antidepressant effects for tDCS (Loo et al., 2012;
Brunoni et al., 2013a; Shiozawa et al., 2014). A key barrier to
the widespread use of tDCS for this common disorder is the
requirement to travel to a treatment center for multiple sessions
as repeated treatment sessions, typically given on consecutive
weekdays over several weeks, are often required to optimize
clinical response. For example, the Loo et al. (2012) study
suggested that extension of the treatment period from three to
6 weeks resulted in greater clinical improvement. After the acute
treatment course, ongoing ‘‘maintenance’’ tDCS, given weekly
to fortnightly, has also been reported to be useful in maintaining
improvement gained in the acute phase and preventing relapse
of depression (Martin et al., 2013a).
Several specific issues need to be considered when applying
tDCS in depression trials:
- An important precaution in this patient group is suicide risk,
which may fluctuate from day to day and should be closely
monitored. It is unknown if tDCS may lead to increased
suicide risk early in the treatment course (as has been proposed
with antidepressant medications), either due to improved
motivation, or specific treatment-related effects.
- Dose-control, i.e., control of access and restriction of
stimulation to pre-programmed stimulation is important as
a safeguard so that the device cannot be used for deliberate
self-harm.
- The research team should closely monitor fluctuations in
mental state, which may impinge on the subject’s ability
to adequately perform the tDCS procedure at home, for
example, due to changes in motivation or concentration.
Thus, it is possible that a subject initially assessed as
capable of performing remotely supervised tDCS at home,
later becomes unable to adequately continue treatment
at home---contingencies should be made for this event.
Conversely, given findings that tDCS improves information
processing speed in depressed patients (Loo et al., 2012) it
is also possible that subjects initially assessed as not capable
of performing remotely supervised tDCS at home, who may
need to commence acute treatment at the treatment center,
may later be able to continue the acute treatment course and
ongoing maintenance treatments at home under supervision.
- As part of the initial assessment of suitability for home-
based, remotely supervised tDCS, a thorough psychiatric
assessment by an experienced clinician is required, evaluating
not only mood, but also personality style, current stressors
and social and family support. All of these factors should
be considered in evaluating a person’s ability to comply
with tDCS procedures, likely fluctuations in mental state and
risk.
- The majority of depressed patients presenting for treatment
are likely to be on a combination of psychotropic medications,
including antidepressants, atypical antipsychotics, anxiolytics,
lithium and anticonvulsant mood stabilizers. Further,
alterations in concurrent medication treatment may occur
frequently common in order to manage side effects, achieve
better antidepressant response or provide symptomatic relief
(e.g., sleep, anxiety). As there is evidence that anticonvulsant
and benzodiazepine medications may affect the efficacy of
tDCS, these medications are best avoided if possible. The
tDCS team should maintain close liaison with the subject’s
treating doctor(s) throughout the tDCS treatment course, to
optimize concurrent medications and to establish procedures
for clear and prompt communication about any alterations in
medications.
Multiple Sclerosis (MS)
For those living with MS, treatments using tDCS have the
potential to directly alleviate common yet refractory symptoms
including pain, fatigue, depression, and sensory and motor
dysfunction (Palm et al., 2014). An important first step is
to establish the procedures for feasible at home use, with
consideration of potential motor and cognitive impairments.
For this patient population, the emphasis is on extensive
and ongoing screening procedures, as well as streamlined and
simplified equipment design and set up. To ensure compliance,
safety, and assist with training, a secure, daily video monitoring
protocol should be implemented.
Further recommendations for MS protocols include the
following:
- Screening is an important first step as remotely-supervised
tDCS will not be appropriate for all MS patients. A treating
neurologist should ensure that the subject has potential
suitability for operating the headgear and device. This
would include cutoffs for minimal neurological (motor) and
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cognitive function. For instance, severe motor impairment can
be screened for using the Expanded Disability Status Scale
(EDSS) score (Kurtzke, 1983), excluding those with scores of
6.5 or greater. In addition, subjects should be excluded from a
remotely-supervised protocol if any visual, auditory, or motor
deficits prevent the ability to understand the study instructions
or operate the device or laptop computer (Figures 1, 3).
Minimal cognitive ability for participation could also be
defined, for example by establishing cutoffs using the Brief
International Cognitive Assessment inMS (BICAMS; Benedict
et al., 2012) to exclude those with severe cognitive deficits.
- The study device should be simple to operate and engineered
to unlock single tDCS sessions through a one-time use
passcode. Headgear should also be simplified for use. For
example, headgear should be modified with a hat-like design
to ensureminimalmotor requirements. In addition, device kits
should be prepared and organized to ensure maximal ease in
terms of sponge pocket set-up and daily materials.
- Clinical and research staff should be trained through a study
technicianmanual on the device setup (programming sessions,
retrieving session codes), headgear placement, and subject
interactions (requirements for a successful session, items that
qualify as ‘‘stop’’ criteria, and troubleshooting). In addition,
research staff should be trained on how to safely abort a subject
session and on procedures to reestablish video connection if
lost.
- Subject training should occur during an initial in-person
training session where each subject will view an instructional
video, practice the technique in full and ultimately complete
their first tDCS session. Beyond training, these initial visits
will ensure inclusion and exclusion criteria are met. Subjects
must have a suitable home environment (e.g., distraction free
location and space to complete the sessions) access to internet,
and the ability to commit to tDCS sessions.
- An instructional video should support training and
implementation, be accessible to the subject throughout
the study, and cover all details necessary to complete a session.
The video should contain information on general materials, a
step by step guide to set up the device, how to abort a session
in case of emergency, and the means of properly ending a
session and disposing of materials.
- Stop criteria (assessed at baseline, during sessions, and at
follow-up) should be used as a gateway for the subject to
proceed at each step (Figure 3). The protocol should be
designed with a series of checkpoints to be met to address
compliance (attendance, ability to complete the procedures as
instructed, following study guidelines) and tolerability (at any
time if any predefined events are reported or if pain crosses a
threshold).
Palliative Care
Palliative care is an interdisciplinary model of care for patients
with serious or life-threatening illnesses. The goal of palliative
care is to manage symptoms of the disease and to mitigate
illness burden for the patient and family from the time of
diagnosis until the end of life. In the U.S., palliative care is
available through both hospital-based and community-based
palliative care programs (Hauser and Kramer, 2004; Defilippi
and Cameron, 2010; Connell et al., 2013; Kamal et al., 2013).
An overall goal of community-based palliative care is to provide
adequate support in symptom management, and psychological
and spiritual support to the patient and family so that the
patient can remain at home, even during the terminal phase of
the disease. Therefore, the development of novel home-based
approaches for symptom control is highly relevant for this patient
population.
Although outcomes targeted in existing tDCS studies, such
as pain, mood, sleep, cognitive performance, or overall quality
of life, are highly relevant for palliative care patients, there are
numerous barriers of an access of palliative care patients to
the tDCS studies. The burden of repeated visits to the research
facility in order to receive the tDCS application has been among
the major obstacles. Therefore, the development of the mini-CT
tDCS enabling home-application provides an opportunity for the
palliative care patients to be included in tDCS studies. However,
designing study protocols of remotely-supervised tDCS for
palliative care patients requires specific considerations, such as
the following:
- Involvement of family caregiver: Palliative care subjects
frequently rely on an assistance of family caregivers. Therefore,
it is likely that the home-based tDCS application will be
delivered by the family caregiver rather than self-performed
by the subject. Thus, both the subject and the family caregiver
may need to be included in the study.
- Minimizing burden to the subject and the family caregiver:
It has to be kept in mind that both the subject and the
caregiver bear the burden of the illness, and the level of
their overall distress may be high. Therefore, study procedures
pertaining to the tDCS procedure and data collection have to
be user friendly, easy and not time-demanding. Further, time
planning of study procedures should leave reasonable margins
acceptable for both the dyad of subject-caregiver and the study
personnel, for example when scheduling the real-time video
monitoring of the procedure. Further, it needs to be taken to
the account that the tDCS stimulation usually takes 15--20 min
during which the subject has to remain seated or in the bed,
without walking around. Therefore, subjects who for variety
of reasons, such as restlessness, are not comfortably able to
comply with that requirement are not good candidates for the
tDCS procedure. Another aspect to consider in this category
is data collection, especially in study population involving
palliative care subjects at advanced stage of the illness. While
data collection in healthy populations may include extensive
questionnaire sets and testing, data collection in palliative
care subjects should very carefully reflect the specifics of the
involved population.
- Polypharmacy: Symptom management in palliative care
frequently relies on pharmacological treatments, often
including multiple medications. There is growing evidence
indicating that certain agents (such as NMDA antagonists or
amphetamine) may alter (inhibit or enhance) tDCS effects.
This requires careful consideration when planning the tDCS
protocol, because it is unlikely that medication wash-out prior
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the study participation would be feasible in palliative care
patients.
- Feasibility: Overall, the feasibility of the home-delivered
remotely-monitored tDCS in palliative care patient population
is multifaceted, including (but not limited to) the following
elements:
- The patient’s and family caregiver’s understanding of the
procedure, their willingness and ability to participate in the
study.
- Caregiver’s ability to perform tDCS specific procedures
[after training]: Establishing videoconference connection;
Assembling the electrodes and the head set; Positioning the
headset on the subject’s head; Turning on-off the tDCS unit;
and the procedure has to be regarded by the involved caregiver
as acceptable for him/her and the subject;
- Subject’s acceptability and tolerability of the procedure: Able
to remain seated or in bed for the 20-min stimulation
[does not interrupt the stimulation session by walking
around]; Able to provide a brief feedback or numerical
rating when asked; Regards the procedure as acceptable;
Tolerates the tDCS procedure (in the means of adverse
events);
- Home environment: the Internet connectivity sufficient for the
videoconference connection; sufficient space to accommodate
the tDCS and videoconferencing devices.
Conclusion
Remotely-supervised tDCS can serve as an extension of in-clinic
administered tDCS sessions. Proper frameworks around clinical
staff training, user capability, training and monitoring guides are
intended to maintain the same level of safety and tolerability
experienced within the clinic setting. Careful consideration
of each of these criteria is essential to a remotely-supervised
trial. Future expansion toward a more robust training method
for clinical staff on the technique will further optimize its
application. In addition, following the completion of each clinical
trial, population-specific modifications will be considered within
the training, design, and monitoring of such patient populations.
For some subjects or populations, prescription for direct home
use may ultimately be the resulting clinical application, while
others may be eligible only for continued remotely-supervised
use. Validation of the compliance experienced in remotely-
supervised tDCS trials will serve as a means of comparison to the
level of compliance observed within in-clinic trials. Expanding
the patient populations able to comply with a tDCS trial through
remote supervision can ultimately broaden the reach of clinical
trials, helping to deepen the current understanding of tDCS.
With these principles in place, tDCS clinical trials will expand
with results to ultimately guide appropriate and effective clinical
use.
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The motivations behind the development
of many neuromorphic processors have
been dominated by either the creation
of better artificial intelligence, or novel
non-von Neumann computing paradigms.
A result of this impetus has been a
number of low-power processors capa-
ble of simulating many different biologi-
cal features of the nervous system. Power
efficiency is crucial for deployed neuro-
morphic systems, but it also opens this
technology up to other energy restricted
applications. In this opinion, we suggest
two such applications pertaining to ther-
apeutic stimulation of the nervous sys-
tem where closing the control loop could
be assisted by advances in neuromorphic
architectures: (1) deep brain stimulation
(DBS) in the treatment of Parkinson’s dis-
ease and (2) epidural spinal cord stimula-
tion (ESS) for restoring voluntary motor
functions. Though there are still questions
that must be addressed before this would
be feasible, but we are suggesting that the
technological barriers—in both the algo-
rithms and hardware—can be overcome
with directed funding and research.
Neuromorphic processor research is
centered around the creation of brain-like
intelligence through power-efficient cir-
cuits that borrow elements directly from
biology (Mead, 1989). The applications
for these projects range from brain-scale
simulations (Gao et al., 2012; Benjamin
et al., 2014) and in silica experimen-
tation (Schemmel et al., 2010; Furber
et al., 2012), to brain-like computing and
learning (Merolla et al., 2011; Srinivasa
and Cruz-Albrecht, 2012; Cruz-Albrecht
et al., 2013; Rahimi Azghadi et al., 2014;
Schmuker et al., 2014). These projects
promise unrivaled access to large-scale
models of the brain as well as insight
into the unique non-von Neumann com-
putation that biological systems appear to
achieve.
Regardless of the motivation, the tangi-
ble result of these efforts has been an accu-
mulation of low-power circuits capable of
emulating various elements of the nervous
system. Although these are essential for
embodying robotic systems and augment-
ing current super-computing paradigms,
they also have the potential to assist in
nervous system stimulation control. This
application is outside the scope of the
currently funded neuromorphic hardware
projects, but with new insights and tech-
nological advances, it is one that will be
particularly beneficial.
1. MODEL BASED CONTROL
In our current capacity to monitor neu-
ral circuits, most system variables are
unobservable. One strategy for estimat-
ing these unknown system variables and
parameters is by employing an Unscented
Kalman Filter (UKF) to combine the
observable and unobservable states. The
UKF employs a set of known dynami-
cal equations and observation functions
with the measurable data to update an
approximation of the state and its uncer-
tainty. At each update, sigma points—
system states that are consistent with
the current state uncertainty—are selected
and used to integrate the system. These
are combined with estimated mean state
values and the approximate uncertainty.
A gain matrix then updates the new most
likely state of the system. The schematic
for this organization is illustrated in
Figure 1A. Applying this kind of feed-
back control to biological systems was ini-
tially demonstrated by Voss et al. (2004)
but has since been demonstrated on a
number of control and estimation prob-
lems (Abarbanel et al., 2008; Li et al.,
2009; Ullah and Schiff, 2009, 2010; Schiff,
2010; ODoherty et al., 2011; Aprasoff and
Donchin, 2012; Schiff, 2012; Liu et al.,
2014).
By using a model of the area under
stimulation, both the activity and state
of that area can be approximated—
something that is not directly measurable.
The model, constructed from the cur-
rent understanding of the anatomy, can
then be used to find an optimal set of
stimulation parameters. In addition, the
model output can be used as the feedback
into a control system that can not only
dynamically tune the stimulation param-
eters but also adapt to the physiological
circuit remodeling—providing the highest
possible therapeutic benefit. Embedding
these models in low-power neuromorphic
hardware would facilitate a transition into
implantable devices.
A discussion of control inherently
implies observability of the system.
However, observability alone is useful
to current nervous system stimulation
strategies. Observing the unknown—or
unreachable—states of the physical sys-
tem, would provide a way to automatically
tune the stimulation parameters—
assisting clinicians in finding the optimal
set points in open-loop control. Finally,
in addition to the UKF there are other
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FIGURE 1 | Example therapeutic applications of model based control.
(A) The system dynamics are described by a model, F , and the observations
are described by a function, A. In most systems those observations are going
to be noisy, so a covariance matrix, R, will account for that. After one step of
F , using the resulting sigma points will provide X̃i = F (Xi ). A new set of
observations can then be found, Ỹi = A(Xi ). The means over these two
matrices are the a priori state and measurement estimates. The a posteriori
state estimate, x̂, is now dependent on the state estimate, x̃, the
measurement estimate, ỹ , the actual measurement, y , and the Kalman gain
matrix, G. (B) Diagram of deep brain stimulation in the treatment of
Parkinson’s disease. Adapted from Thibeault and Srinivasa (2013). (C) Example
epidural spinal cord stimulation for restoring voluntary motor functions.
model-based control schemes that could
be employed here.
2. DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION IN THE
TREATMENT OF PARKINSON’S
DISEASE
The application of DBS to patients with
pharmacoresistant Parkinson’s disease
can be traced back to the early 1980’s
(Montgomery Jr, 2012). In DBS, dual
electrodes are implanted bilaterally into
the nuclei of the basal ganglia (see
Figure 1B)—the current target is the
subthalamic nucleus. Constant electrical
pulses are then injected into the electrodes.
After implantation, clinicians will exper-
iment with frequency, amplitude, and
duration of those electrical pulses to find
a configuration with the highest benefit.
Finding that point however, is an inexact
science and periodic adjustments to com-
pensate for neural plasticity are required.
Although there is a proven clinical benefit
to DBS, there is no clear explanation for
its mechanism of action.
Although the open-loop configuration
of DBS has proven capable, closed-loop
control of DBS has been shown to be a
more effective treatment in both theoret-
ical (Santaniello et al., 2011), and physi-
ological experiments (Rosin et al., 2011).
For example, in Rosin et al. (2011) a simple
feedback loop was created where the acti-
vation of the DBS pulse was triggered by
spiking in a reference structure—either
the internal segment of the globus pal-
lidus or primary motor cortex. The control
paradigm demonstrated a larger reduction
in pallidal oscillations and akinesia com-
pared to open-loop DBS. The resulting
system—although brilliantly designed—
is an incredibly simple solution and one
that exemplifies the therapeutic advances
that can be made with adaptive feedback
control systems.
The class of model-based control of
DBS suggested here has already been
demonstrated in simulation space by
Schiff (2010) using the simple neuron
implementation of Rubin and Terman
(2004). Although the mathematical model
used in that study was computationally
cheaper than the alternative, it is still dif-
ficult to simulate in a low-power micro-
processor. Aspects of the original Rubin
and Terman (2004) results were imple-
mented using a more hardware friendly
model in Thibeault and Srinivasa (2013),
however, the required level of abstrac-
tion in a control paradigm is still unclear.
Despite unanswered questions, these stud-
ies are encouraging and demonstrate the
feasibility of the strategy.
3. EPIDURAL SPINAL CORD
STIMULATION
The recent discoveries in the use of epidu-
ral spinal cord stimulation—diagrammed
in Figure 1C—on patients with motor
complete paraplegia has revealed a
therapeutic pathway toward restoring vol-
untary motor function (Harkema et al.,
2011). However, the mechanisms behind
this benefit as well as the supporting
technology is still immature. The cur-
rent state-of-the-art involves randomly
tuning the stimulation parameters manu-
ally until a physiological improvement is
observed—these parameters include both
the duration and amplitude of the stim-
ulus as well as anode/cathode pairings.
There have been efforts to apply Bayesian
optimization approaches to automating
the parameter search but these did not
directly account for the relevant biological
structures (Desautels, 2014).
Additionally, it has been suggested that
the therapeutic restoration of motor con-
trol is mechanistically dependent on the
remodeling of the remaining spinal cir-
cuits (van den Brand et al., 2012). Having
a control strategy as well as a model that
are adaptive to the plastic changes within
the spinal circuits would require less man-
ual parameter adjustments over the life of
the implant.
As a clinical treatment, ESS is still
underdeveloped. However, it is one that
could benefit from a model-based con-
trol strategy—either as an observer system
for parametric optimization or as a com-
plete closed-loop solution. Although the
fidelity of the spinal cord model and the
source of sensory feedback have not been
fully explored, in many ways this appears
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to be a more tractable problem compared
to DBS—it may also prove to be an ideal
alternative as well (Fuentes et al., 2009).
The accessibility of the spinal cord as well
as the simplicity of the microcircuit may
make closing the loop on ESS more feasi-
ble. However, if more finely tuned control
of the individual muscles is required, the
complexity of the problem could quickly
out pace that of DBS.
4. CONCLUSION
Despite the technological and theoreti-
cal advances outlined here, there are still
obstacles to overcome. Where and what to
measure when closing the loop for both
DBS and ESS is not entirely clear. The
stability of the hardware measuring those
signals is also a concern. Furthermore, as
mentioned above, the appropriate level of
biological fidelity required in the model
has not been fully resolved. The proposed
use of neuromorphic hardware implies
that the model for the control system actu-
ally requires high-fidelity. In DBS treat-
ment of Parkinson’s disease this appears to
be the case. However, for spinal-cord stim-
ulation, it may not be required. Regardless,
closed-loop strategies are clearly more
effective and the theoretical and techno-
logical barriers are low enough that a con-
certed effort should be made to advance
this concept toward clinical treatments.
Finally, model-based control strategies
will not only improve the therapeutic ben-
efit but the power consumption as well.
Rather than blindly applying stimulation,
pulses can be applied only as needed.
Utilizing neuromorphic hardware will add
to that power savings by both reducing
the computational burden and providing
the necessary biological detail for model-
based control.
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Ray Kurzweil predicts that artificial intelli-
gence will equal and then surpass human
intelligence in the not-too-distant future,
in what he calls the “moment of singular-
ity.” Advances in brain/machine interfac-
ing (BMI) may be viewed as a challenge
to this futuristic prediction. BMIs strive to
instrument human brains with unlimited
memory, calculation, and communication
abilities, which provide a competitive edge
to human brain power versus artificial
intelligence. This paper makes a case for a
hybrid human/robot that merges the brain
function with artificial intelligence com-
ponents, and prevents the “moment of
singularity” from ever occurring.
KURZWEIL PREDICTIONS
Kurzweil has made predictions regard-
ing computers and artificial intelligence
in his four books (Kurzweil, 1992, 1999,
2005, 2012). In his 2005 book “The
Singularity is Near, when Humans tran-
scend Biology” (Kurzweil, 2005), he pre-
dicts that by the year 2045 artificial intelli-
gence will be equal to human intelligence,
an event he calls the “moment of singular-
ity.” His most recent book “How to create
a Mind” (Kurzweil, 2012) brings the sin-
gularity date forward in time to 2029. He
argues persuasively in that book that arti-
ficial intelligence embodied in computers
will far surpass human intelligence as the
2030s roll on. He makes an excellent case
throughout the text of how the brain oper-
ates as a hierarchical system and how this
is important in how to create a mind.
In that book (Kurzweil, 2012), he makes
a second somewhat contentious point
about how the neo-cortex can be enhanced
by artificial intelligence. He suggests on
page 244 that using intelligent computers
no bigger than a red blood cell, intelli-
gence will be introduced into the biolog-
ical brain in a minimally invasive way via
the blood stream. Thus, rather than just
making the case for artificial intelligence
within a computer, he alludes to the sce-
nario wherein we will enhance our present
brains. However, he does not say when it
will happen in a meaningful way. He does
state that artificial intelligence will equal
human intelligence by 2029 (the moment
of singularity), he does not predict when
intelligence will enhance biology brains.
Perhaps detailing “how and when” may
well be the subject of his next book.
MY OWN FUTURISTIC VIEW
This issue of “how and when” has already
been proposed in my book: “2051” (Royal,
2013). This brief novelette predicts via a
human story that brain machine interfac-
ing will provide humans with a robotic
shell containing the brain, and with
all emotional and intellectual functions
enhanced by information accessible from
within the robotic shell. This human
brain/robot allow the loving couple to
explore the universe. The hypothesis is
that enhanced brains will be incorporated
into robotic machines that will not lose
human status. Clearly, success in this
venture will delay the original singular-
ity moment of 2045, though perhaps
not Kurzweil’s revised date of 2029. No
mention is made in my novel of the
2029 date, being unknown at the time of
writing in 2006 and 2007 (Royal, 2013).
(Full disclosure: This writer published
“2051” under a pseudonym, Alpha O.
Royal).
BRAIN-MACHINE INTERFACES
Interestingly, many members of the brain-
machine/computer interfacing research
community believe that BMIs may have
a key role in the advancement of intel-
ligence that constitutes the core of Ray
Kurzweil’s hypotheses. The challenge is
to delay or perhaps completely abort his
prediction. This could be achieved by
enhancing the human brain so that we
stay one step ahead of intelligent comput-
ers. Think: If it were possible to provide
humans with instant and total memory,
access to all information, infinite calcu-
lation ability and instant communication
with whomever, whenever and wherever,
we could have intelligence that would be
superior to any present day intelligence
that a computer has today (Li et al.,
2012). Enhanced memory and knowl-
edge can provide an individual with an
unparalleled asset and make you supe-
rior to all other humans except those
others who have this asset. Having all
calculation abilities and instant commu-
nication would complete the superior
human being (Fitzsimmons et al., 2007;
O’Doherty et al., 2011). But would we be
superior to Kurzweil’s predicted intelligent
computers? Is it possible that before 2045,
the original year of singularity, or 2029,
we humans could have superior intelli-
gence and thus delay or abort Kurzweil’s
prediction?
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THE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis in “2051” is based on
our present technology and where it is
likely heading. For example, if record-
ing and stimulating electrodes continue
on their present developmental path, it
is likely that the brain can be instru-
mented completely (Marblestone et al.,
2013). Recording and stimulating elec-
trodes would be placed over the hemi-
spheric cortices primarily, and also within
deeper structures such as the basal gan-
glia as is done today for Parkinson’s disease
(Marblestone et al., 2013). These recording
and stimulating electrodes would provide
all essential inputs and outputs.
ISSUES WITH THIS HYPOTHESIS
A very important problem is immediately
raised however: How can the instru-
mented brain assimilate all the infor-
mation that would descend on it? How
could we restrict and channel it to avoid
being overwhelmed with useless informa-
tion (Fitzsimmons et al., 2007; O’Doherty
et al., 2011)? In these papers, monkeys
received artificial sensations via intra-
cortical stimulation. Initially, the brain was
overwhelmed and the animals did not
understand the meaning of this input.
However, later they started to make sense
of the artificial sensation, that is they
developed a new sense. They then learned
new discrimination tasks faster. Carefully
placed inputs would help. For instance,
visual input would travel from artificial
eyes to the electrodes in the visual cor-
tex, and auditory input would travel to the
auditory cortex, and so on (Fagg et al.,
2007; Bensmaia and Miller, 2014). But
when downloading information does it
consciously or subconsciously arrive at
visual or auditory cortex? Would it be bet-
ter if the information goes directly to the
hippocampus, originally thought to be the
“gateway to memory,” or to other sites?
If through the hippocampus, is the infor-
mation available to consciousness or is it
only conscious and available on demand
when needed? If that is how it is to occur,
then why would the information not over-
load memory storage in the brain? How
would our biological brain be capable of
storing all knowledge? A more likely stor-
age alternative is that all knowledge would
be stored in attached computers or “in
the cloud” to be available when needed
(Li et al., 2012). As Kurzweil predicts, all
the information is to be available within
the cloud (Kurzweil, 2012). If the cloud
is the modus operandi, then how would
we access the information? Perhaps the
same way we search and access informa-
tion using Google or other search engines.
These are the type of problems that we
cannot answer with our present stage of
knowledge of the brain. These issues are
the important ones. Only by understand-
ing the neurophysiology of the brain more
fully, can we approach an answer to these
questions.
OTHER CHALLENGES
Other challenges include how the instru-
mented brain will interact with the body?
How will it comport with the body?
If the brain is thoroughly instrumented
with electrodes does it even need the
body? After all, the body will age and
become diseased with the usual cancer,
cardiovascular, or other problems. A solu-
tion is to replace the aging or diseased
body and support the brain by other
means (provided of course the brain itself
is not diseased). Basically, all the brain
requires to remain functional is a blood
and cerebrospinal fluid supply that pro-
vides oxygen and nutrients, and removes
metabolic products, while inputs and out-
puts are provided by instrumenting the
brain. Thus, metabolic requirements could
be provided, not by our natural bodies,
FIGURE 1 | Theoretical hybrid human / robot.
but by artificial means such as miniature
heart/lung/nutrient machines or internal
factories. Nanotechnology is needed to
provide miniaturization of hardware com-
ponents in such a device and will require
external replenishment of supplies from
time to time or an indwelling biolog-
ical factory to provide these essential
ingredients.
HYBRID/HUMAN ROBOT
If an artificial heart/lung/nutrient factory
were to be feasible, then why would we
need a body? Well, we wouldn’t. There
would be no need for a biological body
to provide mobility. Mobility and other
functions could be maintained by a robotic
shell that contains the heart/lung/nutrient
factory that are all controlled by the instru-
mented brain. Advances with robotic
hardware, software, and nanotechnology
make such a development a strong possi-
bility. It appears likely that we could end
up with a hybrid robot containing an instru-
mented human biological brain that controls
the robotic body (see Figure 1). This is a
different outcome than Kurzweil’s predic-
tion of artificial intelligence in a computer,
or humans with enhanced brains that have
received artificial intelligence via red blood
cells.
Clearly, there is a big problem with this
scenario. That is, how to maintain a sup-
ply of human brains? If all the bodies are
gone, where do the ova and sperm come
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from to create more humans with brains?
Banked sperm and ova are a possibility.
They would be fertilized as needed and
developed into humans by baby factories.
Ugh! Without a supply of human brains
the robots would take over completely. In
that scenario, Kurzweil’s prediction will
only be delayed as long as there are human
brains available. Once the human brains
have all died off, Kurzweil’s prediction will
come true. Oh darn, you think, he’s right
again. Ah, but wait, tissue can be regrown.
Perhaps a new human body and brain can
be regrown completely and maintained,
if not young, at least virile (Monaghan
and Maden, 2013; Racine et al., 2014). In
that case, human reproduction can take
place in a biological fashion, without baby
factories, thus maintaining the supply of
human brains.
THE ETHICAL ISSUES
Then there are the ethical issues (Albrecht
and Devlieger, 1999; Amundson, 2010;
Glannon, 2014). If (a) enhanced humans,
(b) computers with artificial intelligence
or (c) hybrid human/robots, are fully
realized, then these beings would be
superior to all others who are not yet
enhanced. Clearly, this would create a
group of superior beings that governments
would want for their own use as part of
their defense/offense capabilities to pro-
tect against international aggression and
threats. These hybrids could be also used
as national police. This bears on the very
serious issue of control of the native pop-
ulation, a control issue that is becom-
ing ever more prevalent these years. The
present ability to know what humans think
and do through access to their commu-
nications has provided governments with
knowledge that could lead to total dom-
ination of the native population. Such
domination could, and likely would, be
enforced by the hybrid human/robots. I
raise this issue because scientific knowl-
edge and technological achievements do
not occur in a vacuum. They always have
societal implications and no implication
is more serious than this potential tech-
nology. Over half a century ago, President
Eisenhower warned about these dangers in
his farewell speech to the nation 3 days
before he left office in 1960 as shown
in a news reel of his address (Webster,
2014). Of course he made no specific men-
tion of the technological advances that
are occurring today. He discussed his fear
that the military/industrial complex would
become “the whole dog rather than just the
teeth.” The answer to this ethical dilemma
is simply that the hybrid human/robot
should be available to all people and not
restricted to any one group, whether it be
government or otherwise.
CONCLUSIONS
So the serious challenges for the brain
computer interface community are not
just technical, they are ethical as well.
Perhaps we should not go there, but tech-
nology always takes on a momentum of
its own in its inevitable and unrelenting
march forwards. We cannot flee the chal-
lenge of delaying or avoiding Kurzweil’s
prediction. We must embrace it. That is
our responsibility. But let’s tread lightly
and very, very carefully.
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INTRODUCTION
For several years now, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) in which
brain signals are used to navigate a computer, a prostheses or a
technical device, have been developed in various experimental
contexts (Wolpaw and Wolpaw, 2012; Grübler and Hildt, 2014).
Researchers have recently taken the next step and run experiments
based on connections between two brains. These so-called brain-
to-brain interfaces (abbreviation: BBIs or BTBIs) involve not only
a BCI component deriving information from a brain and sending
it to a computer, but also a computer-brain interface (CBI) com-
ponent delivering information to another brain. What results is
technology-mediated brain-to-brain communication (B2B com-
munication), i.e., direct communication between two brains that
does not involve any activity of the peripheral nervous system. In
what follows, ethical issues that arise in neural interfacing will be
discussed after a short introduction to recent BBI experiments. In
this, the focus will be on the implications BBIs may have on the
individual at the CBI side of the BBI, i.e., on the recipient.
RECENT EXPERIMENTS
In their experiments involving a non-invasive BBI, Yoo et al.
(2013) established functional links between the brain of a human
volunteer and the brain of a rat. The human participant initi-
ated an intention for intervention that was then transferred to an
anesthetized rat’s brain. This intention stimulated the motor area
responsible for tail movement and led to involuntary tail move-
ment. Technically, the experiment combined a BCI relying on
EEG-based steady-state visual evoked potential and a CBI using
transcranial focused ultrasound (FUS). FUS-based non-invasive
neuromodulation of the rat brain was triggered by a computer
when the human participant voluntarily started a thought pro-
cess representing the intention to stimulate the rat brain. The
intention was initiated by the participant looking at a strobe light
flickering on a computer screen. In case of high synchronization,
the FUS was triggered to transcranially modulate the anesthetized
rat brain’s motor cortex. Thus, the human subject was able to
initiate (and thus control) the rat’s tail movement via the BBI
mediated “on–off” trigger.
In a similar experiment, Pais-Vieira et al. (2013) used a BBI
to transfer behaviorally meaningful sensorimotor information
from the brain of one rat (the “encoder” rat) to the brain of
another rat (the “decoder” rat). In the study, while the encoder
rat accomplished a sensorimotor task requiring the selection from
two stimuli, cortical activity was recorded and transferred directly
to the decoder rat’s corresponding cortical areas via intracorti-
cal microstimulation. The sensorimotor information transferred
via the BBI guided the decoder rat to learn similar behavioral
choices, i.e., based solely on the neural patterns originating from
the encoder rat. Furthermore, when the decoder animal’s task
performance was fed back to the encoder animal, continuous
BBI operation influenced the encoder rat’s neural activity and
behavior. Overall, the BBI provided a “direct channel for behav-
ioral information exchange” between two interconnected brains
that allowed real-time sharing of sensorimotor information (Pais-
Vieira et al., 2013, p. 6). The authors go on to state that these
results “indicate that animal brain dyads or even brain net-
works could allow animal groups to synchronize their behaviors
following neuronal-based cues.” (Pais-Vieira et al., 2013, p. 6).
A related study not based on BBIs but involving a similar
donor/recipient design, was done by Deadwyler et al. (2013). Via a
mathematical model they derived information encoding patterns
from the hippocampus of “donor” rats well trained in a specified
paradigm and delivered the information via electrical stimulation
to “recipient” rats that had never before been exposed to the
specific character of this task. The transfer of the model-derived
hippocampal firing pattern from the trained donor animals to
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naïve recipient animals via stimulation facilitated the recipient
animals’ task performance. As there was a time delay in between
the encoding phase of the task and the behavioral response in
the recipient animal, the study shows the transfer of a memory
code, quite in contrast to the BBI-based study by Pais-Vieira
et al. (2013) which relies on the immediate induction of a motor
response.
Recently, Grau et al. (2014) provided the first example of
conscious transmission of information between humans via a
non-invasive BBI based on a BCI using motor imagery-controlled
electroencephalography and a CBI that used transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) to induce the conscious perception of
phosphenes, i.e., the experience of seeing light. The receiver sub-
jects on the CBI side of the BBI were able to decipher the
transmitted phosphene sequences carrying encrypted messages
that coded for words such as hola” or “ciao.”
Furthermore, there are speculations concerning possible
future bidirectional BBI applications. For example, Yoo et al.
(2013, p. 7) assume that “if both BCI and CBI are implemented
between two awake human subjects, the information flow could
be made bidirectional and communicative between apperceptive
identities/individuals.”
Possible future applications beyond the laboratory that have
been envisioned include the use of BBIs in the military or in other
professional contexts where they may allow for silent commands
or may serve to synchronize behavior of a larger group of indi-
viduals. Further, applications may be seen in computer gaming,
in enhancing human sensory capacities or in providing support
to individuals with severe motor impairments (cf. Trimper et al.,
2014).
NEED FOR ETHICAL REFLECTION
The recent studies provide proof of principle for the feasibility of
various forms of direct information transfer between two brains,
and may lead to the development of new approaches involving
memory, emotions or senses. In view of these seminal publica-
tions on BBIs allowing information transfer between animals,
between humans, and between animals and humans, there is a
clear need for thorough ethical reflection.
BBIs combine the recording of brain signals on the side of
the sender and brain stimulation on the side of the recipient.
Each of these strategies raises a broad spectrum of ethical issues
that are currently being discussed in contexts such as brain-
computer interfaces, deep brain stimulation, or intrasurgical
brain stimulation (Freudenstein et al., 2005; Grübler and Hildt,
2014; Unterrainer and Oduncu, 2015). What makes BBIs unique,
however, is the transfer of information representing specific mes-
sages directly from one brain to another, without involving any
activity of the peripheral nervous system or senses. On the side
of the recipient, BBIs involve a form of information input not
seen so far. Furthermore, whereas the specific “meaning” of the
transferred signal is clearly defined by the technical system, the
behavioral implications may be far from clear.
As BBI technology currently is in the very first stages of basic
research, the ethical aspects raised in this contribution are spec-
ulative to a considerable degree. Nevertheless, it is important to
reflect on these issues right now. The results will be of relevance to
the design of possible future BBI studies involving human subjects
and will give an idea of the broader implications and possible
future uses of the BBI technology.
SOME GENERAL ASPECTS
But what exactly are the ethical issues possibly arising in brain-to-
brain interfaces?
First of all, as in any kind of research involving human subjects,
health-related safety issues have to be taken into consideration. In
invasive systems that require surgery, there are risks concerning
brain lesions. Furthermore, both in invasive and in non-invasive
systems, some more indirect effects may arise: the recurring acti-
vation of specified pathways or brain regions both on the BCI
part and the CBI part may influence brain functioning in various
aspects.
In BBI use issues regarding agency, responsibility and liability
undoubtedly will play a role (O’Brolchain and Gordijn, 2014; Vlek
et al., 2014). Whereas traditional legal regulations concerning
responsibility and liability in technology use may be applica-
ble to BCIs, as suggested by several authors (Tamburrini, 2009;
Clausen, 2011; Grübler, 2011), the fact that in BBIs two per-
sons are involved complicates things considerably. The concept of
“shared control” (Tamburrini, 2009), stating that in BCI use the
user and the technical system together share control in achieving
the output signal, undoubtedly applies to BBIs as well. Unlike in
BCIs, however, there is not one person involved, but two, both
of them not fully aware of their exact respective role in the sys-
tem (cf. Vlek et al., 2014). Any ascription of responsibility for
the outcome of any activity involving BBI functioning will be
complicated by the BBI characteristic that the encoder may have
initiated or significantly influenced a behavior or some sort of
activity the decoder is performing (Trimper et al., 2014). Who
is responsible for the consequences of activities in which BBIs are
involved? The sender, i.e., the person involved in the BCI part?
The recipient? The experimenter? The technical device? It may
be speculated whether a concept of “hybrid agencies” (Suchman,
2007) involving several human actors might be applicable
to BBIs.
Being part of a brain–brain dyad or a multi-brain system may
also have complex repercussions on a person’s concept of self,
and raises questions concerning self-perception, individuality and
body ownership (Hildt, 2011). For example, as an encoder, what
is it like to be aware of another person exerting some behavior
initiated or influenced by oneself? Will it be possible to clearly
separate one’s concept of self and the other?
Furthermore, complex problems with regard to privacy may
arise, especially when the BCI component uses signals the sender
is not aware of or signals the sender cannot control (Tamburrini,
2009; Trimper et al., 2014). Thus, it will be crucial to clearly define
and explicitly state what kind of information will be transferred
and to provide the sender with adequate measures to control the
information transfer process. The same holds for the recipient in
order to avoid the unconsented intrusion of information.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECIPIENT
Imagine a BBI that transmits information that serves to mechan-
ically make the decoder slightly move his left forefinger, in a
method similar to the experiments run by Yoo et al. (2013) where
BBI activity resulted in an anesthetized rat moving its tail. The
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recipient probably realizes that something is going on (his fin-
ger is moving in an automatic manner) and—being aware of the
BBI and its usual function—will deduce that some information is
being transferred. Thus, he probably will not ascribe authorship
to himself for this movement. However, the situation will be dif-
ferent if the recipient is able to actively control the outcome of
the information transfer, i.e., to actively control whether or not a
certain movement finally occurs. For example, a person may be
able to suppress the movement in question, or the BBI may solely
confer a signal that serves as a stimulus for further action.
Now imagine a more flexible BBI in which various different
patterns are enacted that elicit different types of reactions in the
recipient. In case of five to ten different movement patterns con-
veyed via the BBI, would the recipient still be sure whether it is
himself or the BBI that is initiating or controlling the movements?
I have doubts. This uncertainty may lead him to erroneously
ascribe authorship to himself for these movements (cf. Wegner,
2002; Vlek et al., 2014).
The same holds true, with even more complex implications, in
cases where a BBI was able to elicit different types of emotions
or memories. In a hypothetical situation where a BBI transmits
a memory code that makes the recipient recall seeing a blue ball,
the recipient may be clearly aware of the fact that his recurrent
recalling of a blue ball may result from a BBI whose sole function
is to elicit this urge. With a higher number of different stimulation
patterns available, this connection will vanish so that it will be
increasingly difficult for the recipient to know whether it is he or
the BBI who induces a certain movement, emotion or memory.
Furthermore, the transfer of emotions will considerably influence
the recipient’s overall well-being.
For example, in a scenario of memory transfer in humans,
similar to the experiment in rats carried out by Deadwyler et al.
(2013), the recipient would end up having two types of memo-
ries: his own genuine memories and the quasi-memories1 trans-
ferred via the BBI technology. However, he would not be able to
distinguish between his own genuine memories and the quasi-
memories. As for quasi-memories, the same problems arise for
quasi-olfactory experiences or for quasi-emotions elicited in the
context of BBI use. The recipient would no longer know for cer-
tain which of his memories, sensory experiences or emotions are
genuine and which are his quasi-memories, quasi-sensations or
quasi-emotions resulting from BBI information transfer. In view
of this, the recipient’s sense of identity would be highly questioned
[cf. the philosophical debate run by Shoemaker (1970), Williams
(1976), Parfit (1984), and others].
In contrast, no direct identity issues arise in the conscious
information transfer described by Grau et al. (2014). In their
BBI experiment, the CBI elicits phosphenes in the recipient that
1The term “quasi-memory” has been coined by the American philosopher
Sydney Shoemaker. He describes “quasi-memory knowledge” as “a kind of
knowledge of past events such that someone’s having this sort of knowledge
of an event does involve there being a correspondence between his present
cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of the event, but
such that this correspondence, although otherwise just like that which exists
in memory, does not necessarily involve that past state’s having been a state
of the very same person who subsequently has the knowledge.” (Shoemaker,
1970, p. 271).
code for specific words. The recipient is aware of the information
transfer process which involves active deciphering.
NEURAL INTERFACING, NEURAL GRAFTING, AND CROSS
SPECIES EXPERIMENTS
It is worthwhile to compare neural interfacing with the ethical
issues raised by other biomedical approaches. In particular, neu-
ral tissue transplantation is of interest here since the strategies of
neural interfacing and neural grafting both involve the possibility
of additional content being transferred to a brain.
Neural tissue transplantation studies in Parkinson’s disease
patients were run mainly in the 1980s and 1990s. They aimed
at replacing loss of dopaminergic neurons in the brains of
Parkinson’s disease patients by transplanting mesencephalic tis-
sue from the developing brain of aborted human embryos and
fetuses into the patient’s brain (Barker et al., 2013).
In the context of these clinical grafting trials, guidelines were
developed that addressed ethical issues in the retrieval and use
of human embryonic and fetal material. Some of them, among
other aspects, contain a paragraph that serves to exclude the
possibility of “personality transfer” or any risk of transfer of indi-
vidual characteristics from the brain tissue donor to the recipient
(British Medical Association, 1988; Dickson, 1989; Boer, 1994).
For example, the “NECTAR ethical guidelines for the retrieval
and use of human embryonic or fetal donor tissue for experimen-
tal and clinical neurotransplantation and research” developed by
the Network of European CNS Transplantation And Restoration
(NECTAR), say in point 7: “Nervous tissue may be used for
transplantation as suspended cell preparations or tissue frag-
ments” (Boer, 1994, p. 3). Allowing only cell preparations or
tissue fragments to be transplanted serves to avoid the trans-
fer of any of the donor’s individual characteristics to the graft
recipient.
Even if for practical reasons a “personality transfer” or the
transfer of individual characteristics is very unlikely to occur in
brain tissue transplantations, the guidelines considered this con-
cern by having a paragraph that explicitly rules out this possibility
in clinical transplantation studies. BBIs, however, directly involve
the very issue that these guidelines attempt to avoid in the case
of clinical neural tissue transplantation: the transfer of individual
characteristics from a donor to a recipient, such as for example
in the transfer of a memory code. Whereas in neural grafting a
material substrate, i.e., brain tissue, is transferred, in BBIs there
is a direct transfer of information from one brain to another.
What matters from an ethical point of view is the same in both
approaches. The possibility of transfer of individual characteris-
tics. This discrepancy points to a clear need for further reflection
on the ethical issues involved in the transfer of information in
BBIs involving humans.
Cross species neural interfacing experiments also raise tricky
ethical issues (cf. Trimper et al., 2014). With regard to research
involving animals containing human material (ACHM), some
ethical reflection currently is going on. For example, the
government-commissioned report “Animals Containing Human
Material” from the UK Academy of Medical Sciences (2011)
identifies a category (Category 2) of ethically sensitive research
involving ACHM which should be approached with caution but
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could go ahead if approval by a specialist committee on a case-
by-case basis is obtained (cf. Abbott, 2011). Among others, this
category includes research that involves the modification of ani-
mal brains, other than non-human primates, “that may make
the brain function potentially more ‘human-like”’ (Academy of
Medical Sciences, 2011, p. 110).
The introduction of more “human-like” function into an ani-
mal brain via BBIs is not totally out of reach. A possible example
is the BBI-induced transfer of the ability to distinguish between
different words or commands (such as left, right, up, down)
and to behave accordingly. Thus, some of the considerations
of animals containing human material may apply to BBI tech-
nologies as well. Furthermore, in BBIs, information transfer may
also emanate from an animal to a human being. For example,
(Trimper et al., 2014, p. 2) speculate on possible future inter-
species BBI uses such as enhancing human sensory systems or
“aiding in search-and-rescue operations, linking our brains with
those of the search-and-rescue animal. ” In analogy to the point
raised above with regard to animals containing human material
(ACHM), there is a clear need for further reflection on the ethi-
cal issues involved in attempts to modify the brains of humans in
ways that might result in some “animal-like” functions.
CONCLUSION
Current BBI research opens up fascinating new communica-
tion pathways but also raises considerable practical and ethical
questions. One of the central questions is whether there actu-
ally is a need for direct brain-to-brain communication. At least
at the moment, it seems doubtful whether there are broader
applications for such a complex, rigid and expensive technology.
Furthermore, in view of the complex ethical implications arising
in the BBI recipient described above, the spectrum of possible
ethically acceptable BBIs seems rather limited.
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The critical role of the mammalian hippocampus in the formation, translation and retrieval
of memory has been documented over many decades. There are many theories of
how the hippocampus operates to encode events and a precise mechanism was
recently identified in rats performing a short-term memory task which demonstrated
that successful information encoding was promoted via specific patterns of activity
generated within ensembles of hippocampal neurons. In the study presented here, these
“representations” were extracted via a customized non-linear multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) mathematical model which allowed prediction of successful performance on
specific trials within the testing session. A unique feature of this characterization was
demonstrated when successful information encoding patterns were derived online from
well-trained “donor” animals during difficult long-delay trials and delivered via online
electrical stimulation to synchronously tested naïve “recipient” animals never before
exposed to the delay feature of the task. By transferring such model-derived trained (donor)
animal hippocampal firing patterns via stimulation to coupled naïve recipient animals,
their task performance was facilitated in a direct “donor-recipient” manner. This provides
the basis for utilizing extracted appropriate neural information from one brain to induce,
recover, or enhance memory related processing in the brain of another subject.
Keywords: memory-transfer, rodent, ensemble, non-linear model, electrical stimulation
INTRODUCTION
To understand the neural basis of memory, several features of the
context in which the memories occur and are utilized, and the
functional aspects of the brain areas involved, need to be iden-
tified and controlled (Hampson et al., 2008; Eichenbaum and
Fortin, 2009). In prior studies we achieved both of these impor-
tant contingencies as well as (1) overcoming possible alternative
interpretations of the relationship between recorded hippocam-
pal ensemble activity and the behavioral task in which short-term
memory formation is necessary (Deadwyler and Hampson, 2006;
Deadwyler et al., 2007), and (2) developing an effective math-
ematical/operational model for online prediction of CA1 hip-
pocampal cell activity from simultaneously recorded input firing
patterns from synaptically connected CA3 neurons (Song et al.,
2009; Berger et al., 2011; Hampson et al., 2011). The combination
of these approaches was made possible by the chronic record-
ing of neural firing patterns in the above two major hippocampal
subfields via specially designed mutineuron recording arrays that
allowed simultaneous detection and analysis of behaviorally criti-
cal ensemble discharge patterns (Deadwyler and Hampson, 1997;
Hampson et al., 1999, 2008). It has been shown that a non-
linear multi-input/multi-output (MIMO) mathematical model
provides the mean to translate the above ensemble activity into a
format that allows predictions of CA1 firing patterns from CA3
activity required for successful task performance (Marmarelis,
2004; Zanos et al., 2008; Song et al., 2009).
In the following paper we demonstrate a critically important
feature of the online extracted firing patterns of hippocampal
ensembles by showing how alteration and facilitation of hip-
pocampal function can be employed via direct connection with
the same structure in a different “donor” animal performing the
same task at the same time. A recent study (Pais-Viera et al.,
2013) reported similar brain-to-brain transfer by directly stim-
ulating motor cortex in the brain of a recipient rodent from
a different animal. However, we report here the discovery that
appropriate neural firing patterns which encode useable mem-
ory can be derived online from trained animals, and inserted via
electrical stimulation of those same hippocampal regions to ani-
mals untrained to perform the memory extended requirement
of the delayed-non-match-to-sample (DNMS) task. These find-
ings confirm the functional significance of a previously identified
“hippocampal prosthesis” (Berger et al., 2011) shown to repair
and/or enhance damaged or disrupted memory processes in the
same animal. However, the outcomes of the study described here
also indicate ways of using brain systems from non-impaired
subjects to impart functional information when and where it
did not get formulated in affected subjects, via a donor-recipient
paradigm.
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METHODS
INFORMATION ENCODING BY HIPPOCAMPAL NEURAL ENSEMBLES
DURING PERFORMANCE OF A DELAYED-NON-MATCH-TO-SAMPLE
(DNMS) MEMORY TASK
Recording and analysis of hippocampal mutineuron activity over
a number of years in rodents performing a DNMS memory task
(cf. Hampson et al., 2008, 2011) provided the basis for application
of a non-linear MIMO model to hippocampal neural ensemble
firing patterns in the first demonstration of a memory prostheses
in rodent brain (Berger et al., 2011; Hampson et al., 2012a,b). This
extensively studied DNMS task requires rats to retain the position
of a “Sample” lever that is presented and responded to (i.e., sam-
ple response: SR) at the start of the trial, over a temporal delay
interval of variable duration (1–30 s) in order to make a “Non-
match” response (NR) on the lever in the opposite position when
both levers are presented simultaneously at the end of the delay
(Figure 1A). During the delay period a nosepoke into a photocell
on the wall opposite the levers is required to proceed to the Non-
match phase. If there is no delay a single nosepoke produces both
levers, for delays of increased duration a single nose poke is still
the only requirement but animals make multiple nosepokes until
the light terminates above the photocell as an indicator of delay
termination and both levers are presented on the opposite wall
(Figure 1A). Figure 1D (control) shows that DNMS performance
accuracy decreases linearly as a direct function of the duration of
the interposed delay interval.
NON-LINEAR MULTI-INPUT MULTI-OUTPUT (MIMO) MODEL
DETECTION AND PREDICTION OF HIPPOCAMPAL ENSEMBLE MEMORY
CODES
Electrophysiological recording during the DNMS task employs
custom designed arrays of microwire (20 µm) electrodes
implanted bilaterally in the hippocampus in each hemisphere to
provide single neuron firing data from 8 pairs of aligned CA3-
CA1 probes arranged at 200 µm intervals along the longitudinal
axis in the dorsal hippocampus in rodent brain (Figure 1B). The
neural correlates obtained from studies with these techniques in
the DNMS task have been utilized in more than 2000 animals with
respect to type and amount of behavioral training required for
maximal performance in conjunction with extraction of distinct
patterns of neural ensemble activity correlated with successful
performance (Deadwyler and Hampson, 2006; Hampson et al.,
2008, 2011). In recent studies the trial-by-trial nature of changes
in ensemble firing patterns has been described in relation to non-
linear fluctuations associated with successful task performance
(Figure 1C), as well as applying the same non-linear model for
reversing detrimental actions of drugs on performance (Song
et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2011; Marmarelis et al., 2013).
This very precise MIMO non-linear mathematical model
(Figure 1C) was employed to determine the “strength” of ensem-
ble SR firing patterns or “codes” formulated specifically on
successful (strong code) or error (weak code) DNMS trials
(Figures 1C,D) across all delay durations. The application of
this model (see Supporting Material) allowed prediction of CA1
neuron firing “output” patterns based on the “input” to the
model (CA3 neuron firing) using Laguerre expansions of Volterra
Kernels to determine the temporal relationships between spike
occurrences recorded in these two areas during the task (Song
et al., 2009, 2013; Berger et al., 2012). As shown previously the
inputs to the MIMO model were CA3 cell discharges associated
exclusively with outputs from simultaneously recorded postsy-
naptic CA1 cells connected via Schaeffer collateral monosynaptic
connections (Witter and Amaral, 2004). Hence, as shown at the
lower right in Figure 1C, the MIMO model analysis of CA3 and
CA1 spike occurrences associated with critical DNMS task events
provided the basis for online “detection” (CA3) and “prediction”
of CA1 firing patterns associated with successful (strong code)
vs. error (weak code) trials (Berger et al., 2011; Hampson et al.,
2011). As a final verification that the MIMO model output could
predict behaviorally relevant hippocampal encoded information,
online calculations were utilized in a closed loop paradigm in
which the detection of strong SR codes (Figure 1C) was used to
adjust the difficulty of the same trial via increased or decreased
delay duration. In accordance with the strength of SR codes
(Figure 1D) performance was either above or below that on tri-
als in which such SR codes were not present (Hampson et al.,
2012a,b). This closed loop procedure served as the basis for the
next phase in which strong SR code patterns were detected, mim-
icked and then administered as electrical stimulation, which is
described next.
EXTERNAL INSERTION OF MIMO DERIVED FIRING PATTERNS VIA
ELECTRICAL STIMULATION OF HIPPOCAMPAL CA1 NEURONS
The above successful application of the MIMO model provided
the unique basis for activating CA1 cells if model derived inputs
from CA3 neurons were no longer operative (Berger et al., 2011).
This was accomplished by transforming the CA1 cell output pat-
tern of the MIMO model into trains of electrical stimulation
pulses (1.0 ms biphasic 20–100 µA) and delivering them in real
time to the same CA1 electrode locations in the recording arrays
via a multichannel stimulator (Figure 2A). CA1 stimulation pat-
terns were therefore similar to the strong code SR firing patterns
derived from each animal by the MIMO model from the same
CA1 electrodes. Stimulation was delivered online via the inputs
detected from CA3 electrodes on the same hippocampal array
as shown in Figure 2A for hippocampal implants in both hemi-
spheres. Intensities of stimulus pulses (20–100 µA) delivered to
CA1 were adjusted to provide indications of extracellular cur-
rent flow (i.e., local field potentials) at adjacent CA1 electrode
locations on the same array (see below). MIMO generated strong
code CA1 SR stimulation pulse trains were of 3.0 s duration and
delivered within 50 ms of the detection of corresponding input
patterns recorded in CA3 (see Supporting Material). Since both
the pattern and time of application of the strong code CA1 SR
stimulation were related directly to the MIMO model detection
of corresponding CA3 input firing, it was also possible to deliver
CA1 SR stimulation on trials in which “strong code” input pat-
terns were not detected in CA3 recordings. This provided the
means to facilitate performance above control levels by deliver-
ing strong code CA1 SR stimulation on trials that normally did
not generate strong codes in CA3 or CA1 naturally (Berger et al.,
2011; Hampson et al., 2012a,b).
The effectiveness of SR CA1 stimulation patterns is shown in
Figures 2B,C as marked increases in DNMS task performance
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FIGURE 1 | Delayed non-match to sample (DNMS) task, MIMO model
and associated hippocampal ensemble activity. (A) DNMS Trial Diagram.
Sample lever presentation (SP) and Sample response (SR) are followed by a
variable delay interval which required a nosepoke (NP) in a photocell on
opposite wall. The Non-match phase began after delay timeout, with both
levers presented simultaneously for reward contingent Non-match Response
(NR) on the lever opposite the SR position. Correct non-match responses
produced 0.2 ml of water delivered to the trough between the levers.
Timeline below shows sequence of task phases: ITI–intertrial interval;
SP–Sample Lever presentation; SR–Sample response; Delay–Delay interval;
LNP–last required nosepoke during Delay; NR–Non-match (decision)
response; Reinf.—Delivery of water reward. (B) Hippocampal recording array:
two rows of 8 stainless steel 20 µm wires positioned longitudinally within
hippocampus at 200 µm intervals for each electrode pair in CA3 and CA1 cell
layers. Arrays were implanted bilaterally in both hippocampi providing a total
of 32 indwelling chronic electrodes per animal. (C) Heatmap display (left)
showing online array monitored hippocampal ensemble single neuron (actual
firing) activity. Low-to-high (blue-to-red) firing rates are indicated at the
separate CA3/CA1 locations on the array (B) during the occurrence of the SR
(time 0.0 s). Schematic of non-linear MIMO model: Spike trains X1–X8
recorded from CA3 electrodes (CA3 input) on the hippocampal array (left) are
input to the model and used to predict CA1 firing across the other 8
recording locations shown in the diagram on the right (1–8, predicted CA1) at
the time of the SR. The schematic of the non-linear analysis used to
construct the CA1 predicted outputs which illustrates estimation of the
spatiotemporal relationship between each CA1 output (Y) and multiple CA3
inputs (X) modeled via Volterra kernels which are then combined to form the
MIMO model for all CA1 locations (see Supplemental Material). The output of
the model (right) is then employed to vary the delay interval of the DNMS
task on the same trial in a closed loop manner as shown by the diagram
below. Lower Right: MIMO Codes: Heatmap displays of MIMO model
predicted CA1 firing in both hemispheres during the response on the Sample
lever on individual trials during sample presentation (SP and response (SR) for
trials both Left and Right sample lever presentation. Strong Codes: MIMO
predicted CA1 sample lever firing on successful trials. Weak Codes: MIMO
prediction of the same CA1 cell firing on error trials. Firing rates indicated by
the scale bar at right. (D) MIMO mediated closed loop control of DNMS
performance (mean ± s.e.m. % correct) summed over all animals, n = 15).
Trials in which strong (diamonds) and weak (triangles) SR codes occurred are
plotted as a function of length of delay, shown compared to Control
performance on trials not sorted by code strength. Performance on trials with
extended delays (40, 50, or 60 s, vertical dashed line) was significantly higher
than on trials with the same delays (Control, 40–60 s) presented without
(Continued)
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FIGURE 1 | Continued
MIMO Closed Loop regulation [F(1, 401) = 18.39, p < 0.001, ∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.001, Closed Loop vs. Control trials]. DNMS (performance) for
trials of 1–30 s delay (Control) is also shown compared to
performance on trials in which only weak SR codes (Weak Codes)
occurred [F(1, 401) = 11.81, p < 0.001]. Performance on trials in which
the MIMO model coefficients were randomly assigned (i.e.,
scrambled) to CA1 firing are also shown in the curve for scrambled
coefficients (squares) as having no difference from Control
performance.
FIGURE 2 | Electrical stimulation utilizing MIMO predicted CA1 output
patterns, facilitates DNMS performance. (A) Patterns of recorded CA3
cell firing in hippocampal array, shown as a heatmap (left), constitutes the
input for online implementation of the MIMO model (center) to predict
CA1 firing pattern (Figure 1C) indicated by red “tick” marks in
hippocampal (CA1) layout (at right). This MIMO output pattern is fed to a
programmable 8 channel stimulator (Supplemental Material) which delivers
up to 3.0 s trains of bipolar electrical stimulation pulses (middle right) to
the CA1 electrode locations showing the same firing pattern in each
hemisphere. Stimulator output (photo display) is shown for 4 of the 8
channels to indicate different frequencies and intensities of stimulus trains
delivered to separate CA1 locations (Supplemental Material). The time lag
between CA3 recording, MIMO calculation and output of CA1 stimulation
was approximately 50 ms. (B) DNMS performance graph of trained animals
(n = 9) for delays of 1–60 s compares effects of 3.0 s stimulation delivered
either: (1) at the time the SR occurred (Stim at SR) vs. No Stim
[F(1, 731) = 11.50, p < 0.001], or (2) delayed for 3.0 s after the SR was
made (Stim after SR) vs. No Stim [F(1, 731) = 3.17, n.s.] (see inset lower
right). Asterisks (∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001) indicate significant difference in
DNMS performance compared to control (No Stim.) trials (Berger et al.,
2011). (C) Cumulative effects of MIMO generated SR stimulation over
successive trials (Hampson et al., 2012a) shows progressive increase in
overall mean (± s.e.m.) % correct performance in 30 trial blocks for
animals (n = 5) receiving 25–30 SR stimulation trials (Stim Trials) per
session for 15 sessions. Red curve (squares) shows overall performance
on remaining trials within the same behavioral sessions in which no
stimulation was delivered (No Stim). Inverted triangles (dotted line) shows
performance over the same number of successive trials of equivalently
trained animals (n = 20) that never received SR stimulation (Never Stim).
Stim vs. Non-stim trials: F(1, 145) = 9.42, ∗p < 0.01,∗∗p < 0.001, Stim. vs.
Never Stim: F(1, 1349) = 15.72, p < 0.001, Non-stim vs. Never Stim.
F(1, 1349) = 11.29, †p < 0.01, ‡p < 0.001.
on stimulation trials in comparison to trials in which no stim-
ulation was delivered (No Stim). To control for other possible
actions, the specificity of the CA1 stimulation pattern with respect
to encoding of the SR was tested directly by delaying delivery of
the same stimulation pattern to CA1 until 3.0 s after the SR which
as shown in Figure 2B (Stim after SR) produced no changes in
performance from control (No Stim) levels. Further verification
was revealed by comparing trials in which SR CA1 stimulation
was generated from different MIMO firing patterns with “scram-
bled” coefficients between neurons (Figure 1D) which actually
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impaired performance in some cases as shown in other studies
(Hampson et al., 2012a). A final test of the similarity of the stim-
ulation patterns to actual CA1 output firing patterns was assessed
by repeating the procedure over several sessions and examin-
ing the trial-by-trial cumulative effects of continued exposure
to MIMO predicted SR CA1 stimulation as shown in Figure 2C
(Berger et al., 2011; Hampson et al., 2012b). These procedures
verify that functional encoding of the SR could be imposed in
subjects performing the DNMS task by matching the MIMO pre-
dicted CA1 firing pattern with stimulation pulses delivered within
50 ms to the same CA1 loci (Figure 2A), which provided encoding
of lever position necessary to perform the task successfully across
all interposed delay intervals.
A METHOD FOR TRANSFER OF MIMO SR STIMULATION FROM DONOR
TO DELAY-NAïVE RECIPIENT ANIMALS
The above MIMO model SR CA1 stimulation method served
as the basis for testing a unique dual animal “donor/recipient”
paradigm in which (1) a well-trained “donor rat” performed the
DNMS task in one chamber at the same time as (2) a delay-naïve
“recipient rat” was tested at the same time in a different chamber
in a trial synchronized manner (Figure 3A). The “recipient rat”
was not trained to perform the DNMS task over intervening delay
intervals >1.0–3.0 s (red dotted delay phase in Figure 3B) which
was the time it took to make the required nosepoke response
on the opposite wall of the chamber to present the Non-match
phase (Figure 1A). The imposition of trials with extended delay
intervals during the session constituted the first exposure of recip-
ient rats to the task requirement for retention of SR information
across increased time intervals (8–16 s) in order to correctly select
the opposite lever in the Non-match phase (Hampson et al.,
2008). Performance in the Sample phase of the task was synchro-
nized between animals by presentation of the Sample lever in the
same position at the same time in both chambers to initiate the
same trial simultaneously for both animals (Figure 3B). On syn-
chronous trials in which the MIMO model applied to the donor
rat CA3 firing patterns, generated a successful strong code SR CA1
pattern (Figure 2A), the stimulus pulses representing that MIMO
strong SR code were routed instead to the corresponding CA1
electrodes in the recipient rat (Figure 3A) performing the SR at
approximately the same time. For the naïve recipient rat following
the delivery of the donor rat strong code SR CA1 stimulation pat-
tern after the SR, an unfamiliar delay interval of 8, 12, or 16 s was
introduced into the trial prior to onset of the Non-match phase.
Since routing of SR CA1 stimulation to the recipient rat was deter-
mined by concurrent CA3 encoding strength in the hippocampus
of the simultaneously performing donor rat, extended delay trials
for the recipient rat occurred randomly within the paired sessions.
As a control procedure, performance was compared on trials with
the same delays administered to recipient rats by donor rat CA3
encoding strength on the same trial but without delivery of SR
CA1 stimulation.
RESULTS
TRANSFER OF MEMORY TO DELAY-NAïVE RECIPIENT ANIMALS BY
DELIVERY OF MIMO STIMULATION FROM TRAINED DONOR ANIMALS
The employment of donor rat MIMO model generated SR CA1
stimulation was applied to test whether it was possible to facilitate
performance in delay-naïve recipient rats untrained in the delay
version of the DNMS task. Results in Figure 4A show the mean
% correct performance of 5 different recipient rats subjected for
the first time to 8, 12, and 16 s interpolated delays with MIMO
derived SR CA1 stimulation patterns (Stim) delivered on half the
trials from synchronously performing donor rats. Donor rat SR
CA1 stimulation allowed recipient rats to perform significantly
better than if they did not receive stimulation (No stim) and
these levels are compared with their higher performance on trials
in which no delay was interspersed (0.0 s). The overall perfor-
mance of all recipient is shown in Figure 4B for recipient-stim
and recipient-no stim trials in which highly significant improved
performance is apparent across all delays. Figure 4B also shows
that recipient-stim average performance was significantly below
that of fully trained animals that did not receive SR stimulation at
those same delays (trained subjects, n = 23).
The physiologically specific nature of the donor rat stimulation
was further verified by the fact that performance was facilitated in
a delay dependent manner (Figures 4A,B) in the same way that
natural performance was affected by the duration of interposed
delays during the trial. This was further verified by comparing
the effects of MIMO stimulation patterns delivered by different
donor rats to the same recipient rat within, as well as, across dif-
ferent behavioral sessions. Figure 5A shows the comparison of
performance of the same recipient rat receiving SR stimulation
from two different donor rats over similar interposed delay tri-
als. Figure 5A shows the patterns of SR CA1 stimulation delivered
by each donor rat (donor rats 1 and 2) on both left and right SR
lever trials. Although there were slight differences with respect to
the spatiotemporal delivery of CA1 stimulation pulses, the over-
all patterns related to the time of execution of the SR were highly
similar. The graphs to the right in Figure 5A show the average
performance of the same recipient rat on similar types of trials
with stimulation and non-stimulated extended delays from the
same two donor rats. It is clear that stimulation generated by both
donor rats on different trials in the same session facilitated perfor-
mance of the recipient rat in nearly identical fashion. Figure 5B
summarizes the performance of all recipient rats (n = 5) over the
3 delay intervals for all donor rat (n = 6) stimulation (Stim) vs.
non-stimulated (Non-Stim) trials compared to trials in which no
delay was imposed (0 s).
Control manipulations performed to insure that donor rat SR
stimulation was the basis for the improved performance of recipi-
ent rats included: (1) changing the donor rat stimulation patterns
in different ways such as scrambling coefficients (Figure 1A), (2)
delivering donor rat stimulation patterns at different times (i.e.,
3.0 s) after the SR (Figure 2B), and (3) delivery of stimulation
based on recipient rat MIMO-extracted SR CA1 patterns on the
trials with interpolated delays determined by donor rat encod-
ing patterns (not shown). None of the latter control procedures
produced significant increases in recipient rat performance above
that exhibited on trials with the same delays and no donor rat
stimulation (Figure 4 No Stim, Figure 5B).
NEURAL BASIS FOR MIMO STIMULATION ENHANCED MEMORY
A major factor that relates to the above demonstration of
enhanced memory in the donor as well as delay-naïve recipi-
ent rats, is the actual neural basis for the enhancement invoked
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FIGURE 3 | Transference of successful MIMO coded ensemble firing
patterns from trained “donor” rats to task-naïve “recipient” rats.
(A) Recordings were obtained online from well-trained animals (i.e., donor
rats) with validated effective MIMO SR CA1 stimulation patterns as
shown in Figure 2. A second group of delay-naïve animals (recipient rats)
were only trained to perform the operant responses in the DNMS task in
sequence without exposure to variable and extended delay intervals
interposed between the SR and NR task phases requiring completion of
the nosepoke response on the opposite wall (red middle diagram).
(B) Donor-Recipient rat “pairs” were recorded from and tested
simultaneously in different chambers with DNMS trial execution
synchronized by presentation of the sample lever in the same position at
the same time. During performance of trials within the simultaneous
sessions, donor rat hippocampal ensemble activity was monitored for
presence of CA3 firing predictions of effective strong SR code CA1
stimulation patterns (Figure 2). When such donor rat strong code patterns
occurred, the associated MIMO-predicted SR CA1 stimulation pattern was
routed instead to the CA1 electrodes in the recipient rat hippocampus
while performing the SR within 1–3 s after detection of donor rat strong
SR code. Delay intervals of 8, 12, or 16s were then introduced on the
same trial for the recipient rat which required the previously learned
selection of the opposite lever in the Non-match phase of the task after
timeout of the unfamiliar delay periods. All trials on which delays were
imposed to recipient rats were determined when strong SR codes were
generated by donor rats; hence occurrence of all delay trials during
recipient rat sessions was essentially random and unpredictable.
by delivery of MIMO SR CA1 stimulation and also the type of
changes that occur under normal conditions related to improved
vs. impaired performance in the same subjects. The influence
of administered MIMO CA1 stimulation on synaptic connectiv-
ity during the session was assessed using local field potentials
(LFPs) recorded from each of the 8 CA1 locations generated
by stimulating a single electrode location in CA3 on the same
array (Figure 6A) with min-to-max voltage ranges. For these
LFPs, it was possible to assess changes in identified voltage LFP
components related to excitatory and inhibitory synaptic inputs
(Hampson et al., 1989; Truccolo et al., 2002; Leung, 2011). CA1
LFPs were assessed before and after sessions in which MIMO
stimulation was delivered and facilitated performance vs. sessions
in which no stimulation was delivered. The most effective method
of assessing such changes was to characterize differences in LFP
waveforms by subtracting pre-session LFPs from post-session
LFPs and comparing voltages (Post-Prediff) in 10 ms segments as
shown in Figure 6B. The resulting Post-Prediff waveforms reflect
changes in particular components of the LFP generated from the
same CA3 stimulation location related to both excitatory and
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FIGURE 4 | Recipient rat performance on DNMS trials with unfamiliar
superimposed delays facilitated by donor rat mediated SR
stimulation. (A) Individual DNMS performance of five different recipient
rats subjected to trials with 8, 12, and 16 s delays shown for trials in which
no stimulation was delivered (No Stim) or on trials on which a
simultaneously paired donor rat delivery of MIMO SR CA1 stimulation
pattern was delivered (Stim). The similarity across each graph indicates
generality of facilitated performance on imposed delay trials with delivery
of donor rat MIMO generated CA1 SR stimulation. Asterisks ∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.001, Stim donor rat vs. No Stim. (B) Overall performance of
recipient rats (n = 5) is shown as mean (±s.e.m.) % correct trials with no
delays (green dot−0.0 s values) in comparison to trials with variable delays
(8, 12, 16 s) without donor rat stimulation (green triangles-No Stim)
delivered during the trial [F(3, 279) = 3.61, p < 0.001]; and performance on
trials with the same delays but including donor rat MIMO strong SR code
stimulation (Recipient Stim, red squares) which significantly improved
performance compared to No Stim trials [F(1, 279) = 9.82, p < 0.001]. For
comparison a plot of the average performance level of rats fully trained
(n = 20) on the task at the same delays (Trained subjects) is shown (black
squares) for comparison to recipient rat performance on stimulated trials
[F(1, 1349) = 13.48, p = 0.001, Trained subjects > recipient rats]. Symbols:
∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001, †p < 0.01, ‡p = 0.001.
inhibitory input over the same range of voltages, before and after
behavioral sessions in which SR stimulation was, or was not,
delivered.
Figure 6B shows the average of Post-Prediff LFP waveforms for
a single trained animal following SR stimulation (blue) vs. non-
stimulation (red) sessions. It is clear that the LFP changes were
related directly to both excitatory (40–80 ms) and inhibitory (90–
175 ms) components of well-characterized LFPs recorded from
the cell layer at each of the eight CA1 locations (Leung, 2011).
The lack of as much change in Post-Prediff LFP measures for non-
stimulation (red curve) vs. SR stimulation (blue curve) sessions in
Figure 6B reflects the increase in excitatory synaptic input to the
same CA1 locations that received strong code SR CA1 stimulation
patterns and facilitated performance during the behavioral ses-
sions in the same animal. To demonstrate a more general feature
of this effect, the dotted curve in Figure 6B reflects a further
difference of the LFP Post-Prediff values in terms of subtracted
Stim session Post-Prediff LFP waveforms from similar Non-stim
session waveforms, i.e., Diffstim—Diffnon−stim LFP values. Thus,
the dotted curve in Figure 6B reflects the average differences in
LFPs across 5 individual animals calculated in the same man-
ner as the two Post-Prediff LFP difference curves (red and blue)
but using Post-Prediff LFPs instead to provide the resulting dot-
ted curve average difference of LFP waveform for SR stim vs.
non-stim sessions (i.e., Diffstim—Diffnon-stim). Since this aver-
age difference (Diffstim—Diffnon−stim) across all animals (n = 5)
reflects alteration in the same LFP components as shown for indi-
vidual waveforms in a single animal (red and blue Post-Prediff
LFPs), it is clear that synaptic processes mediating CA3-to-CA1
transmission were increased by MIMO stimulation delivery dur-
ing the DNMS sessions in which performance within and between
animals was facilitated (Figures 4, 5).
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FIGURE 5 | Enhancement of performance of the same recipient rat by
different donor rats. (A) Left: Delivered MIMO SR CA1 stimulation
patterns showed for left and right lever trials from Donor rat 1 (upper) and
Donor rat 2 (lower). Red marks in Donor rat 2 patterns reflect occurrences
of identical pulses delivered in Donor rat 1 pattern (above) for direct
comparison of the two SR Stimulation patterns delivered to the same
Recipient rat on different trials. Right: Overall performance of the same
Recipient rat for sessions in which SR Stimulation (Stim) on delay trials
was contributed by Donor rat 1 (upper) and Donor rat 2 (lower) for left and
right Sample lever trials summed over all delays (red) compared with delay
trials in which SR stimulation was not delivered (blue). Green bars
represent performance by the same Recipient rat on trials with no delay
(0 Dly) presented in the same sessions as described above. (B) Lower plot
shows overall average performance for all Donor/Recipient sessions
(n = 23) for trials with Left and Right SR position and those which received
donor rat SR stimulation (red) vs. no stimulation trials (blue) as a function
of delay (0, 8, 12, 16 s). Plots include all Donor/Recipient pairs, 5 different
recipient rats paired with one or more donor rats (n = 6). Asterisks
(∗∗p < 0.001) indicate significant difference compared to trials with no
donor rat stimulation (No Stim).
DISCUSSION
DONOR/RECIPIENT RECOVERY OF HIPPOCAMPAL MEMORY: A MODEL
FOR APPLICATION TO MEMORY DEFICITS
The above findings provide highly significant evidence that func-
tional working memory can be enhanced by delivery of donor rat
MIMO CA1 patterned electrical stimulation to the CA1 field in
the hippocampus of recipient rats. This shows that information
encoded by individual neural events in naïve recipient rats can
be effectively altered by substitution of donor rat MIMO derived
electrical stimulus patterns in the same manner as demonstrated
in prior studies in which effective stimulus trains were gener-
ated by, and delivered to, the same animal (Berger et al., 2011;
Hampson et al., 2012a). The demonstration of improved task
performance in naïve recipient rats (Figures 4, 5), verifies that
donor rat SR CA1 stimulation was capable of inducing the type
of encoding process necessary when facilitated retention of infor-
mation was required because of interposed unfamiliar delays of
variable duration (Figure 6). The fact that MIMO stimulation
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FIGURE 6 | Possible synaptic basis for facilitative Donor/Recipient
MIMO SR stimulation. (A) Illustration of hippocampal synaptic connections
between CA3 and CA1 cells in the same hippocampal region occupied by
the same electrode array used to deliver SR Stimulation (Figures 1–3).
Arrows show divergent projections from a single CA3 cell to multiple CA1
cells via Shaffer collateral connections used to determine changes in CA1
(small red arrows) local field potentials (LFPs) elicited by stimulation
delivered to a single CA3 locus (large red arrow) before (Pre) and after (Post)
behavioral sessions with MIMO SR Stimulation vs. non-stimulated sessions.
(B) Average CA1 LFPs elicited by CA3 stimulation are plotted as differences
(Post-Prediff) in voltage amplitude measured at the indicated time points
(10 ms) of the LFP after stimulus pulse delivery (vertical black line). Red:
Mean Post-Prediffs in LFP amplitudes recorded prior to and following
non-stimulation sessions for trained animals. Blue: Average Post-Prediffs in
LFP amplitude following sessions in which SR stimulation was delivered to
facilitate performance. Positive Post-Prediffs reflect average voltage changes
related to increased CA1 LFP components after the behavioral session
relative to voltages elicited by the same CA3 current intensities prior to the
session. These Post-Prediffs for sessions in which SR stimulation facilitated
task performance (blue curve) are shown compared to Post-Prediffs for those
sessions in which stimulation was not delivered (red curve). Dotted: Diff-Diff
shows average difference between CA1 LFP Post-Prediffs for SR stim vs.
non-stim sessions (Stim-Non-stim) measured in 6 of the Donor rats (all
animals A1-non-stim).
can approximate normal ensemble firing involved in the encoding
and retrieval of task-relevant information is consistent with other
recent findings investigating relationships between multineuron
firing in cortical ensembles and behavioral task requirements
(Ross and Eichenbaum, 2006; Komorowski et al., 2009; Smith
et al., 2009; Rouse et al., 2011). However, the demonstration
that the patterns marked as effective and generated online in one
animal, could be transferred via temporally matched electrical
stimulation of similar CA1 regions in naïve recipient animals
exposed to the same task contingencies, has not been shown pre-
viously. Although consistent in some ways with a recent “brain-
to-brain transfer” experiment (Pais-Viera et al., 2013) in which
sensorimotor cortical signals were used to influence behavioral
choice in the recipient rodent, the results presented here differ sig-
nificantly because in that experiment, stimulation was delivered
at the time of the behavioral response, whereas in our study, the
stimulation corresponded to the encoding phase of the task (SR)
and was delivered up to 16 s prior to the behavioral response, con-
firming transfer of a memory code, and not simply induction of
a motor response. In addition, the lack of enhancement or trans-
fer when several control procedures were employed in the above
memory transfer paradigm; i.e., temporal relation to SR, reduced
stimulation intensity, closed-loop dependence, etc. (Figures 1–5),
strongly supports the specificity of the transference of donor rat
MIMO model derived SR information for hippocampal function
to naïve recipient rats for task-relevant performance.
These results provide important insight for extending
donor/recipient procedures to functions performed by other brain
regions and other behavioral endpoints as shown recently (Pais-
Viera et al., 2013), and eventually to similar circumstances
involving humans (Boettiger and D’Esposito, 2005; Smith et al.,
2009; Hasson et al., 2012). Once fabricated into a neural pros-
thesis for recipients this unique technology could (1) immedi-
ately enhance task-specific performance, (2) repair damaged or
impaired task-dependent brain circuitry, and possibly even, (3)
provide neural encoding of task-relevant information without
prior training. The long history of investigation with hippocam-
pal recording in the behavioral context employed, and prior
collaboration perfecting application of the MIMO model to these
recordings (Hampson et al., 2008, 2012a; Berger et al., 2012;
Marmarelis et al., 2013; Song et al., 2013), as well as recent
applications to the non-human primate hippocampus (Hampson
et al., 2013) and prefrontal cortex (Hampson et al., 2012c;
Opris et al., 2012), provided the insight necessary to extrap-
olate how donor/recipient memory transference could occur as
demonstrated here. However, the fact that transferred patterns
of electrical brain stimulation have significant functional impact
and are capable of modifying performance via strategic online
delivery provides another demonstration of donor-recipient brain
compatibility (Pais-Viera et al., 2013), but this application to
hippocampus for improving memory is the first demonstration
specific to brain cognitive function. Such results not only pro-
vide important new insight into how hippocampal circuits can be
operated to process memory-dependent information via external
control, but also provide a basis for extending and/or perfect-
ing similar donor/recipient type devices (Jarosiewicz et al., 2008;
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Venkatraman and Carmena, 2011; Hasson et al., 2012) to enhance
and/or replace memory deficiencies in humans.
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INTRODUCTION
Human intelligence (i.e., the ability to
consistently solve problems successfully)
has evolved through the need to adapt
to changing environments. This is not
only true of our past but also of our
present. Our brain faculties are becom-
ing more sophisticated by cooperating
and interacting with technology, specif-
ically digital communication technology
(Asaro, 2008).
When we consider the matter of brain
function augmentation, we take it for
granted that the issue refers to the human
brain as a distinct organ. However, as we
live in a complex technological society, it
is now becoming clear that the issue is
much more complicated. Individual brains
cannot simply be considered in isolation,
and their function is no longer local-
ized or contained within the cranium,
as we now know that information may
be transmitted directly from one brain
to another (Deadwyler et al., 2013; Pais-
Vieira et al., 2013). This issue has been
discussed in detail and attempts have
been made to study the matter within a
wider and more global context (Nicolelis
and Laporta, 2011). Recent research in
the field of brain to brain interfaces has
provided the basis for further research
and formation of new hypotheses in this
respect (Grau et al., 2014; Rao et al.,
2014). This concept of rudimentary “brain
nets” may be expanded in a more global
fashion, and within this framework, it is
possible to envisage a much bigger and
abstract “meta-entity” of inclusive and
distributed capabilities, called the Global
Brain (Mayer-Kress and Barczys, 1995;
Heylighen and Bollen, 1996; Johnson et al.,
1998; Helbing, 2011; Vidal, in press).
This entity reciprocally feeds informa-
tion back to its components—the indi-
vidual human brains. As a result, novel
and hitherto unknown consequences may
materialize such as, for instance, the emer-
gence of rudimentary global “emotion”
(Garcia and Tanase, 2013; Garcia et al.,
2013; Kramera et al., 2014), and the
appearance of decision-making faculties
(Rodriguez et al., 2007). These characteris-
tics may have direct impact upon our biol-
ogy (Kyriazis, 2014a). This has been long
discussed in futuristic and sociology lit-
erature (Engelbart, 1988), but now it also
becomes more relevant to systems neuro-
science partly because of the very promis-
ing research in brain-to-brain interfaces.
The concept is grounded on scientific
principles (Last, 2014a) and mathematical
modeling (Heylighen et al., 2012).
AUGMENTING BRAIN FUNCTION ON A
GLOBAL SCALE
It can be argued that the contin-
ual enhancement of brain function in
humans, i.e., the tendency to an increasing
intellectual sophistication, broadly aligns
well with the main direction of evolu-
tion (Steward, 2014). This tendency to an
increasing intellectual sophistication also
obeys Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety
(Ashby, 1958) which essentially states that,
for any system to be stable, the number
of states of its control mechanisms must
be greater than the number of states in
the system being controlled. This means
that, within an ever-increasing techno-
logical environment, we must continue
to increase our brain function (mostly
through using, or merging with, technol-
ogy such as in the example of brain to
brain communication mentioned above),
in order to improve integration and
maintain stability of the wider system.
Several other authors (Maynard Smith
and Szathmáry, 1997; Woolley et al., 2010;
Last, 2014a) have expanded on this point,
which seems to underpin our continual
search for brain enrichment.
The tendency to enrich our brain
is an innate characteristic of humans.
We have been trying to augment our
mental abilities, either intentionally or
unintentionally, for millennia through
the use of botanicals and custom-made
medicaments, herbs and remedies, and,
more recently, synthetic nootropics and
improved ways to assimilate information.
Many of these methods are not only use-
ful in healthy people but are invaluable
in age-related neurodegenerative disorders
such as dementia and Parkinson’s dis-
ease (Kumar and Khanum, 2012). Other
neuroscience-based methods such as tran-
scranial laser treatments and physical
implants (such as neural dust nanopar-
ticles) are useful in enhancing cogni-
tion and modulate other brain functions
(Gonzalez-Lima and Barrett, 2014).
However, these approaches are limited
to the biological human brain as a distinct
agent. As shown by the increased research
interest in brain to brain communication
(Trimper et al., 2014), I argue that the issue
of brain augmentation is now embrac-
ing a more global aspect. The reason is
the continual developments in technology
which are changing our society and culture
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(Long, 2010). Certain brain faculties that
were originally evolved for solving practi-
cal physical problems have been co-opted
and exapted for solving more abstract
metaphors, making humans adopt a better
position within a technological niche.
The line between human brain func-
tion and digital information technologies
is progressively becoming indistinct and
less well-defined. This blurring is pos-
sible through the development of new
technologies which enable more efficient
brain-computer interfaces (Pfurtscheller
and Neuper, 2002), and recently, brain-to-
brain interfaces (Grau et al., 2014).
We are now in a position expand on this
emergent worldview and examine what
trends of systems neuroscience are likely
in the near-term future. Technology has
been the main drive which brought us to
the position we are in today (Henry, 2014).
This position is the merging of the physical
human brain abilities with virtual domains
and automated web services (Kurzweil,
2009). Modern humans cannot purely be
defined by their biological brain function.
Instead, we are now becoming an amal-
gam of biological and virtual/digital char-
acteristics, a discrete unit, or autonomous
agent, forming part of a wider and more
global entity (Figure 1).
LARGE SCALE NETWORKS AND THE
GLOBAL BRAIN
The Global Brain (Heylighen, 2007;
Iandoli et al., 2009; Bernstein et al.,
2012) is a self-organizing system which
encompasses all those humans who are
connected with communication technolo-
gies, as well as the emergent properties
of these connections. Its intelligence and
information-processing characteristics
are distributed, in contrast to that of
individuals whose intelligence is local-
ized. Its characteristics emerge from the
dynamic networks and global interac-
tions between its individual agents. These
individual agents are not merely the bio-
logical humans but are something more
complex. In order to describe this relation-
ship further, I have introduced the notion
of the noeme, an emergent agent, which
helps formalize the relationships involved
(Kyriazis, 2014a). The noeme is a combi-
nation of a distinct physical brain function
and that of an “outsourced” virtual one.
It is the intellectual “networked presence”
FIGURE 1 | Computer-generated image of internet connections world-wide (Global Brain).
The conceptual similarities with the human brain are remarkable. Both networks exhibit a
scale-free, fractal distribution, with some weakly-connected units, and some
strongly-connected ones which are arranged in hubs of increasing functional complexity. This
helps protect the constituents of the network against stresses. Both networks are “small
worlds” which means that information can reach any given unit within the network by passing
through only a small number of other units. This assists in the global propagation of
information within the network, and gives each and every unit the functional potential to be
directly connected to all others. Source: The Opte Project/Barrett Lyon. Used under the
Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License.
of an individual within the GB, a mean-
ingful synergy between each individual
human, their social interactions and arti-
ficial agents, globally connected to other
noemes through digital communications
technology (and, perhaps soon, through
direct brain to brain interfaces). A com-
parison can be made with neurons which,
as individual discrete agents, form part of
the human brain. In this comparison, the
noemes act as the individual, information-
sharing discrete agents which form the
GB (Gershenson, 2011). The modeling of
noemes helps us define ourselves in a way
that strengthens our rational presence in
the digital world. By trying to enhance
our information-sharing capabilities we
become better integrated within the GB
and so become a valuable component of
it, encouraging mechanisms active in all
complex adaptive systems to operate in
a way that prolongs our retention within
this system (Gershenson and Fernández,
2012), i.e., prolongs our biological lifespan
(Kyriazis, 2014b; Last, 2014b).
DISCUSSION
This concept is a helpful way of inter-
preting the developing cognitive relation-
ship between humans and artificial agents
as we evolve and adapt to our chang-
ing technological environment. The con-
cept of the noeme provides insights with
regards to future problems and opportuni-
ties. For instance, the study of the function
of the noeme may provide answers useful
to biomedicine, by coopting laws applica-
ble to any artificial intelligence medium
and using these to enhance human health
(Kyriazis, 2014a). Just as certain physi-
cal or pharmacological therapies for brain
augmentation are useful in neurodegen-
eration in individuals, so global ways of
brain enhancement are useful in a global
sense, improving the function and adap-
tive capabilities of humanity as a whole.
One way to augment global brain func-
tion is to increase the information content
of our environment by constructing smart
cities (Caragliu et al., 2009), expanding the
notion of the Web of Things (Kamilaris
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et al., 2011), and by developing new con-
cepts in educational domains (Veletsianos,
2010). This improves the information
exchange between us and our surround-
ings and helps augment brain function,
not just physically in individuals, but also
virtually in society.
Practical ways for enhancing our
noeme (i.e., our digital presence) include:
• Cultivate a robust social media base, in
different forums.
• Aim for respect, esteem and value
within your virtual environment.
• Increase the number of your connec-
tions both in virtual and in real terms.
• Stay consistently visible online.
• Share meaningful information that
requires action.
• Avoid the use of meaningless, trivial or
outdated platforms.
• Increase the unity of your connections
by using only one (user)name for all
online and physical platforms.
These methods can help increase informa-
tion sharing and facilitate our integration
within the GB (Kyriazis, 2014a). In a prac-
tical sense, these actions are easy to per-
form and can encompass a wide section of
modern communities. Although the ben-
efits of these actions are not well studied,
nevertheless some initial findings appear
promising (Griffiths, 2002; Granic et al.,
2014).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
With regards to improving brain func-
tion, we are gradually moving away from
the realms of science fiction and into the
realms of reality (Kurzweil, 2005). It is now
possible to suggest ways to enhance our
brain function, based on novel concepts
dependent not only on neuroscience but
also on digital and other technology. The
result of such augmentation does not only
benefit the individual brain but can also
improve all humanity in a more abstract
sense. It improves human evolution and
adaptation to new technological environ-
ments, and this, in turn, may have positive
impact upon our health and thus longevity
(Solman, 2012; Kyriazis, 2014c).
In a more philosophical sense, our
progressive and distributed brain func-
tion amplification has begun to lead us
toward attaining “god-like” characteristics
(Heylighen, in press) particularly “omni-
science” (through Google, Wikipedia,
the semantic web, Massively Online
Open Courses MOOCs—which dramat-
ically enhance our knowledge base), and
“omnipresence” (cloud and fog comput-
ing, Twitter, YouTube, Internet of Things,
Internet of Everything). These are the
result of the outsourcing of our brain capa-
bilities to the cloud in a distributed and
universal manner, which is an ideal global
neural augmentation. The first steps have
already been taken through brain to brain
communication research. The concept of
systems neuroscience is thus expanded to
encompass not only the human nervous
network but also a global network with
societal and cultural elements.
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Introduction
The surge in development of brain-computer interface (BCI) devices is highly focused on the
algorithms, mechanics, and neurophysics of their production (Lebedev and Nicolelis, 2006;
Lebedev et al., 2011; Opris, 2013). Here I propose that capitalizing on research findings from
the field of social neuroscience can enhance training and effectiveness of BCI devices. BCIs are
not just about individual brains but also about brains in interaction with other brains. Learning
in a social context is more effective than non-social instruction and countless neurophysiology
studies have demonstrated that social interaction actually alters physiology, including changes in
neuroplasticity and arousal. Importantly, social interaction also consists of emotional responses
that have powerful rewarding qualities and incur reciprocal action. Interdisciplinary cooperation
between social neuroscience and BCI innovation has been proposed to promote development
of more effective BCIs that demonstrate adaptability during interaction (Mattout, 2012). The
challenges of BCI illiteracy, or BCI inefficiency, suggests a vital need to consider all possible
contributing factors to decrease the failure rate seen in up to a third of users (Vidaurre and
Blankertz, 2010). Additionally, it has been suggested that BCI inefficiency can be reduced by
addressing flaws in human training approaches, which have been largely neglected (Lotte et al.,
2013). Therefore, the social cues and contexts a patient has when BCIs are integrated and employed
should not be overlooked for their potential to improve effectiveness.
Social Intelligence
The human brain, like other primate brains, has evolved to be exquisitely tuned to social
interactions (Ghazanfar and Santos, 2004). In fact, sociality might have been the primary force
driving the evolution of primate intelligence (Jolly, 1966; Humphrey, 1976; Dunbar and Shultz,
2007). Thus, it is no leap to assume that cognitive abilities would be influenced by social
interactions (Ybarra et al., 2008). Importantly, cognitive abilities do not exist as abstract mental
activities independent of body and world (Barrett and Henzi, 2005). We are born into an
environment that consists of others acting and interacting; successfully navigating this social milieu
requires the development of many cognitive skills. These essential capacities include memory,
learning, decision-making, and behavioral inhibition as well as more complex abilities such
as communicating, problem-solving, teaching, mentalizing, and inferring others’ mental states
(Gariépy et al., 2014).
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Social Cues and Contexts
Social contexts include observing and participating in exchanges
between individuals, and responding to cues integral to social
behavior. These cues include complex stimuli that require
simultaneous processing of multiple sensory inputs, including
olfactory, auditory, tactile, and visual cues. The emotional
responses of self and others are also social cues. Whom we are
interacting with matters, as well as the connection we feel with
them along a continuum ranging from perceived social isolation
to bonding and attachment (Cacioppo and Cacioppo, 2012).
The mere presentation of cues specific to social interaction,
such as language or images of the same species, is enough
to cause neurophysiological changes in brain and behavior. In
primates, many studies take advantage of the fact that pictures
of objects, abstract images, or other species are not as rewarding
as pictures of conspecifics (Wilson and Goldman-Rakic, 1994).
Even the nature of the stimulus is relevant—we have a preference
for biological movement over robotic movement for encoding
behavior (Tai et al., 2004) and children learn new behaviors better
from humans than from robots or androids (robots that look like
humans) (Moriguchi et al., 2010a,b). The special effectiveness of
social stimuli was recently shown when superimposing familiar
face images onto the P300 Speller character matrix for ERP-
based BCI performance increased accuracy and speed in healthy
individuals (Kaufmann et al., 2011) and patients (Kaufmann
et al., 2013).
Social Neurophysiology
Neurophysiological effects of social context and stimuli are
distributed throughout the nervous system. Multiple areas of the
brain respond to social conditions as assessed by a variety of
methods, including transcranial magnetic stimulation, functional
magnetic resonance imaging, electrophysiology, and molecular
studies. To comprehensively describe all the neurological
findings is not possible here so only a few are highlighted
(see for reviews: Beer and Ochsner, 2006; Adolphs, 2009).
The anterior cingular cortex (ACC) integrates complex stimuli,
empathy, and decision making (Lavin et al., 2013). The striatum
is a vital area for social interaction and reward (Báez-Mendoza
and Schultz, 2013). In the inferior fronto-parietal areas, the
mirror neuron system (discussed further below) is essential for
social learning (reviewed in Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
Differences in genetic expression are seen when zebra finches,
a social songbird, sing to females directly rather than singing
undirected song (Jarvis et al., 1998). Social behavior induces
neurogenesis in the adult hippocampus in rodents (Gheusi
et al., 2009; Lieberwirth and Wang, 2014; Peretto and Paredes,
2014). The early findings that social enrichment improves
cognitive performance, neuronal growth, and overall brain
mass (reviewed by Rosenzweig, 2007) followed by decades
of confirmation, has led to the now standard practice that
animals in research programs are provided appropriate social
interactions (Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals,
2011). Conversely, decades of research have shown social stress
during early development results in a number of behavioral
and neurochemical deficits in multiple brain areas. For example,
social isolation during rearing impairs neurogenesis in the
dentate gyrus of the mouse hippocampus as revealed by deficits
in spatial memory task (Ibi et al., 2008), and cell proliferation,
cell survival, and neuronal differentiation are negatively affected
by isolation during adulthood in female prairie voles (Lieberwirth
and Wang, 2012).
Cognitive Function
Continuing development of BCIs that treat neurological
and psychiatric disorders involving cognitive and emotional
impairments suggests the need for the most comprehensive
techniques to facilitate success. The research reviewed above
clearly shows that cognition is changed by the qualities of social
exchanges or social cues. For example, executive function can
be increased (Ybarra et al., 2008) or reduced (Richeson et al.,
2005) depending on the type of social interaction and even
the identity of the actor. Where an individual falls along the
continuum of social isolation (e.g., neglect, exclusion) to social
connection has important consequences for cognitive abilities.
In older adults, correlations between perceived isolation and
poor cognitive responses have been shown (Tilvis et al., 2004;
Wilson et al., 2007; Dickinson et al., 2011). In fact, brain and
behavioral responses differ depending on the specific feeling of
isolation/connection to the person with whom one is interacting
(Cacioppo and Cacioppo, 2012).
Learning Socially
The social environment can arguably be said to be the richest
environment for learning the most complex cognitive skills,
pointing out the importance of training methods. A special
quality about live social interaction is that it acutely primes
the induction of novel responses (Gottlieb, 1991). For example,
juvenile sparrows will learn the songs of another species when
demonstrated by a live tutor that they do not learn from tape
recordings (Baptista and Petrinovich, 1984). The use of social
reinforcement has been noted to be particularly useful to improve
BCI integration (reviewed in Lotte et al., 2013). Even if social
feedback is provided by an android, behavioral change is better
than when a computer display provides factual feedback (Ham
andMidden, 2014). This suggests that when biofeedback systems
are used (e.g., EEG, fMRI, MEG), engaging a person who
communicates feedback in addition to computer displays could
facilitate acceptance and speed of acquisition during training.
An essential learning substrate lies within the mirror neurons
found in the cortical areas in humans; these neurons fire
when observing or imitating another’s behavior, evoking in
the recipient the representational state of the observer’s action
or emotion (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010). This allows mere observation of an action
to increase motor memory encoding (Stefan et al., 2005;
Celnik et al., 2006). Methods in stroke rehabilitation based
on the mirror neuron system—action observation, motor
imagery, and imitation—take advantage of this opportunity
to rebuild motor function (Garrison et al., 2010). Similarly,
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action observation has been proposed to interact with motor
training in neurorehabilitation (Pomeroy et al., 2005), suggesting
that cognitive training may also be possible by capitalizing on
these mechanisms. For example, in a study with older adults,
the combination of physical training and action observation
together elicited encoding whereas conditions with only physical
training or action observation failed. It is therefore suggested
that employing a person who demonstrates the same action as
the patient during BCI training would facilitate an increase in
encoding more than just using imagery.
Brain-to-brain Coupling
Complex joint behaviors such as communication and social
coordination depend on synchronous interactions. Interpersonal
synchrony promotes a variety of positive outcomes, including
affiliation, liking, rapport, and emotional support satisfaction.
It is challenging to measure brain activity simultaneously
from two people, but studies that examine inter-person
variables such as synchrony have found revealing results
using neuroimaging methods (summarized by Konvalinka
and Roepstorff, 2012). Inter-personal entrainment of behavior
between people occurs when engaged in rhythmic behavior,
such as finger-tapping (Konvalinka et al., 2010) or chair-rocking
(Richardson et al., 2007) resulting in unintentional coordination.
Inducing synchronous activity induces brain-to-brain coupling,
which might increase the efficiency of partnerships engaged with
BCI use. Indeed, it has been suggested that our joint cognition
with other minds increases their efficiency as a unit, particularly
when in compromised situations (Wegner et al., 1991). Intriguing
results with a multiuser BCI video game based on motor imagery
showed improved utility, effectiveness, and engagement (Bonnet
et al., 2013), suggesting methods using interacting brains would
help reduce BCI illiteracy.
Brain-to-brain Transfer
Perhaps the most outstanding example of social interaction effect
is the demonstration of brain-to-brain transfer of information
via computer. In a recent study, the neural firing pattern
code of a rat performing a memory task was transferred to a
recipient rat, who then responded correctly more often than
when stimulated with a random code or without stimulation
(Deadwyler et al., 2013). Further, a study revealed that sensory
information from a rat transmitted via computer included
bidirectional reward contingency information that changed
behavior of both donor and a naïve recipient rat in a location
thousands of miles away (Pais-Vieira et al., 2013). Even human
brain to rat brain transfer has been achieved (Yoo et al., 2013).
These examples suggest that the day when neural signals can
be transmitted between individuals is not out of the realm of
possibility.
Recommendations
BCIs used for neurological rehabilitation require progressive
practice with feedback and reward (Dobkin, 2007); here I
suggest that capitalizing on social factors will result in better
outcomes. The social environment provides a context particularly
relevant for fostering the development and change of cognition.
Given that the presence of social factors facilitates learning
suggests that attention should be given to the conditions by
which the BCI is integrated. For example, engage a loved one
or a trusted facilitator who can supply emotionally rewarding
feedback in training and treatment protocols. Use rewards of
social stimuli, such as images of people or positive language,
to enhance training, and deliver rewards with people instead
of only computer displays. Pay attention to the emotional
environment to ensure it is conducive for promoting change.
Be aware that socially isolated patients will be more sensitive
to negative cues and stimuli. Capitalize on the processes of
imitation and action observation to stimulate responses of the
mirror neuron system; in other words, have the patient and
facilitator do the same task. Even if the patient is unable to
perform the task, mere observation can stimulate motor neuron
responses. Employ synchronization tasks between the facilitator
and patient to increase trust and brain coupling. Finally, most
revolutionary, use healthy individuals as donors to stimulate the
patient via inter-brain coupling with brain-to-brain interfaces. In
conclusion, just as it is essential that BCI development and use
rely on the accurate use of technical principles, it is vital not to
overlook the value of applying findings from social neuroscience
in order to maximize the effectiveness of BCI implementation
and integration.
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Efficient brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are in need of knowledge about the human
brain and how it interacts, plays games, and socializes with other brains. A breakthrough
can be achieved by revealing the microfoundations of sociality, an additional component
of the utility function reflecting the value of contributing to group success derived from
social identity. Building upon our previous behavioral work, we conduct a series of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments (N = 10 in the Pilot Study
and N = 15 in the Main Study) to measure whether and how sociality alters the
functional activation of and connectivity between specific systems in the brain. The
overarching hypothesis of this study is that sociality, even in a minimal form, serves
as a natural mechanism of sustainable cooperation by fostering interaction between
brain regions associated with social cognition and those related to value calculation.
We use group-based manipulations to induce varying levels of sociality and compare
behavior in two social dilemmas: Prisoner’s Dilemma and variations of Ultimatum Game.
We find that activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated
with cognitive control and modulation of the valuation system, is correlated with activity
in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to a greater degree when participants make
economic decisions in a game with an acquaintance, high sociality condition, compared
to a game with a random individual, low sociality condition. These initial results suggest
a specific biological mechanism through which sociality facilitates cooperation, fairness
and provision of public goods at the cost of individual gain. Future research should
examine neural dynamics in the brain during the computation of utility in the context of
strategic games that involve social interaction for a larger sample of subjects.
Keywords: prosocial actions, sociality, value calculation, social cognition, BCI
INTRODUCTION
Daily life confronts us with social situations and interactions on a regular basis. Thus, economic
decisions are often embedded in a social context. However, we rarely think of how the brain
processes the decisions we make, especially those decisions that affect the outcomes of other people
with our decisions. Social factors such as group membership and affiliation motives have powerful
effects on a range of behaviors, suggesting that these factors carry substantial decision utility for
people. However, this “social utility” is rarely included in the formal models of economic behavior.
This paper triangulates the theories of human social behavior from social psychology, decision
modeling techniques from behavioral economics, and brain-imaging tools from neuroscience
to draw a more precise picture of the mechanisms by which social factors influence economic
decisions.
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Recent efforts to unite these traditions have proven fruitful
in delivering theoretical insights and a model-based precision
to the study of economic behavior in a realistic social context
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010;
Perc et al., 2013; Lukinova et al., 2014; Berkman et al., 2015).
One behavioral study (Berkman et al., 2015) confirmed that
socialization induces prosocial behavior in economic games
due to sociality. Participants are introduced in groups creating
group differentiation, which easily satisfies the minimal group
requirement (Tajfel, 1978). In line with Social Identity Theory
we assert some esteem or value is gained by boosting the group
(or derogating the outgroup; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and, in
turn, this additional value (Lukinova et al., 2014) plays a decisive
role in encouraging prosocial actions. Building upon results of
our behavioral work, we now report on a series of functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments that utilize the
fMRI technology in combination with socialization and well-
known economic games to measure whether and how sociality
alters the functional activation of and connectivity between
the social cognition network and the valuation network in the
brain.
We use experiments in fMRI and laboratory facilities in
an attempt to study the neural mechanisms of human social
interactions and the microfoundations of prosocial behavior. The
main novelty and contribution of this paper is in the reality of
social interactions as opposed to artificial social interactions and
in the combination of two social dilemmas in the fMRI study.
To our knowledge the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and various
representations (sequential vs. simultaneous; matrix vs. a game
tree) of Ultimatum Game (UG) have not appeared together in
prior neuroeconomics research. Our study follows pioneer fMRI
studies that compare PD to other games (e.g., Stag Hunt; Emonds
et al., 2011, 2012). Besides regular UG we use Welfare Game
(WG), a novel 2 × 2 simultaneous version of UG that preserves
the distributional essence of the game, as well as its antecedent,
the UG.
Using fMRI gives us a unique perspective on how sociality
works. We examine neural dynamics in specific systems when
people compute their utility in the context of strategic games
that involve various levels of social interaction. Social science
researchers use neuroimaging as the key tool to understand
the nature of the various peculiar aspects of human behavior
such as “economic irrationality” (Peterson, 2005), altruism and
“altruistic punishment” (De Quervain et al., 2004; Waytz et al.,
2012), asymmetry between gains and losses (Yacubian et al.,
2006), cooperation (Fett et al., 2014; Watanabe et al., 2014),
preference of egalitarian outcomes (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tricomi
et al., 2010; Dawes et al., 2012; Yamagishi et al., 2012; Osinsky
et al., 2013), decision about an unfair split (Güroğlu et al., 2014),
and theory of mind (Lee and Harris, 2015; Strombach et al.,
2015). If social neuroscience (Cacioppo et al., 2002; Norman
et al., 2012) attempts to understand mechanisms that underlie
social behavior using a mix of biological and social approaches
(Willingham and Dunn, 2003), neuroeconomics opens up the
“black box” of the brain by finding neural correlates of choice
behavior (Camerer et al., 2005; Lohrenz and Montague, 2008;
Glimcher and Fehr, 2013; Lampert et al., 2014; Schroeder
and Graziano, 2015) and behavior under risk and uncertainty
(Hsu et al., 2005). Unfortunately, current knowledge of neural
mechanisms in prosocial decision making is still limited (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007; Lee, 2008; Emonds et al., 2011, 2012, 2014;
Declerck et al., 2013; Declerck and Boone, 2015; Kuss et al.,
2015).
For the purposes of this paper, sociality, or social utility,
is defined as an additional component of the utility function
reflecting the value of contributing to group success derived
from social identity, defined as knowledge, value, and emotional
significance for group membership (Tajfel, 1982). In economic
terms, social identity may be one of the mechanisms by which
sociality comes to have a positive decision utility. There are many
ways of manipulating sociality for the purpose of testing its effect
on economic decisions and the associated neural systems. To our
knowledge, a formal typology of the various kinds of sociality is
not currently available, even though such a typology would be
quite useful for the present line of research and related efforts.
In the course of our behavioral research, we surveyed the relevant
literature and identified two broad classes of social manipulations
(Low sociality and High sociality). We follow on this distinction
in our fMRI study. In particular, during our Pilot fMRI Study
we compare playing with humans to playing with computers,
whereas in the main study we focus on the difference between
the behavior in economic games where the opponent is a random
individual or an acquaintance.
We have specific, a priori hypotheses about the likely brain
regions involved in each of the two target processes (sociality
and valuation). A growing body of work implicates the ventral
striatal dopamine circuit in the integration and calculation of
subjective value or utility, including the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), the ventral aspects of the caudate (vC), and
the nucleus accumbens (nAcc; Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare
et al., 2008; Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Social cognition, on the
other hand reliably recruits activation in a network of brain
regions including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC),
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009).
Pertinent to the present research, a recent study found that
activity in TPJ tracked perceived social distance between an actor
and a target, and interacted with the vmPFC, a region involved
in value calculation, to modulate the actor’s decisions about how
to divide up a fixed pot of money to be shared by the actor and
the target (Strombach et al., 2015). This study provides proof-of-
concept that social cognition regions can interact with valuation
regions to influence economic decisions. Existent reviews in
neuroeconomics add another neural network that is consistently
recruited when people face social dilemmas, i.e., network related
to cognitive control (Declerck et al., 2013). Thus, one can
formulate a competing hypothesis: the interaction of cognitive
control and valuation regions of the brain facilitate prosocial
decision making.
Since our experimental design includes two types of economic
games we can also examine the question of whether the neural
bases of social welfare choices are different from those of
collective action. The regions of the brain associated with reward
and valuation are under our focus and we hypothesize that these
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brain regions should be more active during the fair condition
than during the unfair condition in the UG. Indeed, the vmPFC
is reported to activate during tasks involving inequality in
social settings (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2008;
Tricomi et al., 2010; Aoki et al., 2015). Inequality is noticed
by participant once reward comparison between the other and
herself is accomplished. However, it also hurts when she realizes
that she falls behind. We hypothesize that there will be an
increased activity in the reward associated brain regions (vmPFC)
as well as the brain regions critical for processing emotions,
such as amygdala and OFC (Davidson et al., 2000; Dolan, 2002)
in variations of UG condition as opposed to the PD game
condition.
A more precise understanding of the mechanisms by which
sociality affects economic decisions in a collective action situation
is the essential next step in improving social brain–computer
interfaces (BCIs; Sexton, 2015).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
All participants are recruited through advertisements on
campus. All subjects are right handed, healthy, have normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, have no history of psychiatric
diagnoses, neurological or metabolic illnesses, and are not taking
medications that can interfere with the performance of fMRI.
Participants can be of any gender and ethnicity, but must be at
least 18 years old. The only exclusion criterion is based on MRI
safety screening (ferromagnetic metal in the body, e.g., dental
braces). The participants in the fMRI experiment can earn $5 just
for showing up on the day of experiment and up to $20 more,
depending on their decisions throughout the game. During all
game conditions the participants earned a number of points that
was later transferred to money. Subjects provide written informed
consent approved by the University of Oregon Human Studies
Committee.
On the day of experiment, four people are invited to the
conference room in Lewis Center for neuroimaging (LCNI) that
is adjacent to the scanning suite. Thus, in every experiment one
participant for the fMRI experiment is paired with three other
subjects for the reality of the high sociality conditions: Human
and Acquaintance. Before they participate in economic games the
subjects have time to get to know each other and engage in an
informal conversation, i.e., undergo socialization, the technique
adopted from our behavioral research (Berkman et al., 2015).
Specifically, the participants are asked to introduce themselves by
name to the others and say one exciting thing about themselves.
The participants then embark on a 10-min interaction with the
goal of creating a list of five attributes they all have in common to
report back to the experimenter. Finally, one of the participants
is asked to go to the scanning room for fMRI experiment and
remaining three participants stay in the conference room and
proceed with a computer experiment.
Computer experiment laboratory data (N = 75) are collected
with the help of the z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade
Economic Experiments) software package (Fischbacher, 2007).
The stimuli presentation is identical to the fMRI experiment, with
one row chooser and two column choosers (one of the column
choosers plays against a predetermined computer strategy).
Pilot Study
Subjects of the fMRI experiment are 10 UO college students (five
females). Stimuli include two sociality conditions (human and
computer opponents), two game conditions (PD and WGs), a
feedback screen that shows profit of participant based on her
decision, and a control condition.
The PD payoff matrix is formed around (1, 2, 4, 6; Table 1)
values. When one participant defects and the other cooperates,
then defector gets the maximum value – 6, and the cooperator
receives the minimum payoff of 1. If both cooperate, participants
get four each, whereas if both defect, they get two each.
The WG is a novel game not seen in prior research. It
resembles a simultaneous version of the UG with an option for
an unfair offer. The UG is a game often played in laboratory
experiments in which two players interact to decide how to divide
a sum of money that is given to them. One of the players proposes
how to divide the sum between the two players, and the other can
either accept or reject this proposal. If the second player rejects
the proposal, none of the players receive anything. However,
if the second player accepts, the money is split according to
the proposal. Usually the game is played only once or with a
randomly chosen partner so that reciprocation is not an issue.
For the same reason, players do not change roles within one
game. The equilibrium in the UG is not in the favor of the
second player. By rejecting the proposal, the second is choosing
nothing rather than something. So, for a rational player it would
be better to accept any proposal that gives any amount bigger
than 0. Contrary to the economic theory of self-interest, multiple
studies (Henrich, 2004; Oosterbeek et al., 2004) show that in
many cultures people offer (50:50) splits and offers less than 20%
are usually rejected.
The WG’s payoff structure corresponds to values in PD (1,
2, 4, 6; Table 1) Based on the payoffs the row chooser always
prefers to choose up. The column chooser’s best response to the
row chooser’s dominant strategy is to choose left. That is why the
Nash equilibrium is (2; 6). However, the row chooser always gets
a worse payoff than the column chooser. So, if the row chooser
prefers egalitarian outcomes, the row player’s deviation from the
equilibrium can occur and result in either of the two egalitarian
options: (1; 1) and (4; 4).
Prior to entering the scanner the subjects complete a series of
practice trials of a similar game on paper. This ensures that the
TABLE 1 | Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and Welfare game (WG) payoffs.
PD Welfare Game
L R L R
U 4, 4 1, 6 U 2, 6 6, 2
D 6, 1 2, 2 D 1, 1 4, 4
PD and WG payoffs are presented in the matrix form. One of the players chooses
between rows, i.e., between up (U) and down (D). The other player (randomly
paired) chooses between columns, i.e., between left (L) and right (R).
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participants understand and are ready for the stimuli presented
in the actual experiment. Participants are told on the day of
experiment that they will be Row choosers [choosing between
up (U) and down (D)] and will maintain the same role for
the whole experiment. Subjects are instructed to look at the
central plus sign, and had to switch their attention from the
central plus sign to the game stimulus (a table 2 × 2 that is
centered on the central plus sign) in each trial to determine
the their response by pressing either left or right button on the
button box in their right hand. Subjects know that by pressing
the left button, they choose up (U) and by pressing the right
button – down (D). This study uses deception. Participants are
told that their opponents in the high sociality condition are
humans. In reality, the participant in the fMRI study always
plays a computerized strategy with fixed probabilities: for PD
game, right (R) with p = 0.85, left (L) with p = 0.15; for
WG, L with p = 0.85, R with p = 0.15. Feedback collected
following the experiment indicates that the deception was
effective and that subjects believed that their opponents were
human.
In order to answer the research questions the following
neural experimental design is used. The experiment consisted
of four blocks [Humans + PD (PG1), Humans + WG (PG2),
Computers + PD (CG1), Computers +WG (CG2)] with events
within each block. To distinguish between blocks the instruction
screen in the beginning of each block indicates whether the
participant will play a computer or a human. The game condition
does not change throughout the block. The blocks are alternated:
for half of the participants the order is PG1, PG2, CG1,
CG2, for the other half – CG1, CG2, PG1, PG2. We use an
event-related fMRI design with a pseudorandom (predetermined
unpredictable) order of game and control condition within
a block with the same interstimulus and intertrial intervals
used in M. Posner attention studies (Flombaum and Posner,
2005; Abdullaev et al., 2010) that approximate an exponential
distribution with a certain mean. The jittering of the time
intervals between game and feedback and between feedback and
the next trial is done in order to separate brain activity to the game
and feedback stimuli.
In the game condition (Figure 1), the plus sign remains on
the center of the screen for 1000 ms. The game stimulus follows
after a variable interval (“one of 12 predetermined intervals
including three 300 ms intervals, and one each of 550, 800,
1050, 1550, 2300, 3300, 4800, 6550, and 11800 ms, approximating
an exponential distribution with a mean interval of 2800 ms;”
Abdullaev et al., 2010). The game stimulus stays until response or
for 30000 ms. Then a fixation screen is on for 1000 ms followed by
another variable intertrial interval (mean of 6000 ms) and finally
the feedback screen is on for 2000 ms till the onset of the next
trial.
In the control condition, the plus sign remains on the center of
the screen for 1000 ms. The control stimulus (each cell in Figure 1
2× 2 table is replaced with “X, X”) follows after a variable interval
(mean of 2800 ms). The control stimulus stays until response or
for 5000 ms. As in the game condition, then fixation screen is
on for 1000 ms followed by another variable intertrial interval
(mean of 6000 ms) till the onset of the next trial. Four blocks are
presented, and each block has 30 trials (20 game condition trials
and 10 control condition trials) with a different pseudorandom
order of conditions and intervals.
Responses are recorded with two buttons on an MRI-
compatible button box. Reaction times (RT) are measured from
the game stimulus to the button press. The control trial is
constructed in order to isolate the mechanical activity of the
finger pressing on the button box. We expected that with each
button press, we should see the ipsilateral cerebellum and the
contralateral primary motor cortex activation. Also there is a 30 s
baseline period in front of each block with no stimuli except a
central plus sign for fixation. So that each condition of the task
can be compared to the baseline period.
fMRI stimuli are presented for the participant in the MRI
scanner and behavioral data are collected using the Presentation
program1 run on a computer. Stimuli are presented with a digital
projector/reverse screen display system to the screen at the back
end of the MRI scanner bore. Subjects see the screen via a
small tilted mirror attached to the birdcage coil in front of their
eyes.
Imaging is performed using a 3T Siemens Allegra head-only
MRI scanner at Lewis Center for Neuroimaging. A standard
birdcage coil is used to acquire data from the entire brain.
Subjects wear earplugs and earphones to protect their hearing.
Additional soft padding is used between earphones and inside the
wall of the head coil to diminish head movements.
For functional MRI, the EP2D-BOLD (Blood oxygen level
dependent) sequence is run with repetition time (TR)= 2000 ms,
echo time (TE) = 30 ms, flip angle = 90◦, Field of View
(FOV) = 200 mm. The brain is covered with 32 4 mm thick
slices acquired in a custom manner (first even slices and then odd
slices). For structural MRI scan, the 3D Magnetization Prepared
Rapid Acquisition Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) TR = 2500 ms,
TE = 4.3 8ms, flip angle = 8◦, FOV = 256, 160 slices is run
for 8 min to acquire 1 mm3 high resolution anatomical scans for
registration purposes.
Main Study
Subjects of the fMRI experiment are 15 individuals recruited from
the Eugene, OR community, college-aged (eight females). The
procedures are nearly identical to the Pilot Study, except for the
sociality, game conditions, and fMRI acquisition. Stimuli include
two within-subject opponent conditions, Low sociality (Random
Individual), and High sociality (Acquaintance), and two within-
subject game conditions, PD, UG as responder. Thus, each trial
falls into one of four cells, with participants playing anonymously
against either someone from the Eugene community who the
participant has not met or someone from the socialized group,
and playing the PD game, or the UG game as responder. This
study uses deception. Although participants believe they are
playing with real people (according to participants’ feedback),
the opponent in all three games is in reality a computer
that follows the Nash equilibrium strategy with random noise
to reduce suspicion. Following the game phase of each trial,
participants are shown a feedback screen displaying the profit the
1www.neurobehavioralsystems.com
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FIGURE 1 | Game condition schedule. Following the fixation cross, there is a game phase for each trial, where participants need to make a choice in a social
dilemma. After pressing on the button box, participants are shown a feedback screen displaying the profit the participants earn based on their decision and the
decision of their partner.
participant earned based on their decision and the decision of the
partner.
Therefore, the experiment consists of four blocks
(Acquaintance + PD, Acquaintance + Ultimatum, Random
Individual + PD, Random Individual + Ultimatum) with
30 trials within each block (20 experimental and 10 control
trials). To distinguish between blocks the instruction screen in
the beginning of each block specifies, whether the participant
would play against a person from his/her Socialized group
(Acquaintance) or against a Random Individual.
The PD game payoffs are the same as in Pilot Study (Table 1).
The UG is modeled in such a way that a participant always
chooses between two options, either accept an unfair offer that
corresponds to up (U) or reject the offer pressing down (D).
Equally likely are offered (2; 6) and (3; 5) splits, where the lesser
value is an offer to a participant.
MR scans are acquired in the Siemens Skyra 3 Tesla scanner
at LCNI, a research-dedicated, whole-body system optimized
for functional brain imaging. Participants are situated in the
scanner by one of LCNI’s imaging technicians, who also control
the scanner during the session. Experimental stimuli (e.g.,
images, instructions) are presented using a magnet-compatible,
rear-projection system controlled by a PC using Presentation
Software. Participant responses (e.g., up/down decisions) are
collected on a 10-key button box (only two buttons are
used) capable of recording responses to the millisecond level.
A shimming protocol maximizes homogeneity in the field, and
a 30 s, T2∗-weighted scout allows slice prescriptions for all
subsequent scans. We acquire a high-resolution anatomical T1-
weighted MP-RAGE scan (TR/TE = 2300/2.1 ms, 192 × 192
matrix, 1 mm thick, 160 sagittal slices, FOV = 256), functional
images with a T2*-weighted echo-planar scan (33 axial slices,
TR/TE = 2000/30 ms, 90-deg flip, 64 × 64 matrix, 4 mm thick,
FOV = 200), and in-plane gradient echo field map magnitude
and phase images to correct for inhomogeneities in the magnetic
field (33 axial slices, TR/TE = 345/8.06 ms, 40-deg flip, 64 × 64
matrix, 4 mm thick, FOV= 200).
Analysis
The epochs used for the analysis are from the game stimulus on-
set until response.
FSL Procedures
The Pilot Study is first analyzed using General Linear Modeling
(GLM) as implemented in the FSL 5.0.2 (FMRIB Software
Library). fMRI data is analyzed using FEAT (FMRIB Expert
Analysis Tool) available as part of FSL2 (Smith et al., 2004).
Preprocessing includes the default options, such as separating
images of brain from the rest of the images of the head, i.e.,
creating a brain mask, using the Brain Extraction Tool (BET;
Smith, 2002), pre-whitening for local autocorrelation correction
using FILM (FMRIB Improved Linear Model; Woolrich et al.,
2001), motion correction based on rigid-body transformations
using MCFLIRT (Motion Correction FMRIB Linear Image
Registration Tool; Jenkinson et al., 2002), spatial smoothing
using a Gaussian kernel and highpass temporal filtering as
implemented in FSL as well as slice timing correction using a
customized text file.
The analysis is done in three steps. On the first level we
analyze each session’s data, i.e., execute time-series analysis
of the raw 4D fMRI data. We generate voxel-wise parameter
estimates of the hemodynamic (blood-oxygen-level-dependent)
responses to the different stimuli we used in the fMRI experiment.
These voxel-wise parameter estimates represent the change in
the blood-oxygenation level for a given stimulus compared to
the baseline neural activation of no stimulus presentation and
control stimulus. Modeled regressors include cooperation, i.e.,
choosing up (U) in PD game both in the human and computer
2www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl
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conditions, C_PG1 and C_CG1, respectively; defection, D_PG1
and D_CG1; inequity aversion [down (D) in WG], IA_PG2 and
IA_CG2; and inequity tolerance, IT_PG2 and IT_CG2. Each
explanatory variable is created by convolving the stimulus actual
duration times (from onset of stimulus till response using one
of the buttons) within each stimulus with a standard gamma
hemodynamic response function using FEAT. Through first-level
analysis, we obtain parameter estimates as well as statistical maps
for each regressor.
On the second level we combine each subject’s activation
across several blocks and create contrasts (for human vs.
computer conditions: C_PG1 vs. C_CG1, D_PG1 vs. D_CG1,
IA_PG2 vs. IA_CG2, IT_PG2 vs. IT_CG2; and WF vs. PD:
IA_PG2 vs. C_PG1) using a fixed effects analysis with cluster-
level statistical threshold of Z > 2.3 and p < 0.05. In order to
compare human condition to computer condition and inequity
aversion in WG to cooperation in PD we subtract one stimulus
type (e.g., in Low sociality condition) from another type (e.g.,
in High sociality condition). The hypothesis of interest here is
whether in each voxel the activation to human condition stimuli
is greater than in computer condition. We also implement this
type of contrast in the opposite direction, i.e., where activation
in computer condition is higher than activation in human
condition. In result, we generate statistical maps for each of the
five contrasts for each subject. These contrast activation maps
are registered to each subject’s own high-resolution structural
image and also to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
152-standard template.
Finally on the third level, we use FLAME (FMRIB’s Local
Analysis of Mixed Effects) modeling and one-sample t-test to
decide whether the group activates on average. Mixed effects
model the subject variability and, therefore, allow making
inferences about the wider population from which the subjects
are drawn. Each of the contrasts for the group are Gaussianized
intro Z-statistical images and thresholded at Z > 2.3 with a
cluster-corrected significance threshold of p < 0.05 (Worsley,
2001). The high resolution structural MRI images of individual
subjects are standardized to the MNI space and averaged within
the group to create an average structural template.
SPM 12 Procedures
The Main Study is analyzed using identical procedures in
SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London,
UK3), which includes correction for field inhomogeneities,
realignment, and coregistration of functional images to each
subject’s own high-resolution structural image using a six-
parameter rigid body transformation model, reorientation to the
plane containing the anterior and posterior commissures, spatial
normalization into space compatible with an MNI atlas, and
smoothing using a 6 mm3 FWHM Gaussian kernel. Statistical
analyses are implemented in SPM12. For each participant,
event-related condition effects are estimated according to
the general linear model, using a canonical hemodynamic
response function, high-pass filtering (128 s), and a first-order
autoregressive error structure. At the individual level, BOLD
3www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
signal is modeled in a fixed effects analysis with separate
regressors modeling each condition of interest during the game
presentation period, for the decision making, and feedback
periods. Linear contrasts are created for each comparison of
interest (e.g., PD + High Sociality vs. UG + High Sociality,
PD + Low Sociality vs. UG + Low Sociality, PD + High
Sociality vs. PD + Low Sociality, and UG + High Sociality
vs. UG + Low Sociality). These contrasts are then imported
to group-level random effects analyses for inference to the
population. The above-threshold activations table (shown at
P < 0.05, FWE) is created with WFU_pickatlas4. The particular
regions reported in the results are visualized using xjView
toolbox5.
PPI in AFNI
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis is conducted in
AFNI6. We define the seed region as medial PFC (defined
using the Harvard–Oxford structural atlas7). The PPI analysis
identifies regions showing differential coupling with the mPFC
during High Sociality vs. Low Sociality conditions. The mPFC
ROI is projected from MNI space to individual subject space,
the time series data are extracted from the combined left
and right mPFC, and terms associated with the baseline,
linear drift, and head motion are removed. These cleaned
time series data are deconvolved with an assumed gamma
impulse response function, and then multiplied by the High
Sociality vs. Low Sociality condition contrast to generate
an interaction term. An additional GLM is implemented as
before, but with additional regressors corresponding to the
deconvolved mPFC time series, the High Sociality vs. Low
Sociality condition contrast, and the interaction of these two
regressors, which is the key term in the PPI analysis. This
final interaction regressor is used to identify brain regions
in which functional coupling with the mPFC differs during
the interaction with an Acquaintance compared to Random
Individual. Beta weights corresponding to this interaction




In the PD the trend is typical, with high (moderate) levels of
cooperation in the first few rounds devolving into consistent
moderate (high) levels of defection. The only difference
is witnessed between high sociality (humans, acquaintances)
and low sociality (computers, random individuals) conditions
(Table 2). Playing acquaintances in the Main Study resulted in
slightly higher levels of cooperation than those in the Pilot Study
for Humans condition. Nevertheless, we observe significant
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TABLE 2 | Computer experiment behavioral results.
Pilot study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in WG Main study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in UG
Human 28% 30% Acquaintance 49% 76%
Computer 16% 46% Random individual 18% 66%
Behavioral results of computer experiments for Pilot and Main studies are reported. The percentages of cooperative decisions (choose U or L in the PD) and the frequency
of inequity tolerance decisions (choose U in the WG or accepted an unfair offer in the UG) across studies and conditions are listed.
TABLE 3 | fMRI experiment behavioral results.
Pilot study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in WG Main study conditions Cooperation in PD Inequity tolerance in UG
Human 26% 40% Acquaintance 34% 71%
Computer 15% 62% Random individual 21% 51%
Behavioral results of fMRI experiments for Pilot and Main studies are reported.
(Humans vs. Computers, N = 30, p-value = 0.002, t-test) and in
the Main Study (Acquaintances vs. Random Individuals, N = 45,
p-value= 0.0006, t-test).
Results of the Computer Experiment for Welfare and UGs
are puzzling. Whereas for WG the egalitarian outcome (inequity
aversion), rather than Nash equilibrium (2; 6) is more likely,
for the UG accepting unfair offers (inequity tolerance) is
predominant. The difference between sociality conditions is not
significant.
For the fMRI portion of the experiment the same pattern
remains: rates of cooperation are significantly higher for the high
sociality condition than those for the low sociality condition
(Table 3; Pilot Study: Humans vs. Computers, N = 10,
p-value = 0.001, t-test; Main Study: Acquaintances vs. Random
Individuals, N = 15, p-value = 0.02, t-test). It is important
to notice that the cooperation level averages oscillated around
the mean till the very last round due to the persistent tests
of cooperative strategy by participants that face nasty Nash
equilibrium computerized strategy.
We observe significant difference between sociality
conditions, for the Welfare and UG (Pilot Study: Humans
vs. Computers, N = 10, p-value = 0.05, t-test; Main Study:
Acquaintances vs. Random Individuals, N = 15, p-value = 0.05,
t-test). The directions of the effect are distinct: acceptance of
unfair offers is higher for Computers (low sociality) compared
to Humans (high sociality) conditions, but is lower for Random
Individual (low sociality) compared to Acquaintance (high
sociality) conditions, similar to what is seen in the Computer
Experiment. The WG is a simultaneous game, whereas the UG is
sequential. In the UG the subject accepts or rejects the offer that
is presented to her. In the WG she does not know what will be
offered, so it is not necessarily inequity aversion, but might be
as well risk aversion. In other words in WG the subject provides
a hedge against potential inequity by forcing the egalitarian
outcome, whereas in the UG it is not possible without losing
everything. That is why in UG most of the subjects tolerate
inequity.
fMRI Results, Pilot Study
The fMRI analysis of the Pilot Study in FSL focuses on the
functional activity pattern associated with social domain and
economic games participants play. We determine areas in the
brain where the neural activation is higher for subjects playing
with humans, than playing with computers in completing several
different tasks. We report functional activation in the areas as
specified in MNI structural atlas (Mazziotta et al., 2001; Collins
et al., 2004) and Talairach Daemon Labels atlas (Lancaster et al.,
2000).
Cooperation in the PD game with humans compared to
cooperation in PD with computers is associated with a signal
increase in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), Brodmann
areas (BA) 8 and 9 (Cooperation contrast: BA 8 [x = 69, y = 69,
z = 55 (MNI_152 space coordinates)], Z-score = 3.01467).
Whereas BA 9 functions include sustaining attention and
working memory, BA 8 is even more intriguing, as it is
linked to the management of uncertainty (Platt and Huettel,
2008) as well as hopes or high expectations. Many studies see
DLPFC as a contributor to rational decision-making in social
situations. Although cooperation in the PD game is seen by
many as irrational, the theory of sociality (Lukinova et al., 2014;
Berkman et al., 2015) provides a rational explanation for such
behavior by adding an economic component to the subject’s
utility function in the social context. Thus, activation in the
Cooperation contrast can be attributed to another demonstration
of sociality at work, where brain processes cooperation as a
rational decision.
Contrast between WG and PD game displays highlight in
BA 30 [x = 36, y = 45, z = 33 (MNI_152 space coordinates),
Z-score = 2.55405] that along with adjacent areas forms
posterior cingulate gyrus. Its functions include spatial memory
and orientation (Owen et al., 1996), as well as face recognition
(Leube et al., 2001). Neither the former, nor the latter directly
correspond to the stimuli presented to the subjects. BA 39
[x = 61, y = 33, z = 51 (MNI_152 space coordinates),
Z-score = 2.54531], located at the middle temporal gyrus, is
also involved in calculation (Grabner et al., 2007), as well
as in “theory of mind” (Goel et al., 1995), i.e., modeling
knowledge, rationality, etc., of another person’s mind. Indeed,
calculation and “theory of mind” occur in both games (Rilling
et al., 2004), however, while the PD game is familiar and is
frequently used in multiple courses in college, the WG, as a
rare simultaneous version of UG, requires participants to think
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TABLE 4 | Above-threshold activations (shown at P < 0.05, FWE) are presented for the contrasts of interest.
Contrast Anatomical region Coordinates (x, y, z) T-statistic Z-statistic Cluster size
PD > UG
L inferior frontal gyrus (−38, 3, 34) 11.49 4.87 2
L inferior parietal lobule (−41, −44, 58) 10.5 4.72 1
UG > PD
R superior frontal gyrus (21, 49, −18) 12.49 4.8 2
High sociality > Low sociality
L sub-gyral (−35, −38, 38) 11.08 4.81 1
L superior frontal gyrus (−10, 12, 58) 10.63 4.74 1
R inferior semi-lunar lobule (12, −60, −52) 9.28 5.15 6
L pre-central gyrus (−36, −12, 58) 8.87 5.07 10
L post-central gyrus (−40, −36, 64) 8.81 5.05 7
R cingulate gyrus (−42, −24, 40) 8.27 4.91 3
R superior temporal gyrus (50, 20, −18) 7.87 4.79 1
Low sociality > High sociality
L inferior parietal lobule (−35, −47, 46) 13.66 5.16 6
L inferior parietal lobule (−35, −56, 46) 13.16 5.09 4
L inferior frontal gyrus (−50, 9, 34) 13 5.07 2
L precuneus (−7, −62, 54) 11.02 4.8 1
R precuneus (3, −56, 54) 10.94 4.79 2
R cingulate gyrus (18, −38, 38) 8.83 5.06 1
R parahippocampal gyrus (38, −22, −18) 8.58 4.99 1
MNI_152 space coordinates are reported.
through other subject’s strategy and execute the cost-benefit
analysis.
fMRI Results, Main Study
The analysis of neuroimaging data in SPM focuses on
the functional activity pattern between games and opponent
conditions (Table 4; shown at P < 0.05, FWE).
One of the goals is to determine brain areas where neural
activation is higher in one game or another. In Pilot Study,
when participant plays in a PD Game compared to her making
decisions in a WG besides significant clusters already identified,
activation is higher in vmPFC, Brodmann area 32 (BA 32,
x = 5.70, y = 25.53, z = 34.81; T-statistic = 6.0101). It is likely
that brain activation differences between games, namely WG and
UGs, are mainly due to calculation issues and the novelty of WG
to college students. It is vital that BA 32 associated with rational
thought processes does not appear to be more activated, when
comparing PD and UG in the Main Study.
When comparing cooperation decision in PD to acceptance of
unfair offers in the UG or agreement to Nash equilibrium in the
WG, no significant clusters are found. We assert that in the social
setting the neural basis for tolerability to defection (opponent’s
strategy in PD is nasty) and tolerability to inequity (advantageous
position of column chooser in WG and unfair offer in UG) is
identical, representing confrontation with the social world that
is at times unjust and rough.
Besides the BA 8 and BA 9 activations already identified in the
Pilot Study differences between sociality conditions in PD also
show higher activations in orbitofrontal area, BA 11 (x=−28.80,
y = 50.61, z = −9.89, T-statistic = 6.0101; Figure 2),
FIGURE 2 | High sociality > Low sociality contrast (BA 11). Contrast
between High sociality and low sociality conditions reveals activations in
orbitofrontal area, BA 11 (x = −28.80, y = 50.61, z = −9.89). This area is
associated with planning, reasoning, and decision making in general.
known for its connection to planning, reasoning, and decision
making. Cooperation in high sociality condition is indeed
attributed to a well-planned and a reasonable, if not rational
decision. The contrasts between High sociality and Low sociality
involve among others the following brain activations: Superior
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FIGURE 3 | Z-scores from the seed to the inferior frontal gyrus in the
axial and sagittal views. Functional connectivity of mPFC with the right
inferior frontal gyrus, a region previously associated with cognitive control and
modulation of the valuation system. Regions depicted are found to correlate
with mPFC to a greater degree when participants make economic decisions
as they interacted with others in the high sociality condition compared to the
low sociality condition.
Frontal Gyri, Inferior Frontal Gyrus, Anterior Cingulate, and
Parahippocampal Gyrus.
We conduct preliminary connectivity tests using PPI analysis
using the mPFC as a seed, a brain region associated with
valuation. The software used for obtaining the activations is
Analysis of Functional Neuro-Images (AFNI). The presence of a
positive context-dependent interaction in a region (i.e., a PPI) can
be interpreted as greater relative connectivity between that region
and the seed in one condition compared to another. In this case,
the regions depicted in Figure 3 are found to correlate with mPFC
to a greater degree when participants made decision in PD as they
interacted with others in the high sociality condition compared
to the low sociality condition. Table 5 shows the correlation
coefficients for the areas of interest, i.e., the areas highlighted for
the High > Low Sociality contrast.
Several regions emerge that have previously been implicated
in prosocial economic choice (e.g., the right inferior frontal gyrus
TABLE 5 | R coefficients with seeded ROI in the medial frontal gyrus
(coefficient range −0.0019445 to 0.01676).
AFNI-r
coefficient
# of voxels % max
coefficient
Fusiform gyrus 0.006777 1492 0.4043
Inferior frontal gyrus 0.006322 731 0.3772
Insula 0.006274 509 0.3743
Anterior cingulate 0.006351 381 0.3789
Parahippocampal gyrus 0.005702 306 0.3402
Regions that were significantly positively correlated with medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) to a greater degree when participants made economic decisions as they
interacted with others in the high sociality condition compared to the low sociality
condition: r refers to the Pearson correlation coefficient relating neural activity in
that cluster and mPFC activation coefficients at the group level.
and the DLPFC; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Notably, these regions
modulate activation of the valuation system in cases when self-
control is necessary to override impulsive or habitual choices such
as selfish economic decisions (Hare et al., 2008). Several small
peaks also emerge in the valuation network proper (not shown),
but the small sample size prevents strong inferences based on
these data.
DISCUSSION
If social cognition constantly results in a different pattern of
brain activity than a non-social one and the regions of brain
activation during social cognition have a special status (high
levels of activity even at rest) in the brain (Adolphs, 2003;
Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011), to what extent are brain systems that
control social behavior domain specific (Cosmides and Tooby,
1994; Stone et al., 2007)? If evolutionary perspective provides
theoretical grounding for domain specificity, neuroscience then
gives an opportunity to investigate it.
This paper focuses on the comparison of two sociality
conditions. It is the first attempt to find what brain regions
correspond to a neural value of sociality and lay a foundation
to identify and estimate this neural value. The key is to induce
prosocial behaviors in economic games, different in nature, but
common in representation. Our findings support the theory
of sociality. Indeed, we assert that additional social utility is
calculated in the human brain, when a person interacts with
someone from the socialized group she identifies herself with.
This additional social utility may cause prosocial decisions, such
as cooperation in the PD, and may as well appear rational to the
brain. A good way of talking about sociality is by illustrating what
happens when it is impaired (Edmiston et al., 2015): sociality can
be described as the opposite of autism.
Based on our research we propose that economic games, such
as PD representing collective action and the UG, the simplest
demonstration of bargaining, can be intertwined. We observed
that presenting UG and PD together results in higher cooperation
rates than when participants deal with the PD only. One
explanation is a spillover effect produced during the UG. In the
social environment, norms of fairness in the UG may encourage
us to be as well fair in the PD, i.e., cooperate. Recent findings,
however, do not report any correlation between rejecting unfair
offers and prosocial behaviors in other games (Yamagishi et al.,
2012). The fact that we did not observe significant differences in
activations between the games could be due to highly perplexed
cognitive processes involved in these social dilemmas when
sociality is induced.
The data collected from the fMRI experiments can serve to
answer many more questions, than those raised in this paper. For
example, how do subjects perceive outcomes? While in this study,
our main focus is on the stimuli from onset till response, next we
can take into account the reaction toward the outcome displayed
to the participant. How will participants react to unfairness
or defection? Or how will participants react and what brain
activation will be related to it if they defect, while the opponent
cooperated? Why do dopaminergic and subcortical regions show
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no activation in the task? These research questions: to identify
the brain regions that are sensitive to sociality and to test the
relative effectiveness of the sociality inductions in altering neural
activation in the social cognition and valuation networks and
economic decisions – hold promise to advance the social aspects
of BCI (Sexton, 2015).
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INTRODUCTION
The successes of the artificial retina and cochlea have lent encouragement to researchers in
the general field of brain augmentation (Gantz et al., 2005; Dagnelie, 2012). However, in order
for brain augmentation to progress beyond conventional sensory substitution to comprehensive
augmentation of the human brain, we believe a better understanding of self-awareness and
consciousness must be obtained, even if the “hard” problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2007)
remains elusive. Here we propose that forthcoming brain augmentation studies should insistently
include investigations of its potential effects on self-awareness and consciousness. As a first step,
it’s imperative for comprehensive augmentation to include interfacing with the biological brain
in a manner that either distinguishes self (biological brain) from other (augmentation circuitry),
or incorporates both biological and electronic aspects into an integrated understanding of the
meaning of self. This distinction poses not only psychological and physiological issues regarding
the discrepancy of self and other, but raises ethical and philosophical issues when the brain
augmentation is capable of introducing thoughts, emotions, memories and beliefs in such an
integrated fashion that the wearer of such technology cannot distinguish his biological thoughts
from thoughts introduced by the brain augmentation.
A consideration of self begins with the conventional mirror self-recognition test (MSR) (Gallop,
1970) that has been successfully executed with Eurasian magpies (Prior et al., 2008), bottlenose
dolphins (Reiss and Marino, 2001), orca whales (Delfour and Marten, 2001), human infants
typically between 18 and 24 months (Amsterdam, 1972; Rochat, 2003), and notably the Asian
elephant (Plotnik et al., 2006). The only primate species reported to pass the Gallup Mirror Test,
albeit controversially, were orangutans and chimpanzees (Suárez and Gallup, 1981). For years, MSR
has been the designated litmus test for determining whether a species possesses self-awareness
(SA), ultimately raising the question of whether the animal is then a conscious entity as a result
of passing this test (De Veer and van den Bos, 1999). “Mirror self-recognition is an indicator of
self-awareness,” proclaims Gallup et al. (2002). If indeed so, then the subsequent query to raise
is whether self-awareness, the ability to differentiate oneself among others, is a precursor to or
derivative of consciousness, and whether the mirror test is necessary and sufficient (Morin, 2011).
In light of brain research like the Blue Brain Project (Markram, 2006), BRAIN Initiative (Kandel
et al., 2013), and development of neural prosthetics, the interest in consciousness is steadily
growing. Here, we not only encourage the study of and suggest methods for addressing science’s
“elephant in the room,” which asserts consciousness is neither physical nor functional, but also place
the Elephas maximus in our proverbial mirror to obtain a perspective toward forming a cohesive
alliance between philosophical studies of consciousness and neural engineering’s augmentative
innovations. As MSR is purposed to grant the animal subject personal physical inspection from
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an objective viewpoint, resulting in self-cognizance, so shall
we take the approach to examine our modern scientific
methods in conceptual mirrors, to appraise our consciousness
dilemma and propose an assertion for progression in
augmentative technologies. Following here is a succinct
primer of consciousness and SA. We also issue a proposition as
to how brain augmentation can influence the arrival of machine
consciousness. Overall, we state our opinion for (1) why SA
must be systematically examined in conjunction with brain
augmentation approaches and (2) how such a merger could
become a tool for investigating consciousness.
Ineffable Consciousness
The first pitfall encountered with consciousness is the inability
to derive a functional explanation for what it means to
experience. Chalmers (2007) lists the “easy” problems of
consciousness as “the ability to discriminate, categorize, and
react to environmental stimuli; the integration of information
by a cognitive system; the reportability of mental states; the
ability of a system to access its own internal states; the focus
of attention; the deliberate control of behavior; the difference
between wakefulness and sleep.” These phenomena are relatively
feasible to exploit and can be described in computational
model terms and neural operation derivations. Chalmers then
counteracts themwith the “hard” problem of lacking competency
to explain why and how we have phenomenal experiences when
being entertained by a movie, exhibiting a sensation toward
classical music, or having feelings when watching a sunset.
Explaining how the brain processes visual and auditory signals
is trivial in comparison to how those same signals translate to
qualia, subjective phenomenal experiences.
Explanatory Gap Dilemma
The term explanatory gap, coined by philosopher Joseph
Levine (1983), notes our inability to connect physiological
functions with psychological experience, thus creating the gap.
Although Levine synonymizes consciousness with subjective
feelings, the explanatory gap additionally alludes to reasoning,
desires, memory, perception, beliefs, emotion, intentions, and
human behavior/action. Correlating physical brain substrates to
thoughts and feelings is the base of dispute between two parties:
materialist reductionists and non-reductionists (Sawyer, 2002).
Materialists’ chief view, representative of most neuroengineers,
on the matter involves the belief that “when the brain shuts
off, the mind shuts off” and the brain is the sole causative
driver for consciousness. However, non-reductionists (typically
philosophers) embrace a holism approach of mandating that
the brain’s cortical components are insufficient in capturing
consciousness, undertaking the possibility of supernatural
properties. It’s an inquiry of necessity and sufficiency. The brain
may be necessary for mental functions, but is it sufficient?
Earlier analytical inspections on conscious experience have
implied that an exclusive reductive justification is not satisfactory
in delineating its emergence (Churchland, 1988; Kim, 2005;
Clayton, 2006; Feinberg, 2012). A novel approach is needed




Althoughmany facets of consciousness are difficult to investigate,
the development of objective tests for SA could be utilized
for brain augmented technologies. With SA comes the sense
of agency. Agency imparts a sense of who is the owner
of an action/trait, the self, and who represents any entities
excluding self, the other(s). Self-other dichotomy processing in
the brain is essential to consciousness due to the necessary
implications the embodiment of “self ” must have to form body
ownership. Once an agent gains the ability to discern when
its own body is the source of sensory perceptions, it will form
body awareness that entails proprioceptive information. We
can look to working experiments that attempt to showcase
how the brain augments the “self ” when necessary to complete
a task (Figure 1). Perceptual parametric information builds a
premeditated awareness of (1) body part locations and (2) the
manipulation of those same parts in space. Body awareness was
demonstrated by a machine via Gold and Scassellati (2007) who
built a robot named Nico that successfully distinguished its own
“self ” from “other.” Nico observably achieved self-recognition
by completing mirror-aided tasks expending inverse kinematics.
Nevertheless, it’s believed Nico lacked consciousness.
Before the sense of agency becomes fully refined through
experiences over time, there must be a repertoire built for
perceptions and actions. Whether, action and perception are
interdependent or each fundamentally isolated has been the focus
of another ongoing debate. It’s not yet concretely understood
how the representation of self is formed during the initial stages
of life. Either an agent first uses perception to motivate their
FIGURE 1 | Extension of self-representation. Here are two depictions of
macaque monkeys that exhibit a case of the body making use of tools as an
extension of the “self.” If given a task to retrieve an object (yellow hexagonal
shape) that is outside the peripersonal space and the immediate reach of an
extended limb (left macaque), the body relies on its physical limitations to
define the “self” and its aptitude for success of the task. However, when an
apparatus is introduced (right macaque) that can help achieve the task’s goal,
the brain’s neural correlates are able to augment themselves to
psychophysically merge tools that were formerly considered to be of “other”
classification into the “self” body schematic and permit optimal behavioral
actions to take place (Hihara et al., 2006; Carlson et al., 2010). The paradigm
for “self” is malleable to accept the dynamic interplay necessary to achieve an
aim for biological function that was once previously unattainable. As tool-use
changes the brain’s representations of the body and alters proprioception, we
subsequently believe it parallels how enriched brain augmentation can alter an
individual’s self-awareness and consciousness.
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actions in the world or it first directs their actions to help drive
perception of the sensory world or both occur simultaneously.
In either method bodily awareness is eventually acquired which
contributes to defining subjective cognitive attributes. Two
opposing views attempt to solve this problem: the action-oriented
theory of visual perception, which suggests that perception results
from sensorimotor dynamics in an acting observer (Gibson,
1966; Noë, 2004; Mandik, 2005), and the dual-visual systems
hypothesis, which advocates independent streams of perception
and action (Schneider, 1969; Goodale and Milner, 1992; Jacob
and Jeannerod, 2003; Milner and Goodale, 2006). Self-awareness
uses expectation of impending perceptions and actions to gauge
the assimilation of inner experience and external reality. Building
a self-aware framework in augmentative technologies requires
integration of an expectancy intuition, which is the capability to
critique on the basis of differences between reality and internal
experience. This is our tactic for creating systems with faculties
for using perception and action to make predictions of self-
sensory states, become self-adaptable to new environmental
stimuli, and set objectives for self-improvement.
Crucial for understanding agency is determining how
the embodied senses fuse to form self-referential experience
(Fingelkurts et al., 2016a,b). It’s our opinion that future advances
of brain augmentation hinges on the application of such
knowledge. Once we bridge this gap of the unknown we’ll
be challenged to use computational intelligence to create
consciousness artificially and to integrate synthetic qualia with
that produced in the brain. Presently, artificial devices can
create various aspects of consciousness. Artificial perception
is made available via cochlear, retinal, and tactile implants.
But they simply work alone as replacements for sensory
organs with consciousness and SA arriving later in the brain’s
neural processing. Applications for augmenting consciousness
would contribute to studies relating to emotions, attention,
supplementing memory capacity, personality alteration,
experience enrichment, sensory perception enhancement, and
hypernormal brain plasticity for self-repair.
PROPOSED TRANSITION TO MACHINE
CONSCIOUSNESS
The marvel of human intelligence is its ability to eclipse physical
limitations and overcome our biological constraints to form
an ever-evolving existence (Jerison, 1973). One primary goal
for reverse-engineering the human brain is to recreate the
same functional mechanisms that underlie human consciousness
in our software infrastructures, neurorobotic agents, and
computational systems. However, prosthetic memory, sensory
implants, neurofeedback (EEG Biofeedback) and brain computer
interfaces (BCIs) are all working examples of fusing such
“intelligent” systems with the brain, leading to conceivable
prospects for consciousness-altering devices. Although BCIs
commonly target disability treatments and brain function
recovery from lesion, the amalgamation of computational devices
with the cortical brain itself (Fingelkurts et al., 2012) may even
prompt increasing developments of an operational “exobrain”
(Bonaci et al., 2014) for the purposes of better understanding
how our brain works. For example, in a scenario where a split-
brain condition is present within a subject, we now have the
option to look toward interfacing artificial exobrains with the
cerebrum; such an interface can either serve as a replacement
for neurological issues or supplement features the brain does
not naturally comprise. If these exobrains have a modicum of
manipulability, then we can explore the plausibility of mind
transfer from device to organ and vice versa; thus, providing
speculation for a conscious machine that can affect how we can
perceive, act, express emotion, feel, and adapt. This poses ethical
concerns as it opens the door for alterations of an individual’s
SA when augmentation is capable of modifying reasoning
skills and subjective judgment. Successful augmentation of the
sort might render the individual powerless in discriminating
actual characteristics and thoughts from those that are mock
and introduced artificially outside the cortex. Combining the
precision and information processing speed of a computer with
the intrinsic non-computational attributes of a human may
provoke discoveries of the mind (e.g., consciousness) that we
as humans are currently incapable of resolving. We suggest
efforts made toward an augmentative interface between brain
and machine that prompts the human mind to think beyond its
unknown limits for the construction of our explanatory bridge.
CHALLENGES MOVING FORWARD
Many people view an in-depth exploration into consciousness
and its emergence as a gamble, considering decades already spent
on the matter with a void of consensus (Dennett, 1991; Jibu and
Yasue, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1996; Stapp, 2001; Crick and
Koch, 2003; Tononi, 2008; De Sousa, 2013; Seager, 2016). Before
we attempt to create another hypothesis, our approach needs
to change; it’s our suggestion to further refine the constructs
and emergence of SA and to use brain augmentation as an
instrument for inspection. We need to define an objective test
for determining whether an entity is a sentient being. This test
in addition to advances in neural engineering provide optimism
that disputes within the consciousness field can be resolved.
Augmentation has a promising future as an enhancement to our
brains and will hopefully influence our centuries-old methods
of thinking about consciousness toward an answer for science’s
greatest mystery.
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Attempts to augment the function of the
human brain inevitably involve in some
way what Block (1995) calls phenome-
nal consciousness—bodily sensations and
perceptual experiences—the redness of
a strawberry, the smell of newly-baked
bread. At present there is no consensus
among scientists about what such sensory
experiences are. This Opinion piece points
out some problems with one of the major
theatrical viewpoints on that question.
CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
The oldest classification system has two
major categories, dualist and monist.
Dualist theories equate consciousness with
abstracta. Monist (aka physicalist) theo-
ries equate it with concreta. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy approaches
the task of defining abstracta and conc-
reta by the ancient method of providing
examples and letting the reader work it out
for themselves: it says “Some clear cases
of abstracta are classes, propositions, con-
cepts, the letter ‘A’, and Dante’s Inferno.
Some clear cases of concreta are stars,
protons, electromagnetic fields, the chalk
tokens of the letter ‘A’ written on a cer-
tain blackboard, and James Joyce’s copy of
Dante’s Inferno.”
A more recent classification (Atkinson
et al., 2000) divides theories of conscious-
ness into process theories and vehicle the-
ories: it says “Process theories assume
that consciousness depends on certain
functional or relational properties of rep-
resentational vehicles, namely, the com-
putations in which those vehicles engage.
On this view, representational contents are
conscious when their vehicles have some
privileged computational status, indepen-
dently of any particular intrinsic property
of those vehicles. What counts is ‘what rep-
resentational vehicles do, rather than what
they are’. . . For vehicle theories, on the
other hand, consciousness is determined
by intrinsic properties of representational
vehicles, independently of any computa-
tions in which those vehicles engage.”
The relative number of words devoted
to process and vehicle theories in this
description hints that at present, process
theories massively dominate the theoret-






Most process theories identify conscious-
ness with the processing of information.
As Velmans (1991) puts it: “For radi-
cal behaviorists, all talk of mind could
be translated, without scientific loss, into
talk about behavior. For the new ‘radi-
cal cognitivists’ all talk of mind (including
consciousness) can be translated, without
scientific loss, into talk about information
processing.” In the quarter century since
1991, process theories have become so
deeply embedded that the term “radical”
no longer applies. Pretty well all cognitive
scientists, computationalists and psychol-
ogists now think of consciousness in terms
of information processing. Indeed, among
these groups the information processing
paradigm is so prevalent that it is usually
not seen as necessary to state it explicitly.
Perhaps as a consequence, it is not
widely recognized that the concepts
“process,” “information,” and “infor-
mation processing” are all abstracta.
Thus, mapping the new process/vehicle
dichotomy onto the old dualist/physicalist
axis reveals that process theories (in the
sense of theories that equate consciousness
with information or information process-
ing per se, rather than with any particular
physical realization or implementation
thereof) are dualist. Philosopher David
Chalmers is one of the few process the-
orists to recognize that his theory is an
example of what he calls “naturalistic
dualism” (Chalmers, 1996). The word
“naturalistic” may have been included in
this description in an attempt to make
the “dualism” part more acceptable to
cognitive scientists, most of whom prefer
to see themselves as staunchly scientific
physicalists.
CHALMERS’ PROCESS THEORY
Chalmers (1996) takes information theory
(Shannon, 1948) as his starting point, but
immediately generalizes Shannon’s two-
state “bit” of information to the con-
cept of a multi-state “information space,”
defined as an abstract space consisting
of a number of information states and a
structure of “difference relations” between
them. Chalmers then discusses ways in
which information states can be real-
ized physically, mentioning thermostats,
books, telephone lines, and Bateson’s
catchy slogan about information’s being
“a difference that makes a difference,”
before proposing as a fundamental prin-
ciple that “information (in the actual
world) has two aspects, a physical and a
phenomenal aspect” (Chalmers, 1996, p.
286). On this theory then, information
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actually is—has the property of being—
conscious.
One immediate problem with this idea
is that it involves a radical redefinition of
the word information, slipped in by the
back door in the sense that Chalmers never
acknowledges that everyone else’s defini-
tions are specifically at odds with his.
There are several technical defini-
tions of information, which differ slightly
depending on the field of enquiry. In infor-
mation philosophy, Floridi (2005) says
“ ‘information’ is often used to refer
to non-mental, user-independent, declar-
ative semantic contents, embedded in
physical implementations like databases,
encyclopedias, web sites, television pro-
grammes and so on. . . the Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, for example,
defines information thus: ‘an objective
(mind independent) entity. . . Information
can be encoded and transmitted, but the
information would exist independently of
its encoding or transmission’.” Floridi then
lists a number of sources that define infor-
mation as data + meaning, before arguing
that truth is also a necessary ingredient
(because if information is not truthful,
it should more properly be called misin-
formation or pseudo-information). Other
technical definitions exclude even mean-
ing. Classical or Shannon information the-
ory was born out of a need to address
the technical problems experienced by
Shannon’s employer Bell Labs in extract-
ing signals from noise in telephone and
telegraph lines, so Shannon (1948) equates
information simply with the observation
that a particular one out of a defined set
of possible messages has been sent from
one entity to another—the meaning of the
message is explicitly stated to be irrelevant.
Cybernetics (Sayre, 1976) later generalizes
Shannon’s definition to equate informa-
tion with increased probability, or reduc-
tion in uncertainty.
The point is that all of these definitions
take information itself as an objective,
mind-independent entity. Thus, whatever
it is for which Chalmers (1996) and oth-
ers now claim a subjective or phenomenal
aspect, it cannot be what everyone else
calls “information.”
A second objection to the Chalmers
proposal, which this time he does
acknowledge, is that thermostats (for
example) clearly carry information, but
are not widely regarded as having any
degree of consciousness. Chalmers offers a
choice of two options to deal with this:
(1) Perhaps only some kinds of “physi-
cally realized information spaces” are
conscious.
(2) Perhaps thermostats are conscious.
Chalmers himself chooses option (2).
He suggests, on no particular grounds,
that the level of organization at which
consciousness “winks out” might be
lower than a thermostat but higher than
a rock.
TONONI’S PROCESS THEORY
Another widely cited process theorist is
Giulio Tononi. Tononi prefers Chalmers’
option (1)—his integrated information
theory (IIT) proposes that only integrated
information is conscious. Actually the ini-
tial formulation of IIT (Tononi, 2004)
sidesteps the question altogether, saying
only: “The theory presented here claims
that consciousness has to do with the
capacity to integrate information” and
“To recapitulate, the theory claims that
consciousness corresponds to the capac-
ity to integrate information.” [emphases
added]. But this unobjectionable formula-
tion soon morphs into the firm statement
“consciousness is integrated information”
(Tononi, 2008, 2012). Integrated informa-
tion is defined in terms of various brain
processes known to be associated with
consciousness—one might almost infer
that it was tempting simply to equate inte-
grated information with conscious infor-
mation, except that this would not have
been terribly informative in the cyber-
netic sense of the word—and both Tononi
and Seth et al. (2011) invest consider-
able effort in suggesting how integrated
information might be quantified. Later
Koch (2014) adds Chalmers’ option (2)
to the IIT mix and invokes panpsychism,
admitting that inasmuch as integrated
information is everywhere, consciousness
must also be everywhere. Despite all the
work that has by now been put into
mathematical quantification of integrated
information, no specific estimate of the
quantity necessary for the appearance
of consciousness is offered, but Koch
speculates that the internet might be
conscious.
MCFADDEN’S PROCESS THEORY
McFadden (2013) in his CEMI (con-
scious electromagnetic information) the-
ory, sticks with Chalmers’ option (1),
proposing that consciousness is associ-
ated only with electromagnetically encoded
information. McFadden draws a distinc-
tion between extrinsic information (which
he says is symbolic and arbitrary and
exemplified by Shannon information) and
intrinsic information, (which “preserves
structural aspects of the represented object
and thereby maintains some gestalt prop-
erties of the represented object”). He
argues that “to avoid the necessity of a
decoding homunculus, conscious mean-
ing must be encoded intrinsically—as
gestalt information—in the brain.” The
precise relationship of this encoded gestalt
information to consciousness is never
spelled out, but it is probably not iden-
tity. McFadden does ascribe properties to
consciousness and as he rightly says in his
discussion of Chalmers’ dual aspect the-
ory, “it is not at all clear whether it is
legitimate to ascribe properties to abstrac-
tions, such as the informational content of
matter.”
WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
There are several problems with all of
this. First, since information is explicitly
defined by everyone except process theo-
rists as an objective entity, it is not clear
how process theorists can reasonably claim
either that information in general, or that
any subset or variety of information in
particular, is subjective. No entity can log-
ically be both mind-independent and the
very essence of mind. Therefore, when
process theorists use the word “informa-
tion” they must be talking about some-
thing quite different from what everyone
else means by that word. Exactly what they
are talking about needs clarification.
Second, since information is specif-
ically defined by everybody (including
Chalmers) as an abstract entity, any par-
ticular physical realization of informa-
tion does not count as information at
all. A “physical realization of an infor-
mation space” like James Joyce’s copy of
Dante’s Inferno may carry information,
but it is not itself information—it’s just an
arrangement of paper and ink. A “phys-
ical realization of an information space”
like Joe Bloggs’ brain when he looks at
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an octopus may encode information, but
it is not itself information—it’s just an
arrangement of neurons, glia and ions.
Of course, it is certainly possible to claim
that particular arrangements of neurons,
glia and ions are conscious—indeed some
remarkably eminent people have done so.
But that claim no longer represents a
dualist/process theory. It now represents
a physicalist/vehicle theory. Since at least
Chalmers specifically identifies his theory
as dualist, it is far from clear how he (or
others) can claim even information status,
never mind consciousness, for any particu-
lar kind of “physically realized information
space.”
Third, it is a problem at least for sci-
entists that process theories are untestable.
The hypothesis that a particular brain pro-
cess correlates with consciousness can cer-
tainly be tested empirically. But the only
potentially testable prediction of theories
that claim identity between consciousness
and a particular kind of information or
information processing is that this kind
of information or information process-
ing will be conscious no matter how it
is physically instantiated. This is a fea-
ture of process theories that makes them
very attractive to those who would like
to build a conscious artifact out of hard-
ware. The unspoken prediction is that all
one has to do to create artificial con-
sciousness is emulate the computations
done by the brain in some manner—any
physical instantiation will do. But sup-
pose it were possible to build a piece of
hardware that adequately reproduced the
brain computations underlying a partic-
ular sensory experience. How could we
know whether the result was conscious?
Consciousness is such a private phe-
nomenon that nobody can be 100% sure
even that their human neighbors are con-
scious at any given moment. We know
we are conscious. Other humans look and
act more or less like us, so when they
tell us they have a particular conscious
experience, we give them the benefit of
the doubt. But what about a bit of hard-
ware? Even a novice software writer could
produce a piece of code that typed “I
feel hot” whenever a thermostat registered
a high temperature, but not many peo-
ple would believe the appearance of this
message meant the thermostat was expe-
riencing hotness. Hence, neither the idea
that information or information process-
ing is conscious, nor its logical extension
panpsychism (the idea that everything is
conscious), is in any obvious way testable.
Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean
these ideas are untrue. It just means
they are unscientific. It may be fine for
philosophers to play with the idea that
thermostats and computer networks are
conscious, but scientists are usually con-
strained to dealing in testable hypotheses.
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INTRODUCTION
Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), or
brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) involve
real-time direct connections between the
brain and a computer (Kubler, 2009;
Wolpaw and Wolpaw, 2011). Bidirectional
feedback between the user and the system
produces physical changes that can restore
some degree of motor or communicative
control for individuals with lost limbs,
extensive paralysis or who are significantly
neurologically compromised (Hochberg
et al., 2006, 2012). In these respects, a BCI
can enable an individual with severe brain
or bodily injury to regain some degree of
agency. By providing the subject with the
relevant type of feedback, the device may
enable her to translate an intention into
an action despite the inability to perform
voluntary bodily movements. There are
two types of feedback with a BCI. The
first concerns feedback about the out-
come of a self-initiated, BCI-mediated
action, such as moving a computer cursor
or robotic arm. It provides only indirect
feedback about brain activity. The second
type concerns direct feedback about the
level of brain activity itself. The first is
more pertinent to the potential to restore
some behavior control in the sense that
one can perceive the success or failure of
their mental act. Although it is still at an
early stage of development, an EEG- or
fMRI-based BCI might also enable mini-
mally conscious individuals or those with
complete locked-in syndrome to commu-
nicate wishes about medical treatment
when they are unable to do this verbally
or gesturally (Sellers, 2013). These appli-
cations of interface technology raise a
number of ethical issues (McCullagh et al.,
2014), three of which I will discuss in this
article. First, in some cases patients’ and
caregivers’ expectations about recovering
motor function with a BCI might not be
reasonable given the cognitive challenges
in operating the system. This might result
in psychological harm when the subject’s
desires and intentions to produce actions
fail to be realized. Second, the different
types of electrodes used to detect and
respond to motor cortical neural signals
involve different levels of invasiveness and
different benefit-risk ratios that have to be
weighed with a view to the probable suc-
cess or failure of the technique. Third, the
use of a BCI for communication in neuro-
logically compromised patients prompts
the question of whether their responses
would be evidence of the capacity to make
informed decisions about their care.
EXPECTATIONS
The user of a BCI can execute an intention
to perform a motor task through changes
in the system caused by electrodes detect-
ing signals in, for instance, the motor cor-
tex mediating the intention. Success in
operating the system depends on a com-
bination of unconscious operant condi-
tioning of brain responses and conscious
goal-directed expectation of the subject.
These depend in turn on how effective the
practitioner is in training the subject how
to operate the system. As in other cases
of traumatic brain injury, goal-directed
thinking in some patients with tetraple-
gia may be impaired if there is signifi-
cant damage to neural networks in frontal
regions mediating planning and decision-
making. This may also impair the subject’s
capacity to understand the benefits and
risks of the technique and give informed
consent to participate in BCI research
and treatment (Hochberg and Cochrane,
2013).
Ordinarily, motor skills are performed
unconsciously and automatically follow-
ing an initial period of conscious atten-
tion and learning. For those with severe
paralysis, however, sustained attention is
required both while being trained to oper-
ate the interface and effectively operating
it to execute motor tasks. Subjects whose
cognitive capacity for planning has been
impaired by injury to the central nervous
system may have difficulty in translating
their thoughts into actions or fail to do
so. Failure to meet the expectation to pro-
duce certain actions may cause distress and
harm in some subjects by defeating their
interest in recovering some, albeit lim-
ited, degree of motor control. Planning is
a critical component in moving a pros-
thetic limb, for example. The subject must
indicate with his brain and mind where
the limb should go before executing the
intention to move it. The cognitive work-
load requires considerable time and effort.
This may cause frustration and anxiety
and increase the probability of failure for
some in trying to achieve their goal. It
can exacerbate the feeling of a loss of
behavior control. To minimize the prob-
ability of harm, investigators and practi-
tioners must educate users on the potential
positive effects and limits of BCIs. They
should also adopt strict selection criteria
and include only those with largely pre-
served cognitive functions who could give
informed consent and would more likely
be trained to successfully operate it. This
may seem unfair to those with impaired
levels of cognition who lack these capac-
ities. Nevertheless, the idea of providing
equal opportunity for all paralyzed indi-
viduals to access to a BCI would have to
be weighed against the potential for emo-
tional harm if a subject cannot meet the
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 136
SYSTEMS NEUROSCIENCE
266
Glannon Ethical issues with brain-computer interfaces
cognitive demands of operating the sys-
tem and his expectations are not met.
Discriminating on the basis of levels of
cognitive function may be justified on
these grounds.
BENEFITS AND RISKS
BCIs utilize wired or wireless systems to
detect and allow transmission of signals
in the motor cortex into actions. The
significance of these systems for bene-
fit and risk to patients depends not so
much on the type used but their level
of invasiveness. Theoretically, the distinc-
tion between wired and wireless systems is
orthogonal to this level. The non-invasive
type consists of scalp-based electrodes that
are part of the equipment required to
record EEG. Because they do not involve
intracranial surgery and implantation of a
device in the brain, they do not involve
a risk of infection or hemorrhage. At the
same time, though, they may not readily
read signals from the motor cortex because
the cranium can smear them.
In electrocorticography (ECoG), elec-
trodes are implanted epidurally or subdu-
rally (Leuthardt et al., 2004). These can
decode motor cortical signals more readily
than scalp-based electrodes because they
are not susceptible to cranial smearing.
But they entail some risk of infection and
hemorrhage. Like the non-invasive system,
both forms of ECoG BCIs impose con-
straints on the subjects’ freedom from the
wires running from the electrodes to the
machine. Wireless systems consisting of
a microelectrode array implanted in the
motor cortex avoid this problem and are
less burdensome for subjects. Because they
can decode and transmit signals from this
region more directly, implanted arrays are
more likely to facilitate the execution of
the subject’s intentions in actions. Still,
this would depend on the specifics of
the neurological deficit and the patient’s
ability to manipulate the BCI. Moreover,
in addition to the risk of infection and
hemorrhage, microelectrode arrays raise
the issue of biocompatibility between the
implanted objects and surrounding neu-
ral tissue. The electrodes may reorganize
and induce changes in the tissue. These
changes may be salutary, especially if they
promote neuroplasticity and the gener-
ation of new neuronal connections that
could bypass the site of brain or spinal cord
injury causing loss of motor function. But
they could also cause adverse changes in
the surrounding tissue and result in neuro-
logical and psychological sequelae. A safe
and effective array that could function for
many years would be one in which the sur-
rounding neuropil grew into the electrode.
This would be more stable and allow mye-
lated axons to be recorded using implanted
amplifiers (Kennedy et al., 2011). If this
occurs, then invasive systems can be func-
tionally superior to and as safe as non-
invasive systems. The first type can have a
more favorable benefit-risk ratio than the
second.
COMMUNICATING WITH A BCI
EEG- and fMRI-based BCIs might enable
individuals to reliably communicate when
they are unable to communicate behav-
iorally (Birbaumer et al., 2008, 2014).
This involves three distinct patient groups.
Minimally conscious patients have resid-
ual awareness of self and surround-
ings. Locked-in patients are fully aware
despite being almost completely paralyzed.
Some of these patients can communi-
cate through voluntary eyelid movements.
These in turn are distinct from com-
pletely locked-in patients who lack the
capacity for any voluntary bodily move-
ments. Conscious perception and expres-
sion of intentions in locked-in patients
is different from that of minimally con-
scious patients, and this may better facil-
itate communication through a BCI. One
challenge for this intervention would be
that BCIs typically utilize visual feed-
back, and minimally conscious and com-
pletely locked-in subjects have limited or
no capacity to receive feedback from and
respond to a visual stimulus in learning
how to operate the system. Alternatively,
tactile or auditory feedback could be
used to enable communication (Kubler,
2009; Hochberg and Cudkowicz, 2014).
Yet even if this modality could over-
come the limitations associated with a
lack of visual feedback, questions would
remain about the meaning of “communi-
cate.” Specifically, it is not clear whether
the responses of linguistically impaired
minimally conscious or even fully con-
scious locked-in patients would be evi-
dence of the cognitive and emotional
capacity to give informed consent to con-
tinue or discontinue artificial hydration
and nutrition (Brady Wagner, 2003; Jox,
2013).
Some investigators have claimed that
fMRI-guided BCIs could enable minimally
conscious patients with a high level of
cognitive function to make these deci-
sions (Peterson et al., 2013). But emotion-
ally laden decisions about life-sustaining
treatment reflect a person’s values and
attitudes about quality of life. It is ques-
tionable whether these values and atti-
tudes can be expressed by simple “Yes”
or “No” responses to questions (Monti
et al., 2010), and yet they have to be
included in any robust sense of “com-
munication.” This involves more than
being aware, even fully aware. More
sophisticated interface systems enabling
the expression of complex semantic pro-
cessing may or may not confirm that
the patient had the requisite capaci-
ties. Hochberg and Cudkowicz point out
that among completely locked-in patients
there have been “no reports of restor-
ing communication using a neural signal-
based BCI in this most severely affected
population” (Hochberg and Cudkowicz,
2014, p. 1852; Birbaumer et al., 2014).
Moreover, Fernandez-Espejo and Owen
acknowledge that, with current interface
technology, simple affirmative or nega-
tive responses to questions about whether
a minimally conscious patient wanted to
continue living would not be sufficient to
establish that the patient had the “cog-
nitive and emotional capacity to make
such a complex decision” (Fernandez-
Espejo and Owen, 2013, p. 808). But
they also say that “it is only a matter
of time before all of these obstacles are
overcome” (p. 808).
This last point may be overly optimistic.
Even advanced BCIs that could detect
neural activity correlating with complex
semantic processing might not be suffi-
cient to show that the subject had the cog-
nitive and emotional capacity to make an
informed and autonomous decision about
life-sustaining treatment. Some form of
behavioral interaction may be necessary to
confirm that the subject had this capacity.
Medical professionals and caregivers must
be cautious not to read too much into BCI-
enabled responses and interpret them as
having a meaning they lack.
CONCLUSION
BCIs can benefit individuals by restor-
ing varying degrees of motor control and
possibly the ability to communicate. But
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expectations of some subjects and their
caregivers may exceed what they can rea-
sonably achieve with the technology and
result in psychological harm. Selecting
candidates with higher levels of preserved
cognitive function for BCI research and
treatment and educating them on the
potential benefits and limitations of the
technique is advisable to prevent or at
least minimize harm. The fact that a
particular BCI system is more invasive
than others does not imply that it has
an unacceptable degree of risk and may
instead indicate a more favorable benefit-
risk ratio if it does more to enable the
execution of intentions in actions and pro-
mote neuroplasticity. Perhaps the most
significant application of BCIs would be
in enabling minimally conscious or com-
pletely locked-in patients to communicate.
Yet it is questionable that even the most
sophisticated system alone could demon-
strate that these subjects have the ability
to clearly and meaningfully communicate
their wishes and make informed decisions
about life-sustaining treatment. Decision-
making capacity falls along a continuum
correlating with a continuum of cogni-
tive and emotional capacities, and there is
no algorithm providing a definitive answer
to the question of where the threshold at
which one has a sufficient degree of these
capacities lies. All relevant parties need to
be cautious and not infer that a BCI indi-
cating certain levels of brain activity and
semantic processing in a subject is evi-
dence of an understanding of the ethical
magnitude of life-and-death decisions and
the ability to make them.
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INTRODUCTION
Brain computer interfaces (BCIs) are sys-
tems that enable the brain to send and
receive information to and from a com-
puter, bypassing the body’s own effer-
ent and afferent pathways. BCIs have
been used in experimental animal mod-
els to augment perception, motor control
and even memory (Velliste et al., 2008;
Berger et al., 2011; Torab et al., 2011).
Human BCIs include cochlear implants
and a host of experimental devices includ-
ing retinal implants (Niparko et al., 2010;
Klauke et al., 2011). BCI technology
holds the potential to benefit human-
ity greatly, but also the potential to do
harm, and its ethical implications have
therefore been addressed by a number of
commentators.
THE PROBLEM WITH SCIENCE FICTION
Commonly addressed ethical challenges
with BCIs concern a future when the tech-
nology is used to give people superhu-
man abilities, or to control their thoughts
and desires. The idea of human beings
with computer-augmented brains engen-
ders a wide range of reactions from layper-
sons, mostly negative (Lipsman et al.,
2009; Lebedev, 2014). There is revulsion
toward these so-called cyborgs occupy-
ing the “uncanny valley” between fel-
low human and robot (Mori, 1970).
Some fear being overtaken by cyborgs
with superior perceptual, cognitive and
motoric powers while others are afraid that
BCIs imposed upon us would result in
mind control. Still others foresee tremen-
dous benefit for humanity, with BCI
enhancements elevating individuals and
society.
Positive or negative, these images of
computer-augmented brains are as spec-
ulative as they are vivid. Therein lie two
significant challenges for ethical analysis
of BCIs. First, we have strong emotional
reactions to the prospects of humans
with cyborg brains. Second, our limited
real-world experience with BCIs deprives
our ethical analyses of a foundation
of pragmatic empirical knowledge. As
a result, our perspectives on the eth-
ical and societal impact of BCIs are
based primarily on gut reactions, either
“the wisdom of repugnance” (as exem-
plified by Francis Fukuyama’s nomina-
tion of transhumanism as “The World’s
Most Dangerous Idea, 2004”) or the
blind faith that technology can fix and
improve everything (as exemplified by
the mission statement of Humanity+,
which promotes “the ethical use of tech-
nology to expand human capacities. . . [to
make them] better than well” (http://
humanityplus.org/).
In this essay, we describe an approach to
the ethical analysis of BCIs that resists the
emotional pull of futuristic scenarios with-
out denying the importance of the ques-
tions they raise. In so doing, we address the
more prosaic ethical issues that confront
us now, which are too often overshad-
owed by the more sensational prospects of
cyborgs, mind control and transhuman-
ism. Finally, we indicate pathways through
which seemingly fantastical futuristic sce-
narios can be more knowledgeably antici-
pated and addressed.
THREE ERAS OF BCIS AND THEIR
ETHICAL CHALLENGES
As an organizing framework, we will dis-
tinguish among three different eras of BCI
development, near-term, medium-term,
and long-term, and distinguish among
the different ethical issues associated with
each.
LONG-TERM CHALLENGES
The futuristic ethical concerns already
mentioned arise in the long-term future.
We define this era as when BCIs are rou-
tinely used to augment human brains,
giving users perceptual, cognitive and
motoric abilities that may greatly exceed
those of the unenhanced, and transform-
ing emotional life as well. At this point,
cyborgs will differ radically from unen-
hanced humans. One concern is that they
will view us as a different, and inferior, life
form, much as we now regard chimpanzees
(Warwick, 2003). Loss of individuality is
another long-term future scenario. If BCIs
are used for direct brain-to-brain contact,
this would enable new modes of com-
munication but also lead to the possible
replacement of individual mental lives by
a network in which individual brains are
mere nodes (Warwick, 2003).
Thoughts, feelings and memories that
can be stored and shared as bits of data
will not degrade as readily as human brain
tissue. While other prosthetics such as arti-
ficial hips or heart valves can replace failing
bodily structures, BCIs offer the first pos-
sibility of increased longevity of a person’s
consciousness. Immortality may even be
possible (McGee and Maguire, 2007).
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These BCI scenarios lead to interest-
ing questions about what it means to be
human. Would we be human if we could
see infrared light, memorize a phone book,
or cause others to move by willing them
to with our own mind? Would we be
human if we ceded the role of smartest
beings on earth to others, or would those
enhanced beings be humanity’s new form?
Would we be human if our minds never
operated independently from others’? If
they operated for eternity? These ques-
tions raise the more general question of
what it means to be human, and also the
question of whether being human by any
particular definition has intrinsic value.
Although these questions are age-old, they
arise with a new urgency in connection
with advanced BCIs (McGee and Maguire,
2007).
BCIs could eventually bring about tec-
tonic societal shifts. The effects of cochlear
implants on deaf culture (Tucker, 1998)
may presage the impact of BCIs on all
aspects of human culture that are adapted
to current human capabilities rather than
the augmented, networked capabilities of
future cyborgs. Global political trends
such as the Arab Spring, attributed in
part to social networking, could be distant
harbingers of the effect of wide bandwidth
BCIs that enable the sharing of thoughts
and feelings among groups of individuals.
MEDIUM-TERM CHALLENGES
The ethical challenges of the medium term
will be largely free of the existential and
metaphysical dimensions just discussed,
such as ceding dominion of the earth to
others, merging our identities into a global
network, or questioning the meaning and
value of being human. Yet the emer-
gence of these medium-term challenges
will depend on BCI technology advanc-
ing significantly beyond its current state
and therefore do still have a science fic-
tion flavor. We take the defining feature of
the medium-term to be the availability of
BCI therapies for a wide range of human
afflictions.
One set of ethical issues at this point
will concern barriers to delivery of BCI
therapies. One barrier is likely to be eco-
nomic. The cost of BCIs in the coming
decades is hard to predict, as is future
societal support for universal access, but
we can anticipate some degree of inequity
in access to BCIs. Patient acceptance
of implants, in particular the bioethi-
cists’ “yuck factor” (Niemelä, 2011) may
also prevent or slow delivery of BCI
therapies.
Another issue with a degree of bioeth-
ical precedent concerns control of the
BCI (Jebari and Hansson, 2013). Therapies
vary in how much control patients have.
How much adjustment or programming of
a BCI by the patient will be feasible, and
with what risks and benefits? An aspect of
control with much less precedent concerns
the possibility of BCI hacking, that is, the
possibility that a third party, unbeknownst
to patient and healthcare provider, would
deliver inputs to a patient’s brain or
read brain states (Denning et al., 2009).
Although safeguards against such inter-
ventions could of course be designed into
any system, experience with current infor-
mation technology shows that no system
can ever be made entirely invulnerable to
such attacks. This raises the dire prospect
of hacking into systems controlling human
thought, feeling and behavior.
Finally, as BCIs are adopted more
widely for therapeutic use, enhancement
uses will likely follow. The ethics of
enhancement is a well-explored area in
bioethics and neuroethics more specifi-
cally (Parens, 2000; Farah et al., 2014).
However, compared to the effects of drugs,
which only modulate function within
existing brain networks, the addition of
new sensory, action and computational
devices has the potential to more radically
enhance human capabilities.
The transition from therapy to
enhancement is evident in many areas of
medicine: from neuropsychiatry, where
attention-boosting drugs are used by
college students to enhance their focus
and improve their grades (Sussman
et al., 2006), to plastic surgery, where
techniques developed to reconstruct
injured faces are now commonly used
to enhance the attractiveness of the unin-
jured. Therapeutic implantation of BCIs
for only mildly impaired individuals could
provide a bridge between therapy and
enhancement uses of BCI. Another path-
way along which BCIs could transition
from therapy to enhancement is by the
addition of enhancing BCIs for someone
who is already undergoing therapeu-
tic implantation for a serious disorder,
for example increasing the range of
wavelengths perceived by someone with
impaired vision.
NEAR-TERM CHALLENGES
Compared with the challenges awaiting us
in the medium and long-term, which are
currently speculative, we are now faced
with a set of ethical challenges that are
clear and present. How we respond to
these challenges will determine the path
we take to the medium- and long-term
challenges of BCIs. One set of ethical
challenges concerns clinical trials—how
trials are conducted and which indica-
tions are pursued. Economic considera-
tions of course shape these decisions, and
the ethical issue is how these considera-
tions will be balanced by other consider-
ations. Will BCIs be developed only for
the most profitable applications, leaving
numerous “orphan” medical conditions
unaddressed? How will an emphasis on
profitability shape the future of BCI tech-
nology, by advancing technology for cer-
tain applications over others?
A related set of immediate challenges
concerns ownership of products during
research and development. The finances
of pharmaceutical research and develop-
ment has been identified as an impedi-
ment to discovery and innovation (Cohen,
2005), as well as a disincentive for scientific
objectivity and transparency (Goldacre,
2013). Given the extensive collaboration
of academic and other publicly funded
researchers with privately held device
manufacturers, how should we design
intellectual property agreements, clinical
trials and regulation to maximize innova-
tion and patient benefit?
APPROACHING THE FUTURE STEP BY
STEP
We cannot help but approach the future
step by step. In contrast, ethical analy-
ses sometimes jump ahead. This is moti-
vated by the commendable desire to
anticipate, and therefore more effectively
address, the ethical issues of the future. But
this long-term ethical forecasting can be
counterproductive. One reason is that it
takes our attention away from the vitally
important, if more mundane, ethical
issues of today. Pondering what it means
to be human may be more interesting
than projecting research and development
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Table 1 | Three eras of BCIs and their corresponding ethical challenges.
Time period Characteristics Ethical challenges
Long-term Extensive enhancement of
human brains with BCIs
Transhuman cyborgs’ treatment of humans as
inferior and inconsequential
Vulnerability of those with BCIs to thought control
and mind-reading
Loss of individuality to a merged group mind
Immortality of thoughts, memories and whole
minds
Medium-term Routine use of BCIs as therapy Cost of BCIs as an obstacle for needy patients
Discomfort or disgust with implants as an obstacle
for patients
Question of who controls operation of patients’
BCIs
Security of BCIs against hacking
Acceptance of BCIs for enhancement of normal
function
Near-term Use of BCIs in a translational
research setting
Conduct of clinical trials
Developing BCI systems that maximize benefit as
opposed to profit
Ownership of intellectual property as an
impediment or incentive to biomedical advances
The influence of funding sources on research
priorities
output under different intellectual prop-
erty regimes. However, there is only one
opportunity to get current decisions right,
and that is now. Another reason is that
bioethical decisions depend not only on
values and principles, but also on the
facts of the matter, which we have lim-
ited ability to anticipate in the distant
future. Only as we live through each of
the eras summarized in Table 1 will we be
positioned to predict the likely empirical
constraints on the ethical decisions of the
next era.
For example, how current BCI work
is financed, who controls intellectual
property and so forth, will set our course
toward the next set of issues, the decisions
on what gets commercially developed,
how patients get access, and what kind
of enhancements are available. Then,
depending on our experience with what-
ever mix of technologies is developed in
that medium-term period—which sen-
sory, motor and cognitive systems can
be effectively augmented for therapy and
enhancement, what unanticipated benefits
and harms emerge—we will have a much
better platform from which to foresee
and address the currently imponderable
long-term ethical challenges of BCIs and
transhumanism.
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“If we were to ask the question: ‘What
is human life’s chief concern?’ one of the
answers we should receive would be: ‘It is
happiness.’ How to gain, how to keep, how
to recover happiness is in fact for most men
at all times the secret motive of all they
do, and of all they are willing to endure.”
(William James, 1902).
Enhancement is generally understood as
being intended to improve well-being. The
motivation to enhance is the desire to
change a person for the better. However,
even when increased well-being is the
motivation, it is unclear how to morally
evaluate any given intervention. Four
examples illustrate why any enhancement
intervention, including those motivated




Humans have always been fighting, with all
the means at their disposal, against disease,
pain, and unhappiness, fighting to increase
their quality of life. There have been many
facts, fictions, and controversies around
the enhancement of brain functions in the
last 15 years. Ever since the debate started
new definitions of enhancement have been
proffered, often diverging from each other
and leading to debates on a wide field of
ethical and social matters (Parens, 1998;
Farah et al., 2004; Levy, 2007; Greely
et al., 2008; Schermer et al., 2009; Nagel,
2010b). Enhancement interventions come
in many varieties: there are manifold
methods, goals, motivations, desires, ide-
als, and values that can invoke heated
discussions. Moral deliberation reaches
from statements such as those put forward
in the President’s Council on Bioethics
report Beyond Therapy (2003) with an
anti-enhancement agenda mainly based
on arguments around the concepts of nat-
uralness and dignity, to arguments for
the moral obligation to enhance (Harris,
2005; Savulescu, 2005)1. This wide vari-
ety in moral evaluations partly seems to
be based on different understandings of
the very term. Although “enhancement” is
a notoriously vague term, a general con-
sensus of what is meant is often implicitly
assumed.
MOTIVATION AND GOAL: WELL-BEING
Here, I will attempt to further a partic-
ular understanding of the concept that
shall serve to improve mutual under-
standing of the different positions.
Furthermore, I suggest distinguishing
what enhancement is and how it is
motivated from how its usage is eth-
ically evaluated. Julian Savulescu and
colleagues distinguish various ways of
conceptualizing enhancement and pro-
pose a “welfarist definition of human
enhancement: Any change in the biol-
ogy or psychology of a person which
increases the chances of leading a good
life in the relevant set of circumstances.
(....) It singles out well-being as one
dimension of value that is constitutive of
genuine human enhancement.” (Savulescu
et al., 2011, 7). Brian Earp and col-
leagues contrast this welfarist approach
with the “augmentative functionalist
approach” to show how diminishment
can be enhancement (Earp et al., 2014).
John Harris elaborates on how enhance-
ment is about making us better people:
“Enhancements will be enhancements
properly so-called if they make us
1 Peter Reiner provides a lucid analysis of how this dis-
cussion is deeply bio-political, and driven by strong
intuitions of those at the extremes (Reiner, 2013).
better at doing some of the things
we want to do, better at experiencing
the world through all of our senses,
better at assimilating and processing what
we experience, better at remembering
and understanding things, stronger, more
competent, more of everything we want to
be (. . . ) In terms of human functioning, an
enhancement is by definition an improve-
ment on what went before. If it wasn’t
good for you, it wouldn’t be enhance-
ment.” (Harris, 2007, 2ff). Enhancement is
understood as generally being for the better
of people. If it was not for an improvement
for the better of an individual we would
not call it enhancement. In fact, it is a tau-
tology to say “enhancement for the better”
as enhancement implies that it improves
a given state, a performance, a capacity,
an appearance, but also an experience, a
feeling and, importantly: one’s evaluations
thereof.
EVEN WHEN IT IS FOR THE BETTER IT
IS NOT ALWAYS GOOD: MOTIVATION
DOES NOT EQUAL EVALUATION
A popular slogan about enhancement
is that it makes people “better than
well” (Elliott, 2003). Back in 1998, Erik
Parens asked: “is better always good?” The
problem actually is what “the better” really
is in the plethora of possible cases of
individuals in their unique socio-cultural
contexts. How to evaluate what is better
for a person, for his or her surround-
ing, or for the wider social context is
a central matter for the normative dis-
cussion about it (Nagel, 2010b; Racine,
2010; Glannon, 2011). Hence, it is use-
ful to inquire about the purpose of
the particular enhancement intervention.
Enhancements are usually not driven by
the motivation to have merely more of
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some capacity, but rather by the desire
to change for the better2. Restricting the
concept of enhancement to the addition
of capacities or augmentation of function
(Bostrom, 2009) does not do justice to
the rich variety of forms which enhance-
ment can take, and underestimates the
plethora of motivations of people striving
for enhancement. The goal of enhance-
ment is improvement. One can argue
whether one understands it as improve-
ment beyond the normal, or improve-
ment beyond the natural (Sabin and
Daniels, 1994; Daniels, 2000; Buchanan,
2008, 2011)—both understandings lead to
their own complex debates, and the con-
cepts themselves require more scrutiny
than this article can offer. Each view
comes with its problems, and the conse-
quent moral evaluations differ depending
on what people feel most committed to
(Parens, 2005). First and foremost, the
goal of enhancement is about what peo-
ple strive for most: “How to gain, how
to keep, how to recover happiness” as
William James put it in 1902. However,
while interventions may indeed be moti-
vated by the desire to increase flourishing,
it is far from clear that the interventions
indeed yield this increase in well-being.
This view does not imply a normative
evaluation of the enhancement interven-
tion in a particular case. John Harris states
that “enhancements per se are not ethi-
cally problematic: they are unequivocally
good, clearly ethical. Unless the down-
side can be demonstrated and is signif-
icant, enhancement has the moral high
ground” (Harris, 2005). While one might
agree that enhancement per se always
aims for something good, i.e., well-being,
the evaluation of an enhancement varies
between individuals depending on their
situation. The moral evaluation of the
intervention in specific cases does not
depend solely on the desired goal of the
intervention.
2 I have argued elsewhere that “more” can even have
negative effects on well-being (Nagel, 2010a). This
refers not only to side effects and long-term effects but
also to the potential burden of increased responsibil-
ity. Responding to this, John Danaher has argued that
this objection does not justify the project to “forestall
or delay the enhancement” project (Danaher, 2013).
However, forestalling the enhancement project is not
the goal of expressing this concern. The goal is to
illustrate the need for closer scrutiny of the diverse
influences of enhancement on well-being.
ETHICALLY CHALLENGING EVEN
THOUGH WELL-BEING IS THE GOAL
The following examples should help clar-
ify the general notion of enhancement
as meaning “enhancement for the better,”
and demonstrate how this still leads to
complex moral challenges.
1) The usage of methylphenidate and
amphetamine products in children
for enhancement purposes, e.g.,
to improve cognitive functioning:
Despite the fact that data on side effects
and effectiveness is sparse, usage of
prescription medication for enhance-
ment is increasing (McCabe et al.,
2011; Smith and Farah, 2011; Kaye and
Darke, 2012). For pediatric enhance-
ment, one can assume that parents
act with the best intentions for their
children. They aim to foster their chil-
dren’s flourishing and often hope to
do so with some form of enhance-
ment. Thus, while striving for the
best for their children and thus aiming
at “enhancement for the better,” they
might still risk the child’s current and
future well-being (e.g., Urban and Gao,
2014). Over and above the individual
impact, there are many pressing social
issues surrounding pediatric neuro-
enhancement (Singh and Kelleher,
2010; Graf et al., 2013).
2) Using neuro-technologies and psy-
chopharmacology to induce plastic-
ity for general-purpose enhancement:
Trans-cranial electrical stimulation like
transcranial direct current stimulation
and transcranial random noise stim-
ulation can be employed as tools to
induce neuroplastic cortical excitabil-
ity alterations (Nitsche and Paulus,
2011; Cohen Kadosh, 2013; Snowball
et al., 2013; for discussions see Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2012; Fitz and Reiner,
2013; Davis and van Koningsbruggen,
2014; Krause and Cohen Kadosh,
2014). Furthermore, the commonly
used anticonvulsant and mood sta-
bilizer Valproat has recently been
shown to induce plasticity, thereby
reopening critical periods for learn-
ing (Gervain et al., 2013). These
technologies seem to promise gen-
eral enhancement potential by target-
ing neuronal plasticity. They certainly
can be used for the better of the
users. Crucially, however, this depends
on the risk and side-effect profile.
Moreover, ethical questions go beyond
purely individual reasoning and must
consider normative questions related
to the values that a society wants
to promote. This requires a cautious
approach that can only be hinted
at here. Paramount is the realization
that “enhancement for the better” still
offers challenges that require ethical
reasoning.
3) Using psychopharmacological
agents to erase or modify memory:
Unpleasant memories diminish life
quality. Especially individuals who
have experienced trauma or shock can
suffer from horrible, haunting mem-
ories. Manipulating such memories
or their emotional intensity promises
to increase well-being. While critics
argue that for individual, social, and
legal reasons “routinely interfering
with the memories of trauma survivors
and witnesses is highly questionable.”
(President’s Council on Bioethics,
chapter 5, IIC, Schacter, 2001), the
motivation for even healthy people to
seek memory blunting (e.g., with beta-
blockers) is the desire to flourish. For
the purpose of the present argument,
the key aspect is this: Memory blunting
as enhancement may help well-being
but still requires ethical reasoning
(Glannon, 2006; Kolber, 2006).
4) Enhancing by amputation?: A partic-
ularly challenging case for describing
what enhancement could mean if one
strongly stretches the concept into
the realm of treatment, is an inter-
vention in cases of Body Integrity
Identity Disorder (BIID). BIID is a
rare disorder in which patients suf-
fer a complete lack of identification
with a healthy limb and obsessively
desire its amputation (First, 2005).
They suffer sometimes so strongly
that they will harm themselves to get
rid of the unwanted limb. In these
cases, amputation reduces anxiety,
relieves suffering, and increases the
amputees’ subjective quality of life.
Despite the unclear medical catego-
rization, and despite the fact that these
patients suffer from a disorder, and
thus interventions qualify as treatment
rather than enhancement, the dilemma
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is strong: There are patients with
BIID who can decide autonomously
for elective amputation that harms
their physical body but enhances their
well-being (Bayne and Levy, 2005).
Approaching such an amputation as
enhancement is provocative, shat-
ters intuitions, and thereby demands
clarification of what is meant by
enhancement.
HOW TO PROCEED?
Various situations of enhancement can
lead to more flourishing. However, this
does not foreclose ethical discussions.
Ethical dilemmas emerge even if the goal
of the intervention is increased well-being.
I agree with Erik Parens who notes that
“some (. . . ) think the term enhancement
is so freighted with erroneous assump-
tions and so ripe for abuse that we ought
not even to use it. My sense is that if we
didn’t use enhancement, we would end up
with another term with similar problems”
(Parens, 1998, 2). Clearly, there is still work
to be done to clarify what we mean with
enhancement. Future deliberation should
include two issues that have not yet been
considered sufficiently in current debates:
(1) Studying the nature of well-being, and
how it can be increased (Parfit, 1984;
Kagan, 1992; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993;
Scanlon, 1998), and (2) probing public
attitudes on enhancement to allow regu-
lation and political decision-making to be
nuanced and sound (Nadler and Reiner,
2010; Fitz et al., 2013). While working
on this, it is worthwhile to avoid clam-
oring for a binary position either “for”
or “against” enhancement in general, and
instead foster sensitive discussions about
the concerns and idiosyncrasies of each
different case.
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This opinion paper discusses the impor-
tance of augmentation in general and
brain augmentation in particular, and con-
siders the merits of some arguments that
have been made against it. Augmentations
are technologies created in order to
improve upon human capabilities and
characteristics. Such technologies have had
a profound effect on our species, and their
omnipresence might be said to distinguish
us apart from every other species more-
so than anything aside from our DNA.
Augmentations are so essential to us, so
widespread, that we often forget that they
are artificial, and not truly a part of us.
Indeed, if all augmentations were lost to
us and could not be replaced, without any
viable means to feed and protect ourselves,
most humans would be dead in very a
short time.
The need for augmentation is related
in part to our poor biological adapta-
tions for survival. We are born with-
out claws, fur, and other characteristics
that most animals require. What evolu-
tion has endowed us with instead is a
large and complex nervous system. Our
brains are metabolically expensive, requir-
ing over 20% of our metabolism, while
representing only 2% of our body mass
(Kety, 1957; Sokoloff, 1960; Rolfe and
Brown, 1997). Large brains are also diffi-
cult to grow, causing potential problems
in childbirth as the baby’s head must pass
through the birth canal, and a long child-
hood is required to learn the minimum
needed for survival and to become a mem-
ber of society. However, they provide us
with the means to compensate for our
physical limitations. We can imagine, cre-
ate, and manufacture a variety of aug-
mentations. Housing and clothing for pro-
tection, agriculture for food, transporta-
tion, medicine, and many others. Such
physical augmentations have provided us
with a means to expand our livable envi-
ronment to include most of the planet,
including underwater and outer space, and
they satisfy our biological and emotional
needs far beyond what would otherwise be
possible.
Augmentative technologies include not
only physical but also cognitive enhance-
ments. Similar to physical enhancements,
cognitive enhancements provide us with
capabilities beyond that provided by
our nervous systems, to maintain or
expand our perceptual, cognitive, and
affective capabilities. This includes such
devices as telescopes, microscopes, hear-
ing aids, television, the internet, and
myriad other devices that expand our
senses and allow us to perceive much
more than our immediate environment.
Cognitive enhancements also include
writing and mathematics, which have
provided tremendous benefits, matched
only by the potential of the computer age,
which has transformed our world in just
a few decades, and is likely to continue
to do so.
Learning how to use any augmenta-
tion leads to adaptive changes in the
nervous system as new memories are
encoded and procedures are automated.
By contrast, neuroenhancement changes
the nervous system directly, augmenting
cognition, and behavior from the inside
out. Current forms of neuroenhancement
include psychoactive substances, biofeed-
back, cognitive training, methods that pro-
mote physical health such as nutrition
and exercise, mindfulness, electromag-
netic methods of neurostimulation such as
deep brain stimulation (DBS), transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and
others reviewed in Clark and Parasuraman
(2014), and methods using ultrasound
or near-infrared light. Indeed, neuroen-
hancement is not just “one thing” any
more then exercise or learning is one thing,
but instead covers a large and expanding
array of different technologies.
Recent work in neuroenhancement has
produced some surprising results. Work in
our laboratory has shown that tDCS, a rel-
atively simple technique that uses a 9-volt
battery to produce a 1–2 mA current, led
to large improvements in learning of a dif-
ficult visual perceptual task. Performance
and d’ (a measure of signal discriminabil-
ity) were found to double while the false
alarm rate was halved (Clark et al., 2012;
Coffman et al., 2012b). This showed a
dose-response effect (Clark et al., 2012),
lasted for over 24 h (Falcone et al., 2012),
and was not related to stimulation arti-
fact or the type of experimental blinding
used (Coffman et al., 2012b). TDCS also
alters neurochemistry (Clark et al., 2011)
and increases some forms of attention
(Coffman et al., 2012a), which together
and along with other effects may result
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in these large improvements in behavior.
Other laboratories have found that tDCS
can be used to increase working memory,
explicit and implicit memory, perception
and attention (reviewed in Coffman et al.,
2014), with an average increase in effect
size of about 0.9 between active and sham
across studies. Using different methods of
stimulation, these forms of cognition can
also be reduced.
It should be clear to the reader
by now that augmentation is essen-
tial to human existence, that physical-,
cognitive-, and neuro-enhancement are
all important to us, and that continued
development of neuroenhancement tech-
nologies may lead to even more use-
ful forms of brain augmentation. While
there is some debate about its ultimate
utility (Walsh, 2013), most evidence sug-
gests that with further development, these
many forms of neuroenhancement will
likely lead to at least a few useful applica-
tions, and perhaps many. However, recent
advances in neuroenhancement have also
led to claims that some types are too
unusual, immoral or unethical and should
be banned or heavily managed. These
arguments take a number of different
forms. I will next discuss a subset of
these.
(1) Cognitive augmentations may provide
benefits only to those few who can
afford them, thus further widening
the social and cultural gap created
by income differences (discussed in
Hyman, 2011).
Different technologies for cognitive aug-
mentation vary greatly in their relative
cost. DBS can indeed be very costly,
requiring neurosurgery to implant a care-
fully manufactured devise. However, other
methods such as tDCS are relatively inex-
pensive, using technology that is already
widely available for other purposes, elec-
trodes made of inexpensive materials, and
a single 9-volt battery that can operate the
device for hours. So, while some meth-
ods of neuroenhancement may be too
expensive for many people, other meth-
ods exist that are more affordable. I suggest
here that simpler, cheaper and safer meth-
ods of neuroenhancement, and indeed all
medical technologies, should be developed
and attempted for treatment first, and
only when these are proven to be inade-
quate should more expensive and poten-
tially dangerous methods be attempted.
This would lead to the most cost effective,
safe, and beneficial treatments becom-
ing more widely available, while reduc-
ing the potential harm of treatment side-
effects.
(2) Cognitive augmentation might lead to
an enhancement “arms race,” where
all people are required to use enhance-
ment in order to stay competitive
(summarized in Hyman, 2011).
This concern may have some basis in
fact. If we look at other forms of aug-
mentation, those that are most useful are
often adapted by the majority of peo-
ple, to the detriment of those few who
do not or cannot. Literacy provides an
excellent example of this. Historically,
literacy was limited to just a few, help-
ing to maintain the sociopolitical struc-
ture, with those on top using literacy
to maintain control. Once literacy was
more widely disseminated, it helped to
promote democracy and social change.
Today, those who are illiterate are often
relegated to lower-paying jobs, welfare,
or crime to survive. Indeed, since lit-
eracy is so beneficial, it is most often
caused by poor circumstances, rather than
a personal choice. Might it be argued
the literacy is unfair because it relegates
most involuntary illiterates to the low-
est levels of society, and therefore should
be denied to all? If a form of brain-
augmentation turned out to be as ben-
eficial as literacy, would it be equally
unreasonable to deny it to all in order
to respect the choices of a few? I argue
here that, as with literacy, mathematics,
computer proficiency, and many other
examples, an entire society should not be
put at a disadvantage to appease those
few who cannot or choose not to use
an augmentation. Should there be addi-
tional costs in terms of safety or other
issues, this becomes more complicated,
and needs to be dealt with by weigh-
ing factual evidence carefully in terms
of costs vs. benefits, and our commonly
accepted sense of ethics. In order to do this
adequately, published studies of neuroen-
hancement must use carefully controlled
and replicable methods, provide statistics,
and openly describeside effects and failures
so that both costs and benefits can be well
understood.
(3) Enhancements in one cognitive
domain may lead to reductions in
other domains (Brem et al., 2014).
This argument assumes that emphasizing
one form of cognition must necessar-
ily reduce others to maintain the total
amount of cognitive function. While there
is some evidence that decrements in one
form of cognition can lead to enhance-
ments in others (Luber and Lisanby,
2014), this hypothesis leads to a number
of questions. For instance, is enhancement
necessarily an increase in a specific cog-
nitive “volume,” or instead might other
mechanisms be involved, such as reduc-
ing neural “noise,” leading to increased
neural SNR but without adding to cogni-
tive load? Also, is total cognition stagnant,
or does it vary over time? There is sub-
stantial evidence that it does, such as
from birth to adulthood, and depend-
ing on state factors such as alertness,
amount of sleep, nutrition, exercise, train-
ing and so on, and so enhancements
that affect these may increase cognitive
“volume” without reductions in other
areas. Finally, if reductions are indeed
found in other cognitive domains, the
question arises of how important those
domains are relative to those that are
enhanced. In all cases, it’s important to
obtain reliable empirical data, and per-
form cost-benefit analyses before making
firm decisions on whether cognitive- and
brain-augmentations should be used.
(4) Uncertainty regarding safety is also an
issue.
Potential dangers are present for all forms
of brain augmentation, but the ques-
tions that should be asked are, “Is it as
safe or safer than other methods cur-
rently in use?” and “Do the benefits out-
weigh the costs?” For some forms of neu-
roenhancement, their use might possibly
cause harm. As an example, DBS pro-
duces damage during implantation, and
can lead to bleeding, infection, and other
issues that have resulted in the deaths
of some patients (Rocha et al., 2014).
However, most methods of neuroen-
hancement are unlikely to cause physical
harm if used correctly. The use of any
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medical augmentation should be based
on published clinical trials when available,
using methods approved by IRBs or other
governing bodies. There are some impor-
tant differences between pharmaceuticals
and tDCS that suggest tDCS should be
safer. TDCS can be ended in a few seconds,
compared with a “wash out” period of days
or weeks for some pharmaceuticals. TDCS
can be directed to specific points on the
head, while avoiding other organs such as
liver, heart and kidneys, where deleterious
side effects of pharmaceuticals can some-
times occur. Also the chance of forming
unexpected chemical side products from
interactions with other concurrent treat-
ments is reduced. Overall, tDCS has far
fewer and less dangerous side effects, lim-
ited to redness/irritation under the elec-
trodes, mild tingling, itching, heat and less
commonly fatigue, transient headaches,
nausea, and insomnia (Poreisz et al.,
2007). Furthermore, brain stimulation for
pain treatment is much less likely to
lead to addiction when compared with
opiates. Based on these qualities, tDCS
appears safer than pharmaceuticals for
most applications. Once effective meth-
ods of brain stimulation for clinical treat-
ment are developed in smaller studies,
large scale clinical trials need to be per-
formed in order to better understand their
costs and benefits relative to the current
standard of care. As an example, TDCS
shows great potential for the treatment
of a variety of illnesses, but few large-
scale clinical trials have been performed
thus far.
(5) A broader argument involves the
potential risks imposed by our
increasing dependence on modern
technologies that might have unfore-
seen negative effects, resulting in our
ultimate demise (Rees, 2003).
While the combined side effects of
our technological world, such as pollu-
tion, population expansion, diminishing
resources, and continued warfare may end
our domination of Earth as soon as it
began, at present we are at our peak in
many ways. The possibility that an other-
wise safe augmentative technology might
lead to our demise is impossible to pre-
dict. We cannot see into the future, but
we can look for patterns that may help
us to estimate the likelihood of future
events. Some technologies, such as land-
mines and nuclear weapons, can be argued
to produce much more harm than good
and should be banned. However, nearly
anything can be used with the inten-
tion of doing harm. From sharpened
rocks to rockets, from ancient writing
to modern computers, even the wheel,
nearly all technologies have been used
to support warfare or to cause harm in
some way. By contrast, cognitive- and
brain-augmentation technologies have
provided many benefits to us thus far,
and will likely continue to do so. Our
success has a species has primarily been
derived through our intelligence and cog-
nitive capabilities. Enhancing these further
through the benefits of cognitive- and
brain-augmentation, we might one day
develop better, safer and more sustainable
technologies to reduce pollution, better
manage resources, reduce the need for or
find alternatives to warfare, and improve
our chances of survival overall, rather than
reducing them.
SUMMARY
We can say with certainty that our species
would be unlikely to exist as it does
today without augmentation. Cognitive-
and neuroenhancements are just the latest
in a long line of augmentations that have
helped our species to survive and flour-
ish. While there are some valid concerns,
the benefits of brain augmentations like
tDCS will likely far outweigh their costs
when properly used. The continued pur-
suit of cognitive- and neuro-enhancement
will help us to improve our quality of life,
reduce suffering from brain and mental ill-
ness, and enhance our chances of survival
long-term.
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There are numerous ways people can improve their cognitive capacities: good nutrition and
regular exercise can produce long-term improvements across many cognitive domains,
whilst commonplace stimulants such as coffee temporarily boost levels of alertness and
concentration. Effects like these have been well-documented in the medical literature
and they raise few (if any) ethical issues. More recently, however, clinical research has
shown that the off-label use of some pharmaceuticals can, under certain conditions, have
modest cognition-improving effects. Substances such as methylphenidate and modafinil
can improve capacities such as working memory and concentration in some healthy
individuals. Unlike their more mundane predecessors, these methods of “cognitive
enhancement” are thought to raise a multitude of ethical issues. This paper presents
the six principal ethical issues raised in relation to pharmacological cognitive enhancers
(PCEs)—issues such as whether: (1) the medical safety-profile of PCEs justifies restricting
or permitting their elective or required use; (2) the enhanced mind can be an “authentic”
mind; (3) individuals might be coerced into using PCEs; (4), there is a meaningful
distinction to be made between the treatment vs. enhancement effect of the same PCE;
(5) unequal access to PCEs would have implications for distributive justice; and (6) PCE
use constitutes cheating in competitive contexts. In reviewing the six principal issues,
the paper discusses how neuroscientific research might help advance the ethical debate.
In particular, the paper presents new arguments about the contribution neuroscience
could make to debates about justice, fairness, and cheating, ultimately concluding that
neuroscientific research into “personalized enhancement” will be essential if policy is to
be truly informed and ethical. We propose an “ethical agenda” for neuroscientific research
into PCEs.
Keywords: cognitive enhancement, brain function augmentation, ethics, modafinil, ritalin, justice, cheating,
personalized enhancement
INTRODUCTION
Recent research in neuroscience and pharmacology has demon-
strated that various pharmaceuticals can have modest cognition-
enhancing effects in healthy individuals (for reviews, see Repantis
et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011). For example, some studies
have shown that modafinil—originally developed for the treat-
ment of narcolepsy—can improve various dimensions of cogni-
tive function in sleep-deprived (Wesensten et al., 2005; Thomas
and Kwong, 2006) and non-sleep-deprived healthy adults (Turner
et al., 2003; Müller et al., 2004). Similarly, methylphenidate—
originally developed for the treatment of Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)—has been shown to improve
spatial working memory and planning in healthy adults (Elliott
et al., 1997; Mehta et al., 2000).
Unlike the more mundane methods for improving cognitive
function—such as exercise and good nutrition (Dresler et al.,
2012)—these pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers (PCEs) are
thought to raise a host of ethical issues for individuals and soci-
ety (Greely et al., 2008; Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). At the
individual level, concerns are raised about medical safety and side
effects, the authenticity of the enhanced mind and the value of
achievements facilitated by pharmaceutical intervention. At the
societal level, ethical questions can be asked about whether the
availability of PCEs would increase or undermine equality, and
about whether individuals will be directly or indirectly coerced
into using PCEs. Further normative questions emerge particu-
larly in the healthcare setting: should we be drawing a sharp line
between treatment and enhancement and should individuals be
given access to PCEs through medical professionals?
In this paper, we outline the key issues at stake in the norma-
tive debate about pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE)
and, for each issue, suggest the contribution that neuroscien-
tific research could make. The greatest contribution will be made
to the discussions surrounding the safety and efficacy of PCEs.
Although the question of what harms are worth risking in the pur-
suit of certain benefits is to a large extent normative, the dearth
of evidence about the effectiveness and safety of PCEs in real-
world contexts renders the discussion mostly hypothetical at this
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point. More research on the risks of dependency is also urgently
needed. Data of this kind will be crucial for discussions about reg-
ulation, and for debates about the permissibility of requiring or
encouraging people to use PCEs.
In addition to the contribution neuroscience will make to
understanding the risk-benefit profiles of PCEs, we suggest that
a more nuanced understanding of the neural systems affected by
different substances will enrich the debate about whether PCE
use constitutes cheating. Also related to cheating, we further sug-
gest that the neuroscientific evidence on the functional trade-offs
precipitated by some PCE adds an important dimension to the
debate about whether achievements facilitated by PCEs should be
seen to be effortless and involve little sacrifice. Drawing together
our conclusions, we propose an “ethical agenda” for future neu-
roscientific research on PCE. This agenda sets out what sort of
research would help move the ethical debates forward, and why.
Resolving these debates will be crucial for ensuring that society
responds to the increasing use of PCE in the most responsible,
fair and rational way. For a summary of our “ethical agenda” for
neuroscientific research, see Table 1.
OVERVIEW OF PHARMACOLOGICAL COGNITIVE
ENHANCEMENT
What it means to “enhance” is notoriously difficult to pin down.
To enhance is essentially to improve or increase, but what this
improvement must be relative to is not obvious. On the broad-
est definitions of enhancement, some capacity is enhanced if it
is improved relative to its prior level of functioning such that
it increases the individual’s chances of leading a good life—
enhancement thus occurs regardless of how well- or poorly-
functioning the capacity originally was (Savulescu et al., 2011).
On more restrictive definitions of enhancement, a capacity is
enhanced if it is improved beyond a particular point—perhaps
a species mean or agreed “normal” level of functioning (c.f. Sabin
and Daniels, 1994). Others define enhancement as any improve-
ment which goes beyond correcting pathology. For example: “A
Table 1 | Summary of ethical agenda for neuroscientific research.
Suggested type of study Advancement in ethical debate
Longitudinal studies investigating the long-term safety profile of
PCEs
This is perhaps the most pressing task for neuroscientists. The long-term,
real-world safety profile of PCEs is of considerable import to potential users
and to all debates about PCE ethics and policy. In relation to the latter
concerns, longitudinal studies will advance ethical debates about: (1) whether
PCEs should be placed on the open market for enhancement purposes (and
with what restrictions), and (2) whether employees doing particular types of
jobs can legitimately be required to take PCEs
Identification of pathology associated with mental or psychiatric
disorders or limitations to enable classificatory separation of
conditions which are diseases from those which constitute normal
human variation
Will advance the ethical debate about whether the administration and effects
of particular PCEs constitute treatment or enhancement, and how resources
should be deployed accordingly
Identification of the effects of PCEs in targeted and specified
populations of ethical significance, such as those who are worst off.
In particular, further research into the baseline effect should be
conducted
Will advance the debate about distributive justice and access to PCEs. If PCEs
have differential effects on those who are already worst off, this will be highly
relevant to their permissibility and just distribution
More precise distinction between the different cognitive effects of
different PCEs
Will (1) be of central relevance to whether certain putative PCEs will be used
for enhancement and, if so, in which contexts and (2) advance the debate on
cheating in competitive contexts: some effects (e.g., creativity) might be
considered more unfair than others (e.g., wakefulness) and enhancing
motivation vs. enhancing effectiveness might be considered relevant to the
value of any resulting achievements
Investigation of the functional trade-offs associated with different
PCEs
Will (1) be of central relevance to whether certain putative PCEs will be used
for enhancement and, if so, in which contexts and will (2) advance the debate
about the nature of the sacrifice possibly required for achievements to have
value. It will also (3) advance the debate about the practicality and legitimacy
of requiring certain people to take PCEs
Pursuit of a “personalized enhancement” approach to bring us
closer to understanding what effect any particular PCE will have in
any particular person
Will be relevant to many (if not all) ethical debates and policy considerations
including: (1) whether particular people could legitimately be required to take
PCEs in certain contexts, (2) who should be given priority access to which
PCEs, (3) whether unequal effects have ramifications for cheating. Only when
we can predict the personal benefits and costs of enhancement can policy be
truly informed and ethical
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cognitively enhanced person [. . . ] is not necessarily somebody
with particularly high (let alone super-human) cognitive capac-
ities. A cognitively enhanced person, rather, is somebody who has
benefited from an intervention that improves the performance of
some cognitive subsystem without correcting some specific, iden-
tifiable pathology or dysfunction of that subsystem” (Bostrom
and Sandberg, 2009). In this paper, we adopt the broader under-
standing of cognitive enhancement. We do this in part because
the substances currently available and likely to be available in the
near future effect only modest improvements (Husain and Mehta,
2011), but also because we believe that any line intended to mark
the point at which an improvement counts as enhancement nec-
essarily involves a value judgement involving normative (ethical)
considerations.
Most of the substances cited as putative PCEs were originally
developed for clinical use, to treat conditions that are at least
partly characterized by some observable cognitive defect. Here,
again, it is sometimes difficult to decide what should count as
a cognitive defect. However, in the case of defective or deficient
capacities, decisions must be made about where to place the line
to determine who should receive medical attention and resources.
For example, two of the substances receiving the most atten-
tion from those interested in enhancement—methylphenidate
and modafinil—were originally developed to treat the symptoms
of ADHD and narcolepsy, respectively. More recently, however,
these substances have been used off-label by healthy individuals to
improve their memories, level of alertness, or powers of concen-
tration (e.g., Maher, 2008). Other substances with some modest
enhancing effects on cognition include donepezil, dopamine ago-
nists (such as d-amphetamine, bromocriptine, and pergolide),
guanfacine, atomoxetine, reboxetine, galantamine, rivastigmine,
and memantine. Working pharmacologically in different ways,
these substances have been shown to improve cognitive functions
such as response inhibition, working memory, episodic memory,
attention, vigilance, and incidental learning (see de Jongh et al.,
2008; Lanni et al., 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011). However, this
limited evidence of effectiveness should be cautiously considered
alongside studies producing null results and some evidence of
task-specific impairments (see Hall and Lucke, 2010 and Advokat,
2010 for less optimistic reviews of the scientific literature on
PCE).
The prospect of being able to enhance any of these cogni-
tive functions probably would be attractive to many individuals.
Whether the goal of such enhancement would be to perform bet-
ter at work, to learn a skill or language quicker, to decrease the
need for rest in leisure time, or even just to experience one’s mind
as “sharper,” improving cognition would presumably come with
many benefits. Data from various prevalence studies indicate that
there are groups of individuals who use some of the substances
listed above for purposes of studying, to combat jet-lag or even to
facilitate completion of household chores (for a review of student
uses, see Smith and Farah, 2011; see also Maher, 2008).
Whilst the neuroscientific literature is reporting some mod-
est enhancement effects of these substances on the cognition
of healthy individuals (c.f. Husain and Mehta, 2011), the eth-
ical literature has been raising and responding to a variety of
issues pertaining to their use (for overview see Greely et al., 2008;
Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). Some of these issues are practi-
cal, some socio-political and others relate to the individual user.
The overarching goal is to ascertain how permissible and how
moral PCE use is and how society and regulatory bodies should
respond to it. Although the ethical debate is principally a nor-
mative enterprise, it cannot reach firm conclusions about how to
proceed based purely on hypothetical reasoning and untutored
speculation: it must be informed by neuroscientific research pro-
viding the empirical facts about PCEs. In what follows, we outline
the key issues in the enhancement debate, emphasizing where we
think neuroscientific research might have particular importance
for the normative debate.
ETHICAL DEBATE AND THE RELEVANCE OF
NEUROSCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
MEDICAL SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS
In many ethical discussions of cognitive enhancers the first issue
to be raised (often to be set aside so that there can be any fur-
ther discussion at all) is whether cognitive enhancers are medically
safe to use. Since there are no longitudinal studies yet examin-
ing the long-term use of pharmaceuticals such as modafinil and
methylphenidate, some authors argue that we currently do not
know enough about the potential dangers and that the avail-
ability and use of PCEs should be avoided on this basis (e.g.,
Drabiak-Syed, 2011; Boot et al., 2012).
Despite the huge interest in PCE from philosophers and sci-
entists, the evidence of their effectiveness is still inconclusive.
Moreover, where there is evidence of enhancement effects, they
often tend to be limited to improvements on specific tasks, are
only seen at certain dosages and are not observed in all peo-
ple (Ragan et al., 2013; Farah et al., 2014). Crucially, it must be
remembered that the degree and nature of any cognitive improve-
ments will be different for each PCE and so no sweeping claims
should be made about the effectiveness of PCEs in general. In
terms of both effectiveness and safety, it should also be noted
that short term studies carried out in laboratory settings are not
representative of long term use in real world contexts.
In his meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials of methy-
phendidate, Repantis et al. (2010) found a significant improve-
ment in the long-term memory of healthy participants, partic-
ularly when there was a longer interval between the learning
phase and recall. However, the meta-analysis revealed no signif-
icant improvements in attention, mood or executive functions.
Similar findings emerged from Farah et al.’s (2014) review of
more than fifty experiments on the effects of amphetamine and
methylphenidate: they found convincing evidence of an enhanc-
ing effect of stimulants on learning under some circumstances,
specifically when the retention interval between study and test
was longer than an hour, but not at shorter intervals. They also
concluded that the evidence for improvement of executive func-
tions was much less clear. There is some evidence to suggest that
the effects of methylphenidate on cognitive control are only sig-
nificantly positive in participants whose performance on placebo
was lowest (Smith and Farah, 2011).
In relation to the effectiveness of modafinil, Farah et al.’s
(2014) recent review of single dose studies of modafinil con-
cluded that there is clear evidence of enhanced executive function
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and memory for sleep-deprived individuals but, for rested adults,
whilst there were some positive findings for specific tasks such as
those requiring inhibitory control, there were also a large num-
ber of null results and the occasional finding of impairment. They
refer to this pattern—of limited improvements on some specific
tasks and impairment on others—as being “familiar” for PCEs.
There are also some reviews of the effectiveness of anti-
dementia medications for cognitive enhancement. These include
acetylcholinesterase inhibitors such as donepezil, rivastigmine,
and galantamine. A review conducted by Repantis (2013) con-
cluded that the few existing studies of effects in healthy partic-
ipants provide no consistent evidence for a neuroenhancement
effect. In the case of, donepezil there was some evidence to sug-
gest improvements on retention of training on complex aviation
tasks (Yesavage et al., 2002), improvements in verbal memory
and episodic memory (Gron et al., 2005). However, other stud-
ies showed no or limited effects on memory and attention and
two others showed transient impairment of episodic memory
(Beglinger et al., 2004, 2005). The same pattern of results suggest-
ing enhancement in some cases but no effect or even impairment
in others can be seen for donepezil. Further, a review of the effi-
cacy of these putative cognitive enhancers for patients with mild
cognitive impairment concluded that they did not improve cog-
nition or function among patients with low-level impairment
(Tricco et al., 2013).
The medical safety of PCEs varies from substance to substance,
and side effects relate not only to the direct pharmacologi-
cal effects but also to broader psychological and physiological
changes. The review conducted by Repantis (2013) concluded
that in the majority of trials, the drugs were well tolerated.
However, side effects were noted. In relation to methylphenidate,
side effects included increased heart rate and some instances
of increases in blood pressure. Headaches, anxiety, nervousness,
dizziness, drowsiness, and insomnia were also typical complaints.
Repantis (2013) summarizes similar side effects for modafinil,
where adverse reactions included headache, dizziness, gastroin-
testinal complaints (e.g., nausea, abdominal pain, dry mouth),
increased diuresis, palpitations, nervousness, restlessness, and
sleep disturbances and insomnia (especially in studies with non-
sleep deprived individuals). In their recent review, Ragan et al.
(2013) highlight the fact that modafinil was reviewed by the
European Medicines Agency (2010), who concluded that it should
not be prescribed for obstructive sleep apnea, shift-work sleep
disorder, and idiopathic hypersomnia because of the risks of seri-
ous skin reaction, suicidality, depression, psychosis, and adverse
cardiovascular events.
In relation to anti-dementia drugs, Repantis (2013) concluded
that, in the majority of the trials in healthy adults, donepezil
was well tolerated. However, some side effects were reported
in some participants, including gastrointestinal complaints (e.g.,
nausea), headaches, dizziness, nightmares, and insomnia. The
meta analysis of anti-dementia drugs for people with mild cog-
nitive impairment (Tricco et al., 2013) revealed that patients
taking these medications experienced significantly more nausea,
diarrhea, vomiting, and headaches than patients taking placebo.
The authors also suggest that patients taking these medications
might be at greater cardiac risk, with one study finding a higher
incidence of bradycardia among patients who received galan-
tamine.
As Farah et al. (2014) emphasize, there is another type of risk
that should not be ignored in a consideration of the safety of
PCEs. Many pharmaceuticals, especially stimulants, present a risk
of dependence. The authors cite a nationwide survey analyzed by
Kroutil et al. (2006) which estimates that almost one in twenty
nonmedical users of prescription stimulants meet the criteria for
dependence or abuse (For further discussion of the potential for
addiction in student populations see Outram, 2010 and White
et al., 2006).
Finally, as Ragan et al. (2013) point out, there is no such
thing as a completely safe drug, only a drug whose benefits out-
weigh its drawbacks. However, it is also worth emphasizing that,
even if there are long-term risks associated with these substances,
this does not (by itself) mean that they should automatically be
prohibited. There are serious risks associated with many activi-
ties that the state permits because it is believed that individuals
should decide for themselves whether these risks are worth taking.
Dangerous sports and cosmetic surgery both come with risks, but
the value some individuals attach to the respective sporting expe-
riences and cosmetic effects justifies giving these individuals the
choice to take risks in their pursuit.
This caveat notwithstanding, and taking into account poten-
tial costs to the healthcare system, greater knowledge about safety
and efficacy will allow regulators to decide whether the deci-
sion about which risks are worth taking should be put in the
hands of consumers (for a detailed discussion of the way risks and
benefits should be assessed for cognitive enhancement devices,
such as brain stimulators, see Maslen et al., 2014). The ethical
debate about the level of risk consumers should be allowed to
take is of great practical importance when it comes to making
policy recommendations. In addition, the question of whether
the harms of a certain PCE outweigh its benefits will be impor-
tant to discussions about the permissibility of requiring indi-
viduals to use PCEs and about the possible need to protect
individuals from pressure to take any of the substances under
discussion.
Finally, the empirical project of identifying the different
effects PCEs have across a different individuals (c.f. Husain
and Mehta, 2011) is likely to feed into the normative debate
about which effects (for which individuals) constitute a form of
treatment and which effects (for which individuals) constitute
enhancement. We discuss these and other ethical issues in what
follows.
AUTHENTICITY AND NATURALNESS
There are a bundle of related ethical issues that are sometimes
raised under the broad heading of authenticity (see Bublitz and
Merkel, 2009; Juth, 2011). Some of these pertain to numerical
personal identity—do individuals become categorically differ-
ent persons when they transform themselves via enhancement?
(DeGrazia, 2005)—some consider less drastically what it is for
an individual to be to be more or less his or her “real” self (The
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003), and other ethical con-
cerns pertain to what it is to be, and function as, a human being
(Kass, 2003).
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The principal tenet underlying authenticity objections against
the use of PCEs is that individuals are most themselves when they
are in their “natural,” unaltered state. If capacities and characteris-
tics fundamental to one’s identity are changed, then the individual
is recast as an altered or inauthentic person (e.g., Elliott, 1999).
This argument is premised on the idea that there is a “real,” true
self, and that this real self is to be preserved as much as pos-
sible. However, this assumption can be challenged: individuals
often (and understandably) try to improve themselves in ways
that allow them to more successfully achieve their goals. Being
autonomous is to form goals for how one’s life is to go, includ-
ing what kind of person to be. On this model of authenticity
as autonomy, whether PCE is authentic depends on whether it
helps a person to achieve her autonomous goals. For example, an
individual might teach him or herself motivational strategies to
overcome his or her naturally lazy disposition; another individual
might use techniques from cognitive behavior therapy to over-
come his or her propensity for generalized anxiety (e.g., Butler
et al., 2006) or shyness, or gregariousness, or bad temper, or gulli-
bility. Such strategies may not render the individuals inauthentic,
but rather assist them in removing barriers that otherwise pre-
vent them from maximizing self-actualization. Correspondingly,
if PCEs can, for example, help an individual to concentrate bet-
ter so that he or she can achieve the goals he or she values, this
acts in service of authenticity rather than undermines it. There
is great human variation, and variation within individuals subject
to many intrinsic and extrinsic factors (see Kahane and Savulescu,
2013). Even if the authentic self were defined, it seems likely that
many factors interfere and PCEs may reduce the effect of such
influences.
However, some deny that authenticity is reducible to auton-
omy. Such writers (e.g., Taylor, 1991) appeal to a “real self.” But
even on such an account, the real self may be complex and mul-
tifaceted. Often people have a range of qualities and they may
use PCEs to bring out some of their qualities, while suppress-
ing others. Thus, whether an enhanced self compromises the real
self depends on what constitutes a person’s real self and what the
effect of the PCE is—both questions for cognitive science. If PCEs
merely amplify, rather than add entirely new qualities, then they
enable the self to evolve, rather than replacing one individual with
a set of attributes with another with different attributes.
There is a related but different concern about naturalness.
The idea that enhancements will take us too far from what it
is to be human altogether is often accompanied by the idea
that too much technological intervention will lead to an over-
mechanization of the mind. The activities in which we engage—
and, more importantly, the ways in which we engage in them—
are said to have a certain quality to them that makes them
“human” activities (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). In
this vein, Kass (2003) argues that since individuals play no role
in bringing about the effects of biomedical interventions, they
cannot understand these effects “in human terms.” His sug-
gestion is that whereas the effects of studying or training are
“intelligible” to us, the effects of direct interventions are not
comprehensible and thus our use of them departs “from “gen-
uine,” unmediated, and (in principle) self-transparent human
activity” (p. 23).
However, we argue that we make use of many directly-acting
substances, in medicine and in leisure, that do not result in depar-
ture from “genuine” human activity. Just because their pharma-
cological mechanisms are not understood by the average person
does not mean that they cannot be made sense of as part of a
human narrative. Kass cites alcohol, caffeine and nicotine as not
having the same unintelligible quality as direct biomedical inter-
ventions. He says this is because “we use these agents not as pure
chemicals but in forms and social contexts that, arguably, give
them a meaning different from what they would have were we to
take them as pills” (p. 22). An obvious objection to Kass’ resis-
tance to PCEs would be to add PCEs to beverages, as caffeine
currently is. It would then be “intelligible” in the same way that
caffeine is said to be “intelligible.” Moreover, if intelligibility can
be conferred by social context then the social context of, for exam-
ple, studying, or conducting research should equally make PCEs
part of a comprehensible human enterprise. Perhaps his distinc-
tion between the forms alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine tend to
take, and the form of a simple pill, is supposed to indicate that
the former are enjoyed for themselves, rather than being instru-
mental to achieve some goal. However, studies have reported
that some individuals take PCEs for recreational purposes (see
Smith and Farah, 2011) and it is common knowledge that caffeine
is regularly used exclusively for alertness and for performance
enhancement. Even if it might be the case in lay people’s current
perceptions (cf. Faulmüller et al., 2013; Schelle et al., 2014), from
a normative stance it cannot be that form and context make all the
difference between the human intelligibility of an espresso and a
caffeine pill and a PCE.
The core of such an “intelligibility” objection may be that
PCEs and other new technologies work in ways entirely alien to
the way the human mind normally works, adding a completely
new way of being. For example, chips inserted into the human
brain that allowed us to perceive other people’s thoughts directly
would be entirely new. Neuroscience can assist by unravelling the
way the mind does work, and does not, and by enabling catego-
rization of enhancers into those which harness natural processes,
and those that introduce entirely new capacities. Most enhancers
at present appear to harness existing neurobiological physiology,
though exactly how many enhance performance remains to be
determined.
The ethical debate about authenticity and naturalness is
unlikely to be advanced solely by the findings of neuroscientific
research. The disagreement is partly a normative one about what
constitutes the “real” self and whether our “real” selves are the
selves we are most prone to being or the selves that we aspire to
develop in to—or whether it makes sense to speak of “real” selves
at all. Qualitative research, such as that conducted by Singh (2005)
or Bolt and Schermer (2009), will helpfully provide a clearer pic-
ture of the sorts of experiences individuals have when taking
PCEs.
In summary, it is important to recognize that most PCEs, if
not all, harness innate biological systems, for example, affecting
release, reuptake or sensitivity to neurotransmitters that cause
cognitive activity. They do not at present introduce radical “new
ways of being” divorced from the ordinary human way—they
really just provide “more of the same.” Indeed, humans vary in
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the ways in which their cognitive systems function and in some
cases, PCEs may bring those at the lower end of normal up to the
level of function of those in the mid to upper range.
More importantly, we suggest that what matters more than
whether the experiences are in some sense authentic is whether
the individual wants and values the effects of the PCE and whether
the individual is autonomous in his or her decision to use PCE.
This, we suggest, is a legitimate concern and is addressed in the
following section.
COERCION
If PCEs were to become more commonplace, then employers
might start to require their employees to use PCEs. The Academy
of Medical Sciences et al. (2012) suggested in a recent report that
“[O]ccupations that require particular patterns of focus could
benefit from enhancements that facilitate achieving such patterns.
For example, surgeons may need to be able to concentrate for
extended periods, whereas other jobs such as air traffic control
can require very rapid reactions during periods of relative uni-
formity. As an extrapolation to this, it is possible that in these
high-responsibility occupations enhancement could be seen as a
moral obligation, or even demanded by the public.” (p. 38, for
a discussion see also Maslen et al., in press). The US Airforce
has already approved the use of modafinil by its pilots (Caldwell
and Caldwell, 2005) and some medical practitioners are begin-
ning to wonder whether enhancement might be required of them
in the future (Rose and Curry, 2010). Writing in the Journal of
Surgical Research, surgeons have suggested that the use of PCEs
may come to be required practice. They say, “The prospect of
fatigued surgeons taking a prescription drug, such as modafinil,
to allow them to operate for longer, and possibly to a higher stan-
dard, is perhaps not as far-fetched as some may suggest. This drug
has already been trialed in emergency physicians, when perform-
ing non-medical-related tasks at the end of a nightshift.” (Warren
et al., 2009, p. 168).
Further, the authors note that there are “useful and warranted
forms of coercion” (p. 170) such as forcing surgeons to under-
take hygiene practices such as handwashing prior to and during
surgery. Given that this coercion is acceptable, they go on to ask,
“What will our employers feel about a drug that makes us less
prone to error, able to work longer hours, or to operate more
efficiently? Employers are able to request certain behavioral stan-
dards from their employees, dictate rest periods, and insist on
abstinence from certain drugs to ensure that their doctors per-
form well—will a day arise where they can recommend or even
insist on surgeons being artificially enhanced? This may seem fan-
ciful, but recent work has suggested that a mixture of napping and
caffeine attenuates fatigue in interns and thus should be adopted
by hospital administration. Why not other types of stimulant?”
(p. 171).
The ethical objection often raised in this context is that,
although it is thought to be reasonable to require certain things
of employees, such as compulsory training and codes of conduct,
requiring them to ingest psychoactive substances into their bod-
ies is too demanding a requirement. It would require a compelling
justification (perhaps pointing to the severity of harm that would
be prevented through requiring enhancement) to trump the value
we place on preserving the right individuals have to determine
what happens to their bodies and minds (for discussion of the
right to mental self-determination in relation to enhancement
and other mental manipulation, see Bublitz and Merkel, 2014).
As far as possible, this right should be preserved, and this is
especially the case where there is not enough evidence about
the harms to which an employer would be subjecting his or her
employee. Neuroscientific evidence will have a large role to play
in understanding the seriousness of any proposed requirement.
In addition to the risks posed by individual instances of PCE use,
more data on the potential for dependency will be essential for
this discussion. Whilst we might think it permissible to require
some employees to take small, isolated personal risks, requiring
them to do something that results in substance dependency would
more comprehensively infringe an individual’s autonomy. In this
connection, although PCEs may become more common in the
workplace, one of us has argued elsewhere that for these and
other reasons, it is unlikely that there will ever be a legal obli-
gation for a professional like a surgeon to take a PCE (Goold and
Maslen, 2014). At present, no employer requires employees to take
caffeine. Caffeine is a PCE.
Even if people were not directly coerced to take enhancers it
could still be objected that permitting PCE use could result in
indirect pressure to use them. The perception that others are tak-
ing substances that make them more productive could lead to
the belief that taking them is necessary to keep up (Academy of
Medical Sciences et al., 2012) and not taking PCEs might ren-
der one de facto ineligible for certain jobs (Chatterjee, 2004).
However, whether indirect pressure to take PCEs would in fact
result in their more prevalent use is a question for social science.
(For empirical data relating to this question, see Franke et al., 2011
and Maier et al., 2013). Neuroscientific research will have little
to contribute to the debate about the limits of acceptable social
pressure and restriction on employees’ autonomy. However, as
noted above, opposition to enforced PCE use is partly motivated
by the current lack of evidence on long-term safety and efficacy.
What we can legitimately require of people is closely related to
what risks we can require them to take. Assessment of the legiti-
macy of requiring certain individuals to take PCEs will depend in
large part on their medical safety and efficacy. If PCEs are very
safe and efficacious, their use in life-saving/threatening profes-
sions (e.g., surgeons, politicians, truck drivers, airline pilots, etc.)
may legitimately be required.
TREATMENT vs. ENHANCEMENT
As noted in the introductory section, there is much disagreement
about what should count as enhancement (c.f., Parens, 1998).
Sometimes this disagreement is framed as a debate about where
treatment ends and enhancement begins. The distinction often
made is that treatments serve to cure illness and preserve health
whereas enhancements make people “better than well.” For exam-
ple, Juengst (1998) defines enhancement as the term “usually used
in bioethics to characterize interventions designed to improve
human form or functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain
or restore good health” (p. 29).
However, a common objection to this distinction is that, in
many cases, what we define as “healthy” and “normal” is arbitrary.
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This objection does not deny that there can be clear failures of
function or physiology as a result of pathology which most would
agree are inimical to good health, such as the effects of a brain
hemorrhage or stroke. Rather, it emphasizes that the boundary
between healthy and unhealthy cognition in many cases is a mat-
ter of where we choose to draw the line, not based on either
statistically significant subfunctioning or pathology. For example,
delimiting normal from defective powers of concentration when
diagnosing ADHD is necessarily to engage in marking a categor-
ical point on what is otherwise a continuum (c.f. Schermer and
Bolt, 2011). The point could be selected further to the left or right
on that continuum of functioning. Would selecting a point which
increased ADHD diagnosis increase the instances of individuals
being treated or would some be receiving enhancement through
the back door? Since the point is to some extent arbitrary, the
corresponding labels of treatment and enhancement appear less
meaningful in this context.
Similarly, it is difficult to know whether to classify substances
used to combat age-related cognitive decline as instances of treat-
ment or enhancement. Drawing sharp lines could have the result
that a young person with cognitive abilities just above the cut
off for being classified as having a mental disability would be
“enhanced” by a drug but the elderly person whose abilities
slipped to a level still above the young person would be receiving
“treatment” if given the same substance (for a similar example,
see Sandberg, 2011). Given the slipperiness of the distinction, one
of us has argued (Savulescu et al., 2011) that instead of trying to
determine whether certain drugs or certain of their effects con-
stitute treatment or enhancement, it is more coherent and useful
to think of a continuum of well-being which can be increased or
diminished by various interventions.
It might be thought that evidence from neuroscience could
adjudicate between instances of treatment and enhancement. If
substances have discernable, discrete effects on different groups
of people, it could be argued that these discrete effects mark the
difference between a treatment and an enhancement. For exam-
ple, although the way modafinil works is still unknown in detail
(Minzenberg and Carter, 2008), neurologists do know that the
brain of the narcoleptic is not neurophysiologically equivalent to
the brain of the sleep-deprived individual and, correspondingly,
it might be hypothesized that the effects of modafinil on the two
groups will differ. Most forms of narcolepsy are associated with a
deficiency in the hypothalamic neurotransmitter orexin (Mignot,
2010). The average sleep-deprived person, in contrast, does not
exhibit such a deficiency. Accordingly, it might be thought that the
more differences neuroscience can reveal between the narcoleptic
and the non-narcoleptic, the better equipped we will be to distin-
guish between the treatment and enhancement effects of at least
this PCE.
However, such knowledge would still not provide a defini-
tive solution to which effects we should refer to as treatment
and which we should call enhancement. Modafinil is also pre-
scribed for shift work sleep disorder (SWSD), which is a product
of unusual working patterns affecting circadian rhythms, not of
underlying neurophysiology (Åkerstedt and Wright, 2009). This
being said, it should be noted that not everyone who does shift
work suffers from SWSD. This suggests that there must be some
physiological or psychological difference between sufferers and
non-sufferers and our lack of knowledge as to the cause of this
difference does not make the disorder less of a treatable disorder.
In labeling the prescription of PCEs for SWSD an instance
of treatment, a normative or ethical decision is still being made
about which conditions and patterns of functionality should
attract medical attention and resources. We are also implicitly
making an assessment that medical treatment is the just and
appropriate course of action for sufferers of the disorder, rather
than prioritizing a change away from shift work. Neither the
individual’s underlying neurophysiology nor the particular mech-
anism of action of the substance tells us anything about whether
this decision is the correct one.
One avenue through which neuroscience might illuminate the
treatment vs. enhancement debate is by identifying pathology
associated with mental or psychiatric disorders or limitations. So
far, accurate tissue or cellular level pathological classification of
psychiatric disease or disorder has eluded researchers. However,
if psychiatric disorders could be characterized in the same way as
neurological disorders, the presence of pathology would separate
conditions which are diseases from those which constitute normal
human variation.
Given that PCEs are not universally available through the
healthcare system, individuals without conditions for which PCEs
are approved would currently have to obtain them through other,
unauthorized routes. This means that some people will have
access to them but others will not. Even if PCEs were available
on an open market, there could still be financial or other bar-
riers to their accessibility. We discuss this issue and its potential
implications next.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Society-level debates about PCE-related inequality consider dis-
tributive justice, and are related the question of whether PCEs will
exacerbate existing socio-economic inequality. A common argu-
ment is that, as with many technologies, the rich and informed
will have access to them whilst the poor and uninformed will
not (e.g., Fukuyama, 2002). Assuming that cognitive enhance-
ment confers some benefits, this will make those already at an
advantage even better off. Whether this would in fact happen
would depend on factors such as the affordability and accessibil-
ity of PCEs, as well as on the realities of their cognition-improving
effects: the affordability and accessibility of PCEs will determine
whether people are able to use them; the effects of the substances
will determine whether they really put people who do so at an
advantage. However, although there is the potential for PCEs
to exacerbate unfairness if their distribution is unregulated, as
one of us points out elsewhere, this is not a necessary conse-
quence (Sandberg and Savulescu, 2011): if PCEs were distributed
according to a principle of justice such as “prioritarianism”—
the principle that says that we should give priority to those who
are worst off, but also aim to maximize well-being of every-
one in society—then PCEs would be most accessible to the
worst off, becoming less accessible (but not inaccessible) as need
decreases.
Further as we go on to discuss below in relation to compet-
itive fairness, neuroscientific evidence supports the hypothesis
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that there is a base-line effect of many PCEs: their effects seem
to depend on the subject’s baseline working memory capacity.
Individuals with low working-memory capacity improve while
high-span individuals are either not affected or are even impaired
(de Jongh et al., 2008). This means that those most in need
of PCE would benefit most from it, with those less in need
not benefiting at all or even experiencing impairment from the
same substance. Given this evidence, it has been suggested that
enhancement might actually serve to reduce inequality (Bostrom
and Sandberg, 2009). However, whilst this could be true in terms
of the equality of cognitive capacity, it must be remembered
that cognitive capacity and socio-economic status are not always
correlated: there would still be people with more opportuni-
ties and resources who could improve their prospects further.
Whilst policy decisions about access to PCEs will be principally
socio-political matters, those making the decisions will need to
know how enhancers affect members of the population in order
to best serve the interests of justice and equality. If PCEs have
differential effects on those who are already worst off, this will
be highly relevant to their permissibility and just distribution.
Neuroscience research can thus contribute to ethical debate if
effects in targeted and specified populations of ethical significance
are studied. This would require ethically relevant population
stratification.
COMPETITIVE FAIRNESS AND CHEATING
The ethical discussion of whether using cognitive enhancers con-
stitutes cheating—perhaps in exams or at work—is more nuanced
than the simple question of whether taking enhancers is “against
the rules.” It can extend beyond considerations of fairness in
competitive contexts to ask whether personal achievements facil-
itated by PCEs are devalued for this reason (c.f., Schermer,
2008; Goodman, 2010; Santoni de Sio et al., in press). We sug-
gest that evidence from neuroscience will help to develop the
cheating debate in important ways. Below, we argue that three
types of empirical inquiry are relevant to the ethical discussion.
The first, the phenomenon of the “inverted U”—according to
which the enhancing effects of PCEs are often baseline depen-
dent and exhibit non-linear dose response curves —(de Jongh
et al., 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011), is relevant to efficacy
questions involved in debates about cheating. The second type
of study relevant to the debate is that which seeks to identify
the particular neural systems affected by different substances,
leading to disparate effects (e.g., Lanni et al., 2008): whether a
substance improves creativity or rote learning may matter for
some possible conceptions of what constitutes cheating. Similarly,
whether a substance improves motivation and task enjoyment
vs. memory capacity might matter for those who place a lot
of value on success requiring effort. Third, we argue that the
neuroscientific evidence pointing to the likelihood of cogni-
tive trade-offs (de Jongh et al., 2008; Husain and Mehta, 2011)
adds an underdeveloped dimension to the cheating debate: if
the complaint is that achievements facilitated by PCE are deval-
ued because they do not involve enough personal sacrifice, then
evidence suggesting that enhancement in some domains comes
at the cost of impairments in others offers a challenge to this
view.
The inverted U curve and baseline dependency
Neuroscientific research so far shows that the effects of many
purported PCEs are base-line dependent and have an inverted
U-shaped dose-response curve (de Jongh et al., 2008; Husain
and Mehta, 2011). This is important to the cheating debate as
it means that some individuals will benefit from taking PCEs
whereas others will gain no benefit and might even be impaired:
low performing individuals will tend to be on the upward slope
of the inverted-U and so benefit from a substance that moves
them further up this slope. High performing individuals, on the
other hand, will tend to be at the peak of the inverted U and will
therefore become impaired by a substance that increases neuro-
transmitter levels further. If neuroscience were to more precisely
identify the neurological profiles of those who are able to benefit
from PCEs and those who are not then ethicists would be able to
consider in greater detail whether the prospect of some being able
to enhance whilst others cannot counts more decisively against
PCE in competitive contexts than if all could enhance in these
contexts. They would need to consider whether it is the case that
enhancement is only fair if everyone could (in principle) avail
themselves of it or whether is it permissible given that some are
physiologically denied the possibility of improving.
Disparate effects of different PCEs
Although the exact mechanisms of substances like
methylphenidate and modafinil are not yet fully understood,
researchers have begun to investigate which PCEs affect which
underlying systems, and with which effects (Lanni et al., 2008;
Smith and Farah, 2011). Although cognitive functions necessarily
interact, attempts have been made to ascertain the primary
cognitive functions improved by particular PCEs based on their
effects on neurotransmitters. Husain and Mehta (2011) explain
that “a simple mapping between a specific neurotransmitter and a
particular cognitive function—such as [working memory]—[. . . ]
seems untenable. However, subtle but important differences in
the precise processes modulated might provide some discrimi-
nating value: for instance, dopamine has an established role in
reinforcement learning in response to rewards, whereas serotonin
seems to modulate reinforcement learning for aversive stimuli.”
(p. 29). Pursuing such discrimination, Lanni et al. (2008) review
the neuroscience literature investigating the neuronal circuits,
neurotransmitters and molecular events underlying the cognitive
domains of memory, attention, and creativity to distinguish the
effects of different enhancement substances. Elsewhere, Smith
and Farah (2011) review the cognitive neuroscience literature to
examine whether (and which) prescription stimulants improve
learning, working memory, cognitive control, and other executive
functions.
If neuroscientific research were able to distinguish between
the effects of different PCEs this could have some implications
for discussions about cheating. This is again effect stratification.
Combined with population stratification, neuroscience research
could bring us closer to understanding what effect this particular
PCE will have in this person. This reflects the move to “person-
alized medicine” and might be dubbed “personalized enhance-
ment.” Only when we can predict the personal benefits and costs
of enhancement can policy be truly informed and ethical.
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It might be thought that the enhancement of some cognitive
functions is more unfair than the enhancement of others. For
example, the enhancement of creative thinking might be thought
to constitute more significant cheating than improving wakeful-
ness or even memory capacity. Imagine someone who says “when
I take enhancers my work is no better, I can just do more of the
same for longer” vs. someone who says “when I taken enhancers
my work is much better than I can do without them.” Having links
with the debate about authenticity, it is as if the former individual
is enabled to make better use of his or her own cognitive resources,
whereas the latter is given new cognitive resources upon which he
or she can draw. Those who think PCE use is unfair because the
achievement is not a reflection of the person’s natural abilities to
solve and create might be less concerned by a PCE that simply
allowed more efficient work of the standard the person could nat-
urally achieve. A PCE that promoted wakefulness might allow an
individual to work for longer but it will not come up with ideas
on his or her behalf. Of course, it is important to remember that
a PCE that improved creativity still has its effects on and through
the individual’s own brain. What will be interesting for ethicists to
discuss is whether “assistance” with time management and effi-
ciency is relevantly different to “assistance” with the content of
ideas (if, indeed, we want to characterize the respective effects in
this way).
Practical consequences might be to consider certain substances
unfair for certain types of tests or for entry into certain types
of employment: employers might only be troubled by the use of
PCEs, the effects of which are necessary to carry out the job. This
would be a practical consideration: could the employee continue
to work without the PCE? For example, an architect who could
only perform satisfactorily when taking a substance like modafinil
that seems to improves spatial planning and visual pattern recog-
nition memory (Turner et al., 2003) might be thought to be a
higher risk employee than one who uses a memory enhancer
which enables him or her to remember the names of building
materials that he could look up without problem in the absence
of the substance.
Further, neuroscientific research that could distinguish
between substances that enhance the effectiveness of cognitive
capacities, such as working memory, from those that instead
(or additionally) increase motivation could also have implica-
tions for the competitive fairness debate. In the ethical literature,
the point is sometimes made that it is effort and striving that
makes achievements intelligible and valuable. For example, Fox
(2005) argues that “[b]ecause they act directly on the human
body and mind, biotechnological enhancements tempt us to shirk
individual striving and struggle” (p. 1150).
A common rebuttal to this type of argument is that, whilst
PCEs can make efforts more effective, they do not replace the
need for dedicated, sustained study—striving and struggle is still
required in order to achieve. For example, Greely (2010) notes
that “the more plausible cognitive enhancements would not elim-
inate the need to study; they would just make studying more
effective” (p. 6).
If, however, there were a significant enough effect of a PCE
on motivation and/or task enjoyment, then it would be open
to ethicists to argue that this does in some sense reduce the
amount of effort that the person puts in. The drive to work or
achieve no longer emanates from the individual and no struggle
is encountered.
On the motivating effects of prescription stimulants, Smith
and Farah (2011) write: “Another empirical question concerns the
effects of stimulants on motivation, which can affect academic
and occupational performance independent of cognitive ability.
Volkow et al. (2004) showed that [methylphenidate] increased
participants’ self-rated interest in a relatively dull mathemati-
cal task. This is consistent with student reports that prescrip-
tion stimulants make schoolwork seem more interesting (e.g.,
DeSantis et al., 2008). To what extent are the motivational effects
of prescription stimulants distinct from their cognitive effects,
and to what extent might they be more robust to differences in
individual traits, dosage and task? Are the motivational effects of
stimulants responsible for their usefulness when taken by normal
healthy individuals for cognitive enhancement?” (p. 735).
If particular PCEs were shown to significantly improve moti-
vation and/or task enjoyment whilst others only improve effec-
tiveness, ethicists would need to consider whether there is any
relevant difference between enhancing motivation and enhanc-
ing effectiveness and, if so, what the implications would be for the
value of resulting achievements.
Enhancement is likely to involve trade-offs
Research suggests that enhancing one domain of cognition might
come at the cost of impairing another. de Jongh et al. (2008)
review evidence suggesting trade-offs between long-term mem-
ory and working memory; between stability and flexibility of
long-term memory; between stability and flexibility of working
memory; and perhaps, they conjecture, between cognition and
mood. If a PCE comes at a cost—and, especially, a mental cost—
this could also add a new dimension to the debate about cheating
and the value of achievements.
In terms of gaining an unfair advantage over others in exams
and other competitive tasks, the trade-offs would be relevant if
the test required exercise of both the enhanced and the impaired
capacity. Whilst the individual gains some advantage in some
parts of the test, he or she would be disadvantaged in other parts.
More generally, neuroscientific evidence of trade-offs are inter-
esting to the debate about fairness and the value of achievements
because some of the objections rest heavily on the idea that using
PCEs means that no sacrifice—usually conceived as sacrifice of
time, energy or other opportunities—is made by the individual.
For example, Kass (2003) says: “Yet in those areas of human
life in which excellence has until now been achieved only by
discipline and effort, the attainment of those achievements by
means of drugs, genetic engineering, or implanted devices looks
to be “cheating” or “cheap.” We believe—or until only yesterday
believed—that people should work hard for their achievements.
“Nothing good comes easily.”” (p. 21).
If enhancement of one domain of cognition comes at the
cost of another then it does seem that some sort of sacri-
fice has been made. We might conceive of an individual who
chooses to enhance his or her working memory such that he
or she can solve complicated puzzles quickly. This same indi-
vidual might accept that this enhancement comes at the cost
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of him or her finding it harder to recall facts and experiences
from longer ago. Accordingly, whilst the physical act of ingest-
ing a substance might be easy, there is a sense in which the
enhanced capacity did not come easily—it did not come without
personal cost. Whilst the conceptually most interesting trade-
offs will involve impairments to cognitive capacities—like for
like—it should also be noted that the more general side effects
of PCEs (discussed in relation to medical safety above) also
constitute an additional sort of “cost” to enhancement. The evi-
dence on medical safety reviewed in section Medical Safety and
Effectiveness suggests that PCE use will always come at a cost and
may involve multiple costs of different kinds. The number and
nature of these unavoidable costs constitute further challenge to
the view that achievements facilitated by enhancement involve no
sacrifice.
Important to note is that these costs of a trade-off are not like
financial costs, which can be trivial and will constitute diminish-
ment only insofar as they prevent the individual from making
other purchases important to him or her. Rather, the costs of an
enhancement trade-off are often mental costs—like for like—and
are of a kind much more likely to constitute diminishment. Thus,
neuroscientific research poses questions for those engaged in
the cheating debate about whether there are relevant differences
between different various costs of achievement—effort, opportu-
nity, physiological side effects, cognitive trade-offs—and which (if
any) are required for achievements to involve a sufficient level of
sacrifice.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed six of the main issues debated by ethicists work-
ing on PCE. Often, their purpose in debating these issues is to
clarify concepts and normative positions, which then serve as a
basis for recommending how society—and especially those tasked
with its regulation—should respond to the emergence of PCEs.
We have argued that whilst some of these issues are mostly polit-
ical (coercion) or metaphysical (what constitutes authenticity),
others have much to gain from emerging neuroscientific research.
As well as providing data on safety and effectiveness, neuroscience
will also allow a more fine-grained debate about whether the
effects of some PCEs are more unfair than others in compet-
itive contexts and whether employers should be more wary of
employee reliance on some PCEs than on others. Further, due to
emerging evidence on trade-offs, those who object to PCE on the
ground that it facilitates individual gain without any attendant
pain will have to explain why accepting an associated impair-
ment in exchange for an enhancement is not a relevant sacrifice.
Although we anticipate that ethicists will be far from stumped
by this challenge, we hope to have demonstrated that it will,
in large part, be though responding to emerging scientific evi-
dence that normative accounts become more refined, complete
and practically relevant.
In general, neuroscience can contribute to the formation of
ethical policy on PCEs by adopting a “personalized” approach:
personalized enhancement. Fine grained and stratified research
should seek to identify specific risks, benefits, and trade-offs in
small ethically relevant populations, or ideally in individuals. In
doing this, according to the ethical values principles and criteria
we choose, we can form policy on who should access which PCEs
in which ways.
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The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the
augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like.
Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements should
be considered permissible for individuals with no particular “medical” disadvantage along
any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is
the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set
of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual’s overall well-being: more is
not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we
suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment
of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of “diminishment as
enhancement” and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show
how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement
literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the
use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing.
Keywords: enhancement, neuroenhancement, welfare, well-being, neuroethics, bioethics, diminishment, empathy
INTRODUCTION
Advances in neuroscience and related fields have allowed for an
unprecedented increase in our ability to intervene in brain-level
processes, thereby influencing a wide range of higher-order func-
tions and behaviors. As Nagel (2010) has noted, this growing and
ever more finely-tuned capacity to tamper with even normally-
functioning neural systems raises a number of ethical questions
about the boundary between traditional research/clinical prac-
tice and outright human enhancement. “[A] societal climate of
performance measurements and improvements,” Nagel writes,
has led to a “growing tendency to use medical and technologi-
cal means beyond their applications in classical therapy” (p. 1).
Hence, even though “most of these technologies are developed
for medical or research purposes, their application for [human]
enhancement interventions is at hand” (ibid.).
A burgeoning academic literature has begun to debate the moral
propriety of such enhancement. This debate often centers on the
useofneurotechnological,pharmacological,orother interventions
to increase some human capacity or function (e.g., Bostrom, 2003,
2009; Bostrom and Roache, 2008; see also Daniels, 2000; Harris,
2007; and Kass, 2003a; especially pp. 12–13). What, after all, is the
meaning of “enhance” if not to heighten, to augment, to intensify?
Thus we see articles asking whether non-invasive brain stimulation
should be used to enhance learning (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2012); whether we should be worried about university students
taking Ritalin to improve focus (e.g., Outram, 2010); whether
doctors have an obligation to ingest ergogenic drugs to stay awake
during late-night surgery (e.g., Greely et al., 2008); and whether
the use of mood brighteners is getting out of hand (e.g., Farah,
2002). The “augmentative” flavor of much of this work can be
seen in a recent article by Dees (2007, p. 372):
[Now or in the near future] drugs may be able to improve our abil-
ity to think. Amphetamines can help people to learn skilled motor
tasks, like playing the piano, more rapidly. Cholinsterase inhibitors
now help [patients] to improve their attention and memory, and
better versions may help virtually anyone. Amphetamines, like
Ritalin, improve focus, attention, and memory... Some drugs may
help the formation of long-term memories and thereby facilitate
learning... [Drugs can also] alter people’s moods.... Soon drugs
almost certainly will be developed that will “brighten” the mood
of anyone who takes them.
Bostrom and Roache (2008) take a similar approach: “One impor-
tant way in which the human condition could be changed is
through the enhancement of basic human capacities... There are
various ways in which we can currently improve [these capacities,
including] stamina, strength, dexterity, flexibility, coordination,
agility, and conditioning” (pages 1 and 7 1). In another paper,
Bostrom (2009, p. 82) asks us to
1Page numbers are from the online version available at http://www.
nickbostrom.com/ethics/human-enhancement.pdf
2Page number is from the online version available at http://www.
nickbostrom.com/ethics/dignity-enhancement.pdf
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Consider, for example, enhancements in executive function and
self-control, concentration, or of our ability to cope with stressful
situations; further, consider enhancements of mental energy that
would make us more capable of independent initiative and that
would reduce our reliance on external stimuli such as television;
consider perhaps also enhancement of our ability to withstand
mild pains and discomforts, and to more effectively self-regulate
our consumption of food, exercise, and sleep.
Note the specific focus here on capacities, moods, or functions
that might be improved by the pharmacological (or other)
intervention—“improved” in the sense of facilitating more of
whatever it is that the function normally does (see Dresler et al.,
2013 for a recent review). We can summarize this sort of approach
as follows:
The Functional-Augmentative Approach to Enhancement:
Interventions are considered enhancements insofar as they
improve some capacity or function (such as cognition, vision,
hearing, alertness) by increasing the ability of the function to
do what it normally does.
The debate then typically turns on whether the proposed
capacity-enhancement should be considered permissible for
someone who does not suffer a “medical” disadvantage along
that dimension (Daniels, 2000; Allhoff et al., 2009). In this con-
text, a distinction is frequently drawn between “enhancement”
(on the one hand) and mere “treatment” or “therapy” (on the
other), with the implication often being that the former may
be morally problematic in ways that the latter may not be.
This consideration suggests a second approach to understanding
enhancement:
The Not-Medicine Approach to Enhancement (Treatment vs.
Enhancement) (see, e.g., Sabin and Daniels, 1994; Juengst,
1998; Daniels, 2000; Kass, 2003b; Pellegrino, 2004): On this
view, “the term enhancement [characterizes] interventions
designed to improve human form or functioning beyond what
is necessary to sustain or restore good health” (Juengst, 1998,
emphasis added).
There are other approaches as well. In an earlier work, we iden-
tified two additional ways of understanding enhancement—the
sociological-pragmatic approach and the ideological approach
(see Savulescu et al., 2011, for details)—and then proceeded to
outline a new account of enhancement, which we argued was
preferable to the others: the welfarist approach. This approach can
be defined as follows:
The Welfarist Approach to Enhancement: “Enhancement”
should be defined to mean any change in the biology or psy-
chology of a person which increases the chances of leading a
good life in a given set of circumstances.
In the present article, we wish to develop our defense of
this welfarist account by contrasting it specifically with the
“augmentative” functionalist approach 3 (i.e., enhancement of
some capacity; see Table 1 for a selective summary)—as well as
the related “not-medicine” approach to enhancement—in light
of recent discussions in neuroethics that seem to break the con-
ventional mold. We introduce the notion of “diminishment as
enhancement” and focus on a set of cases in which “subtractive”
interventions—that is, interventions geared toward weakening a
given capacity or function—might plausibly contribute to indi-
vidual welfare enhancement in line with the definition just laid
out. We conclude by discussing some of the advantages that this
welfarist conception has over other common definitions.
DISCUSSION
What do we mean by “diminishment”? We can dispense with a
potential red herring. We do not mean to draw attention to spe-
cific neural pathways or low-level mechanisms whose weakening
or disruption might go on to yield some higher-order functional
outcome. For instance, stimulants such as Ritalin, sometimes
used to augment focus and concentration, could in principle be
understood as “diminishments” since—on at least at one level of
description—they actually limit the reuptake of neurotransmit-
ters, ultimately producing their stimulating effects 4 . Likewise,
TMS and other forms of brain stimulation may involve disrupting
3One may wonder just how common this approach is—that is, how frequently
it is encountered in the literature compared to other approaches. As noted
above, in addition to the work of prominent figures such as Bostrom—who
define enhancement explicitly in terms of augmentation of functions or capac-
ities (see especially Bostrom, 2009)—the most commonly referenced account
is the “not-medicine” approach, which distinguishes enhancement from treat-
ment, as in the seminal report from the President’s Council on Bioethics,
“Beyond Therapy” (Kass, 2003b). “Therapy” is ordinarily understood as being
an attempt to address disease, which on the dominant account after Boorse
(1977) is species-typical subfunctioning (see also Daniels, 1985). Therefore,
on the “not-medicine” approach as well, enhancement just is the improve-
ment of some function within (or beyond) the normal range. We do not
suggest, of course, that the functional-augmentative view is the only view
one encounters in the literature, nor that cases of functional diminishment
are never employed in these debates. Indeed, one of the classic examples of
“enhancement” from the field—the blunting of painful memories (which we
discuss below)—is quite common. However, in our reading of the literature, it
is examples relating to capacity augmentation that are much more frequently
encountered and actually used as illustrations of enhancement; and when
instances of diminishment are raised, their specific implications for the con-
ceptual understanding of enhancement is rarely if ever addressed. In addition,
the link between the intervention (whether augmentative or diminishing) and
well-being is not commonly articulated as such, with other goals such as “self
improvement” being either stated or implicitly assumed (e.g., Farah, 2013).
4Though note, as a reviewer points out: diminishment-as-enhancement “can
work at both lower (neurobiological) and higher (mental, psychological) lev-
els in a complementary way [depending upon the way the enhancement is
described]. While methylphenidate produces its stimulating effect by limit-
ing the reuptake of dopamine, it enhances one’s capacity to be more attentive
to and focused on a particular task by diminishing the content and scope
of one’s attention” (emphasis added). Thus we can see that it is possible to
augment (via diminishment) a given capacity (here, focus), not only by inter-
fering with some lower-order neurological process, but even by diminishing
an inversely related higher-order capacity: in this example, the scope of one’s
attention. Therefore it is important to make clear (as we do in a subsequent
paragraph) that our emphasis in this paper is on interventions that would
diminish the targeted higher-order capacity itself (i.e., focus), rather than
either (a) some lower-order mechanism whose diminishment would actually
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Table 1 | Selective summary of “augmentative” neural enhancements, means, and references.
Function Means References
Attention Nicotine, Modafinil, caffeine, glucose, aerobic
exercise, rTMS, computer training, meditation
Benton et al., 1994; Hilgetag et al., 2001;
Rezvani and Levin, 2001; Newhouse et al.,
2004; Repantis et al., 2010; Smith et al.,
2010; Chiesa et al., 2011; Zelinski et al., 2011
Empathy and mind-reading Oxytocin, MDMA Bartz et al., 2010; Hysek et al., 2012
Executive function Aerobic exercise; computer training;
meditation
Smith et al., 2010; Chiesa et al., 2011;
Nouchi et al., 2012
Learning—including implicit learning,
verbal learning, and numerical
learning
Amphetamine, methylphenidate, a large
number of synaptic-plasticity affecting drugs,
tDCS, various memory arts and mnemonic
systems
Soetens et al., 1993; Clark et al., 1999;
Kincses et al., 2004; Williams and Eskandar,
2006; Lee and Silva, 2009; Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2010; Repantis et al., 2010; Javadi
et al., 2012; Suthana et al., 2012
Inhibitory control and self control Modafinil, Atomoxetine, glucose Turner et al., 2003; Galliot et al., 2007;
Chamberlain et al., 2009
Memory—including working
memory, memory encoding, and
memory consolidation
Glucose, donepezil, physiostigmine, exercise,
tDCS, Ampakines, Modafinil, methylphenidate,
computer training, protein, meditation
Elliott and Sahakian, 1997; Furey et al., 2000;
Lynch, 2002; Turner et al., 2003; Barch,
2004; Marshall et al., 2004; Fregni et al.,
2005; Luber et al., 2007; Jaeggi et al., 2008;
Ohn et al., 2008; Riby et al., 2008; Thorell
et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010; Chiesa et al.,
2011; Teo et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012
Planning Methylphenidate Elliott and Sahakian, 1997
Reaction speed Glucose Owens and Benton, 1994
Recall tDCS Gagnon et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2010
Wakefulness/alertness Caffeine, Modafinil, amphetamine, other
stimulants
Hartmann and Cravens, 1976; Smith, 2002;
Baranski et al., 2004
activity in one region as a means to enhancing function in another
(or at another level of description). For example, TMS can reduce
interference between similar-sounding words in phonological
memory (likely by disrupting the phonological store), thereby
improving verbal recall (Kirschen et al., 2006). In these sorts of
cases, it is the higher-order function itself that we take to be the
target of enhancement (i.e., the capacity for focus, concentra-
tion, or recollection), whereas the lower-order “diminishment” is
merely instrumental.
By contrast, we intend to highlight interventions that serve to
diminish the higher-order capacities themselves. That is, we want
to focus on interventions that make concentration (for exam-
ple) worse—by virtue of whatever neural mechanism is involved.
Consider some illustrative cases. Should soldiers be given propra-
nolol to reduce the emotional intensity of wartime memories (e.g.,
Henry et al., 2007)? Should a battered spouse use “anti-love” neu-
rotechnology to sever the emotional attachment she has with her
increase the target capacity, or (b) an inversely-related higher-order capacity,
whose diminishment would have a similar effect.
abuser (Earp et al., 2013)? Should sex offenders have to undergo
“chemical castration” as a condition of parole (e.g., Gupta, 2012)?
Should appetite suppressants be developed for mass-market con-
sumption (e.g., Farah, 2013)? These are just a few recent examples
of potential interventions that might reduce or diminish a higher-
order capacity.
Interventions of this kind raise many of the same patterns
of ethical concern as the more conventional cases of functional
enhancement typically encountered in the bioethics literature.
For example: who should administer the drug or apply the tech-
nology? Should the intervention be regulated? How? Is a threat to
autonomy or authenticity potentially implied? And what sort of
externalities might need to be anticipated?
At the same time, however—given a functional-augmentative
framework—these cases might seem puzzling or out of place.
They seem puzzling because they apparently involve the very
opposite of enhancement, namely, diminishment: i.e., dimin-
ishment of wartime memories; diminishment of harmful love;
diminishment of ill-directed lust, and so on. How might these
seemingly opposite-to-enhancement outcomes be made to square
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with the seemingly similar-to-enhancement applicability of “stan-
dard” bioethical analysis?
There is a straightforward solution to this puzzle. Sometimes,
diminishment is enhancement—on the welfarist definition of the
term (see above). That is, once we shift our focus from the partic-
ular capacity or function being modified to the overall normative
goal of the modification itself, we begin to see that “enhance-
ment” may be more broadly understood as having something to
do with well-being—a goal that the welfarist definition makes
explicit. On this account, in order for an intervention to count as
an enhancement, it does not matter if the capacity itself is being
modified “up” or being modified “down.” Nor does it matter if
the modification is being accomplished by means 5 of a drug, a
biochip, an electrical brain-stimulator, or something more famil-
iar and lower tech. Nor does it matter if the intervention is called
“medicine” or “therapy” or “beyond therapy” or anything else. If
it increases the person’s chances of leading a good life in the rele-
vant circumstances, then we propose that it should be considered
an enhancement.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT
Well... so what? What does this welfarist definition get us? How
will it be useful for medical professionals, neuroethicists, and
other stakeholders engaged in these sorts of discussions? Finally,
what advantages does it have over other definitions used through-
out the literature?
First, and most basically, it acknowledges that “more” is
not always “better.” As commonplace a maxim as this is, it is
not always duly appreciated. As the neuroscientist Baron-Cohen
(2011) has recently argued, even such “obviously” beneficial
human capacities as the ability to empathize may have mal-
adaptive consequences in certain cases. For example, too much
empathy might drive a person to prioritize attending to others’
feelings over meeting her own basic needs. Or consider “empathy
fatigue”—a term used by Stebnicki (2007) to refer to the phys-
ical and emotional exhaustion that grief and trauma counselors
sometimes come to face: their inability to distance themselves
emotionally from the pain and suffering of their clients ultimately
prevents them from doing their job. Likewise, Williams (1989) has
hypothesized that among helping professionals, high emotional
empathizers may be disposed to earlier career burnout.
The same lesson may apply to other “obviously” beneficial
capacities such as intelligence or IQ. While super-intelligence
might seem to be an enviable trait or disposition, being “too smart
for one’s own good” is not always a mere teasing admonition: for
many intellectually gifted individuals, very high intelligence can
come at a direct cost to their overall well-being (Harrison and
Van Haneghan, 2011). Furthermore, intelligence is not sufficient
5Note that the means “do not matter” only in the specific sense stated—i.e., in
terms of whether some intervention should be counted as an enhancement. By
contrast, the means might very well matter in terms of having different safety
profiles, etc. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that all means will be
normatively equivalent either, even if well-being is taken as the explicit goal of
enhancement. This is because there are other normatively-relevant consider-
ations besides well-being, such as justice or fairness, which may impact upon
the evaluation of means (as well as other factors related to enhancement), as
we discuss in a later section.
for achieving the good life, but is merely instrumental, and IQ
enhancement per se does not seem to have any clearly determinate
value (Tännsjö, 2009).
Likewise, the ability to remember well would seem to be a ben-
eficial thing: “memory makes us” (it has been said) and many
elderly people are very sad to see their powers of recollection fade
over time. But as any victim of rape might tell you—and as the
soldiers we referred to earlier would hasten to agree—sometimes
memory can be a devastating shackle. In addition, research has
shown that excessive autobiographical memory (hyperthymesia)
can interfere with the basic business of living one’s life (Parker
et al., 2006).
Finally, even romantic love—undoubtedly the most cele-
brated emotional capacity of all—can be dangerous or even life-
threatening when the object of affection is cruel or abusive. Some
victims of domestic violence, for example, find themselves unable
to diminish their passionate feelings for their abuser, despite being
fully aware that their long-term well-being and even basic phys-
ical safety may be under threat by remaining in the relationship
(Earp et al., 2013, 2014, under review; see also Earp et al., 2012,
for further discussion).
The implication in all of this is clear; and here we reaffirm our
thesis to drive it home: Sometimes, diminishing a certain capacity
or function—under the right set of circumstances—could quite
plausibly enhance a person’s overall well-being.6
SOME FINE-TUNING
Given this possibility, one might be tempted to argue that func-
tional diminishment would only enhance well-being by bringing
the individual back from a pathological state to a species-typical
state. Yet while this direction of change could reasonably describe
a number of specific cases, it is unlikely to hold as a general rule.
This is because what it is that enhances well-being is not species-
general, but rather context-specific. Thus, as Dees (2007) notes,
“beta blockers [can be used to] decrease stress and nervousness,
and so they help even normal people cope with abnormal sit-
uations” (p. 372). In the context of a public performance, for
example, even a quite ordinary stress reaction could interfere with
an individual’s well-being, given the context-local goals of the per-
former: hence “[the] widespread use [of beta-blockers] among
concert performers is legendary” (ibid.) Likewise, in the noto-
rious “Ashley case” (Liao et al., 2007), the parents of a severely
brain-impaired child wanted to stunt her growth by using estro-
gen therapy (as well as remove her uterus and breast buds) in
order to improve her quality of life. While parts of the treatment
and even the motivations behind it may certainly be called into
question, it is at least plausible to think that reducing Ashley’s
growth, all things considered, would count in favor of her own
best interests. For example, Ashley’s parents suggested that her
smaller size would make it easier to carry her around, thus allow-
ing her to participate more fully in the activities of daily living.
If so, then approaching the normal human size range would not
improve well-being, whereas the proposed diminishment might.
6This sort of welfare enhancement is likeliest to occur, we suggest, when
the functional diminishment in question results in optimal levels of capacity
functioning for successful adaptation to the demands of the environment.
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But what is the more general thrust of the argument? In other
words, when, or under what conditions, is (functional) dimin-
ishment likely to produce (well-being) enhancement? We have
already discussed context-specific and “pathological” cases, but
others suggest themselves as well. One plausible view is that we
should expect promising enhancers when the trade-offs in our
living conditions have shifted from the environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2008). While some
changes no doubt enable well-being enhancement in the sense of
getting more of something that was limited in the past because
of its cost, there are likely other domains in which something
has lost importance today. For example, fight-or-flight reactions
that would have served well in an environment flush with preda-
tors might today contribute more to stress, cardiovascular disease,
and problems with anxiety (Bracha and Maser, 2008). Anti-
parasite immune cells can become overactive in our relatively
clean environment, triggering allergies (Sironi and Clerici, 2010).
And ancient hunger drives can lead to obesity in today’s societies,
given the unprecedented availability of low-nutrient, high-calorie
foods (e.g., Serlie et al., 2011). These examples provide further
potential cases in which we might judiciously diminish our body’s
natural responses in order to improve our overall well-being.
CONCLUSION
Our aim in this article has been simple. It has been to rethink,
or at least to problematize, the chiefly “augmentative” flavor of
discourse surrounding neurotechnological enhancement. We do
not mean to imply, of course, that all or even most of the dimin-
ishments we have discussed are currently technologically feasible,
nor do we suggest that they would always be the best solution to
the problem at hand. As Levy (2012) has recently argued, when
faced with a detrimental mismatch between our capacities and
our context, it is often better to change our environmental condi-
tions than it is to re-tool our biology, all things considered. Other
times, the best course of action might be to pursue a comple-
mentary strategy that involves the use of brain-level interventions
alongside other types of approaches (Savulescu and Sandberg,
2008). The answer is likely to be different for different cases.
Yet whatever position one takes on the proper balance of inter-
vention strategies, we have tried to show that there is something
to be gained by distinguishing functional enhancement from
enhancement of well-being. For any disposition, trait, or func-
tion, there is likely to be a discrete range of optimal levels (of
intensity, sensitivity, etc.) for the given set of conditions, and
too much or too little may detract from health or happiness.
Identifying diminishment as a possible form of human enhance-
ment, therefore, invites us to ask whether we may have too much
X for the best life, based on the relevant local circumstances and
other facets of modern living.
Another advantage of the welfarist definition of enhancement
is that it can handle not only cases of functional diminishment
(our emphasis in this paper), but even unusual cases includ-
ing extensions of the body, in which a new capacity is added
that did not exist before. One example of such a case is the
use of implanted magnets for “magnetic vision” (Larratt, 2004).
While this type of intervention is clearly “augmentative” (in the
sense of adding something rather than subtracting), it differs
from the usual augmentative cases—which involve intensifying
an existing capacity—in that it introduces a novel capacity that
would not exist at all without the enhancement. Similarly other
forms of body-modifications may be seen as attempts to enhance
well-being through bringing the body more in line with per-
sonal ideals of self-expression. These cases, too, may not involve
the “enhancement” of any existing capacity, but rather welfare
enhancement more broadly construed through the employment
of biotechnology.
We are careful to note that we have left untouched important
questions about who would administer these new technologies,
under what specific conditions; how their advisability would be
decided upon (especially as compared to other, potentially less
invasive, forms of intervention); how long their effects should
be expected to last; what risks or side-effects might be involved;
and whether any regulatory structures would have to be put in
place to accommodate their existence. These types of questions
are bound to overlap with analogous puzzles being worked out in
the “augmentative” enhancement literature, so we will leave their
discussion for another day. Here we have endeavored, not to cul-
tivate a vast procedural forest, but rather to plant a conceptual
seed.
FINAL THOUGHTS
As we have argued elsewhere (Savulescu et al., 2011), the
“enhancement debates” in biomedical ethics have been needlessly
encumbered by the existence of a hodge-podge of ill-defined,
poorly articulated notions of enhancement—often only implic-
itly communicated—along with endless to-ing and fro-ing about
the relationship between enhancement and the limits of medicine.
Re-casting “enhancement” as being essentially related to welfare,
however, provides several distinct advantages:
It ties enhancement to the value of well-being... It offers a gen-
eral framework for thinking about well-being. It offers more than
a mere list of value claims. It singles out well-being as one dimen-
sion of value that is constitutive of genuine human enhancement.
But it leaves open substantive and contentions questions about the
nature of well-being, and important empirical questions about the
impact of some treatment on well-being. [Moreover], the welfarist
approach distinguishes ways in which some treatment might ben-
efit a person from other relevant values, such as justice. It thus
allows us to say that although some treatment is an enhancement
(i.e., contributes to individuals’ well-being), it might neverthe-
less be bad overall, because its employment in the current social
context will lead to far greater injustice. (p. 7)
Finally, we note that people’s normal brain functions will dif-
fer across time and circumstance. They will differ between people
as well. We can now control function, at least in part, through the
use of neurotechnology and biomedicine, and our ability to do
so is likely to become increasingly more potent as well as more
targeted in the decades to come. We suggest that we should tie
this ability to a robust account of well-being (e.g., Kahane and
Savulescu, 2008; Earp et al., under review), and seek to maximize
function toward that end, whether the capacity itself is being aug-
mented (as is typically emphasized in these debates) or indeed (as
we emphasize here) effectively diminished.
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Functional neurosurgery has seen a resurgence of interest in surgical treatments for
psychiatric illness. Deep brain stimulation (DBS) technology is the preferred tool in the
current wave of clinical experiments because it allows clinicians to directly alter the
functions of targeted brain regions, in a reversible manner, with the intent of correcting
diseases of the mind, such as depression, addiction, anorexia nervosa, dementia, and
obsessive compulsive disorder. These promising treatments raise a critical philosophical
and humanitarian question. “Under what conditions does ‘altering brain function’ qualify
as ‘mind control’?” In order to answer this question one needs a definition of mind control.
To this end, we reviewed the relevant philosophical, ethical, and neurosurgical literature in
order to create a set of criteria for what constitutes mind control in the context of DBS.
We also outline clinical implications of these criteria. Finally, we demonstrate the relevance
of the proposed criteria by focusing especially on serendipitous treatments involving DBS,
i.e., cases in which an unintended therapeutic benefit occurred. These cases highlight the
importance of gaining the consent of the subject for the new therapy in order to avoid
committing an act of mind control.
Keywords: philosophy of mind, ethics, neurosurgery, deep brain stimulation, psychiatry
INTRODUCTION
The use of deep brain stimulation (DBS) technology for the
treatment of psychiatric disorders is one of the most promising
and rapidly evolving areas of neurosurgical research (Abelson
et al., 2005; Mayberg et al., 2005; Lozano and Lipsman, 2013).
Nonetheless, in treating diseases of the mind by directly altering
the brain’s functioning, neurosurgeons, neurologists, psychia-
trists, and neuro-engineers run the risk of having this effort
interpreted as “mind control”. The purpose of this paper is to
address that specific concern in the context of DBS as it is
currently practiced and studied by providing a definition of “mind
control” that applies to DBS. That is, it is not intended to account
for the neurosurgeons staffing the wards of philosophical thought
experiments, whose powers to monitor and manipulate the brain
and their patients’ actions know no limits (Frankfurt, 1969).
Therefore, this paper seeks to cover adult patients who have
given informed consent for the treatment of their psychiatric or
neurologic illness.
By narrowing the scope of the article, we hope to maximize
its relevance while minimizing distracting (though philosoph-
ically interesting) cases. It is important to point out that the
conditions under discussion (adults, undergoing treatment, who
are capable of informed consent—including patients in states
such as locked-in syndrome) describe nearly all individuals
currently receiving DBS with the exception of those treated for
persistent vegetative state who lack the capacity to do anything,
including the ability to provide consent (Yamamoto et al.,
2010).
While the phrase “mind control” appears in the contemporary
literature discussing advances in DBS, it is often brought up
dismissively (Fins et al., 2009) or to catch the reader’s attention
(Horgan, 2004) but never with an accompanying formal defi-
nition. This is surprising, especially given a sophisticated and
robust ethics literature on DBS and psychiatry that deals with
related topics such as autonomy and informed consent (Bell et al.,
2009; Clausen, 2010), authenticity (Kraemer, 2013), enhancement
(Earp et al., 2014), and paternalism (Sjöstrand and Juth, 2014)
as well as unintended side effects of stimulation which alter
personality (Synofzik and Schlaepfer, 2008) and the way in which
DBS can influence patients’ perceptions of their identity (Lipsman
et al., 2009). Common features in this literature are an agreement
that autonomy is one of the key features that must be preserved in
the ethical practice of DBS and that this can been accomplished
in psychiatric patients through the practice of informed consent
(Dunn et al., 2011).
Beyond the contemporary neuro-ethics literature, mind
control has been the subject of numerous books and arti-
cles. One of the most thorough accounts of mind control
in the context of electrical stimulation of the human mind
appears in Elliot Valenstein’s aptly titled Brain Control (Valen-
stein, 1973). While Valenstein never supplies a formal defini-
tion of mind control, his primary argument focuses on discred-
iting the notion that a subject’s thoughts, choices or actions
could be manipulated through electrical stimulation of the
brain by giving a detailed account of its known capabilities
and limitations. Other discussions of mind control tend to
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have focused on psychopharmacologic methods or behavioral
methods of altering brain function, such as those employed in
the Central Intelligence Agency’s MKULTRA program (Senate,
1977).
Possibly the richest source of accounts of mind control is not
in the formal academic literature but in the online accounts of
individuals who claim to have witnessed acts of mind control or
who claim to be the target of mind control. In 2006 Bell et al.
provided a formal textual analysis of 10 characteristic examples.
Though the authors make it clear that they take these narratives
as signs of a delusional disorder and their analysis focused pri-
marily on the social network of the reports, they managed to
highlight several themes which the accounts shared. These shared
features help to establish an intuitive basis for what people believe
qualifies as mind control. The accounts often focused on: (1)
an authoritarian organization, such as “the police,” “the Dutch
government,” or “freemasonic intelligence agencies;” (2) employ-
ing some tool to augment brain function, such as a “frequency
weapon,” “brain implant” or “network of transmitters,” in order
to; (3) alter the subject’s thoughts or actions; (4) without the
subjects consent.
In proposing our criteria for mind control we retained and
formalized all of the common themes of the internet accounts
with the exception of the authoritarian organization. The author-
itarian element was dropped because the authors saw no rea-
son to exclude individuals acting alone from being capable of
committing an act of mind control. This is especially true in
the context of DBS where typically only one person or a few
people are responsible for the management of the treatment.
Therefore, we are proposing the phrase “mind control” be used
to describe instances when researchers or clinicians using DBS
intentionally alter patients’ behavior without consent and define
those instances using the criteria below.
After stating our formal criteria, we explain why the criteria
are limited to the subject’s behavior and neutral with regards
to the subject’s mental events during the act of mind control.
Then we provide test cases, which we argue intuitively do and
do not qualify as mind control and are correctly included and
excluded by the proposed criteria respectively. Next, we apply
the criteria to a non-obvious case of mind control. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of mind control in the context of
serendipitous therapy, i.e., cases where an individual sees a ther-
apeutic effect for a psychiatric illness for which he or she did
not give consent to have treated, such as in a patient treated
with DBS for anxiety who saw a remission of his alcoholism. We
argue that in such cases one should gain the individual’s explicit
consent for the treatment of the serendipitously improved co-
morbid illness or else one would qualify as committing an act of
mind control.
CRITERIA OF MIND CONTROL
Alteration of the brain’s functioning through direct stimulation
(either activation or suppression of action potentials) within the
subject’s brain qualifies as mind control when it meets all of the
following three criteria:
Result Criterion: Direct alteration of the brain’s function must
result in a behavioral change in the subject.
Consent Criterion: The behavioral change does not need to be
against the expressed will of the patient. The change must simply
have taken place without the subject’s consent.
Intent Criterion: The behavioral change must have been the
goal or the purpose of the person or the group controlling the
DBS. It cannot be an accident or an unintended consequence,
including side effects, of the stimulation.
In summary, mind control must alter the patient’s behavior
in an observable way without the subject’s consent and must be
enacted for that purpose.
LIMITING MIND TO BEHAVIOR
The above criteria rest on an assumption that the ultimate pur-
pose of “mind control” is to modify the behavior of an individual,
and the word “mind” is used in a folk psychology manner to
describe the intuitive mechanism of the control (Dennett, 1982).
It is important to spell out the definition of “mind control” in
the context of behavior because that is the relevant way DBS is
currently employed. This is because neurosurgeons and neurol-
ogists cannot make perfectly reliable a priori guesses about what
effect a given instance of DBS will have on a given patient. They
must therefore rely entirely on their observations of the patients’
behaviors, which include their patients’ reports.
To understand this point, consider that neurosurgeons have
a great deal of information about what parts of the brain are
associated with certain faculties, such as the formation and com-
prehension of speech, sensation of touch over the body, execution
of intended movement, and sight. Further, they know that the
destruction of these regions will leave the patient with a deficit
so protecting them during surgery is one of the surgeon’s highest
priorities. However, the surgeons cannot predict exactly where
these regions are located in specific patients based on previous
studies alone (Penfield and Perot, 1963; Kim et al., 2009). There-
fore, some neurosurgical cases are performed with the patient
awake so that he or she can report the sensations he or she
experiences when the neurosurgeon applies electric current to
the brain region of interest. Based on the patient’s reports, the
surgeon will individualize his approach in order to resect the
pathological tissue while sparing the functionally important, so
called eloquent, cortex. If the procedure were performed without
the patient’s behavioral feedback there would be a very high
probability that an important cortical region would be damaged
leaving the patient with a neurological deficit (Penfield and
Boldrey, 1937).
The same type of procedure is also essential to the practice
of DBS. For example patients must be closely observed intra-
operatively for behavioral signs, such as a reflexive smile, in
order for the surgical team to determine the effect of stimulation
(Okun et al., 2004; Haq et al., 2011). Once the electrode and
stimulator are implanted, specially trained neurologists adjust
the stimulation parameters and closely observe the effect on the
patient’s symptoms (Volkmann et al., 2006). Finally, patients must
be closely followed during treatment for signs of cognitive decline
(Parsons et al., 2006), mood disorders (Bejjani et al., 1999; Kuli-
sevsky et al., 2002), or other, sometimes serendipitous, behavioral
changes (Kuhn et al., 2007). In summary, the use of DBS relies
entirely on the patient’s behavior as the sole feedback mechanism
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for targeting the electrode as well for modifying the stimulation
parameters in order to achieve the desired effect. Because the
person or persons controlling the DBS rely on observation of
behavior, any instance of mind control using DBS would neces-
sarily rely entirely on the subject’s behavior. Therefore, a practical
definition of mind control can be limited solely to behavior
without directly addressing metaphysical questions related to the
mind itself.
OBVIOUS TEST CASES
Having proposed the criteria for mind control, it is important to
test them. This is best done by asking whether the criteria account
for cases of obvious mind control while excluding cases that are
obviously not mind control.
For a clear example of mind control, we must (fortunately)
look beyond the current practice of DBS into its murkier past.
One such case was published in 1963 in the journal Science
by a psychosurgery group working under Dr. Robert Heath at
Tulane University (Bishop et al., 1963). This article detailed
a “self-stimulation” experiment in which a 35 year old man
was implanted with electrodes in eight different brain struc-
tures, including in the head of the caudate, the septal area, and
the amygdala. These electrodes were labeled by researchers as
either “rewarding” or “aversive” and the subject was given a
lever and a button which, when operated, would activate one
of the electrodes. As the experiment proceeded, the researchers
varied the electrodes which the lever and button activated and
also varied the stimulation parameters delivered through the
electrodes.
This experiment was based on studies previously done in
rats, cats, dogs, goats, monkeys, and bottle nosed dolphins
(Olds, 1962) which had shown that the animals’ behavior
could be predictably controlled by placing stimulating elec-
trodes into “rewarding” and “aversive” regions of the brain and
then correlating stimulation through the electrodes to elements
of the animals’ environment. Therefore, the researchers had
good reason to anticipate specific behavioral responses in the
human subject. Further, at no point do the authors say that
the subject, who was referred to as “clearly nonnormal,” gave
consent for the experiment or understood why the experiment
was conducted.
Looking back to the proposed criteria for mind control, we
see that this case satisfies all three. First, electrical stimulation
of the brain was employed in a manner that clearly influenced
the subject’s behavior, satisfying the Result Criterion. Second, at
no point did the authors state that the patient gave consent
to have his behavior manipulated in this manner, satisfying the
Consent Criterion. Finally, the behavior change was anticipated by
the researchers controlling the stimulation of the subject’s brain,
satisfying the Intent Criterion.
Next, we must ask is there an example of altering brain func-
tion which obviously is not mind control and, also, is correctly
excluded by the Result, Consent, and Intent Criteria? Consider the
treatment of essential tremor with DBS. It is safe, effective, and
has been approved by the FDA (Koller et al., 2001). It is believed to
work through altering the function of the brain (more specifically
by causing a reversible, functional lesion (Grill et al., 2004) in
a malfunctioning part of the brain), ultimately permitting the
patient to accomplish routine daily activities free from the violent
hand tremors that are the hallmark of the disease. This relief of
symptoms is the direct result of the electrical pulses in the brain,
which alter its standard pattern of firing; however, it is not an
instance of mind control.
Why is DBS for the treatment of essential tremor not an
example of mind control? After all, it could be argued that one
is altering the behavior of the patient’s hands, from a tremulous
grasp to a stable grip, and that this was explicitly the purpose
of the individual programing the DBS device. However, while
this example meets the requirements of the Result Criterion
as well as the Intent Criterion, it fails to meet the Consent
Criterion because in all cases of DBS for essential tremor, all
patients give consent for stimulation with the explicit desire
to see this behavioral change. Interestingly, DBS for essential
tremor could be thought of as “mind freedom,” as opposed
to “mind control” because, instead of preventing the patient
from carrying out a desired behavior or forcing an undesired
behavior, it allows the patient to act on his choices with less
difficulty.
The same argument also holds for DBS treatments of psychi-
atric diseases like depression (Lozano et al., 2008). One might
make the argument that being a psychiatric disease, depression is
classically described as a disease of the mind. Therefore, if one can
control the patient’s disease one must be controlling the patient’s
mind, i.e., committing an act of mind control. The proposed
criteria would exclude this case of mind control because, as in the
case of DBS for the treatment of essential tremor, the effect on
the patient was with the patient’s consent, and, thus, it fails the
Consent Criterion.
NON-OBVIOUS TEST CASE
While it is important that the criteria capture one’s intuition,
they should also go beyond and clarify murkier territory. The
criteria should be able to help one examine non-obvious cases and
arrive at a reasoned judgment about their status as mind control
or as non-mind control. Thus, the criteria above are especially
useful when attempting to identify borderline instances of mind
control.
Turning again to the past, consider the following case of an
experiment conducted by Jose Delgado and his collaborators
Drs. Obrador and Martin-Rodriguez into the stimulation of the
caudate nucleus of an epileptic patient:
As shown by direct observation and by analysis of the record,
within 30 s after application of caudate stimulation there was a
significant change in the patient’s mood. During controls, he was
reserved, his conversation was limited and he was concerned about
his illness. After caudate stimulation, his spontaneous verbaliza-
tion increased more than twofold and contained expressions of
friendliness and euphoric behavior which culminated in jokes and
loud singing in a gay cante jondo style, accompanied by tapping
with his right hand, which lasted for about 2 min. The eupho-
ria continued for about 10 min and then the patient gradually
reverted to his usual, more reserved attitude. This increase in
friendliness was observed following three different stimulation
sessions of the caudate, and did not appear when other areas were
tested (Valenstein, 1973).
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In the above description, the researchers are attempting to
correct the patient’s epilepsy with the use of electrical current. In
testing one of their hypothesized targets, they managed to elicit a
strong behavioral effect. The patient’s attitude changed from quiet
reserve to expressive joviality, i.e., the researchers significantly
altered the patient’s behavior and in doing so satisfied the Result
Criterion, as well as the Consent Criterion because they did not
have the patient’s consent to alter his behavior in this manner. At
this point one could argue, correctly, that this was an accident.
The experimenters had no a priori knowledge that the patient
would respond to stimulation in this fashion so it could not have
been their intention to do so; thus, they failed to satisfy the Intent
Criterion.
The essential issue arose when the stimulation was repeated,
three different times, without any documentation that the patient
wanted to have his personality manipulated in this manner.
While this might, at first, seem like nit picking, it is impor-
tant to appreciate that the experimenters now had reason to
believe that the behavior of the individual would be affected in
a specific way. When they activated the stimulation and pro-
duced the anticipated effect, it was purposeful. In this way, the
experimenters fulfilled the Intent Criterion. As in the case of
a schizophrenic patient subjected to the self-stimulation exper-
iment above, it seems clear that the researchers’ motivation
was intellectual curiosity and not malice. Nevertheless, both of
these cases demonstrate that malice is not necessary for mind
control.
SERENDIPITY AND MIND CONTROL
The above case raises a critical question with regard to several
recently published studies in which subjects received DBS in
an effort to treat one illness, but instead saw serendipitous
improvement in a comorbid psychiatric illness. One serendip-
itous discovery was reported by Kuhn et al. (2007) who
attempted to treat a man with anxiety disorder by placing
DBS electrodes into his nucleus accumbens, a major compo-
nent in the reward circuit of the mammalian brain. While
the patient’s anxiety did not improve, he did see significant
remission in his alcohol dependency, leading the group to pro-
pose the target as a potential treatment for alcoholism and
addiction.
A second example comes from Hamani et al. (2008) who
used DBS of the hypothalamus in an effort to help control a
patient with morbid obesity. Although the patient continued
to gain weight (a fact left out of the primary article and only
included in the online supplemental materials) he did experience
a flashback while receiving intra-operative test stimulation. This
led the researchers to do a battery of studies to determine if
stimulation to the same area at a lower level, which did not
cause a flashback, could improve memory. To the surprise of
the researchers, they found a significant increase in the subject’s
verbal memory. Based on this finding the authors proposed the
anterior fornix (a structure adjacent to the hypothalamus) as a
target for the treatment of dementia and began enrolling patients
to study it further.
Finally, Israël et al. (2010) describes a case in which a woman
was receiving DBS of the subgenual cingulate gyrus (Cg25) for
treatment of depression. The authors noted that, although the
patient continued to have relapses of major depression, she
stopped experiencing symptoms related to a significant comorbid
anorexia nervosa. Based on the remarkable improvement the
patient experienced, despite her less remarkable improvement for
her depression, the authors proposed Cg25 as a target for the
treatment of anorexia nervosa.
There are several curious similarities among the cases above.
First, the intended effect of DBS was either not seen or was
not particularly robust. Second, the serendipitous effect on the
comorbid illness (or enhancement of normal faculties in the
case of anterior fornix stimulation for memory) was remark-
able. Third, based on these cases all authors proposed that the
stimulated sites be tested as targets for monotherapy for the
responding illness. A final common feature was that at no point
did the authors describe the patient receiving informed consent
for the managing of the comorbid illness or for enhancing the
patient’s faculties (Earp et al., 2014), with DBS. The only paper
that commented on informed consent was Hamani et al. which
stated:
The procedure was approved by the University Health Net-
work Research Ethics Board, and written informed consent was
obtained under the guidance of a hospital ethicist, who served as
a consent monitor. The basis of the approval for this man was
the refractory nature of the obesity, the exhaustion of reasonable
therapeutic alternatives, and the possibility of reducing the health
risks of chronic obesity should the intervention prove successful
(Hamani et al., 2008).
In the passage above, the authors clearly stated a reasonable
approach for obtaining informed consent for the treatment of
the patient’s obesity. However, they did not describe receiving
the patient’s consent for the use of DBS in order to enhance
his verbal memory. Despite not reporting the patient’s informed
consent to have his memory augmented, they proceeded to run
a battery of tests on the patient’s memory function and, fur-
thermore, did not mention discontinuing the treatment once it
became apparent that DBS was not effective for the treatment of
obesity.
The above cases raises a critical question: were these examples
of “mind control”? The patients had unexpected alterations in
their behavior and it appears, based on the descriptions of the
cases, that the DBS was continued primarily because of these
unexpected results. Further, the authors did not report that they
repeated the informed consent process for the serendipitous
alteration in the patient’s behavior. The authors of this paper
could conjecture that, once the researchers realized the unex-
pected effect DBS was having on their patient they consulted
with him or her and received his or her blessing to continue
therapy. Nonetheless, if they (or others) had not secured the
consent of their patients for these new treatment indications, then
they would be satisfying the Result (behavior change) Consent
(happening without patient’s consent) and Intent (behavioral
change was the goal of DBS) criteria of mind control. Therefore,
it is critical for clinicians and researchers to secure additional
consent in the case of serendipitous therapeutic benefit in order
to avoid the charge that they are committing an act of mind
control.
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CONCLUSION
We have argued that DBS is not synonymous with mind control;
however, if not appropriately safeguarded, patients can be vic-
tims of mind control even without malice on the part of those
controlling the stimulation, especially in the case of serendipi-
tous treatment of co-morbid psychiatric illnesses. While many
instances of mind control are easily identified, there are certain
instances where the distinction is more ambiguous. This paper
outlines a clear set of criteria to help more effectively and reliably
clarify those ambiguous cases. For an act to be considered mind
control it must alter the individual’s behavior (Result Criterion)
without his consent (Consent Criterion) and this alteration to
the behavior of the individual must be the goal of the person
or group controlling the alteration (Intent Criterion). Relying on
the researchers’ or clinicians’ intuitions alone is not sufficient
because those intuitions might easily become clouded such as in
the serendipitous discovery of an effect of DBS. It is, therefore,
important to note that in cases of serendipitous treatments of
psychiatric illness patients also require the explicit consent for
the treatment of the co-morbid illness, or else the case would
qualify as mind control. It is the intention of the authors to
minimize the risk of such accidents by clarifying the underlying
concepts.
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The will is a complex set of cognitive
(including affective and motivational) and
motor capacities that enable us to initiate
and complete action plans. Neurological
and psychiatric disorders impair these
capacities because of dysfunction in neu-
ral circuits mediating them. Parkinson’s
disease (PD), major depressive disor-
der (MDD), obsessive-compulsive disor-
der (OCD), and other conditions can
be understood as disorders of the will
involving overactive, underactive or inac-
tive critical nodes of these circuits (Lozano
and Lipsman, 2013). Neural prosthe-
ses such as brain-computer interfaces
(BCIs), hippocampal prostheses (HPs),
and deep-brain stimulation (DBS) can
bypass, replace, or modulate damaged or
dysfunctional circuits and thereby restore
or enhance the capacities necessary to
translate intentions into actions. In this
respect, they can be described as prosthe-
ses for the will.
Philosophers claim that for the will to
be free, actions must not be generated by
causal routes that bypass and undermine
agent’s control of the mental states that
issue in them (Mele, 1995). Presumably,
this would include manipulation of the
brain by an artificial implanted device.
Yet neural prostheses that bypass, replace,
or modulate dysfunctional circuits do not
undermine but instead restore this control
when it has been lost and can enhance it
when it is impaired by brain injury or neu-
rodegeneration. They restore control of
thought and behavior by restoring the rel-
evant motor and mental functions. I will
describe the different respects in which the
three neural prostheses in question can
achieve this goal.
BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES:
RESTORATION OF MOTOR FUNCTION
BCIs utilize operant conditioning and
goal-directed thinking in restoring some
degree of motor function. As motor pros-
theses, they can enable some individu-
als with paralysis caused by traumatic
brain injury, neurodegenerative disease, or
limb loss to move a cursor on a com-
puter screen or a robotic arm by detect-
ing signals in the motor cortex associated
with intending to perform these actions.
These systems may involve macroelec-
trodes placed on the scalp and connected
to an EEG, electrodes implanted subdu-
rally or epidurally, or a microelectrode
array implanted in the motor cortex. What
causes the cursor or robotic arm to move
is the mental act of forming and executing
an intention by the person manipulating
the interface. BCIs may also enable those
with disorders of consciousness or locked-
in syndrome who retain a high level
of cognitive functioning to reliably com-
municate their wishes about continuing
or discontinuing life-sustaining treatment
when they cannot communicate behav-
iorally. Difficulties with learning how to
manipulate BCIs, sustaining attention to
the task at hand, and the semantic capac-
ity necessary to communicate for those
with cognitive impairment are some of the
challenges presented by this technology
(Birbaumer et al., 2014). Whether a per-
son using such a system can translate his
or her thoughts into actions may depend
on the extent of brain injury, which cor-
tical circuits are intact, and how effective
the practitioner is in training the patient to
operate the interface. The extent to which
the patient can do this successfully, and
thus the extent to which he or she can exer-
cise the motor component of the will, can
be a matter of degree.
HIPPOCAMPAL PROSTHESES:
RESTORATION OF MEMORY ENCODING
HPs to restore the cognitive function of
memory have been used as prototypes
in animal models but have not yet been
used in humans. While they are at the
developmental stage and may be ready for
implantation in the human brain in the
next 5 years, they remain a hypothetical
intervention. Electrical stimulation of the
fornix, which projects to a circuit consist-
ing of the hippocampus and entorhinal
cortex, improved semantic, working, and
procedural memory in at least one person
in a Phase I trial for early-stage Alzheimer’s
disease (Laxton et al., 2010). For those
with this or other dementias whose hip-
pocampal degeneration is too advanced to
respond to neurostimulation, or for those
with anterograde amnesia from traumatic
injury to the hippocampal-entorhinal cir-
cuit, an HP replacing it might be able to
restore the ability to encode new mem-
ories and learn and retain information
(Berger et al., 2011; Hampson et al., 2013).
It would do this by re-establishing inputs
and outputs in this circuit. This structure
is a component of the episodic memory
system and one of the first structures to
undergo cellular loss and tau pathology in
Alzheimer’s disease. Artificial reconstruc-
tion of neuron-to-neuron connections
with a biomimetic microchip model
replacing the hippocampal-entorhinal
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circuit could improve and sustain seman-
tic, working, and procedural memory in
those with degeneration in brain regions
mediating memory and enable them
to continue performing cognitive and
physical functions. Memory provides
a cognitive basis on which to imagine
counterfactual and possible courses of
action in the present and future (Hassabis
et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007). It
thus plays a critical role in deliberation
and decision-making. A prosthesis that
could resolve anterograde amnesia by re-
establishing the ability to encode, consol-
idate, and retrieve episodic memory could
restore planning and decisional capacity
and restore one component of the will.
Theoretically, it would not matter
whether memory functions were main-
tained by a natural or artificial system,
provided that the prosthesis connected in
the right way with the neural inputs and
outputs necessary for these functions. To
a certain extent, memory retrieval is an
involuntary process. We have some degree
of control of this process insofar as we
can make some episodic memories con-
sciously accessible and use the information
in working memory for immediate cog-
nitive demands and in prospective mem-
ory to plan ahead. But memories that
flooded our brains with information serv-
ing no such purpose could be a bur-
den and an impediment to free action.
Device makers and practitioners implant-
ing and activating an HP would have to
ensure that circuits mediating the encod-
ing, consolidation and retrieval of episodic
memory were neither underactive nor
overactive. They would also have to ensure
that the device integrated with adjacent
circuits in the medial temporal lobes
and did not interfere with nondeclarative
memory systems such as striatum- and
cerebellum-mediated procedural memory
and amygdala- and brainstem-mediated
emotional context memory. In addition,
the encoding function of an HP would
have to be compatible with the meaning
the agent assigns to past events and memo-
ries of them. This meaning influences how
the agent imagines future situations and
forms action plans. Prostheses would not
assign meaning to newly formed memo-
ries but would encode them with equal
value-neutral weight. This could impair
goal-directed behavior if it interfered with
the person’s capacity to select some past
events as more valuable than others in
deliberating about courses of action. The
encoding of new memories by the prosthe-
sis would have to complement meaning-
ful long-term memories that already have
been encoded and consolidated and are
available for retrieval. So the HP would not
only have to integrate with other circuits in
the person’s brain but also with his or her
history as an agent with a past and future.
DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION:
RESTORATION OF MOTOR AND
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS
DBS has the widest range of applica-
tions among neural prostheses, restoring
or enhancing motor as well as cogni-
tive functions. It can be used as both
as a probe and modulator of activity in
dysfunctional neural circuits implicated
in neurological and psychiatric disorders
(Lozano and Lipsman, 2013). DBS has
confirmed the pathophysiology of PD as
degeneration of dopaminergic structures
in the nigro-striatal pathway of the basal
ganglia. Unilateral or bilateral stimula-
tion of the subthalamic nucleus (STN)
or globus pallidus interna (GPi) have
restored circuit integrity and resulted in
significant improvement for many patients
with PD and other movement disor-
ders such as primary dystonia and essen-
tial tremor in their ability to perform
voluntary bodily movements. While the
technique is still experimental and inves-
tigational for psychiatric disorders, DBS
has confirmed that dysfunction in brain-
stem dopaminergic structures such as the
ventral tegmental area (VTA) associated
with motivation and reward is implicated
in depression with symptoms of anhe-
donia and avolition. Stimulation of the
nucleus accumbens, which receives projec-
tions from the VTA, has resulted in relief
of these symptoms in some patients whose
depression had been resistant to phar-
macological treatment (Schlaepfer et al.,
2008). By restoring their capacity to con-
sider and engage in pleasurable activ-
ities, DBS can restore one component
of their will. In addition, because of
its projections to frontal-striatal pathways
mediating cognitive, affective, and motor
functions, stimulation of the STN can
modulate dysfunction in these pathways
and release individuals with OCD from
paralyzing obsessions and compulsions
(Mallet et al., 2008).
The neuromodulating effects of DBS
can re-establish and sustain optimal levels
of neural function, preventing extremes of
deficit and surfeit and promoting flexible
behavior and adaptability to the environ-
ment. Overstimulating targeted circuits, or
inadvertently stimulating the wrong cir-
cuits, in an attempt to release mental and
physical constraints caused by one type
of neuropathology could cause a differ-
ent type and have an equally disabling
effect on the will. In PD, for exam-
ple, electrical stimulation of the STN or
GPi can resolve hypodopaminergic activ-
ity causing motor, cognitive, and emo-
tional inhibition. But imprecise stimu-
lation or overstimulation of these brain
regions may induce hyperdopaminergic
activity and produce behavioral disinhi-
bition and impulsive or addictive behav-
ior (Castrioto et al., 2014). The ethical
implications of altering brain circuits with
this technique in terms of benefit and
harm are evident in reports of Parkinson’s
patients experiencing both symptom relief
and neurological and psychological seque-
lae (Muller and Christen, 2011; Christen
et al., 2012). Motor and emotional effects
of stimulating the STN or GPi can be
difficult to dissociate because the basal
ganglia include these motor nodes as
well as limbic nodes. There is consider-
able overlap between them, with affer-
ent inputs and efferent outputs regulated
by the same neurotransmitter. Similarly,
in MDD overstimulation of an underac-
tive nucleus accumbens associated with
anhedonia and avolition can cause hyper-
dopaminergic effects in the reward cir-
cuitry and result in pathological behavior
in the form of euphoria, hypomania, and
mania (Synofzik et al., 2012). The cost-
benefit ratio of DBS for depression and
other psychiatric disorders is still unclear.
The increasing use of this and other
brain-invasive technologies raises ethical
questions because not all outcomes are
positive. A recent study of DBS of the
reward system for MDD showed promis-
ing results within a few days of stimu-
lation at lower intensities. As in earlier
studies, however, surgical risks such as
intracerebral hemorrhage and psychiatric
complications such as suicidal ideation
and hypomania in some subjects, as well
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as the high cost, were among the nega-
tive aspects of the technique (Schlaepfer
et al., 2014). Some sequelae are not fore-
seeable, and it cannot be predicted which
patients will experience them. This under-
scores the fact that this type of neuromod-
ulation for psychiatric disorders remains
experimental and investigational. Neural
targets of DBS must be carefully selected
and stimulation parameters adjusted in
response to brain changes and neurologi-
cal and psychiatric symptoms to maintain
optimal levels of neural and mental
function. Stimulation must sustain the
neural and psychological mean between
extremes.
Technological advances such as closed-
loop feedback devices that can monitor
and adjust to changes in the brain while
circuits are stimulated can reduce the inci-
dence of adverse effects. This would make
them more tailored to individualized ther-
apy in maximizing benefit and minimizing
harm regarding the capacity to think and
act. A recent study demonstrating positive
outcomes from DBS at an early stage of
PD suggests that it might have similar out-
comes in treating psychiatric disorders if
the effects on neural circuits are similar
(Schuepbach et al., 2013). Electrical stim-
ulation of dysfunctional circuits at an early
stage of degeneration could strengthen
synaptic connectivity, release trophic fac-
tors and possibly induce neurogenesis.
This would be especially welcome in light
of previous studies indicating that DBS for
advanced neurodegenerative disorders can
relieve symptoms but not alter the under-
lying pathology and disease progression.
Even if DBS or other neural prostheses
failed to arrest neurodegeneration, they
might be able to delay or prevent further
degeneration and enable patients affected
by these disorders to retain some degree
of control of their behavior by sustain-
ing a certain level of cognitive and motor
functions for longer periods.
CONCLUSION
The ability of DBS to modulate underac-
tive and overactive circuits in neurological
and psychiatric disorders can restore or
enhance the physical and mental capac-
ities composing the will. Although their
range of applications is more limited,
BCIs and HPs could bypass or replace
dysfunctional pathways in cortical and
subcortical areas mediating motor con-
trol and dysfunctional pathways in the
medial temporal lobes mediating episodic
memory. A BCI may restore the will to
some degree by enabling individuals par-
alyzed from brain or spinal cord injuries
to translate their thoughts into certain
actions and communicate their wishes
about medical treatment. An HP replacing
a damaged hippocampal-entorhinal cir-
cuit might enable individuals to learn and
retain information necessary for present
cognitive tasks and future planning. These
considerations about the neurobiological
basis of the will and the effects of alter-
ing it show that there is much in common
between neuroscience and philosophy and
that each discipline can inform and be
informed by the other. In different respects
and in varying degrees, the three pros-
theses I have discussed can re-establish
and sustain the structural and functional
integrity of the brain circuits necessary for
freely willed actions.
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This theoretical paper draws the scientific community’s attention to how pharmacological
cognitive enhancement may impact on society and law. Namely, if safe, reliable, and
effective techniques to enhance mental performance are eventually developed, then this
may under some circumstances impose new duties onto people in high-responsibility
professions—e.g., surgeons or pilots—to use such substances to minimize risks of
adverse outcomes or to increase the likelihood of good outcomes. By discussing this topic,
we also hope to encourage scientists to bring their expertise to bear on this current public
debate.
Keywords: cognitive enhancement, neuroenhancement, modafinil, methylphenidate, mental capacity, ethics, law,
professional duties
INTRODUCTION
Whereas techniques for the augmentation of brain function are
usually seen as beneficial when used as a form of medical treat-
ment, both amongst the general public (Schelle et al., 2014) and
in academia (e.g., Sandel, 2009) some concerns have been raised
about the possible negative moral and social impacts of the use
of these techniques in healthy people. For example, concerns
about such so called “cognitive enhancement” include seeing it
as a threat to the fairness and meaningfulness of competitive
activities, or as a potential threat to a meaningful human life.
Even though “cognitive enhancement” may refer to different brain
intervention techniques like genetic modification, pharmacolog-
ical substances, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulations (TMS), or
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS; Bostrom and
Sandberg, 2009), in this paper we focus on pharmacological cog-
nitive enhancers such as methylphenidate and modafinil. These
substances have been reported to modestly improve wakefulness,
attention, concentration, learning and retention of memory, not
only when taken by people diagnosed with mental deficits or
disorders, but also when taken by healthy individuals (Repantis
et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011; Coffman et al., 2014;
Gilleena et al., 2014; Meinzer et al., 2014).
In what follows, we discuss a seldom-recognized but crucial
way in which pharmacological cognitive enhancement may
impact on our society’s moral and legal norms: the availability
of such enhancers might evoke new duties for certain people.
In particular, it may impact on the professional duties of people
engaged in jobs where the lives of other people are directly at risk
(e.g., surgeons and pilots)—i.e., it may impact on what we can
(legally) demand these professionals to do. By exploring this issue,
we want to offer some insights into a particular way in which
scientific work on brain function augmentation may impact on
society: by enhancing our cognitive capacities, neuroscientific
progress may change our duties to one another (for in-depth
discussion see Vincent, 2011, 2013; Enck, 2014; Goold and
Maslen, 2014; Santoni de Sio et al., 2014).
HOW PHARMACOLOGICAL COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT CAN
CREATE NEW DUTIES
Our main question may be framed in the following way: assuming
that a certain kind of pharmacological enhancement proves to be
relatively safe and effective at reducing risks of negative outcomes,
may some people, in virtue of what is at stake in the perfor-
mance of their professional roles (e.g., surgeons or pilots), be
sometimes legitimately expected to cognitively enhance themselves
even if they would rather not do so? Even though this question
may sound counterintuitive at present, we think there are good
reasons to assume that such an expectation might be a realistic
scenario in the future. In particular, we think that the professional
duty to use pharmacological enhancers may sooner or later be
raised in tort cases at least under restricted circumstances, for
instance in emergencies, when less invasive and at least as effective
alternatives are not available. If this happens, judges will take a
decision mainly through analogical reasoning. We thus think it is
important to anticipate how such reasoning is likely to run. By
having a clearer picture of such a possible future scenario, the
scientific community and the public more generally will be able to
think ahead about whether any pre-emptive steps need to be taken
to forestall the development of foreseeable undesirable social,
political, and legal consequences involved in such a scenario.
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In the following we present three main points in support of
our claim that a duty to enhance, as circumscribed above, may
arise in the future.
Firstly, scientific and technological progress has already
affected professional duties in the past. Surgeons, for instance,
are nowadays expected to deploy many measures that enhance
their performance and/or reduce the risks of fatal outcomes.
Historically, this professional duty to take measures has gradually
emerged over time, and progress in scientific and technological
knowledge has been one decisive element in the creation of the
duty. When, for instance, basic antiseptic procedures which are
common today—e.g., cleansing hands with carbolic acid—were
originally developed, their efficacy was not yet established, their
risks for the user were unknown, they were available only in select
research laboratories and medical practitioners were not expected
to deploy them. But today, now that the clinical value of these
techniques is widely recognized, and they are relatively inexpen-
sive, largely free of risk, and ubiquitously available (Gawande,
2012), medical practitioners cannot legitimately reject the request
to employ these techniques. The discovery of the antiseptic effi-
cacy of carbolic acid, as it were, brought with it the creation of a
duty to use it.
Of course, the analogy between cognitive enhancement med-
ications and carbolic acid is far from perfect—while the former
is highly invasive to an important domain, namely brain func-
tioning, the latter is not even skin-deep. Therefore, one should
not expect this analogy to be sufficient to make a case for the
professional duty to use pharmacological enhancers. However,
this analogy is arguably sufficient to make a more general point:
when it comes to professions with a high societal value like those
aimed at healing people or warranting their safety, it may be
legitimate for society to demand professionals to not follow their
individual preferences but rather the rules of good practice that
are proven to lead to optimal results, including those requiring
them to undertake particular treatments of their body. Even in the
most democratic society, the value of individual freedom of choice
of professionals is not protected unconditionally. For instance,
at present we already expect medical or legal professionals to
engage in continuing education programs. Often this is quite an
invasion on people’s lives since they must set aside time from an
often already busy schedule to attend classes after hours, often
losing sleep, and certainly losing personal time. But yet we do not
think that this imposition on their freedom is an unreasonable
one. We think that this is a sacrifice that we are entitled to
expect professionals to make for the benefit of their patients and
clients. The underlying thinking is that what’s gained in terms of
outcomes is presumed to be more important than the sacrifices
that others have to make to secure those outcomes.
Secondly, it may certainly be insisted that things are dif-
ferent with pharmacological enhancers, and that no matter
what happens with the compulsory use of non-invasive tech-
nologies or with compulsory non-pharmacological enhance-
ment programs, the use of medical substances that directly
affect the brain can never be imposed on professionals against
their will. However, even as things currently stand we already
sometimes expect some people to use medical substances that
directly affect their brain for the benefit of others—namely,
when we expect people who wish to operate motor vehicles
but who are diagnosed with conditions like epilepsy and dia-
betes to take medical substances to prevent the negative effects
of these conditions from adversely affecting others (Knoxville
Optical Supply, Inc. v Thomas, 1993 WL 574 (TennCtApp Jan
04, 1993)). Naturally, a good reason for them to take these
medications is simply the benefits to their own health. But it
has to be noted that the argument which justifies legal coercion
to use those substances in the case of the epileptic and dia-
betic motor vehicle drivers is not that the medical substances
will benefit them—in a liberal democracy paternalism is rarely
accepted as a valid justification for infringements on freedom—
but rather that their not taking those medications would impose
an unacceptable risk to others (if they should take to the roads
un-medicated).
We offer the above example in support of two points. Firstly,
there is already an existing and accepted practice of expecting one
group of people to take brain-invasive medications for the benefit
of other groups of people. Secondly, it makes little difference that
these examples involve the use of medications to treat rather than
to enhance, because the persons concerned are expected to take
the medications not for their own benefit, but for the benefit
of others. In fact, Queensland Health, the medical regulatory
body of the North-East Australian state, has recently followed a
similar reasoning pattern in relation to fatigue management. In
their Queensland Health (2009), it is suggested that in order to
cope with fatigue-related risks, surgeons could take up to “400
mg of caffeine [which is the] equivalent to about 5–6 cups of
coffee” (78) because “[c]ompared with other psychoactive drugs
(e.g., modafinil), caffeine is... more readily available and less
expensive” (79). Given that the report explicitly cites modafinil,
and that it only cites availability and cost as considerations that
favor the use of caffeine over modafinil, we think it is perfectly
conceivable that a future report may recommend such drugs to
be used (cf. Maslen et al., in press). To be sure, one may still
insist that this is not a desirable scenario, and that the protection
of minds from external interference should be recognized as a
human right. However, as a matter of fact, the right to “cognitive
liberty” (Bublitz, 2013) is not (yet) protected by international
human rights in the same way in which bodily integrity is, so that
the scenario that we propose remains realistic.
Finally, one may wonder whether concerns about safety will
in the end prevent the imposition of a duty to enhance in every
situation imaginable. Admittedly, the long-terms possible nega-
tive effects of the use of cognitive enhancers are not sufficiently
known (Madras et al., 2006; Volkow et al., 2009), and a greater
scientific understanding of these substances is needed before
normative conclusions can be confidently drawn (Maslen et al.,
2014). However, it is also a fact that methylphenidate has been
prescribed to children to treat the symptoms of attention deficit
and hyperactivity disorder for well over two decades. We cite this
example only to illustrate that there is at present already consensus
about the relative safety of these drugs to prescribe them to the
most vulnerable part of the population—namely, to children. This
point is salient because if, as a society, we deem the costs or risks of
particular cognitive enhancement technologies to be sufficiently
low, then this may lead us, together with the other considerations
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mentioned above, to impose a duty to use these medications onto
some people at least in some emergency situations, namely when
other more common forms of intervention like napping or being
replaced by another worker who is not fatigued are not available.
A GLANCE INTO THE FUTURE
Admittedly, we are not (yet) in the scenario that we just described.
The efficacy of pharmacological cognitive enhancement tech-
niques in reducing the rate of fatal mistakes and thus enhancing
the quality of performance of professionals like surgeons and
airline pilots has not been established yet (Förstl, 2009; Repantis
et al., 2010), and they are not even easily accessible. It is therefore
not surprising that the law has not yet demanded any profession-
als to enhance themselves nor have lay people advanced such a
demand.
As for the law, Goold and Maslen (2014) have offered a detailed
legal analysis on the issue of whether surgeons who are at risk
of making fatigue-related errors during patient care might be
considered legally obliged to pharmacologically enhance them-
selves, i.e., if, at least under certain circumstances, there can be
a legal duty to enhance for surgeons. Their conclusion is that, at
the moment, such a legal duty cannot be imposed (at least in
England and Wales). However, once one considers the reasons
behind their conclusion, it becomes clear that Goold and Maslen’s
statement about the current legal situation is not necessarily
incompatible with our claim about the future. Their case against
the imposition of a legal duty to enhance on surgeons, in fact,
critically depends on their reasonable doubts about the efficacy of
current enhancers, and the possible negative side-effects of these
substances. Moreover, this conclusion does not affect the validity
of our theoretical point. In fact, as Goold and Maslen themselves
explicitly state, in a hypothetical scenario in which efficacious
and relatively safe cognitive enhancers were available, surgeons
might be burdened with a duty to take pharmacological cognitive
enhancers to reduce the risks of fatal fatigue-related error, at
least under some emergency circumstances, namely when other,
less invasive, options like napping or being replaced by another
surgeons are not available. And it is this kind of hypothetical
scenario that our reasoning has taken into account, and that
future judges may have to decide upon.
As for lay people, they also seem to believe that no obligation
to enhance should ever be imposed on professionals or other
subjects (Maslen et al., in press). Many are indeed skeptical even
about the moral permissibility of the use of pharmacological
enhancers in any circumstance (Santoni de Sio et al., in press).
Again, this is reasonable and understandable. Lay reasoning
widely reflects the current state of affairs of scientific progress.
From this perspective, lay reasoning is somehow similar to that
of the above-mentioned legal scholars: because pharmacological
cognitive enhancement is currently neither uncontroversially effi-
cacious nor safe, people are legitimately wary and suspicious of it
and reluctant to expect anyone to use it. However, lay reasoning
may also reflect less rational and justified concerns. Medical
enhancement substances are perceived negatively compared to
other “natural” enhancers, and as a consequence the use of phar-
macological cognitive enhancement might be stigmatized also in
an irrational way (Faulmüller et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
Reflections on the social impact of scientific and technological
progress can come in different forms. On the one hand, we may
reflect on how current technologies and techniques are already
impacting on society. However, we may also wish to reflect on how
the social, political, legal, and moral landscape may change due
to pressure from reasonably expected future advances in science
and technology, and think ahead about whether any pre-emptive
steps need to be taken to forestall the development of foresee-
able undesirable social, political, legal, and moral consequences.
Adopting this latter “socially responsible innovation” approach
(Moor, 2008; van den Hoven, 2013) which has recently been
embraced also by the European Commission (2011), our paper
has discussed the possible impact on society of future advances
in pharmacological cognitive enhancement. We have argued that
the availability of techniques that can enhance performance may
in the future impose new duties on certain people under certain
circumstances.
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For this Research Topic on brain augmen-
tation,1 several authors discuss possibilities
of brain stimulation (e.g., Duecker et al.,
2014), pharmacology (e.g., Lynch et al.,
2014), and psychobiological training (e.g.,
Chapman and Mudar, 2014). According
to a definition proposed by ethicists,
such procedures are human enhancement
if and only if they are a “change in
the biology or psychology of a person
which increases the chances of leading
a good life in the relevant set of cir-
cumstances” (Savulescu et al., 2011b, p.
7). Note how this definition describes
the individual as malleable and the cir-
cumstances as given. The authors con-
tinue to explain that something counts
as enhancement “so long as it tends to
increase a person’s well-being” (Savulescu
et al., 2011b). Similarly, Nagel emphasizes
the notions of happiness, well-being, and
improvement in her discussion of the eth-
ical challenges of enhancement and dis-
cusses the possibilities and risks related to
neuro-technology and psychopharmacol-
ogy (Nagel, 2014).
These and similar publications identify
concepts like improvement or well-being
as foundational issues of the enhancement
debate. This raises important questions,
such as who defines well-being and how
to achieve it. In the three following sec-
tions, I will discuss the conceptualization
of well-being, the framing of enhance-





The majority of the experimen-
tal enhancement literature employs
neuropsychological test designs developed
to measure the presence of psychological
impairment in terms of attention, learn-
ing, memory, and the like (for systematic
reviews, see Repantis et al., 2010; Smith
and Farah, 2011; Bagot and Kaminer,
2014). Referring to this literature in the
human enhancement debate is problem-
atic: That these tests can be used to inform
clinical decisions does not warrant their
usefulness outside the clinics. Higher test
scores do not necessarily reflect a hap-
pier, more meaningful life in general. Yet,
clinical studies are often cited in ethi-
cal discussions to debate the benefits and
prospects of enhancement for the healthy.
This carries the risk of a normative fal-
lacy, namely, the identification of clinical
benefit with overall well-being.
This risk is often accompanied by
another one, namely, that of a localiza-
tional fallacy. It consists in only targeting
individuals psychobiologically, not their
circumstances. In contrast, established
measures such as the World Happiness
Report which are provided by United
Nations institutions measure well-being
macroscopically: GDP per capita, social
support, healthy life expectancy at birth,
freedom to make life choices, generosity,
and perceptions of corruption together
explain 75.5% of the international
variance of happiness rankings in 2012
(Helliwell et al., 2013). It goes without
saying that these indices are also based
on norms, but not primarily driven by
clinical needs, instead broader in scope,
and developed by institutions which
are representing people at large at least
remotely.
An advanced recent proposal consists
in the OECD Guidelines on Measuring
Subjective Well-being, operationalizing
subjective well-being as consisting of
life satisfaction, affect, and eudaimonic
well-being, which in turn consist of
three subcategories each, namely, income,
health, and work satisfaction; anger, worry,
and happiness; competence, autonomy,
and meaning and purpose (OECD, 2013).
Based on these guidelines, people can cre-
ate their own Better Life Index, prioritizing
11 pre-defined dimensions (such as hous-
ing, jobs, education, or safety), and more
than 60,000 citizens from OECD coun-
tries have so far participated2. Using such
methods, the risk of a normative fallacy
can be minimized, since people can choose
their own standards, although ideally they
should be able to design the methods,
too. The results, including meaningful dif-
ferences between countries, indicate that
human enhancement need not be local-
ized in individual psychobiology, but can
also be achieved by socio-political reform.
It turned out, for example, that safety
is valued most highly by participants from
Japan, income and housing by those in the
United States, and education by those in
Finland. To assess the relevance of brain
stimulation, pharmacology, and psychobi-
ological training for human enhancement,
2 http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org (accessed May
30, 2014)




it would be informative to know to what
extent these methods can contribute to
human well-being broadly understood. If
it turned out that the causal link is very
remote and speculative, proponents of
human enhancement could conclude that
socio-political reform is more promising
a means than individual psychobiological
intervention. In the terms of the defini-
tion proposed by Savulescu and colleagues
above, this amounts to not changing the
subject with respect to the circumstances,
but the circumstances with respect to the
subject.
FRAMING AND RELEVANCE
Cognitive enhancement has been framed
as common by leading scholars in the field
who described it as a means “not to get
high, but to get higher grades, to pro-
vide an edge over their fellow students
or to increase in some measurable way
their capacity for learning” (Greely et al.,
2008, p. 702). Greely and colleagues sub-
sequently stated that almost 7% of stu-
dents in the US already use stimulants
like amphetamine or methylphenidate for
cognitive enhancement, with the preva-
lence reaching 25% on some campuses.
In a comment gathering some anecdotal
evidence, I pointed out that such fram-
ings occur regularly in the ethical literature
(Schleim, 2010). This impression is shared
by Lucke et al. (2011) who also carried
out a media analysis of newspaper arti-
cles and found that 94% of the reports
mentioning the prevalence of psychophar-
macological enhancement described it as
common, increasing, or both (Partridge
et al., 2011). Actually, 66% of these reports
referred to the academic literature as evi-
dence. It goes without saying that this
framing of the practice as common and/or
increasing lends the topic high urgency.
In the systematic review of prevalence
studies in student samples by Smith and
Farah, the most comprehensive I know
of, the authors conclude that “[a]mong
college students, estimates of use vary
widely but, taken together, suggest that
the practice is commonplace” (Smith
and Farah, 2011, p. 717). Referring to
this review, Nagel even claims that the
usage is increasing (Nagel, 2014). Both
claims are difficult to justify, though, with
respect to cognitive enhancement: First
of all, it is in the eye of the beholder
what to count as common. The decision
is complicated by the variance in find-
ings, ranging from 1.7 to 34% in stud-
ies with more than thousand students
(N = 12; mean = 9.5%, median = 6.7%).
Sometimes the reported figures reflect past
month prevalence (N = 2; mean = 4.6),
sometimes they refer to last year (N = 6;
mean = 6.7) or even lifetime usage (N =
4; mean = 16.1). Secondly, their authors
often investigated non-medical use, which
allows many different motives for stim-
ulant consumption that do not indicate
cognitive enhancement, such as feeling
high or losing weight. Smith and Farah
summarize that in those surveys address-
ing motives, study-related answers were
dominant but regularly accompanied by
recreational/lifestyle choices (Smith and
Farah, 2011). However, detailed interviews
with consumers at an elite university in
the United States suggest that emotional
rather than cognitive motives drive non-
medical use even for improving studying,
since people report feeling better and over-
coming motivational problems with stim-
ulants (Vrecko, 2013).
For the time being, framing the rele-
vance as common and non-medical use
as cognitive enhancement is therefore, in
my view, in contrast to the best avail-
able evidence. It is even more problematic
to claim that the practice is increas-
ing, because this would require repeated
cross-sectional studies of comparable sam-
ples under standardized conditions. Yet,
even within research groups definitions
of inclusion criteria and ways of sam-
pling data often differ. Nevertheless, what
has been increasing steeply during the last
decades was the production of stimulants
like amphetamine and methylphenidate,
particularly in the United States, and pub-
lications on enhancement (see Figure 1).
That the former increase is not reflected
in the prevalence studies previously men-
tioned is most likely due to the concept
of non-medical use. Both drugs are con-
trolled prescription stimulants and most
epidemiologists as well as ethicists strictly
distinguish medical use as treatment from
non-medical use as either drug abuse or
enhancement.
This framing has wider ramifications
for the scientific community: Without
the treatment/enhancement distinction,
the consumption of stimulants can and
has been analyzed by medical sociolo-
gists under labels such as medicaliza-
tion or pharmaceuticalization (Abraham,
2010; Bell and Figert, 2012); and without
the claim that enhancement is common
or even increasing, the problem appears
much less urgent. By framing stimulant
consumption as enhancement and com-
mon, though, neuroethicists generated a
new ethical problem, new prospects and
risks, that they subsequently could man-
age (see also Conrad and De Vries, 2011;
Littlefield and Johnson, 2012). Indeed,
the steep increase in publications on
enhancement topics coincides with the
inception of instutionalized neuroethics
(Marcus, 2002; Farah, 2012; Figure 1). It
thus becomes apparent that both, medical
sociologists and neuroethicists, have a con-
flict of interest in framing stimulant con-
sumption in the competition for research
funds and high-impact publications.
PROMISES
The abundant literature on enhancement
suggests the possibility to increase learn-
ing, to feel better, and to become more
intelligent by means of brain stimulation,
pharmacology, or psychobiological learn-
ing (Savulescu et al., 2011a; Farah, 2012;
Hildt and Franke, 2013; Nagel, 2014).
However, it is also noted that there is much
that is not known about the working of
stimulants, for example, and that funding
of empirical research is difficult because
it is not about treatment and therefore
outside the purview of disease-oriented
schemes and it is too applied for fun-
ders of basic science (Smith and Farah,
2011). As mentioned in the section on
well-being above, it is furthermore not
clear what the goal of the intervention is
and whether changing the individual in its
circumstances is actually more promising
than changing the circumstances for the
individual.
However, by analogy with biologi-
cal psychiatry it is possible to at least
engage in informed speculation on what
the situation might be like had there
been more agreement on the research
goals and more funding of enhancement
research. When psychiatric researchers
started to prepare the fifth edition of
the Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) they set the aim
to include biomarkers, particularly based
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulant production and enhancement papers increased strongly. Lines show a
steep increase in publications on cognitive enhancement (blue) and neuroenhancement (yellow),
but only modestly on mood enhancement (orange). Publication numbers are based on a Web of
Science topic search. Bars show a strong increase in production quotas for amphetamine (red) and
methylphenidate (green). In the shown 10-year period from 2004 to 2013, the former increased
5.5-fold, the latter 3.4-fold, after quotas had already been increasing in the 1990s (not shown, but
see Rasmussen, 2008). Figures based on US Drug Enforcement Agency, October 2, 2013,
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/quotas/quota_history.pdf (accessed May 30, 2014),
accumulating amphetamine produced for sale and conversion.
on genetic and neuroimaging research, to
improve diagnosis and treatment (Hyman,
2007). Note that the previous fourth edi-
tion of the DSM listed more than 300
disorders and their respective symptoms
guiding clinical diagnosis (APA, 2000).
It is now widely acknowledged that this
attempt for the fifth edition was unsuccess-
ful, though views on why this happened
and what to do about it differ (Hyman,
2010; Kapur et al., 2012; Walter, 2013;
Kirmayer and Crafa, 2014). Certainly, with
more than one billion dollars annually
spent on research at the National Institutes
of Mental Health alone, lack of fund-
ing was not the problem3. In the light
of decisions by pharmaceutical compa-
nies to close their psychiatric laborato-
ries because of negative prospects (Amara
et al., 2011; Van Gerven and Cohen, 2011)
and reports that prescription stimulants
do not even seem to have a lasting posi-
tive effect on individuals diagnosed with
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(Currie et al., 2013; Sharpe, 2014), the
frequently promised translational possi-
bilities of enhancement research may be
unrealistic (Schleim, 2014). Perhaps we
need to minimize risks of committing a
translational fallacy, too.
3 http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/budget/index.shtml
(accessed May 30, 2014)
When Quednow speaks of a “phantom
debate” (Quednow, 2010) or Lucke and
colleagues want to deflate the “neuroen-
hancement bubble” (Lucke et al., 2011),
they appear to have good reasons for doing
so. We should also not forget that people
in many countries are already quite happy
and that in those where they are not, the
difference in happiness is probably not due
to limited access to enhancement technol-
ogy. Clinical research for those suffering
from a disorder should keep the priority
over enhancement. It could even be the
case that too much focus on increasing
well-being and happiness, on how things
might yet be better than they presently
are, might make more people unhappy
in the first place; or, in Schopenhauer’s
words:
“We then recognize that the best, which
the world has to offer, is a painless,
calm, bearable existence and we confine
our claims to these in order to accom-
plish them better. Because not to become
very unhappy, it is the best means that
one may not demand to be very happy.”
(Schopenhauer, 1874, p. 434; author’s
translation).
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Neurothics has far greater responsibilities than merely noting potential human
enhancements arriving from novel brain-centered biotechnologies and tracking their
implications for ethics and civic life. Neuroethics must utilize the best cognitive and
neuroscientific knowledge to shape incisive discussions about what could possibly count
as enhancement in the first place, and what should count as genuinely “cognitive”
enhancement. Where cognitive processing and the mental life is concerned, the lived
context of psychological performance is paramount. Starting with an enhancement to
the mental abilities of an individual, only performances on real-world exercises can
determine what has actually been cognitively improved. And what can concretely counts
as some specific sort of cognitive improvement is largely determined by the classificatory
frameworks of cultures, not brain scans or laboratory experiments. Additionally, where
the public must ultimately evaluate and judge the worthiness of individual performance
enhancements, we mustn’t presume that public approval towards enhancers will
somehow automatically arrive without due regard to civic ideals such as the common
good or social justice. In the absence of any nuanced appreciation for the control which
performance contexts and public contexts exert over what “cognitive” enhancements
could actually be, enthusiastic promoters of cognitive enhancement can all too easily
depict safe and effective brain modifications as surely good for us and for society. These
enthusiasts are not unaware of oft-heard observations about serious hurdles for reliable
enhancement from neurophysiological modifications. Yet those observations are far more
common than penetrating investigations into the implications to those hurdles for a
sound public understanding of cognitive enhancement, and a wise policy review over
cognitive enhancement. We offer some crucial recommendations for undertaking such
investigations, so that cognitive enhancers that truly deserve public approval can be better
identified.
Keywords: ethics, neuroethics, cognitive science, neuroscience, cognitive enhancement, culture, public policy
In its disciplinary stance and practice, neuroethics acknowledges
the most sufficiently confirmed theories of the neural and cogni-
tive sciences as (provisionally) accurate in an overriding manner.
Indeed, neuroethics should not ignore or set aside such theories
if/when these prove to be inconvenient for, or incompatible with,
practical applications, principled values, private intuitions, or
popular common sense. Nor should these theories be muted when
neuroethical engagement of real-world issues, questions and
problems are needed. The actual functions of the brain, as best as
can be described at present, is—and must remain—fundamental
to any and all neuroethical discourse and deliberations.
In light of this, we argue that neuroethical inquiries into
cognitive enhancement should establish the crucial role for
context, especially socio-cultural contexts to conceptions of the
“cognitive”, so as to better define the realities of neuroethical
debates about cognitive performance enhancement (and
enhancers). We write in support of investigations into putative
neuro-enhancers which adopt the theoretical stance that
hoped-for improvements cannot be evaluated in isolation from
human activities that provide the meaningful context to any
alteration in performance. At key points of our argument we
appeal to empirical studies examining performance alterations,
to exemplify our concern for due attentiveness to real-world
situational conduct as possible enhancers are tested and
utilized. Where relevant contexts to neuroscientific inquiry and
information utilized for normative purposes are taken seriously,
the work of formulating and guiding neuroethical quandaries
would be appreciably strengthened.
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With our argument for this role of context established, we then
outline crucial policy considerations regarding neuro-cognitive
enhancement, and raise some warnings about over-eager advo-
cacy for enhancement. While remaining cautiously optimistic
toward opportunities for cognitive enhancement, we insist upon
fostering public understanding of the issues, and upon develop-
ment of sound public policy. In this way we join the ranks of other
neuroethicists who have voiced similar views and concerns (Illes
and Bird, 2006; Levy, 2011; Farah, 2012; Gunson, 2012; Fitz et al.,
2014; Maslen et al., 2014b; Racine et al., 2014).
As a discipline and set of practices, neuroethics must utilize
the best cognitive and neuroscientific knowledge to shape incisive
discussions about what could possibly count as enhancement
in the first place, and what should count as genuinely “cogni-
tive” enhancement. Where cognitive processing and mental life
is concerned, the lived context of psychological performance is
paramount. In the absence of any nuanced appreciation for the
control which performance contexts and public contexts exert
over what “cognitive” enhancement could actually be, enthusiastic
promoters of cognitive enhancement can all too easily depict
brain modifications as being good for individuals and for society.
Such claims are not unaware of serious hurdles—hurdles noted in
oft-heard observations and express concerns—that may impede
enhancement derived from neurophysiological modifications. Yet
those observations are far more common than penetrating inves-
tigations into the implications that such hurdles may evoke—both
for the sound public understanding of cognitive enhancement,
and for wisely informing policy to guide and govern cognitive
enhancement. To wit, we offer what we maintain to be crucial rec-
ommendations for undertaking such investigations, so as to better
identify cognitive enhancers that truly deserve public approval
and policy support.
Civics and general ethics can be idealistic, but neuroethics
should not be unrealistic, and must be liberated from ethical
theorizing done in ignorance of the most contemporary under-
standing of the structure and function of the brain. In this way,
neuroethics must strive to comprehend the genuine basis of
conceptions of self, society, and morality, and rely on changes or
replacements to those conceptions when and where scientifically
warranted (Shook and Giordano, 2014).
ENHANCEMENT STANDARDS
Bioethicist Thomas Murray identifies two primary meanings to
the term “enhancement”: first, “to advance, augment, elevate,
heighten, increase”; and second, “to increase the worth or value
of.” (Murray, 2007) In both definitions, context is axiomatic.
Numerous scholars have similarly noted the “metric” and “nor-
mative” dimensions of this term. For an organism such as a
human being, enhancement implies opportunities to improve
capacities or abilities—features that can be simultaneously mea-
surable and valuable, and possibly moral, as well. Structure and
function cooperate and even interfuse, even as they have distinct
implications for ethicality, and this can confuse discussions of
enhancement, in general, and of “cognitive enhancement” more
specifically.
Hence, it is important to ask whether a particular modifica-
tion is responsible for altered performance of a specified task.
If it is, then that physiological modification is a performance
modifier, and if that change is regarded as positive relative to
some normative standard, then we can refer to it as a perfor-
mance improver. Furthermore, if we call a particular activity an
“intellectual” task, then we are really talking about an intellectual
enhancement for performing that task. This physiological mod-
ification may be labeled as an “intellectual enhancement” in an
easy, colloquial manner of speaking, although at this point in the
description, a scientific understanding of the brain or intellectual
capacities is not yet involved.
In light of that science, however, it can no longer be enough
to simply track cognitive functions and the resulting perfor-
mance on particular tasks to verify enhancers. An alteration to a
physiological process associated with cognition can be measured
and compared against some organic standard. Has enhancement
occurred? It is still too soon to say; a pre-set physiological standard
is never simply a “given” normative standard. Detecting a phys-
iological alteration within an individual requires an individual-
relative standard against which to measure that alteration, to
be sure. But what may be expected from one person needn’t
expected from others. Setting someone’s neurological functioning
as the standard for any human brain’s “normal” functioning, so
that a baseline for cognitive functioning can be established in
preparation for detecting cognitive improvement done to any-
one, is quite another normative decision. One that normality
standard is put in place, then actual cognitive function (for
the processing and integration of various types of sensations,
memories, emotions, subconscious valuations, and so on) can
be estimated and compared against some standard of normality.
Even after this has been done, it still may be premature to say
whether or not the evoked changes represent an enhancement;
reliable cognitive performance (for one’s overall management of
life activities and achievements) must be judged in light of some
ethical standard. Just as human-normal performance can’t be
reduced to any single individual’s functioning, ethically responsi-
ble enhancement cannot be reduced to any superiority over what
has been conventionally set as generically normal for “average”
humans.
Standards at the three levels of individual physiology,
human-generic normality, and sensible ethicality all compete for
prominence where definitions of “enhancement” are concerned.
Furthermore, it doesn’t help that the complexities of the ner-
vous system can permit odd scenarios in which an increase in
physiological function(s) might diminish cognitive ability; and
diminishing a specific type of cognitive function might be con-
ducive to optimizing a person’s actions or general well-being
(Earp et al., 2014). Rigidly demanding only one standard, or
one direction by that standard, with which to dictate enhance-
ment is a stubborn path to take, and one that we assert any
rational approach to neuroethical analysis and discourse should
avoid.
Letting the concept or term “enhancement” stand for any non-
therapeutic benefits conferred by an intervention is a common
way to avoid taking any (if not all three) standards seriously. Does
enhancement begin when a medical treatment exceeds the usual
dosage or typical extent of repair? Perhaps enhancement refers to
those instances where treatment yields physiological functioning
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beyond the normal range. Or, enhancement might entail evok-
ing superior performance that lends distinct advantages to life.
Arguing over these options overlooks the mistake that enhance-
ment can begin where therapy ends. It is a mistake that is easy to
make.
Therapeutic medicine simplifies its standards because it takes
all of humanity to be its proper field of work; a good treatment
for a health deficiency generically helps any patient suffering from
that problem. So long as the reference class remains “humanity,”
then a physiological “average” functioning can be equated with
generic normality, and there would only be “disease treatments”
(aiming towards normality) and “enhancement treatments” (aim-
ing beyond normality). However, patients aren’t so generic in the
real world. Broad culture and local society are contexts that always
exert influence.
For example, what can count as normality and abnormality
within a particular culture might not obtain for all of humanity
too. But, if that culture’s influence (viz.—power) is sufficiently
strong, clinicians, patients, publics and governing bodies might
not necessarily notice, or care (or feel empowered to act even
if they did). Furthermore, any social group within that cul-
ture could come to regard itself as the proper reference class,
expressly if that group enjoys some status and/or privilege. When
that social group requests medical treatment, it is set in terms
of what counts as “group normal” rather than just “culturally
normal” or “normal for humanity.” For example, when middle-
aged privileged men take their reference class as “adult men
like us”, they surely aren’t thinking about “all human males on
the planet between the ages of 18 and 80.” Nor are they taking
their reference class to be people very much like them, such as
“successful men between 45 and 65.” Instead, what counts as
“normality” is the reference class that these men desire to be,
perhaps something like “healthy guys in their 30s-50s.” So, in
effect they want what counts as “subgroup optimal.” Growing
approval among a subgroup about using a drug or device off-label
lends credence towards that intervention’s status as an “enhancer”,
even if that subgroup expects more than just intellectual per-
formance (Hildt et al., 2014; Wade et al., 2014). Interventions
can transition from enhancers back to treatments, as well. If a
culture’s medicine proves willing, then treatment for achieving
subgroup optimality could be labeled as medical “therapy”, rather
than enhancement.
Neuroethics must take close notice of: (1) the kinds of
standards applied for determining enhancement; (2) the chosen
reference class serving as the background against which enhance-
ment would stand out; and (3) the selection of “normality” or
“optimality” as the envisioned goal to enhancement. Medicine’s
traditional focus on generic remedies for universal application to
all humanity is not the best (or perhaps even a viable) framework
for identifying and classifying enhancements. Cultural inher-
itance, group socialization, personal values, and physiological
factors are each and all necessarily involved when defining and
addressing enhancement. The advent of “personalized” medicine
aiming towards the individualization of diagnostics and treat-
ments should raise awareness across neuroethics that specifics will
matter to ever greater degrees in the future.
ENHANCING COGNITION IN CONTEXT
The temptation to regard cognition as an entirely neurophys-
iological matter, amenable to objective study, definition, and
measurement, isn’t just a symptom of overreaching reduction-
ism or scientism. Frustration with too much context can set
in for anyone reconciled to cognition’s reliance on brain func-
tioning. If cognition is, in some sense, objectively present as
subjects undergo experimental study, then it could be objectively
modified. Researchers would be able to determine when and
how cognition is improved when compared against some pre-
set standard of cognitive ability. Serious attention to cognitive
enhancement came to the fore as a consequence of experimental
facilitation of cognitive ability, with due caution leveraged against
exaggerated claims of capability, meaning and utility. (Metzinger
and Hildt, 2011; Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2011; Sandberg,
2011; Chatterjee, 2013; Cohen Kadosh, 2013; Hildt and Franke,
2013). Hard lessons learned from pharmaceutical studies apply to
any sort of performance effects produced by alteration of brain
structure and function (Luber, 2014).
Neuroethical attention must be paid to wider contexts of
neurological manipulation, beyond the fairly objective and nar-
row ways that cognitive performances can be adjusted in desired
directions. Determining if a neurological intervention can actu-
ally produce a desired enhancement is one thing; ascertaining
that some sort of adjustment is truly cognitive (in the expected
manner) is quite another, and these distinctions deserve prior-
ity. Imitating medicine’s quest for therapies that have universal
utility for anyone suffering from a generic health problem is no
longer a wise undertaking for the application of 21st century
biomedical advancements. As well, we maintain that it is equally
unwise to promote enhancements as if they could be univer-
sally beneficial for generic cognitive improvements to anyone’s
intellectual performances. Indeed, we argue that there may not
be such a thing as a “generic enhancement to cognitive per-
formance.” A major reason for this involves cultural contexts.
Two people from two different cultures, or even two people
from two subgroups of the same culture, may not necessarily
agree on what is cognitively adjusted by some alteration of neu-
rological function. Thus, neuroethical inquiry cannot avoid an
interpretative circle: some group of people ascribe a “function”
to a cognitive process in service of a task that is considered to
be “normal”—but this is a social imposition of normality on a
neurophysiological process. In this way, performance, not neuro-
physiology in isolation, decides functionality, and what counts as
“normal”.
For illustration, consider an analogy: suppose a practical
way to increase muscle mass (without deleterious side effects)
is offered as a general “athletic enhancer” that could be used
by anyone. Athleticism depends on one’s musculature, surely,
so given this rationalization, more muscle should enable more
athleticism. But muscle mass alone does not equate with athletic
ability (or in some cases even potential ability!) For example, one
can take anabolic-androgenic steroids (AAS) to augment muscle
mass. As matter of fact, these very likely will lend something of
an “edge” to (important) dispositions and characteristics neces-
sary for improved athletic performance (i.e.,—muscle size and
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strength; Llewellyn, 2010). However, the underlying premise is
that the agent is increasing specific qualities of muscle (e.g.,—
diameter of muscle fibers, contractile force, etc.) that have been
shown to be operative in a number of athletic events.
Herein though, are important caveats. While an AAS may yield
mass and strength gains, these are only preparatory for “training
effects”, because an athlete must still train for a particular sport.
AAS can facilitate that training, but if training is conducted
improperly, less success at a sport is a likely result. Furthermore,
different physiological agents can elicit distinct effects. Some will
enable gains in muscle mass but not necessarily facilitate defini-
tion; others will be more lipolytic, and produce lean, muscular
density, but will not greatly increase mass, and so forth. Also,
AAS does little for aerobic endurance per se, just as an endurance-
facilitating agent (such as erythropoietin, EPO) does little for
mass or strength. (consult Llewellyn, 2010). The adage is: The
right agent for the right effect.
These points account for the ample evidence—and practical
wisdom—indicating that if one wants to become proficient in
a particular sport, then it is necessary to vigorously train in
that sport. There are generic athletic training exercises, but each
sport must evaluate their utility. For example, cross training
can lend overall benefits to components of athleticism, but it
doesn’t necessarily permit direct performance gains peculiar to
each sport. Only after specific kinds of athletic performances,
and the individual athletes performing them, are identified and
targeted, would an intervention be intelligently developed and
employed to exert positive effect(s) within selected contexts.
Expanding upon this example of sports performance, we may
expect that most types of neurological interventions intended for
the enhancement of performances displaying much complexity
may only work best in conjunction with cognitive training reg-
imens. Not only must any trials confirming a modification for
cognitive improvement involve successful routine practice under
controlled conditions, only implementing that modification in
conjunction with strenuous performance training result in the
practical enhancements to performances actually valued outside
of any laboratory.
More generally, it is naïve to suppose that a compensatory
adjustment, much less an enhancing adjustment, could be gener-
ically assigned validity across all of humanity. Even best-case
scenarios must remain stubbornly diffuse. Calling a performance
test a “cognitive performance test” and observing that individuals
who are subjected to intervention “x” perform better doesn’t
mean that some purely cognitive functioning has been isolated
and targeted as the improved factor. Fortunately, careful research
is hardly so naïve, as recent exemplars have noted (Pringle et al.,
2013). The lesson is that no one pondering cognitive enhance-
ment should assume that higher cognition can occur in some
“pure” forms, no matter how specific the task. To begin with,
multiple affective and motor processes are interfused with the
functional components that are operative in executive control.
In turn, executive control is interfused with every sophisticated
practice acquired during childhood and adolescence. This is
especially the case when dealing with higher cognition manifest-
ing in social and moral behaviors (Shook, 2012; Specker et al.,
2014).
Enculturalization takes advantage of advanced executive con-
trol for instilling specialized task performances, such as learning
mathematics and logic. It is no paradox that the more cogni-
tively abstract the task, the more it has a cultural rather than a
purely biological basis; hence such tasks are very much subject
to the vagaries of cultural history and practice. Something as
simple as conceptualizing number and amount has been shown
to be culturally variant (Núñez, 2011). Similarly, memory perfor-
mance has been shown to be culture-dependent and -influenced
(Gutchess et al., 2011; Hewer and Roberts, 2012). Cultures con-
tribute to cognition as much as cognition contributes to culture
(Han and Pöppel, 2011; Ishii, 2013; Kim and Sasaki, 2014). Even
context is contextual as far as cognition is concerned, since the
developing sensitivity towards, and responsiveness to, environing
interpersonal context displays cultural variability (Imada et al.,
2013).
The contextual factors raised here are not posed to endorse a
thorough relativism or dismissive eliminativism about potential
enhancers. Cognitive enhancement can be quite real, when and
where it is created. To be sure, confirmable cognitive enhance-
ments can be achieved because improved cognitive (i.e.,—
intellectual and/or emotional) performances by selected and
trained participants can be measured under controlled condi-
tions. Generally speaking, under sufficiently similar conditions,
similarly altered people having enough in common will perform
similarly, all other things being equal. What more could be
expected from science?
ENHANCEMENT IN PUBLIC CONTEXTS
Desires to “improve the human condition” conjure proposals for a
proverbial “rising tide” of neuroscientific and neurotechnological
modifications that will “raise all boats”—and brains. But when
realistically looking ahead, unavoidable questions loom: How
much can humans be enhanced without deforming or destroying
aspects of the social or natural world on which life relies? and,
Will human character and moral progress be sustained if hopes
for enhancement become realized? Some have supported a duty
to urge enhancers and even intervene with required enhancement,
once we can apply a safe and effective intervention. However,
our comprehension of long-term consequences is limited, and
encouraging (what may be long-lasting) modifications without
ensuring equally durable individual welfare is reckless (Rossi et al.,
2013).
Shall the position of the responsible individual prevail instead?
Letting individuals choose for themselves is no less reckless. Even
when individual benefits can be guaranteed, it must be asked:
who should receive them? The answer, “All who can benefit,” is
no answer at all, because it will not be the case that everyone will
have the same, or even similar, access at the same time. Differential
access is inevitable in a world of finite time and resources. Such
differential access is prima facie unjust, as those who already
possess certain traits, attributes, and/or resources will likely and
quickly get even more. Hence, essential concerns for distributive
justice arise from the position of society at large. The distribution
of improved health and lifestyle status, and even improved moral
status, will always be a social concern (Buchanan, 2011; Douglas,
2013).
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Worries over distribution cannot—nor should not—be easily
dispelled. Those with the least assets are those most unlikely to
get access to state-of-the-art scientific and technological interven-
tions. It is unrealistic to assume that some massive shift in the
social architectonics of medical resource allocation will occur so
as to allow neuroscience and neurotechnology to close the gap
between those who “have” and those who “have not.” Given this
reality, does everyone really want a society where the people get-
ting the most enhancement(s) are precisely those enjoying great
wealth? The prospect of cognitive enhancement surely highlights
this worry: intelligence does what character directs, and the kinds
of characters getting so wealthy in a society may not be the
people to be trusted with even more intelligence—and power.
Proponents of unlimited access to enhancement simply point the
way toward an unbalanced distributive scheme. Contests between
rival distribution methods can be debated in ethics, but they get
adjudicated in politics.
Hence, entering the realm of politics becomes unavoidable.
The politics surrounding access to enhancement will be intense.
Of equal importance is the temptation to use brain science within
agendas of political power to control fundamentally biological
aspects of individuals’ and communities’ existence (invoking what
Foucault referred to as biopolitics; see Foucault, 2008; Anderson
et al., 2012). Bioethical and neuroethical analyses cannot avoid
addressing science as a public good; ethics as a search for the
good and the right; and politics as the participation of citizens
in decisions about the guidance of public order. As public debate
over the impact(s) of enhancement interventions accelerates, the
search for principled guidelines has ensued, and neuroethics has
become ever more involved (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009).
Irrespective of whether enhancement is regarded as a boun-
tiful cornucopia or a ticking bomb, the differing contexts of
enhancement radically transform its biopolitical status. Recall
from a previous section our attention to the choice among
physiology, normality, and ethical standards for identifying what
counts as enhancement. Experimental medical research focusing
upon physiological alterations (typically) emphasizes interven-
tions for those who are the most unhealthy. Policy tends to
approve funding for basic research if and when it could soon
help those with the most severe, and/or epidemiologically exten-
sive, health conditions. These prioritizations wouldn’t work in
the realm of enhancement for three reasons. First, a traditional
approach to funding and engaging research would tend to leave
most enhancements on the theoretical drawing board. Second,
while there may be desires for expensive advanced research into
fundamental neurological mechanisms that can be targeted for
cognitive performance enhancement, unless these approaches
can be ascribed to incur some “therapeutic” benefit against an
identified disease, disorder or (medical) condition, financial and
administrative support for broad scale research and translation
of outcomes and products would tend to be lacking. Third,
while there may be a viable—and perhaps growing—market for
certain cognitive performance enhancements, it is difficult to
generate the funding necessary to support and sustain exploratory
research required for translation to safe commercial technolo-
gies (unless developed and marketed as “non-medical” prod-
ucts such as toys and games, which then raises the specter of
inapt and/or unsound development, distribution and use; see, for
example, Giordano and DuRousseau, 2011; and Plischke et al.,
2011).
A related issue is the contemporary medical endorsement of
interventions that restore or sustain “normality.” Explicitly and
implicitly this position conforms to socio-cultural requirements
that all people should seek and exhibit “normal” functioning,
rather than (what is regarded to be) abnormal or anti-social
conduct that deviates from socially established standards. What
posture should be assumed when (a) certain people seek optimal
functioning in pursuit of what they personally deem as the apex
of the good life, and/or (b) society sets requirements that indi-
viduals in special roles (such as physicians, pilots, peace officers,
or warfighters) must attain some level of optimal functioning?
(Giordano et al., 2013; Goold and Maslen, 2014) Medicine’s
laudable work in service of living a good life isn’t automat-
ically extendable to living a great life, or to achieving great
performance in a socially-sanctioned service. Justifications for
specialized enhancements for enabling idiosyncratic lifestyles or
for extraordinary public service will not necessarily be obtained
in and from medical principles.
A second set of examples arise from our earlier discussion
of the cultural relativism inherent to the precise identification
of cognitive improvements. Medicine’s due caution with clinical
application, watching carefully for deleterious health and lifestyle
side-effects, relies upon cultural consensus about what constitutes
“normal” performance in daily life (Gini et al., 2010). Those
seeking significant enhancements, by contrast, won’t be inter-
ested in conforming to cultural norms about ordinary perfor-
mance, and medicine may not be able to restrain them. When
the recipient of an enhancement is achieving extraordinary per-
formance levels and feeling empowered to transgress cultural
expectations in the name of greatness (despite the risks), what
social institution or cultural tradition can and will reign-in their
pursuits?
Evidently, society turns to law for such proscriptions. Yet, here
it becomes necessary to ask how restrictions of, and prohibitions
against certain types and extents of enhancement will be
determined. Targeting concrete neurological modifications
for legal bans (i.e.,—imitating medical bans of performance
enhancing substances for professional athletes, and/or scheduling
certain drugs) has the merit of objective verification. But this only
spurs those seeking improved types of cognitive performance
to find alternative physiological methods not yet banned or
detectable, and the chase is begun anew.
POLICY PRIORITIES AND THE ROLE OF NEUROETHICS
Frustration over excessive contextualization is a perennial com-
plaint. Simplifying matters can seem attractive when modest
advances require prompt address and short-term priorities are
within reach. Simplification would be possible if the construct and
term “enhancement” satisfied defined and pragmatic scientific
and ethical criteria. That way, any continued debate would be cen-
tered on those improvements that were already deemed to be fairly
good for people in general, so far as could be scientifically and
ethically determined. Warnings are certainly in order that current
enhancement interventions rarely prove to be wholly effective
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or without deleterious effects. Unsurprisingly, wide agreement
among scientific, ethics, and policy communities can be found
on the view that enhancing interventions shouldn’t be counter-
productive or harmful to overall health.
However, we posit that practical risk-benefit analyses aren’t
entirely sufficient. Detailed ethical scrutiny is required before any
such practical improvements can be classified as good enhancers.
It is wise to demand that putatively enhancing interventions do
not diminish self-control or autonomy, degrade personal growth
or self-worth, or diminish life-management and social skills (de
Melo-Martín, 2010; Allhoff et al., 2011). These demands can
be reasonably placed upon envisioned enhancements, even if
they aren’t applied so stringently to proven medical therapies.
Improvements towards health are usually consistent with personal
empowerment, and the consequences of restoring normal func-
tioning are largely understood. By contrast, the longer term effects
of experimental enhancements, especially cognitive performance
enhancements, on the psychological self and internal self-
conceptions and motivations are among the least predictable and
understood aspects of this issue. Ethics is rightly concerned about
the vital capacities for autonomy, dignity, and morality. All the
same, as we have noted, setting high standards for cognitive per-
formance enhancing interventions need not cast dark suspicions
upon the persistent search for, and studies of enhancements.
A number of scholars have advocated for practical and ethical
standards while endorsing the pursuit of enhancement (including
Buchanan, 2011; Glannon, 2011; Giordano, 2012; Heinrichs,
2012; Clark, 2014; Maslen et al., 2014a). In short, the goal is to
develop helpful interventions able to meet these high standards.
If such normative thresholds are maintained, public and
regulatory approval could be a helpfully expedited matter. But
approval may not be automatic. Labeling an intervention as
an “enhancement” once it makes individual lives demonstrably
better can’t be the final hurdle before regulatory approval (Gior-
dano and DuRousseau, 2011). One further—and arguably major
factor—that cannot be omitted is the wider public context. We
believe that this is where the broadest and deepest deliberations
over the wisdom of enhancement should occur. We are forced to
ponder what shall be done when sound public priorities cannot
automatically approve genuinely ethical enhancements.
Policy principles should be well informed, ethical, and just.
When some reliable enhancements are deemed safe and effective,
and seem capable of promoting the good life, why wouldn’t they
be approved through policy and law? Here, it is important to
appreciate that sincere advocacy of genuine individual enhancers
could still be under-informed, potentially unethical, and possi-
bly unjust. In those cases, public wisdom should lean against
approval.
In this regard, two issues must remain distinct: First, it must be
asked, and determined, if an intervention is a genuine enhancer.
Second, if it is, then it must be asked if this enhancer is something
that sound policy can approve and sanction. The criteria by which
an enhancement is deemed conducive for the “good life” cannot
be the same criteria that are used to determine whether to approve
it. In the open space of public deliberation, it must be possible that
sound policy can proscribe or prevent something that is presently
understood to be reliably conducive to the “good life”.
Here we avoid assumptions that knowing what is conducive
to the good life for each person constitutes knowing what is
ethical and wise. We also avoid the position that knowledge about
what is conducive to the “good life” for everyone constitutes
knowing what is ethical and wise. Rather, we posit an alternative
stance. We argue that (1) well-informed policy would use more
information than just the scientific facts about a performance
enhancer promoting the “good life”; (2) ethical policy would use
other ethical criteria beside simple promotion of the “good life”
(individually or collectively); and (3) just policy may prefer a
stable and well-ordered society that isn’t advancing the individual
or collective “good life” quite as fast as could be technologically
possible (or imagined by technophiles).
Gazing upon the stance we propose, eager advocates of
enhancement might ask why objective scientific facts couldn’t or
shouldn’t lead the way, especially when cognitive performance
enhancement seems so modest, practical, and generically useful?
In doing so, they appear to endorse the general ethical guideline
that:
A sound policy decision will always approve what, in light of ascer-
tainable scientific facts, can be expected to be an enhancement to
an individual that is conducive to what “our society” regards as the
“good life.”
This guideline does not represent our position; we deem it
unwise and replete with confusions, and when it appears to be
doing the real work behind hasty encouragements of cognitive
performance enhancement, we deplore it. Whether this is the
actual view of any bioethicist or neuroethicist, or just a caricature
for academic target practice, we cannot really say, because few
scholars have explicated their meta-ethical presumptions. We do
assert, however, that this stance is inadequate to meet the urgent
complexities and contextualities inherent to authentic human life
as we all must actually live it. In fact, there is little that is genuinely
neuroethical in it. Our call for a neuroethics that takes context
seriously, especially where cognitive performance enhancement is
the issue, isn’t merely fodder for academic debate.
Sarewitz and Karas (2012) outline several different approaches
that can be adopted in order to make choices and decisions about
cognitive enhancing technologies. Among those, our view aligns
with the “optimistic” approach, via engagement of a managed
technological optimism that best represents our position as rel-
evant to ethical decision-making processes and public policies
in this field. We endorse continued research into cognitive per-
formance enhancements. We also call for the need to optimize
definitions of any/all concepts and terms, and to equally define
the contexts in which any cognitive task optimization can/would
occur. Only from that point can one be optimistic that a pro-
gressive, non-static concept of the human and human function
will be realistically entertained and enhanced, both practically and
ethically. This position takes a pluralistic, democratic approach
towards options of emergent (rather than merely proscriptive)
governance, and the final section of this essay points to ways that
neuroethics can play a supportive role.
We posit that a contextualized neuroethical outlook allows
for better-informed approaches, utilizing all relevant interdisci-
plinary input, for considering what therapies and enhancements
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could be. It permits neuroethical deliberation to rise above local
conventionality and a single social ethos, to instead survey the
rich cultural diversity of human self-understandings and dynamic
cognitive capacities. And, it encourages neuroethics to render
verdicts against destabilizing and unjust procedures in policy
debates that rashly extend medical models beyond their proper
functioning.
This neuroethics isn’t proscriptive, nor does it seek to
uniformly obstruct enhancement. In its naturalistic basis, it estab-
lishes grounds to view the human as engaging biology (through
intellectual and physical tools) to optimize survival and flour-
ishing in changing ecologies. And in its appreciation for the
human as a bio-psychosocial organism it engenders an inter-
disciplinary approach (conjoining anthropology, sociology, eco-
nomics, and political science) to depict and address ethical issues
within the contexts in which human activities are conducted.
Thus, in the spirit of cognitive enhancement itself, neuroethics
as a discipline—and in its methods, approaches, and practices—
should embody and enable greater human self-understanding,
and improve our public deliberations over the many dimensions
of life that we treasure.
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Research into cognitive biases that impair human judgment has mostly been applied to
the area of economic decision-making. Ethical decision-making has been comparatively
neglected. Since ethical decisions often involve very high individual as well as collective
stakes, analyzing how cognitive biases affect them can be expected to yield important
results. In this theoretical article, we consider the ethical debate about cognitive
enhancement (CE) and suggest a number of cognitive biases that are likely to affect moral
intuitions and judgments about CE: status quo bias, loss aversion, risk aversion, omission
bias, scope insensitivity, nature bias, and optimistic bias. We find that there are more
well-documented biases that are likely to cause irrational aversion to CE than biases in
the opposite direction. This suggests that common attitudes about CE are predominantly
negatively biased. Within this new perspective, we hope that subsequent research will
be able to elaborate this hypothesis and develop effective de-biasing techniques that
can help increase the rationality of the public CE debate and thus improve our ethical
decision-making.
Keywords: cognitive enhancement, rationality, cognitive bias, attitudes, de-biasing, moral intuitions, brain function
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COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND BIASED REASONING
The enhancement of cognitive brain functions by means
of technology has become a reality. Recent research has
demonstrated that various pharmaceuticals can have—at least
modest—performance-enhancing effects in healthy individuals
(for reviews, see Repantis et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011).
In line with these findings, the off-label use of pharmacological
substances like methylphenidate (e.g., Ritalin-®) or modafinil
(e.g., Provigil-®) seems to be prevalent, in particular among
students (Herman-Stahl et al., 2007; Smith and Farah, 2011;
Dietz et al., 2013), and professionals in very responsible jobs like
physicians (Franke et al., 2013). It has even been argued that the
use of such substances might become an implicit requirement for
individuals in certain professions (e.g., Maslen et al., in press).
Non-pharmacological methods of cognitive enhancement (CE),
such as gene therapy or neural implants, could become more
widely used in the future (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009). Even
though there is considerable use of CE, recent research shows
that the general public has strongly negative attitudes regarding
the introduction and use of CE (for a review, see Schelle et al.,
2014).
In this article, we argue that these concerns are partly driven by
pervasive cognitive biases. A bias is a systematic deviation from a
standard of rationality (Baron, 2005), an error frequently com-
mitted by the human mind. We use the definition of “rationality”
common in cognitive science, referring to normative models of
accurate belief formation (Foley, 1987; Audi, 2001) and optimal
decision-making in order to achieve one’s goal (Dawes, 1998).
(Ir)rationality is therefore relative to the goal of having accurate
beliefs or to goals in general. Thus, while some cognitive pat-
terns may be suboptimal with regard to a particular goal, they
may be perfectly optimal with regard to another. For illustra-
tion, consider “status quo bias”, which we will address in the
following section. If, upon reflection, an agent consciously and
stably places some intrinsic value on the status quo, then in
no sense can the agent be said to irrationally prefer the status
quo (i.e., to make a cognitive mistake in doing so). However,
the available evidence suggests that human agents do not, upon
reflection, intrinsically care about the status quo, or at least to a
significantly lesser degree than their immediate intuitions would
have it: the experiments documenting our intuitive status quo
preference (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) are inter-
esting because they reveal a fact about our intuitive decision-
making which our reflection disapproves of and is thus irrational.
Also, nearly all action-guiding moral theories have an account
of when the status quo should be modified, which is why the
general bias towards it will tend to bring about suboptimal
moral outcomes (c.f. Bostrom and Ord, 2006). Furthermore,
if by “moral” decision-making we mean decision-making that
is optimal from an “altruist” or “impartial” perspective, then
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 195
325
Caviola et al. Biases affecting intuitions about cognitive enhancement
non-related goals such as status quo preservation will lead to
irrationality, too. Hence, it is justifiable to classify the status quo
bias and the other biases we are discussing below as, indeed,
biases.
The aim of this paper is to offer a new perspective on the debate
about CE by identifying cognitive biases that affect our common
intuitions and moral reactions. We will first give a rough overview
of the academic debate and the public’s view of CE and then
discuss a number of potential biases that are likely to influence
widespread judgments about CE.
In the academic debate about CE, opinions of critics (often
bioconservatives) and supporters (often transhumanists) are
quite sharply divided. Critics often question its medical safety,
considering the potential side effects and unknown long-term
health risks (Healey and Rayner, 2008). Critics also see CE as
a threat to human autonomy (Habermas, 2003), authenticity
(Elliott, 2004) humility and solidarity (Sandel, 2004) and equality
and fairness (Fukuyama, 2004). Proponents, on the other hand,
focus on the potential positive aspects and potentials of CE. For
instance, Savulescu (2006) points out that the introduction of CE
could help decrease unfair natural differences in abilities. Bostrom
(2008) emphasizes the enormous positive leverage effect that CE
could generate in the future. He speculates that a 1% increase in
all scientists’ cognitive performance “would amount to an indirect
contribution equal to 100,000 times what the average scientist
contributes” (p. 2). Others note that CE is not relevantly different
from traditional forms of enhancement, such as information
technology (Harris, 2010).
Recent research reviewing the general public’s attitudes
towards CE has shown that lay people share many of the crit-
ics’ concerns about CE (Schelle et al., 2014). Participants from
samples of students or parents, for example, fear that safety is
not ensured (Forlini and Racine, 2012; Partridge et al., 2013).
They think that CE could lead to peer pressure and thus under-
mine our autonomous decisions (Forlini and Racine, 2009). Also,
they worry that unequal distribution of CE would result in an
unfair advantage of a privileged few (Fitz et al., 2013). These
views are often reflected in exaggerated reports by the media
and might even lead to severe aversive social consequences for
users (Faulmüller et al., 2013). The Guardian, for example, has
described CE substances as “capitalism’s wonder-pills”, which
“turn you into the closest human approximation there is to a
machine” (Mahdawi, 2012).
We believe that the common concerns about CE are justified at
least to some extent, and a greater scientific understanding of CE
is required in order to draw confident conclusions (Maslen et al.,
2014). Most importantly, long-term safety of CE is not currently
ensured (c.f. Husain and Mehta, 2011) and is being called into
question (e.g., Urban and Gao, 2014). Nevertheless, we specu-
late that the public’s views on CE are negatively biased. While
the involved biases do not necessarily undermine any specific
argument for or against CE—these would need to be evaluated
on their philosophical and scientific merits—they might partially
explain the general opposition to CE as well as the selective focus
on certain arguments and exaggeration of their relative weight. It
is not unusual for human cognition to selectively search for cer-
tain classes of arguments and systematically neglect or undervalue
certain others (c.f. Kunda, 1990 on “motivated reasoning”)—
a bias that might affect the judgments of both opponents and
proponents of CE. Biases may lead people to come up with a set of
arguments that expresses sound considerations but is significantly
incomplete or weighted wrongly. We thus propose that in order to
fully explain prevalent opposition to CE, it is necessary to look
into the role biases play in the CE context. Awareness of these
biases is a precondition of rational public debate about CE, which
in turn is needed for developing and establishing optimal social
and legal regulations.
Empirical research into biases over the last four decades has
shown that human reasoning is very prone to systematic irra-
tional patterns, i.e., cognitive biases (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman,
1974), especially when the subject matter is as complex, novel,
abstract and ideologically loaded as is the use and regulation of
CE (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Kahan et al., 2013). We argue that
a number of cognitive biases well-documented in psychology and
behavioral economics partly explain prevalent negative attitudes
towards CE. While we believe that attitudes towards CE are
predominantly negatively biased, there may also be biases leading
us to irrationally favor CE. We will indicate some biases likely to
affect judgments about CE and illustrate why and how they may
be impairing our judgments in this context. Thus, our aim is to
suggest several hypotheses about potential irrational sources of
the prevalent (negative or positive) attitudes towards CE. Some
of the biases on our below list have been studied in behavioral
economics, such as status quo bias, loss aversion, risk aversion,
scope insensitivity. The others—omission bias, nature bias, and
optimistic bias—have been addressed more in psychology and
philosophy. Our application of the knowledge about biases to the
CE debate is comparatively novel, as is the application to ethical
issues in general. We hope to offer a valuable perspective as a
contribution to more rational public debate on controversial eth-
ical issues involving new practices or technologies. Since ethical
questions often involve high stakes, this endeavor can be expected
to yield important results for public ethical debate.
POTENTIAL COGNITIVE BIASES
STATUS QUO BIAS
Status quo bias describes the tendency to prefer the current state
of affairs over a change even if a change would result in better
expected outcomes. For instance, Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988) presented participants with hypothetical choice tasks
about financial investment, which either were defined with a clear
status quo or not. Participants were significantly more likely to
choose the option designated as the status quo compared to the
same option that was not labeled the status quo. Numerous fur-
ther experiments reliably demonstrate this effect (e.g., Kahneman
et al., 1991). It seems plausible that popular aversion to CE is
partly due to status quo bias: it may partly result from the pure
fact that CE constitutes a novelty. Historically, new ideas and tech-
nologies have often encountered strong aversion and opposition
at first (Jay, 1981; Weil and Rosen, 1995), but became accepted at
a later point in time. Coffee—a traditional form of CE—provides
an instructive example: it was first considered an unacceptable
drug and even forbidden in some countries (Weinberg and Bealer,
2001; Cowan, 2005). Bostrom and Ord (2006) have already drawn
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attention to the role status quo bias likely plays in the debate
about CE. They also suggest a de-biasing tool—the Reversal Test—
designed to expose and overcome status quo bias. If we believe
that the enhancement of certain cognitive abilities will have nega-
tive consequences, we should consider the reverse: if an increase in
intelligence is judged as negative, would a decrease in intelligence
be judged favorable? If not, we are committed to claiming that
our current level of intelligence is at an at least local optimum.
This is, of course, possible but would require further justification.
Obviously, it is an empirical question whether the introduction
of CE actually results in net positive consequences or not. In
case it would, however, status quo bias still exerts a psychological
force against its endorsement. Empirical research can potentially
expose the prevalence of status quo bias by, for example, observing
whether people come to a different conclusion after reflecting on
the rationale of the Reversal Test and applying it to the context of
CE.
LOSS AVERSION
Loss aversion describes the tendency to weigh losses more than
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). In monetary contexts,
for example, loss aversion results in a stronger dissatisfaction
after losing $1 than satisfaction after gaining $1 (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984). Whether something is perceived as a loss or as
a gain depends on how the decisional situation is framed: one
can either “get a $1 discount” or “avoid a $1 surcharge”. Loss
aversion can act on its own, but may also be a source of status
quo bias (Bostrom and Ord, 2006). Maybe we recognize positive
as well as negative consequences that the introduction of CE
likely entails, such as the potential benefits due to enhanced
intelligence on the one hand and the fear of increased unfairness
in society due to unequal access to CE on the other hand (Fitz
et al., 2013). But due to loss aversion, we likely tend to exaggerate
the weight of the negative consequences relative to the positive
ones.
RISK AVERSION
Risk aversion describes the tendency to undervalue an option
that is less certain compared to a more certain option with equal
expected outcome value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Since
preserving the status quo usually involves less uncertainty than
a change does, risk aversion may be a further source of status
quo bias, and it can act on its own as well. Consider a gamble
where you have the option A of winning $1000 with a chance
of 85% or the option B of winning $800 for sure. Most people
prefer option B to A. However, option A has a higher expected
value of 0.85 ∗ $1000 = $850 and is therefore the rational decision
if one values money linearly. As we are constantly faced with
uncertainty, we are in fact dealing with such gambles all the
time. We may be reluctant to introduce CE simply because its
expected consequences involve probabilities that deviate more
strongly from 100% and 0% than do the ones of the status quo.
For example, methylphenidate almost certainly improves memory
(for a meta-analysis, see Repantis et al., 2010), but there is a
chance of long-term adverse effects (King et al., 2006). Though the
expected utility calculation may favor the use of methylphenidate
in certain cases, people are likely to retain a preference against
it due to risk aversion and a resulting “precautionary principle”
heuristic.
OMISSION BIAS
Omission bias describes the tendency to judge decisions differ-
ently depending on whether the same outcome is brought about
through an act or an omission (Spranca et al., 1991). More specif-
ically, people consider harms that have been caused by action
worse than equal harms caused by omission. Ritov and Baron
(1990) observed that parents often show reluctance to vaccinate
their children. The expected harm of non-prevented disease is
much greater than the expected harm of vaccination (Gangarosa
et al., 1998), but parents seem to overvalue the expected harm
caused by the vaccination because it is the result of their action.
Similarly, we may fear that the introduction of CE is likely to
or may cause harm. However, CE may also prevent harms from
occurring and thus refraining from introducing may be a harmful
omission, i.e., a missed opportunity for reducing harm. Due to
our general omission bias, we are likely to systematically overvalue
the harm of introducing CE compared to the harm resulting
from not introducing it. For example, people might believe that
the use of CE substances by medical doctors potentially causes
active harm by inducing sleep disorders (Partridge et al., 2013)—
but they might neglect or underestimate the potential positive
consequences of doctors’ increased ability to focus, i.e., the poten-
tial negative consequences of inaction. Rejecting CE may lead
to greater harms suffered by more people overall. This question
cannot be settled by unreflective intuition but requires open—
un-biased—scientific investigation.
SCOPE INSENSITIVITY
Scope insensitivity occurs when people don’t assign appropriate
weight to the quantity of a decisional option (Kahneman, 2000;
Desvousges et al., 2010). For example, a study has demonstrated
that people are willing to pay the same amount of money to either
help 9,000 people or 90,000 people who are at risk (Kahneman
and Knetsch, 1992; Baron and Greene, 1996). This is irrational if
one’s goal is to help people and have everyone count the same, for
the money one is willing to pay should then scale linearly with the
number of people affected. It seems that our ability to intuitively
represent such large numbers and their relations correctly is
quite limited. In the context of CE, a probable implication is
that we are not giving appropriate weight to the enormously
high number of individual decisions, people (and generations)
potentially affected by the consequences of introducing CE and
thus to the importance and priority of the CE issue.
NATURE BIAS
Several studies on peoples’ attitudes towards CE have revealed
that natural CE substances are seen as less harmful and less
ethically problematic than artificial ones (e.g., Bergström and
Lynöe, 2008). For example, in a study with university students,
participants were more likely to consider the use of artificial CE
substances morally wrong than herbal ones (Scheske and Schnall,
2012). These judgments seem to be impaired by a form of nature
bias (c.f. the fallacy of appealing to nature), i.e., a tendency to
view the “natural” as good and the “unnatural” as bad. Given
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that many examples of “natural and bad” (e.g., diseases) as well
as “unnatural and good” (e.g., medicine) things exist, it is highly
questionable whether tracking the “natural” tracks what people
(would) actually assign value to, and it is clear that it is not intrin-
sically morally relevant according to the “altruistically/impartially
optimal decision-making” criterion.
OPTIMISTIC BIAS
Some biases may also be pushing people towards an overly
optimistic evaluation of the consequences of introducing CE. An
example is the optimistic bias described by Chapin and Coleman
(2009), which causes people to underestimate the possibility of
negative outcomes. Examples include people underestimating the
risk of becoming a victim of crime, of losing money in the
markets, or of getting lung cancer after smoking (Weinstein and
Klein, 1996). In the context of CE, people might underestimate
the dangers, such as negative side effects, that CE could entail.
An additional source of optimistically skewed views of CE
might result from biased reduction of cognitive dissonance by
people who are already using forms of CE. When confronted
with falsificatory information about CE, such as documented
health concerns, users might experience discomfort—cognitive
dissonance—and be likely to selectively adopt beliefs that justify
their behavior (Festinger, 1957).
Thus, there are potential biases leading to an overly positive
attitude towards CE. Overall, however, it seems there are more
well-documented highly prevalent biases likely to cause irrational
aversion to CE than biases in the opposite direction.
CONCLUSION
We have aimed to offer and motivate the perspective that biases
are likely to impair judgments about CE, mostly in the negative
direction. We are aware that the above list of biases is incomplete
and speculative and hope that empirical research will further
elaborate on our suggestions. It must be emphasized that “biases”
often do provide sensible decisional rules of thumb—after all,
many of them seem to have proven to be successful heuristics for
our evolutionary ancestors. However, the practical scope of this
argument is very limited first because our current environment is
different from our evolutionary environment, and second because
the metaphorical goals of our genes that have been served by some
“bias-heuristics” need not coincide with our goals (Stanovich,
2004). Nevertheless, the existence of such biases cannot alone
undermine the soundness of any objection to CE. But they can
explain why people, including policy makers, may take an unre-
flective or one-sided position on such debates. More generally,
many of our moral intuitions about controversial practices are
likely to be influenced by such cognitive biases. Not only do we
require psychological interventions such as remedial heuristics,
we require good ethical argument and relevant scientific evidence
to identify which of our moral intuitions are justified, and which
are not.
We believe the CE debate would benefit from research inves-
tigating the role cognitive biases play in judgments about CE
and from the subsequent development of techniques that help
people judge the relevant issues in a less biased way. These
techniques should be simple heuristics (Larrick, 2004) that are
easily applicable in the context of CE. Bostrom and Ord (2006)
Reversal Test or Savulescu (2007) Loss/Gain Heuristic are exam-
ples of such heuristics. Psychological research could test whether
people’s attitudes towards CE change after applying de-biasing
techniques, i.e., by being made aware of the biases potentially
impairing their judgments. If they do change, we have reason to
assume that cognitive biases play a role in the current attitudes
towards CE.
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The production of expectations or future-goals for the development of techniques
which “read” and modulate brain function, represent an important practical tool for
neuroscientists. These visions-of-the-future assist scientists by providing focus for both
individual and cross-disciplinary research programs; they encourage the development of
new industrial sectors, are used to justify the allocation of government resources and
funding, and via the media can help capture the imagination and support of the public.
However, such expectations need to be tempered by reality. Over-hyping brain imaging
and modulation will lead to disappointment; disappointment that in turn can undermine its
potential. Similarly, if neuroscientists focus their attention narrowly on the science without
concomitant consideration of its future ethical, legal and social implications, then their
expectations may remain unrealized. To develop these arguments herein we introduce
the theoretical concept of expectations and the practical consequences of expectations.
We contextualize these reflections by referring to brain imaging and modulation
studies on deception, which encompass the measurement-suppression-augmentation
range.
Keywords: expectations, hype, ethics, brain modulation, neuroimaging, deception
INTRODUCING EXPECTATIONS
On May 25th in 1961 during a special address to Congress, a
young and charismatic US President J.F. Kennedy presented an
incredibly exciting prospect to Congress and the entire nation:
a manned moon landing. He was asking Congress to share
his vision, and in so doing to invest an astronomical budget
in research and development to increase the likelihood of that
vision becoming reality. Less than a decade later that vision was
achieved with the Apollo 11 mission and the first moon walk:
“one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind” (Neil
Armstrong, 1969). Kennedy was perfectly aware that the required
technology was not yet available in 1961 but he was well informed
about its potential and knew a thing or two about the power of
expectations.
Proclaiming the start of the Decade of the Brain on 1st
January 1990, President Bush senior stated “The coopera-
tion between [. . .] agencies and the multidisciplinary efforts
of thousands of scientists and health care professionals pro-
vide powerful evidence of our nation’s determination to con-
quer brain disease”. He raised public awareness and brought
to the fore a series of targets (e.g., stopping or curing
Alzheimer’s disease), which have not been quite met yet but
the attention and investments brought upon relevant neu-
roscientific research see us at a clear advantage compared
to our colleagues trying to meet the same targets 25 years
ago.
When discussing scientific and technological advancement the
concept of expectations adopts the shape of; goals, promises,
visions of a future reality, “wishful enactments of desired futures”
(Tutton, 2011, p. 413), and “real-time representations of future
technological situations and capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006,
p. 286). The value of such expectations, as a powerful pre-
cursor to future scientific and technological advances, can-
not be underestimated as both a conceptual and a practical
tool.
In this paper we begin by setting out the benefits to neu-
roscientists of employing expectations. This positive message is
then balanced by a discussion of hype and its potential negative
connotations for research programs. We finish by positing that if
neuroscientists temper their expectations of future scientific and
technological advances with social, ethical, and legal concerns,
they will be better placed to avoid the drawbacks associated
with hype while maintaining their ability to enjoy the benefits
expectations can bring.
EXPECTATIONS: CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS
On a conceptual level, expectations (as described above) represent
the potential pre-manifestation or genesis of a future scientific or
technical advance which has yet to be attained. To illustrate; neu-
roscientists envision a future whereby neuroimaging and brain
stimulation techniques have been developed which, say, detect
deception and/or increase the disposition and the ability to lie
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and deceive (Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 2010; Karton
and Bachmann, 2011), “simply and safely influenc[e] the human
will and freedom by interfering with deception” (Priori et al.,
2008, p. 455; see also the “deception inhibitor”: Bohning et al.,
2004). They may also envision military applications whereby
the ability of human operators to sense and assess threats in
the real world is enhanced by noninvasive brain stimulation
(e.g., Parasuraman and Galster, 2013). These particular near-to-
medium term expectations are typically based on converging evi-
dence from a small series of original precursor studies on human
participants conducted in one or more laboratories around the
world. When neuroscientists envision a future whereby in-helmet
ultrasound transducers could be used to remotely control brain
activity (Tyler, 2010; Sato et al., 2014), or where a time-slowing
pill may be used in law enforcement and prisoner incarceration
(Heaven, 2012; Anderson, 2014), or “brain prostheses” can be
used by the military to enhance memory for complex environ-
ments or existing memories can be wiped out from the brain
of personnel under capture (Moreno, 2012) they are envisioning
medium-to-long term expectations. Here the know-how needed
to achieve these particular goals remains largely unavailable and
it is claimed that the ethical and legal implications of such
enterprise are still relatively imponderable (Attiah and Farah,
2014).
What makes these particular expectations of specific interest
to neuroscientists is that through a combination of their training,
expertise, accumulated knowledge, and access to funding and
specific equipment, neuroscientists find themselves well placed
to successfully act and bring these expectations and visions into
reality. This is not to claim that they are the only scientists
capable of fulfilling these expectations; merely that they may
enjoy a head start on their competitors when attempting to do
so.
Moving beyond the conceptual, it is via its practical benefits
that the true power of expectations becomes recognizable; for
expectations possess the power to assist turning future-visions
into tangible advancements. With similarities to the concept of
the self-fulfilling prophecy (see Merton, 1948), future expecta-
tions have been described as possessing performative or gen-
erative powers (Borup et al., 2006) in that they are “crucial
to providing the dynamism and momentum upon which so
many ventures in science and technology depend” (Brown and
Michael, 2003, p. 3). By studying past advancements, it has been
recognized that expectations can provide the following benefits
(see: van Lente, 1993; Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003; Borup et al.,
2006; Konrad, 2006; Pollock and Williams, 2010; Bakker et al.,
2012):
• A focal point to guide and drive research activities, as well
as a common vision/bridge with which to enhance inter-
disciplinary interactions and communication.
• A promise of future benefits with which to justify and legitimize
the mobilization and allocation of financial resources and other
forms of support.
• The means of attracting the attention and engagement of
diverse actors and potential collaborators; from scientists to
investors, governments, NGOs and policy actors.
• They enable the production of experiments, models, research
projects, and calculations.
• The construction of future scenarios for shaping a technol-
ogy, as well as the formation of a consensus or structure to
counterbalance the inherent uncertainty over the potential of a
new technology which is highest during the early development
stages.
• A means of enlisting public support through the presentation
of possible future(s).
Within the life sciences expectations of future medical
advancements have repeatedly been employed by specific research
areas seeking to benefit from the points listed above. These
expectations have included; the promise of lives being saved and
the development of new cures for diseases as the result of human
embryonic stem cell research (Rubin, 2008); the development of
anti-aging treatments which will extend human lives (Mykytyn,
2010); and the expectation that by identifying one’s genetic
makeup, pharmacogenetics will deliver bespoke, personalized
medications (Limdi and Veenstra, 2010).
Within neuroscience, and in particular the study of neu-
roimaging and brain stimulation, we can readily identify how
neuroscientists are employing expectations in their efforts to
secure supporters and resources for research, attract collabora-
tors and potential customers for spin-off businesses, and pro-
vide focal points with which to guide research. All of this is
achieved through the presentation of possible futures where
brain imaging and modulation advances have been successfully
developed. What follows is a brief description of some of these
research programs, accompanied by the envisioned advances (the
expectations) they are predicted to produce. While presenting
these, we will intentionally embrace such expectations (whether
or not we believe they are realistic), as this will help making
the points we are raising in the following sections even more
obvious.
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF BRAIN IMAGING
AND MODULATION: THE CASE OF DECEPTION
Riding a wave of exciting technical developments in neuroimag-
ing, one popular research enterprise that has provided fertile
ground for boosting expectations on a global scale is the study
of deception. Here deception is defined as the concealment of
the truth, which often takes the form of a memory, in order to
mislead. On average humans are thought to be badly equipped
to detect deception when the person attempting to deceive is
unfamiliar to the observer (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Expecta-
tions in this area have included a promise of a future whereby
the scientific detection of deceptive claims and behaviors would
add a game-changing weapon to the arsenal of forensic sci-
ences, police, the judiciary, and military and security agencies
worldwide. Whether that can be ever achieved is still open to
speculation.
Historically a multitude of deception detection systems have
been invented and employed by public and private bodies with
variable success. Few such systems survived in the present; and
none has been scientifically proven to solve the deception detec-
tion problem in the real world. The most popular system so far
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has arguably been the polygraph, however, on close inspection,
it was deemed unreliable; though since its myth is very hard to
debunk, it still has use as a deterrent (NRC (National Research
Council), 2003; see also Moreno, 2012). More recently, advances
in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and neural
decoding techniques prompted expectations that mind-reading
(or more accurately brain-reading; Gazzaniga, 2005) may soon
become reality (Haynes and Rees, 2006). In relation to decep-
tion, expectations and research have focused on systems that
can accurately detect deceit from brain activation contrasts or
pattern analysis, perhaps in connection with other physiological
measures (Kozel et al., 2009; Langleben and Moriarty, 2013).
These would help reduce uncertainty and provide information
otherwise undetectable to the interviewer. By making the inter-
viewee’s brain more accessible they would artificially augment the
interviewer’s detection capabilities. Moreover, they would provide
essential information about the localization of deception-relevant
brain activity for individually targeted deception modulation
tools (see e.g., Bohning et al., 2004). It may be easy to create
expectations about potential advantages for the criminal justice
system and security at large if such an enterprise were to actually
succeed. For example, it could be claimed that it will be possible
to accurately discriminate between genuine and concocted eye-
witness testimony (Azar, 2011), more judiciary decisions could
be based on objective evidence, and trials would become more
expedite. Culprits would be less likely to elude unmasking and
arguably more likely to be found guilty; crime rates may drop;
and organized crime which relies on member loyalty could be
more penetrated.1 On its face, and without critical analysis, the
benefits cited here might be presented as both obvious and great
in number.
Expectations within deception research are by no means lim-
ited to the development of reliable lie detectors. Indeed nonin-
vasive brain stimulation (e.g., tDCS and TMS) may soon offer
both a new, upgraded alternative to truth serums by enabling
the user to interfere with activity in brain regions that are
causally related with deception (e.g., Priori et al., 2008; Karton
and Bachmann, 2011), as well as its counterpart; a portable
deceit enhancer (Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 2010; Kar-
ton and Bachmann, 2011; Fecteau et al., 2013). It is easy to
imagine the enormous advantages for counterespionage, polic-
ing, and diplomacy if a “deception inhibitor” was available. In
extreme scenarios, interrogations would become more humane;
negating the need for more outrageous practices such as sleep-
deprivation, electric shocks, nail pulling, water-boarding, and
so forth, to weaken psychophysical defense mechanisms and
coerce the disclosure of information (see e.g., Tarabay, 2014,
and the documentary Standard Operating Procedure, 2008). In
more ordinary cases, this induced cooperation would make crim-
inal justice mechanisms more agile and cost-effective. Poten-
tially more guilty individuals will confess and be rightfully
convicted.
Similarly, it is arguable that difficult diplomatic negotiations
could benefit from both sides employing “deception inhibitors”.
These may decrease the capability of either side negotiating
1See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/organizedcrime
FIGURE 1 | The Gartner Hype Cycle (van Lente et al., 2013).
in bad-faith by concealing their true thoughts (though it
is equally likely such devices may make parties reluctant to
enter into negotiations to begin with). Conversely “deception
boosters” would conceivably be invaluable in the hands of private
and governmental agencies concerned with security, policing,
espionage, and diplomacy. Undercover agents might be better able
to conceal their true identities, and negotiators better equipped
to convincingly promote positions they knew to be false.
HYPE: THE DOWNSIDE OF EXPECTATIONS
While expectations such as these play important roles in achieving
scientific and technological advancements, we must acknowledge
an inherent fundamental limitation: expectations may be unreli-
able as predictors of the future (Brown and Michael, 2003). Even
when high expectations for future advancements are shared by
a large multidisciplinary community of scientists enjoying both
support and resources, this does not guarantee scientific success
(Pollock and Williams, 2010; Tutton, 2011). The failure of a
scientific or engineering endeavor to meet its expectations leads to
accusations of hype. Used in this way hype is referring to unrealis-
tic, unattainable expectations; hence it is often only a distinction
in framing that separates expectations from hype. What follows
the characterization of (positive) expectations as (negative) hype
is usually a period of disappointment or disillusionment. Enthusi-
asm for the proposed scientific advancement plummets as a result
of expectation not being met, possibly followed by a gradual form
of recovery. This process is referred to as a hype-disappointment
cycle (van Lente et al., 2013). The Gartner hype cycle (see
Figure 1), employed by the analyst firm Gartner Inc. is probably
the most recognized model employing this concept. Note that
under this model, the failure of scientific research or technological
development to meet its initial expectations does not mean it is
automatically and permanently discarded; rather that it is subject
to a period of slower development towards more realistic goals.
This process, whereby (what in hindsight proved to be exagger-
ated) expectations were employed to secure support for research
only to be followed by an abrupt collapse, has repeated itself in a
multitude of past technologies; including hydrogen-powered cars
(Bakker, 2010), nanotechnologies (Ebeling, 2008), and genomics
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(Bubela, 2006). No scientific discipline is immune from such
outcomes, and some expectations for the promise of brain imag-
ing and modulation will almost inevitably suffer the same result
to some extent (see e.g., Walsh, 2013). The likelihood of this
occurring is growing as neuroscientists increasingly push the
boundaries of what they are presenting as realistic research out-
comes in their efforts to secure support and resources for their
research. Indeed in Gartner’s (2013) Hype Cycle for Emerging
Technologies, human augmentation (which would include brain
augmentation) is specifically identified as a technology currently
on-the-rise towards its peak of inflated expectations (Gartner,
2013). It has also been suggested that functional neuroimaging
technologies may be even further advanced along the classic
Hype Cycle trajectory than augmentation (Rachul and Zarzeczny,
2012). One example from neuroscience justifying this char-
acterization is the potential use of fMRI in the detection of
deception.
More than a decade on since the first peer-reviewed empir-
ical reports on deception detection in fMRI (see e.g., Spence
et al., 2001; Langleben et al., 2002; Ganis et al., 2003), the
field has seen incremental advances both in the “brain-reading”
technique and in the refinement of cognitive testing protocols
(see e.g., Sartori et al., 2008; Moreno, 2012; Wright et al., 2012;
Park and Friston, 2013). Multiple patent applications have been
filed but the envisioned fMRI deception detector looks still far
from becoming reality. We have highlighted elsewhere a series
of hurdles that an fMRI-based deception detector would need to
surmount before it can succeed (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen,
2013). These include scientific hurdles such as; the assumptions
and inferences underlying fMRI processes, the need to achieve
consistent internal validity, manipulation of results by subjects,
and the difficulty in moving beyond the laboratory setting. Also
included were legal and ethical hurdles, such as; possible human
rights violations, the issue of compelled questioning, the pro-
bative value of such evidence, and how the right to a fair trial
would be impacted. It is open for debate whether or not its
stimulation counterpart stands a better chance to translate into
an applied deception modulator tool. One obvious advantage
is that certain stimulators are both portable and affordable;
however the science is probably not mature enough to justify
its near-medium term expectations. The reported modulatory
effects (facilitation or interference) obtained in controlled lab-
oratory settings are statistically significant but rather minus-
cule in a standard interrogation context and short-lived, thus
as things stand the gains may not eventually justify the efforts.
This consideration only applies to applicative expectations—
not to the utility and importance of such research within basic
science. The in-lab testing protocols have not been validated
against real-world situations (Luber et al., 2009), and the rela-
tion between modulation of deceits and its effects on other
brain functions are still unclear, as is the role of individual
differences (see Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013 for a thorough
discussion).
THE DOWNSIDE OF HYPE
The reason why neuroscientists should resist the temptation to
over-hype the potential for brain augmentation is the detrimental
consequences that can follow once unrealistic expectations are
inevitably unmet. These include the following (see Brown, 2003;
Ruef and Markard, 2010):
• Unrealistic short-term hype detracts from the long-term value
of the basic science.
• Financial losses for corporate investors, and future difficulty
in securing resources within fields which have suffered from a
collapse of expectations.
• Resources are diverted from more realistically-achievable, yet
less exciting, research programs.
• Undermined trust, which can slow or prevent future progress
within a field of research.
• The reputations of individuals, companies/institutions, and
entire research fields can suffer as past promises fail to mate-
rialize in the present.
• Identifiable people can suffer as a result; from individuals who
suffer financial loss from investing in unrealistically over-hyped
research programs, to patients who suffer emotionally having
believed the claims that certain proposed brain augmentation
techniques could treat their conditions.
In different combinations, these detrimental consequences
arise in the multitude of science and technology examples pre-
sented in the annual Gartner hype cycles, as well as the specific
case-studies of hydrogen-powered cars, genomics, and nanotech-
nology discussed above.
Nevertheless, despite all these drawbacks of hype the temp-
tation still remains to present the most ambitious expectations
for scientific and technological research as something achiev-
able in the future; be they time-slowing pills to replace prison
sentences, portable reliable lie detectors, brain control devices,
or extra-memory microchips. Perhaps unsurprisingly the prob-
ability of achieving these goals (which may be incredibly small)
and the time-frame for doing so (which may be incredibly
long) are afforded little discussion. The challenge facing neuro-
scientists is how to construct and present expectations that are
less likely to cross that invisible barrier dividing “hope” from
“hype”.
ADDRESSING ETHICAL CONCERNS TO PRODUCE BETTER
EXPECTATIONS AND THE RISKS OF NOT DOING SO
It is our contention that by reflexively considering the ethical,
legal, and social impacts of a potential future technology or
field of advancement, neuroscientists can improve the quality
of the expectations they disseminate within their own field;
thereby developing more nuanced, better expectations. This of
course does not replace or neglects but is additional to the
need for neuroscientists to educate the media, patients and
research subjects about the potential and limits of neuroscience
and neuroscientific techniques; to conduct enough studies and
generate valid scientific data to know what neuroscience and
these techniques can and cannot do. Before we develop this
contention below, two points require expansion and clarification
here. Firstly, we are characterizing these expectations as “better”
if they constitute visions of the future constructed after taking
into account existing legal regimes and concepts of human rights,
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ethical norms, and attitudes of societies into which they are
expected to operate. Secondly, it should also be emphasized that
the stage we are referring to is the formulation and presenta-
tion of initial expectations by the scientists. This stage often
precedes wider public/multi-stakeholder engagement and the
development of respective communication strategies (for more
detailed discussions of such topics see: Jasanoff, 2003; O’Doherty
and Einsiedel, 2012; Bucchi and Trench, 2014; Stilgoe et al.,
2014).
The concomitant social, legal and ethical implications of a
proposed scientific/technological expectation are often neglected
at the initial stage of its formulation and proposition. Hence
what is often initially presented is the envisioned advancement
free from ostensibly non-scientific constraints; i.e., presenting
the expectations of a pill that slows one’s perception of time or
of the portable lie detector device, but doing so free from any
contextual discussion. This may occur for a number of reasons,
including: (a) because no ethical/legal/social implications exist
(highly unlikely for most expectations); (b) those presenting these
futures have not considered and/or foreseen such implications;
(c) these implications are viewed as either unimportant or not
the responsibility of the scientist involved; and/or (d) there is a
fear that by acknowledging the existence of such implications,
the advancement in question will be viewed less positively thus
putting at risk the benefits expectations can bring to a research
program.
However, failing to reflexively consider the ethical, legal,
and social impacts of a potential future technology or field
of advancement does not negate their existence or make them
disappear. These factors are going to have to be addressed
at some point in the research and development lifecycle of
a new technology for scientific advancements do not develop
or exist separately to the societies in which they operate (see
MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). We contend that both the
benefits of engaging in this reflexive process early in the devel-
opment of new expectations, as well as the potential negative
implications of failing to do so, make this early consideration
of ethical, legal, and social impacts an essential step in their
development.
By considering ethical, legal, and social impacts to create
“better” expectations, neuroscientists gain a number of
advantages. They can act to avoid their expectations becoming
characterized as hype. They can identify sources of possible
controversy and resistance within their proposed expectations,
thereby affording them the opportunity to consciously address
such issues both through how they formulate their expectations
and how they seek to present them. Also by mitigating the
propensity for individuals or societal groups to actively criticize
or resist their expectations, the neuroscientist is effectively
maximizing their potential network of future supporters.
Failure to create “better” expectations can have specific neg-
ative consequences. It can shift expectations into the realm of
hype (the inherent negative consequences of such were discussed
earlier). It has also been posited that by presenting technological
expectations unfettered by non-technical considerations (such
as ethics, legality, and social acceptability), critics can more
easily create counterarguments by presenting dystopian futures
involving them (see Tutton, 2011). Essentially the argument here
is that; if the presentation of an expectation devoid of some
inherent moral character justifies utopian visions of its future
use, then dystopian visions of its future use are also equally valid
(see Pickersgill, 2011 for a practical example of this argument in
relation to neuro-law).
Furthermore, by promoting a real-world version of, and uses
for, a future technology absent of a robust consideration of
social, legal and ethical issues is to promote a tool that is more
easily open to legitimate social, legal and ethical criticism. We
believe this advice has resonance for many of the expectations
currently being espoused by neuroscientists within the field
of neuroimaging and brain modulation; from enhancing the
cognitive potential of users, to brain control/manipulation, to
increasing/decreasing the capacity of an individual to deceive. An
important point here is that each expectation must be individually
reflexively examined, for the nature of these social, legal and
ethical criticisms will differ depending on the specific appli-
cation that is being envisaged. This diversity means there are
no shortcuts to robust reflexive examinations. For example, in
the case of fMRI deception detection in criminal proceedings
discussed above, we examined in depth how future expectations
of this advancement conflicted with existing legal and human
rights regimes, as well as social and ethical norms. This led us
to conclude that “[c]ognitive neuroscientists must be careful not
to over-play what these technologies can offer criminal courts
nor their vision of the potential future role of neuroscience
within criminal courts, lest they overplay themselves out of the
courtroom altogether” (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen, 2013, p.
9). Conversely, the main hurdles of brain reading and modu-
lation may be characterized as: legal and human rights issues
over compelled questioning, fair trials, and the probative weight
attached to such evidence; as well as the social implications of
undermining our naturally evolved capacity to deceive. Whereas
those raised by cosmetic enhancement include: the ethicality of
altering fundamental elements of self-identity; social justice con-
cerns over the inequitable distribution of cognitive enhancement
techniques; the undermining of autonomy; and determining the
“proper” role of enhancement technologies in society (Wolpe,
2002; Hamilton et al., 2011). Given the mounting emphasis on
“impact”, even from government founding agencies that have
traditionally encouraged basic research, neuroscientists may need
some assistance in this reflexive process. This could be offered
in the form of further training and multidisciplinary education
opportunities or direct access to professional figures with the
relevant expertise. On the other hand, funding agencies and
scientific journals could also be required to closely monitor
and develop awareness of the more hype-prone research areas,
as their endorsement (sometimes motivated by the immediate
visibility that inflated expectations can grant) may play a role in
amplifying, rewarding and maintaining hype within the scientific
community.
CONCLUSION
Expectations are presented as a valuable tool for neuroscientists
in acquiring both resources and networks of allies to assist in
converting these expectations into reality. However, in applying
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the often-used adage of caution, that “if a little bit of some-
thing is good then a lot is not necessarily better”, unrealis-
tic expectations can become synonymous with hype which in
turn can threaten the very programs the scientists are seeking
to promote. Similarly, promoting the expectation of a scien-
tific or technological advancement free from any social, legal
or ethical considerations will not benefit that advancement.
For any critical assessment will easily be able to identify these
non-technical concerns which neuroscientists have ostensibly
ignored; again placing at risk the programs they are seeking to
advance.
Provided they are supported by (and are not used as a
replacement for) sound research on the safety and efficacy of
neuroscientific techniques, expectations are a valuable resource
for capturing the public’s imagination and promoting investment
in an area for research. We encourage those neuroscientists
working in the field of neuroimaging and brain modulation,
with its exciting prospects for the future, to employ this
valuable resource as they would any other at their disposal
to help further their research goals. We simply caution that
when doing so, if they present expectations that are disasso-
ciated from any measure of realism, or treat the concomi-
tant legal, social and ethical considerations as optional extras,
then hype (and Gartner’s Trough of Disillusionment) surely
awaits.
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